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Abstract
Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 ushered in a new imperial phase that aimed to radicalize
Italian Fascism at home and abroad. But the military commanders entrusted with conquering
and pacifying Fascism’s imperial dominion, and moulding the Fascist “new man” through
war, belonged to a conservative monarchist institution with ambiguous ties to Mussolini’s
regime. This dissertation explores the relationship between the Royal Italian Army and
Fascist empire-building in Africa and Europe, focusing on the Italian military occupation of
Ethiopia from 1936 to 1941 and of Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1943. Drawing on ministerial,
gubernatorial, division, corps, and army-level archival material, it examines the behaviour,
attitudes, and decisions of Italian senior officers through three analytical lenses: politicallegal; ideological-cultural; and, military-strategic. The result is a portrait of a military
institution that, despite misgivings about Fascist style and bombast, functionally “worked
towards the Duce.”
Although the army’s involvement in uniquely Fascist policies was restricted by the
regime’s expectations that civil authorities would predominate in imperial administration,
indigenous resistance to Italian rule ensured that military officers remained involved in most
aspects of imperial politics. Yet, despite frequent jurisdictional or tactical conflicts between
military authorities and Fascist functionaries, Italian generals never challenged Rome’s
principal objectives. Rather, the themes and rhetoric employed by Italian military
commanders and propagandists reflected the regime’s official line, from racialized
representations of local populations to claims of a “civilizing mission” on the Roman model.
Military propaganda aimed to brutalize Italian conscripts on occupation duty by
delegitimizing resistance and presenting enemy insurgents and populations in subhuman
terms. The army’s counterinsurgency strategies relied on mass repression and violence.
Confronted by effective resistance movements, Italian generals resorted to draconian
methods that — while rooted in military culture and colonial doctrine dating back to Italy’s
nineteenth-century unification — coalesced with Fascism’s exaltation of violence and
obsession with the prestige of force. Equating imperial expansion with the status of their
nation and institution, and facing military circumstances that elicited a harsh response, a
relatively unexceptional group of Italian generals easily found common ground with Fascism.
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Note on Language
There is no standard system for transliterating Amharic words into English using the Latin
alphabet. For Ethiopian names and places, I have sought to use spelling that will be familiar
to English readers. Ethiopian and Eritrean names consist of two parts: a person’s given name
followed by his or her father’s name. The latter is not a family surname; it is not accurate or
useful to refer to an individual only by their last name. Thus, Ethiopian and Eritrean names
are recorded in full both in the text and footnotes.

Diacritics have been retained for all Slovenian and Serbo-Croatian terms, names, and places.
Frequently used terms, such as Ustaša and Četnik are not italicized. For plural forms, I have
followed common practice, referring to Ustaše (rather than Ustašas), but to Četniks (as
opposed to Četnici). Where possible, I have used interwar Slovenian and Serbo-Croatian
spellings of place names, which often differed dramatically from those used in Italian maps
and correspondence at the time (for example, Dubrovnik versus Ragusa). Italian spelling has
been retained for localities and provinces that were part of the Kingdom of Italy before 1941
(for example, Fiume [Rijeka] and Zara [Zadar]).

To distinguish between South Slavic nations, I have adapted the system laid out in Ivo
Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 17–18.
The words Slovene, Croat, and Serb are used as nouns and adjectives referring to people. The
adjectives Slovenian, Croatian, and Serbian refer to language, geography, historical concepts,
and state entities.
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Introduction
The soldiers of the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division’s 51st Infantry Regiment were
exhausted when they reached the village of Zapotok in central Slovenia. It was nearing
the end of July 1942; to the veterans in the unit it seemed that they had not enjoyed a
moment’s rest during the past nineteen months. They referred to themselves as “the
wandering division.”1 The Cacciatori — who took their name from Giuseppe Garibaldi’s
patriotic brigade of volunteers and were known for the red ties they wore in his honour —
were sent to the Balkans in January of the previous year. Deployed to the Greek front in
the mountains of Albania, the division lost half its strength to combat, frostbite, and
illness.2 The campaign concluded in April and the Cacciatori were sent to occupy
Montenegro, where they faced a general insurrection that kept them engaged in
operations until their transfer to Dalmatia in September. No sooner had they established
their winter quarters when high command ordered the Cacciatori to relocate to the
interior of Herzegovina at the beginning of December. Here, they confronted a
burgeoning insurgency before being sent back to the Adriatic coast at the end of January
1942. Between April and May, the division took part in a series of major anti-partisan
operations that criss-crossed eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finally, in June the
Cacciatori delle Alpi were transferred by train to Slovenia, as reinforcements for yet
another cycle of operations.
For the past week they had scoured the densely forested hills of central Slovenia
on the heels of the notoriously elusive partisans of the Liberation Front. Apart from a few
minor skirmishes the regiment had not managed to come to grips with its adversary.
There was plenty of evidence that partisans had indeed occupied the area in some force;

1
2

Mario Casanuova, I°/51 (Florence: Fauno, 1965), 48.

According to a later report, the division arrived in Albania with only 70 percent of its complement. In
fighting against the Greeks, the Cacciatori lost 532 dead, 1,875 wounded, and 246 missing, with another
2,545 hospitalized due to frostbite and illness. “Attività addestrativa,” 13 October 1941, Archivio
dell’Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Rome [AUSSME], N1–11, b. 381, Diario storico
[DS] 22nd “Cacciatori delle Alpi” Division, October 1941, allegati. The Cacciatori delle Alpi Division
shared the nickname cravatte rosse [“red ties”] with the Re Division, whose troops wore red ties
representing the primary colour in the coat of arms of the House of Savoy.
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the Italians discovered abandoned outposts, supply dumps, infirmaries, bicycles,
typewriters, and documents, but very few actual rebels. Despite the pleasant weather and
picturesque scenery, frustration mounted. The officers of the division were under
pressure to achieve results, which — higher commands made clear — meant body
counts. Among the documents captured in the previous days, the Italians had found lists
which they took to be registries of members belonging to the communist partisan
organization. Now, they searched Zapotok and its sparsely populated environs for the
individuals named on the list. The villagers claimed that armed guerrillas had forced
nearly the entire population to sign the registry. Italian officers selected fourteen men,
including the village headman, and escorted them a kilometre out of town.
Only when they were told to line up on their knees in a ditch did the villagers
realize the true nature of their plight. This was not a work detail, but an execution.
According to the medical officer that accompanied the firing squad, the thirty soldiers
assigned to the task were “reluctant” to pull their triggers. Too many missed their targets;
it took three rounds of shooting before the firing squad was ordered away, leaving the
medical officer to dispatch the wounded with his pistol. The division’s war diary for the
two days at Zapotok recorded nineteen men “shot by firing squad.”3 According to
Slovene researchers, the final death toll from the operation in Zapotok was thirty-six.4
Seeking to impress his superiors, the corps commander in charge of the whole operation
reported the victims as “rebels” killed.5 But the Italians uncovered no weapons or direct
evidence of subversive activity in the village, which now mourned the loss of fathers,
husbands, brothers, and sons who may or may not have offered active resistance to the
occupation of their country by a foreign power.
The episode at Zapotok was not exceptional. An ever growing body of case
studies has shed a broader light on Italian behaviour in military occupations during the

3

The details of the action in Zapotok have been reconstructed from Casanuova, I°/51, 127–31, and the
Cacciatori delle Alpi Division Command war diary, 22–23 July 1942, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 1036, DS 22nd
“Cacciatori delle Alpi” Division, July–August 1942.
4

Tone Ferenc, ‘There is Not Enough Killing’: Condemned to Death, Hostages, Shot in the Ljubljana
Province, 1941–1943; Documents (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 1999), 262–62.
5

Robotti to Roatta, 23 July 1942, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 1058, DS XI Corps, July–August 1942, allegati.

3

Fascist years. Scholarship on Italian occupation regimes in the Balkan countries has
grown exponentially since the 1990s, thanks to the opening of Italian archives and to the
interest prompted by the Yugoslavian wars.6 Less has been written on Italian military
policies and repression in Africa, a field dominated by a small but active group of
scholars.7
Together, these studies have thoroughly debunked the myth of Italians as brava
gente [good people]. At the end of the Second World War, the Italian government and
anti-fascist political forces officially fostered the notion that Italians and their institutions
had remained fundamentally humane, despite the violent tendencies of Mussolini’s
Fascist regime. This “master narrative” — reinforced by Allied wartime propaganda, the
experience of German occupation after September 1943, limited postwar purging, and the
failure to prosecute Italians for war crimes — dominated public memory of the war for
decades.8 Today, the myth remains stubbornly persistent in Italian collective memory

6

Francesco Caccamo and Luciano Monzali, eds., L’occupazione italiana della Iugoslavia (1941–43)
(Florence: Le Lettere, 2008), 6. Alongside Caccamo and Monzali’s volume, which includes case studies on
Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Kosovo, see H. James Burgwyn, Empire on the Adriatic: Mussolini’s
Conquest of Yugoslavia, 1941–1943 (New York: Enigma, 2005), Marco Cuzzi, L’occupazione italiana
della Slovenia (Rome: USSME, 1998), Eric Gobetti, L’occupazione allegra: Gli italiani in Jugoslavia
(1941–1943) (Rome: Carocci, 2007), Eric Gobetti, Alleati del nemico: L’occupazione italiana in
Jugoslavia (1941–1943) (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 2013), Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, L’Esercito italiano in
Slovenia 1941–1943: Strategie di repressione antipartigiana (Rome: Viella, 2011), and Davide Rodogno,
Fascism’s European Empire: Italian Occupation during the Second World War, trans. Adrian Belton
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
7

Angelo Del Boca’s multivolume works on Italian colonialism in Libya and East Africa remain essential.
The volumes most relevant to Fascist counterinsurgency are Gli italiani in Africa Orientale, vol. 2, La
conquista dell’Impero (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1979), Gli italiani in Africa Orientale, vol. 3, La caduta
dell’Impero (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1986), and Gli italiani in Libia, vol. 2, Dal fascismo a Gheddafi
(Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1988). See also the essays in Del Boca’s edited work, Le guerre coloniali del
fascismo (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1991) and Giorgio Rochat, Guerre italiane in Libia e in Etiopia: Studi
militari 1921–39 (Treviso: Pagus, 1991). In English, see Alberto Sbacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini:
Fascism and the Colonial Experience (London: Zed, 1985). More recent additions to this body of work are
Eric Salerno, Genocidio in Libia: Le atrocità nascoste dell’avventura coloniale italiana (1911–1931)
(Rome: Manifesto, 2005) and Matteo Dominioni, Lo sfascio dell’Impero: Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936–1941
(Rome and Bari: Laterza, 2008).
8

Filippo Focardi, Il cattivo tedesco e il bravo italiano: La rimozione delle colpe delle seconda guerra
mondiale (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 2013). The ability of Italian war criminals to avoid extradition and the
lack of an “Italian Nuremberg” largely was the result of Cold War politics and a lack of will on the part of
the victorious Allied powers. Filippo Focardi and Lutz Klinkhammer, “The Question of Fascist Italy’s War
Crimes: The Construction of a Self-Acquitting Myth, 1943–1948,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 9, no.
3 (2004): 330–48. Costantino Di Sante, Italiani senza onore: I crimini in Jugoslavia e i processi negate
(1941–1951) (Verona: Ombre Corte, 2005). Although a large number of Italian army officers were purged,
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and subject to partisan politics between the right and left in Italy. However, with evidence
of Italian brutality as well as detailed narratives of specific cases now widely available,
historians have begun to shift their emphasis from exposing to explaining Italian
behaviour.
What motivating factors lay behind the shooting of civilians at Zapotok? It is
clear that the executions were ordered from above; they were part of a broader military
policy. The present study focuses on the senior officers and the institutional culture from
which those orders and policies stemmed. The questions that can be asked of events at
Zapotok can be asked of Italian commanders and commands at a more general level. Was
the behaviour displayed at Zapotok a legitimate response to the difficult conditions posed
by guerrilla warfare, as Italian generals claimed? In Africa and Europe, the Italian army
confronted well-organized and effective insurgencies against which conventional forces
and doctrine often proved inadequate. How typical was the case of Zapotok? Was Italian
behaviour uniform and consistent between units, commanders, and theatres? To what
extent did higher authorities tolerate variation, and to what degree did they seek to
balance harshness with restraint? An officer of the 51st Regiment later claimed that high
command wanted all 130 villagers named on the list executed, but that the division and
battalion commanders conspired to reduce the final tally.9
What role did Fascism play in the army’s behaviour? How fully did military
authorities conform to directives from Mussolini’s regime in Rome and to a Fascist
ideology that exalted violence? While acknowledging the fallacy of the brava gente
myth, historians nonetheless have argued that the lack of ideological preparation within
the Italian army prevented its episodes of violence from matching the “massacres and

demoted, or forced into retirement after the Second World War, the main criteria in this process was the
extent of their collaboration with the pro-German Italian Social Republic after September 1943. Behaviour
in occupied territory was not taken into consideration. Andrea Argenio, “L’epurazione e la discriminazione
degli alti gradi dell’esercito italiano (1943–1948),” Clio 41, no. 4 (2005): 617–51.
9

Casanuova, I°/51, 127.
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brutality” committed by their German allies in eastern and southeastern Europe.10 The
commander of the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division was described as “far from fascist [...] a
humane man.”11 Yet, if true, this did not translate into meaningful resistance. Finally, was
Italian violence at Zapotok the result of a perceived “colonial” or “imperial” mission in
the Balkans, shared by Fascists and traditional nationalists alike during Mussolini’s bid to
re-establish an empire for Rome? Were the methods adopted in Zapotok imported from
the army’s colonial doctrine in Africa where such executions, at times, had been
commonplace?
These questions on the relationship between the Italian army, Fascism, and
Mussolini’s imperial programme are of particular importance. Not only can they help to
understand the decisions and policies of Italian generals conducting counterinsurgency,
they also can reveal much about the dynamics of Italian Fascism and, more broadly, of
traditional state institutions within a self-styled totalitarian dictatorship. The Italian
army’s role as an occupying force overlapped with Fascist programmes for territorial
expansion and national transformation. The potential for the army’s involvement in the
Fascist revolutionary project was greatest in the occupied territories. Furthermore,
because Fascism’s imperial vision spanned two continents — Africa and Europe — these
questions can identify linkages between colonial rule and totalitarian domination.
The present study seeks to understand the Italian army’s behaviour within the
context of Fascist empire-building. Its focus is on the way that Fascist objectives,
intentions, and plans were perceived, interpreted, and implemented by the generals of the
Italian army during Fascism’s imperial phase from the mid-1930s through the Second
World War. To identify areas of consistency and continuity, ambiguity and departure, as
well as institutional learning and knowledge transfer, this study adopts a comparative
approach. By comparing the Italian army’s occupation policies in Ethiopia between 1936
and 1941 to those in Yugoslavia between 1941 and 1943 — the two most significant
occupations of Fascism’s imperial phase — it is possible to evaluate trends, continuities,
10

Giorgio Rochat, Le guerre italiane, 1935–1943: Dall’Impero d’Etiopia alla disfatta (Turin: Einaudi,
2005), 368–70. Gianni Oliva, Soldati e ufficiali: L’esercito italiano dal Risorgimento a oggi (Milan:
Mondadori, 2009), 232–33.
11

Casanuova, I°/51, 124.
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and divergences of behaviour in a way that single narrative case studies cannot. Within
this seven-year period, Italian army officers on occupation duty in these two regions
found themselves at the forefront of Mussolini’s Fascist Empire. Examining its activity in
these two geographically and culturally diverse territories allows for broader conclusions
on the army’s role as an institution within the context of Fascist imperialism.
The picture that emerges of the Italian army’s approach to occupation is complex
and nuanced, but this study reveals significant patterns. Italian officers demonstrated a
mentality that was compatible with Fascist expectations. This was dominated by social
Darwinian concepts of imperialism and racism. They also shared with Fascism a notion
of racial hierarchy that permitted different forms of political and military behaviour in
Ethiopia and Yugoslavia. Similarities in the army’s conduct in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia
stemmed partly from the army’s colonial mentality but, more tangibly, from military
culture — from an institutional approach to irregular warfare in general. In functional
terms, the Italian army occupying Fascism’s empire did “work towards the Duce.” It
sought as best it could to further Rome’s often vaguely defined interests, sometimes quite
effectively. But it did not do so primarily out of an attraction to Mussolini and Italian
Fascism. The army’s relationship to Fascism was based on overlapping worldviews,
national objectives, and military priorities rather than enthusiastic dogmatic devotion.
What is remarkable is how sturdy and enduring this basis of collaboration proved in
Italy’s occupied territories.

Royal Army
The Regio Esercito — the Royal Italian Army — had its roots in the unification of Italy
under the Savoy dynasty in 1861. The new institution largely adopted the shape, form,
and customs of the Armata Sarda, the army of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. While
it absorbed the armed forces of the other Italian states, the persistence of Piedmontese
traditions and its central role in nation-building ensured that the Regio Esercito remained
closely connected to the House of Savoy. Italian monarchs donned the uniform of the
army, shared a military education, and surrounded themselves with officers. In its role of
uniting conscript soldiers and professional officers from various regions and — to
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paraphrase Massimo D’Azeglio — making them Italians, the army instilled a strong
sense of institutional loyalty closely connected to the cult of the monarchy. Through the
nineteenth century, the Regio Esercito remained generally conservative, aloof, and
apolitical, its relations with the parliamentary government characterized by mutual
apathy.12
The First World War had a transformative impact on the Italian officer corps.
Especially after the disastrous defeat at Caporetto — when the Italian government and
high command sought to bridge the divide between the “legal” Italy of the state and the
“real” Italy of its largely peasant population — officers became propagandists and were
themselves radicalized by their patriotic cause.13 The politicization of the Regio Esercito
continued after the war, connected to a broader “failure to demobilize wartime culture” in
Italy, and in much of Europe, after 1918.14 Brutalized by the war and expecting great
rewards for the victory that the army claimed to have achieved for Italy, many officers
reacted sharply against the government’s failure to achieve larger gains at the Paris peace
talks or to clamp down against socialist revolutionaries during the biennio rosso [the
“two red years” of 1919–20]. As military discipline broke down, officers and soldiers
openly collaborated with nationalist and Fascist paramilitary groups committing antisocialist and, on the eastern frontier, anti-Slavic violence. The Liberal government’s
mistrust of the army combined with postwar budget reductions to further alienate the
officer corps, driving it into an “alliance” with Fascism in hope that the protection offered
by a Fascist government would allow a return to the army’s traditional apolitical

12

John Whittam, The Politics of the Italian Army, 1861–1918 (London: Croom Helm, 1977). Rochat, Le
guerre italiane, 163–66. On the role of the army and monarchy as tools for establishing a national identity
in Italy following unification, see Christopher Duggan, The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy since 1796
(London: Allen Lane, 2007), 283–90, 305–309.
13
14

Whittam, Politics of the Italian Army, 205.

Marco Mondini, “Between Subversion and Coup d’Etat: Military Power and Politics after the Great War
(1919–1922),” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 11, no. 4 (2006): 447. In their broader study of the First
World War, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker conclude that “the culture of war did not die
with the armistice.” See their work, 14–18, Understanding the Great War, trans. Catherine Temerson (New
York: Hill and Wang, 2002), 166.

8

disposition.15 This context influenced the decision of King Vittorio Emanuele III not to
oppose the Fascist March on Rome at the end of October 1922, and to instead appoint
Mussolini as prime minister. Although his generals agreed that the army could crush the
Blackshirts without significant loss, they also warned the king that “it would be best not
to put it to the test.”16
After the March on Rome, the army’s support for Mussolini’s government was
“clear and decisive.” Similar to Fascist relations with other pre-existing structures and
institutions in Italy, the “alliance” between the Regio Esercito and Mussolini’s regime
allowed the army to retain its organizational autonomy so long as it did not involve itself
in political affairs.17 Despite growing scholarly consensus on this marriage of
convenience between the army and Fascism in the 1920s, the level to which the Regio
Esercito truly was or became “Fascistized” is open to debate. Evaluating the ideological
and political impact of Fascism on the Italian army and its strategy has proven a difficult
task. There is no systematic structural analysis of the relationship between the army and
the regime.18 This study seeks to fill that void, at least in part, by examining the army’s
role as an institution within Fascist ideological, political, and legal frameworks of
imperial administration and occupation.
During the 1920s and 1930s, the Regio Esercito made a series of “concessions”
[cedimenti] to the regime, which introduced a new Fascist “style” to the army. These
“external manifestations” of Fascistization included the adoption of the passo romano
[the “Roman Step,” or Goose step], the Fascist salute, Fascist songs and anthems, and the
use of Fascist mottos stenciled onto barracks walls. The army collaborated with Achille
Starace’s campaign to replace the supposedly bourgeois and foreign third person singular
formal address lei with voi, and military correspondence usually included the Fascist

15

Marco Mondini, La politica delle armi: Il ruolo dell’esercito nell’avvento del fascismo (Rome and Bari:
Laterza, 2006), and Mondini, “Between Subversion and Coup d’Etat.”
16

Rochat, Le guerre italiane, 145. Denis Mack Smith, Italy and its Monarchy (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1989), 249–50.
17
18

Rochat, Le guerre italiane, 146–47.

Osti Guerrazzi identifies this as a gap in the historiography. Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, Noi non sappiamo
odiare: L’Esercito Italiano tra fascismo e democrazia (Turin: UTET, 2010), 50.

9

calendar year alongside the conventional date. In 1938, the army accepted Mussolini’s
newly created rank of “first marshal of the empire,” at the expense of the monarchy’s
prestige and of military procedure, since the Duce had actually served in the armed forces
only as a corporal.19
Despite the aesthetic impact on the army of two decades of Fascist rule, most
accounts emphasize continuity with the nineteenth-century image of the Italian officer
corps. The ideal Italian officer held onto a “caste mentality” based on privilege and he
espoused paternalistic or bourgeois codes of honour at odds with the Fascist vision of the
“new man.”20 So as not to lose personal control over the armed forces to his party,
Mussolini opposed the complete Fascistization of the army. Like Hitler, Mussolini
refused to subordinate the armed forces to his party’s paramilitary wing, the black-shirted
squadristi who lived on after the March on Rome as the Milizia Volontaria per la
Sicurezza Nazionale [MVSN]. Instead, he allowed the army to gain dominance over the
MVSN.21 It has thus been argued that, with few exceptions, the army retained its
institutional independence under Fascism.22 While small groups of officers became either
militant supporters of Fascism or devoted anti-Fascists, the majority adopted a reserved
consensus that weakened over the course of the Second World War, a conflict which
exposed the regime’s inability to prepare or mobilize for total war.23
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Most debate on the loyalty of the army to Fascism focuses on the latter half of the
1930s — a period during which Mussolini adopted an increasingly aggressive and risky
foreign policy while the Fascist Party stepped up attacks on the middle classes that made
up the officer corps — through the Second World War.24 Certainly, leading Fascists
perceived a widening breach between themselves and the generals of the Regio Esercito.
Galeazzo Ciano and Giuseppe Bottai, among the many Fascist hierarchs that participated
directly in the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, complained that “the generals […] have
taken the revolution prisoner,” and that Mussolini “listens to them too much.”25 Fascists
complained of the elitism of “career” officers, their contempt for the MVSN, their
bourgeois mentality, and their loyalty to the king.26 Indeed, Fascism always had to
compete with the monarchy as the primary focus of loyalty for the officer corps.27
Despite the long-lasting marriage of convenience between Fascism and the monarchy,
Mussolini privately considered the king “an irreducible enemy of the regime” and
promised eventually to eliminate the monarchy altogether.28 Disgusted by the army’s
“backward mentality,” Mussolini blamed monarchism for the moral and spiritual
“disorder that reigns in the army.”29 It is clear that Mussolini and the Fascist leadership
did not perceive of the army as a Fascist or particularly Fascistized institution.
In practice, the attitudes of Italian generals towards the Second World War were
ambiguous, open to a variety of interpretations. The army was among the most reluctant
groups of the Italian ruling classes to enter the war in 1940. Whereas Fascists,
industrialists, and the middle classes largely backed Mussolini’s decision to intervene
against Britain and France, Italy’s military leadership adopted a pessimistic view towards
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general war and requested more time to prepare.30 However, when push came to shove,
Mussolini’s generals did not resist the Duce’s decision to declare war on 10 June 1940.
As in the Ethiopian campaign of 1935, Italian generals willingly entered war despite
incomplete plans and a lack of intelligence. As John Gooch concludes, through 1940
“there is no substantive evidence to suggest that the pull of the monarchy ever
significantly affected the strategic postures or military policies of any of the services, and
in moments of tension for Italy their members seem to have managed to link the security
of the state with the well-being of the realm.”31 Ultimately, Italy’s military leadership and
monarchy played a role in the downfall of Mussolini and the Fascist regime in July
1943.32 But the fact that the army remained loyal for as long as it did — following the
abject failure of Mussolini’s “short war” [guerra breve] at the end of 1940 — suggests
that its relationship with the regime was more than superficial. Fortunato Minniti argues
that career officers and Fascists continued to share an affinity between mentalities, if not
ideologies, centred on similar Great War myths and beliefs of sacrifice, pragmatism, and
a dominant state.33
To better understand the army’s commitment to Mussolini and to Fascism,
historians have extended their gaze beyond considering the activity of the high
commands in Rome and the fighting spirit of frontline units to examining the behaviour
of the Regio Esercito in occupied territories. Because occupation duty required generals
to play political roles, and because certain occupied territories carried great ideological
30
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significance for Fascism, the army’s policies in these regions can shed much light on
broader issues of Fascistization. Indeed, the most polemical arguments regarding the
army’s loyalty to the regime focus on occupation forces in the Balkans. Jonathan
Steinberg bases his argument that Italian generals “conspired” to protect Jews in the
Balkans partly on the assumption that they belonged to a “traditional, monarchist, liberal,
gentlemanly, masonic, philo-semitic and anti-fascist service.”34 According to Luciano
Monzali, the army’s ambivalence turned into genuine anti-Fascist dissent during the
Second World War. This was especially prevalent in the Balkans, where generals
“criticized and contested” the regime’s monopoly on policy, eventually adopting
autonomous policies of their own in defence of what they saw to be Italian national
interests.35
On the other hand, Davide Rodogno argues that the Italian military leadership in
the Balkans effectively was Fascistized. Rodogno borrows Ian Kershaw’s concept of
“working towards the Führer” and applies it to Italian civil and military functionaries in
occupied Europe. He argues that the chaotic system of Fascist government in the
occupied territories fostered internal rivalries in which the various power centres,
including the army, sought to obtain the objectives defined by the charismatic leader,
Mussolini, who remained the final arbiter.36 Between these interpretations of the Italian
army as either fundamentally anti-Fascist or devotedly loyal to Mussolini lies a large
middle ground, best exemplified by the work of James Burgwyn. Rejecting the notion
that Italian generals actively “worked towards the Duce,” he presents them as reluctant
empire-builders who nonetheless conducted their duties out of loyalty to the king and
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traditional romantic nationalistic pride, and whose often violent policies were based more
on pragmatism than upon Fascist aims or values.37

Fascist Empire
Central to the debate on the behaviour, motivations, and relative Fascistization of the
Italian army in the Balkans is the imperial context of occupation. Officers of the Royal
Army administered and pacified an avowedly “Fascist Empire,” whose existence
Mussolini had announced to the world on 9 May 1936 following the Italian conquest of
Addis Ababa.38 The anniversary of that date entered the regime’s calendar as Army Day
[festa dell’Esercito], symbolizing the close relationship between the army and Fascist
empire-building.39 The invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935 ushered in what Alexander
De Grand refers to as Fascism’s “imperial-colonialist phase.” This was a period marked
by heightened imperialist rhetoric, an increasingly aggressive foreign policy, massive
colonial expenditure, and racist legislation that pushed Fascism towards a more “Nazilike orientation.”40 The dynamism of Mussolini’s imperial turn was largely spent by the
end of 1940 with Italy’s failed invasion of Greece, but the Italian occupation of Balkan
territories after 1941 represents the true dénouement of the imperial phase, even if the
Fascist regime’s freedom of action was sharply limited by Nazi dominance within the
Axis. In order to situate the Italian army within the context of Fascist imperial designs,
this study examines episodes of occupation at either end of Fascism’s imperial phase, the
period in which the Fascist regime most closely identified itself with imperial expansion
and colonialism.
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Precisely what made the post-1935 Fascist Empire “fascist” is open to question.
Certainly, the idea of empire among Italians was not a Fascist creation. Imperial
aspirations developed hand-in-hand with the Risorgimento. The seizure of Rome from the
papacy in 1870 brought with it expectations of regaining the glory of the ancient Roman
Empire. Most realists focused on achieving civic greatness, but many Italian nationalists
nurtured hopes of an eventual territorial re-creation of empire under favourable
circumstances. Allusions to the Roman Empire, and disappointment that a united Italy
had not yet regained its greatness, became common dialogue in Italian literature.41 Prime
Minister Francesco Crispi, whose brand of nationalism was in many ways a Fascist
prelude, was driven by images of a new Rome. Proclaiming it to be Italy’s historic
destiny and demographic necessity, Crispi presided over the first expansionistic phase of
Italian imperialism, only to see it end in disaster with military defeat at Adwa in 1896.42
Nonetheless, through its “discovery of imperialism” at the turn of the century, Italian
political culture connected might, expansion, and conquest to nation-building and
modernization.43 The Liberal state had fostered a colonial mentality among Italians prior
to the advent of Fascism.44
While notions of a reborn Roman Empire were already well-advanced after the
Risorgimento, Angelo Del Boca has argued, “only with Fascism did this hypothesis
transform itself into promise, and finally into a solemn commitment of the regime.”45
Nicola Labanca agrees that, despite continuity with the Liberal era, Fascism brought a
41
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new style and substance to Italian imperialism and colonialism at least a decade before
invading Ethiopia. The consolidation of dictatorship in 1925 permitted the regime to
stifle anti-colonial discourse — a growing problem faced by other colonial powers during
the interwar period — and to focus its propaganda instruments towards establishing a
“colonial consciousness” among Italians.46 The regime launched periodicals, funded
lectures, and built a museum devoted to colonialism, which gained new exposure in the
Italian education system.47 Various professional groups, including archaeologists,
classicists, and geographers, were mobilized or co-opted to justify expansionism and
prove the links between Fascism and Imperial Roman civilization.48
A colonial mentality — that of the disciplined, civilized, paternalistic, war-like
conqueror and ruler, confident of his superiority, authority, and status — was an essential
component of the Fascist “new man” that was intended to restore Italy’s dominance in the
modern world. The national image remade by Fascism used nostalgia for an idealized
Roman past to present an avowedly revolutionary model for modernity as an alternative
to Western capitalism or Soviet communism.49 Colonial rule and imperial expansion were
central to Fascism’s drive towards cultural revolution. Like Nazism, Italian Fascism tied
open-ended expansionism to the objective of national rebirth and the quest for an “ideal
Fatherland.”50 Recent scholarship has also highlighted the role of racism in Fascism’s
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“anthropological revolution” to remake Italians. Through violence and legally defined
hierarchies, the regime used cultural and biological racism — in its colonies against
subject populations and at home against foreigners and Jews — to establish its idealized
harder and more severe “new man.”51
As De Grand argues, expansionistic desire and colonial visions grew more radical
in Fascist Italy during the mid-1930s, partly in response to domestic pressures. The
failure of the corporative experiment to transform Italians, the persistence of bourgeois
values among Italian elites, and the population’s growing disaffection with a provincial
Fascism riddled by corruption indicated that the Fascist revolution had stalled. Mussolini
intended to “relaunch” his totalitarian revolution through war, conquest, and imperial
rule, beginning with the invasion of Ethiopia.52 The Italo-Ethiopian War was intended to
complete “the militarization of society and the fascistization of the army.”53
The timing of the regime’s imperial and racist turn was also influenced by
changes in the international balance of power. The heightened Japanese threat to the
British Empire in Asia combined with a resurgent, revisionist, and rearmed Germany
gave Mussolini the opportunity to act more assertively than he had in the 1920s, with less
risk of British and French intervention.54 Claiming that the British Empire was in crisis,
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resentful Fascists sought to replace Britain as the “epitome of modern imperial power.”55
Fascist aggression challenged the status quo in Africa and Europe, and Mussolini
gradually aligned his foreign and military policies with those of Hitler’s. The invasion of
Ethiopia was followed by massive intervention in the Spanish Civil War, the
announcement of a Rome-Berlin Axis, the dispatch of troops to Libya, diplomatic efforts
to achieve hegemony in the Balkans, the invasion and occupation of Albania, and finally
the signing of the Pact of Steel, an offensive alliance with Nazi Germany.56 Forced to
admit that his armed forces were not ready for war when Hitler’s armies invaded Poland
in September 1939, Mussolini kept out of the conflict with Britain and France until June
1940. Then, “unleashed” by German successes against France, Mussolini’s ambitions
during the Second World War saw Italian troops take the offensive in the Western Alps,
East Africa, North Africa, Greece, and Yugoslavia.57
While it is clear that Mussolini’s foreign policy escalated in relation to Hitler’s,
scholars disagree over the extent to which this was the result of Fascism’s ideological
programme and Mussolini’s long-term imperial objectives. One school of thought
emphasizes the continuity between Liberal and Fascist foreign policies, and portrays
Mussolini as an opportunist acting without a clearly defined vision. According to Denis
Mack Smith, Mussolini’s rule was based solely on propaganda and was reliant on bluff to
achieve its recklessly devised objectives. While Mussolini desired colonies for their
propaganda value, he had no idea how to develop them and provided little guidance in
colonial affairs.58 Though taking a different vein, Richard Bosworth also argues that, as
the “least of the great powers,” Italy was concerned primarily with prestige and
appearances. Weakness had forced Liberal-era diplomats to use trickery, deceit, and
opportunism to achieve limited gains, and these conditions had not changed under
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Fascism.59 Bosworth cautions that Fascism’s “words rarely meant exactly what they
said,” and that Mussolini’s regime was inconsistent, vague, and uncertain in its
application of policy.60
Following the lead of MacGregor Knox, a second school counters that “Mussolini
had a genuine foreign policy program: the creation of an Italian spazio vitale [living
space] in the Mediterranean and Middle East” intended to cement Italy’s great power
status and to transform Italians through cultural revolution.61 Recent scholarship on
Fascist foreign policy tends to support this view. Robert Mallett has extended Knox’s
analysis, which originally focused on the period 1939–41, back to 1933, including the
conquest of Ethiopia as part of a larger imperial project aimed against British and French
possessions in Africa and the Mediterranean.62 Like Knox and Mallett, Bruce Strang
emphasizes the central role played by Mussolini as ideologue and policy maker. Strang
argues that Mussolini’s ultranationalist and social Darwinian mentalité led him to
consider territorial expansion essential for national survival, and contributed to his
decision to ally with a like-minded Hitler.63 Focusing on Italian military archives, John
Gooch outlines Mussolini’s persistent but flawed efforts to prepare his armed forces for
the war against Britain and France which his imperial policy necessarily entailed.64
According to these interpretations, the empire envisioned by Mussolini would have
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included most of the Mediterranean coastline and islands, southeast Europe, and
northeast Africa.65
These debates over the ideological nature and novelty of Fascist imperialism and
foreign policy have important ramifications on the present study, which focuses on the
point of view of Italian senior officers in the context of Fascist plans and ideology.
Drawing from the present historiography, this study makes several basic assumptions
about Fascist concepts of empire. First, while most aspects of Fascist colonialism had
antecedents in the Liberal past, their extent and scale after 1935 were unprecedented;
empire had become the central element of Italian Fascism in a way that would have been
inconceivable before the March on Rome. Second, the specific territories to be included
in the empire were not clearly defined by the regime; Fascist ideology and policy
emphasized an open-ended expansionism in the Mediterranean and Africa, whether
connected to the palingenetic aims of Fascism, Mussolini’s social Darwinism, or to his
own personal quest for glory. Third, Mussolini wielded strong personal control over
foreign, military, and colonial affairs, but he did not always employ that control directly;
this contributed to the seemingly vague nature of his aims and policies. Fourth, the
chauvinism and totalitarian intentions of the Fascist regime meant that it preferred, at
least in theory, “total” solutions that eschewed negotiation and exalted violence.66

Colonial Violence
This study concerns itself less with continuity between the Liberal and Fascist eras of
Italian history than with continuity within the Fascist period, and specifically within
Fascism’s imperial phase after 1935. The empire imagined by the Fascist regime
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straddled both sides of the Mediterranean, with one foot in Africa and another in Europe.
The period examined here saw Italian expansion first in Ethiopia and later across the
Adriatic. Did the Italian army — which spearheaded both invasions and dominated both
occupations — export a colonial mentality from Africa to Europe? Given the close
relationship between “colonial consciousness” and Fascism’s vision of its “new man,”
this question is directly pertinent to understanding the Italian army’s ideological role
within the Fascist empire. It also intersects with a recent trend in genocide studies that
examines similarities between European genocides and the violence of colonial wars and
counterinsurgencies, which arguably were inherently genocidal in nature.67
A growing, but still contentious, school of thought has searched for the roots of
German brutality during the Second World War and the Holocaust in the colonial past.
There are two main aspects to this interpretation. One focuses narrowly on German
concepts of a continental empire in eastern Europe, which predated Nazism.68 The other
focuses more broadly on European colonialism in Africa and Asia as providing precedent
and legitimacy for genocidal violence elsewhere. This has involved the re-evaluation of
arguments made by Rafael Lemkin and Hannah Arendt in the 1940s and 1950s that
genocide, totalitarianism, and the Holocaust were all rooted partly in European

67

For an overview of colonial genocide studies, see A. Dirk Moses, “Empire, Colony, Genocide:
Keywords and the Philosophy of History,” in Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and
Subaltern Resistance in World History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn, 2008), 3–54. Moses
argues that colonial wars usually targeted entire populations due to the difficulty distinguishing between
civilians and combatants, and that colonial warfare thus meant “total war on a local scale.” He also credits a
“security syndrome” shared by many counterinsurgents, obsessed with creating conditions in which
resistance would never recur, for promoting genocidal violence. On this, see also Enzo Traverso, The
Origins of Nazi Violence, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: New Press, 2003), 64, and H. L. Wesseling,
“Colonial Wars: An Introduction,” in Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa,
ed. J. A. de Moor and H. L. Wesseling (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 3.
68

This has involved the partial rehabilitation of the Sonderweg [special path] thesis in German
historiography and a reappraisal of Fritz Fischer’s controversial work that highlighted similarities between
the eastern objectives of the Second and Third Reichs. On this perspective, see Fritz Fischer, Germany’s
Aims in the First World War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967); Shelley Baranowski, Nazi Empire:
German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011); Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2005), 20–24; and, Mark Mazower, “Germans and Slavs: 1848–1918,” chap. 1 in
Hitler’s Empire (New York: Penguin, 2008).

21

colonialism and imperialism.69 Studies focusing on the “Nazi imagination” have argued
that Hitler, Himmler, and other leading Nazis drew their “colonialist fantasies” in the east
from a broader European colonial past, and that they sought to instil a racial and colonial
consciousness among Nazi functionaries by equating Slavs with Africans and Asians.
The Nazis justified criminal policies in part by defining the east as a colonial arena,
within which international law had no application. Moreover, by demonstrating that
“wiping out peoples was a possibility,” the colonial past made the killing and expulsion
of Jews and Slavs “thinkable” for ordinary Germans.70
Within this field, a heated debate has evolved over the connection between
Wilhelmine colonial rule and warfare in German Southwest Africa, or Namibia, and later
Nazi practices in eastern Europe. After laying claim to Namibia in the 1880s, the
Germans established a “genocidal administration” intended to establish “direct and
unrestricted German rule” through the complete political dissolution of indigenous
societies. When the Herero and Nama tribes revolted against German rule in 1904, they
were met with a brutal counterinsurgency that reduced their populations by more than
half over the course of four years.71 Benjamin Madley argues that Wilhelmine rule in
Southwest Africa “contributed ideas, methods, and a lexicon that Nazi leaders borrowed
and expanded.” These borrowings included the concept of Lebensraum — which may
have been rooted in Namibia’s status as a settler colony — and the criminalization of
miscegenation, as well as the genocidal rhetoric and policies adopted during the
campaign against the Herero and Nama, defined by German military commanders as a
“race war” of “annihilation.” Madley argues that the Namibian experience was
transmitted to German society through personal connections, colonial literature, and
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public debates.72 Others have countered that, while the exploitation of indigenous labour,
apartheid policies, and military brutality in Namibia provided a “bed of experiences” for
the Third Reich, these experiences were not unique to Germany and did not parallel
exactly what was to come.73 Critics have argued that “phenomenological similarities”
between Nazi and colonial violence do not necessarily indicate “direct personal and
structural continuities” between men and institutions operating forty years apart.74
Widely held ideas on race, security, and ethnic cleansing could persist over time
even without structural continuities. Nonetheless, the time gap between 1904 and 1941 —
during which period the First World War stripped Germany of its colonies and
transformed its politics and society — remains the fundamental obstacle to demonstrating
direct tangible links between overseas colonialism and Nazi violence in occupied Europe.
In response to this dilemma, Enzo Traverso has argued that the Italian invasion of
Ethiopia in 1935 “bridged the gap between nineteenth-century European imperialism and
the Nazi war for Lebensraum.”75 Likewise, Patrick Bernhard has demonstrated that
Mussolini’s colonial ventures inspired enthusiasm for colonial expansion in Germany,
gave legitimacy to Hitler’s plans for eastern Europe, and provided a model for Nazi
colonialism, at least as envisioned for Mittelafrika.76 If the Italian experience in Ethiopia
can throw light upon Nazi expansionism and rule, can it not also illuminate Fascist Italian
practices in Europe during the Second World War? Indeed, the connection between
behaviour in Africa and Europe is more direct and testable for Fascist Italy than it is for
Nazi Germany. Italy maintained a colonial presence in East Africa from the 1880s until
1941; its counterinsurgency in Yugoslavia followed immediately on the heels of its
colonial war in Ethiopia and involved some of the same personalities.
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Possible links between Italian colonial practice in East Africa and occupation in
the Balkans have been suggested before. In a short synthetic essay on the Italian
occupation of Yugoslavia, Teodoro Sala noted several similarities to colonial rule.
Beyond some of the high-ranking officers involved, these included citizenship laws,
systems of economic exploitation, the use of irregular auxiliary bands, and the adoption
of colonial phraseology in counterinsurgency directives.77 Relying on a handful of
secondary sources, Eric Gobetti and Davide Rodogno have also argued that past colonial
experience, especially in Ethiopia, was one of the most important factors that determined
Italian behaviour in Yugoslavia.78 While the hypothesis of such links has been apparent
for some time, a systematic attempt to compare Italian conduct in Africa to that in Europe
has been lacking. With the exception of general surveys, works either focus on Italian
occupation and counterinsurgency in Africa or Europe, not both.79 Yet, as the debate over
the colonial origins of Nazi violence indicates, drawing useful and accurate links between
the events of the Second World War and their colonial antecedents requires detailed
comparative analysis.
This task is more practicable for the Italian example, not only because of the
much smaller time gap between the cases to be analyzed, but also because it is less
hampered by the looming issue of the Holocaust, which is generally regarded as unique
among genocides.80 The objectives of this study are more narrowly focused; it intends to
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use evidence of institutional knowledge transfers between Africa and Europe as a tool to
evaluate the Italian army’s assimilation of Fascist values. By seeking to imbue Italians
with a colonial mentality and by using East Africa as a testing ground for more radical
policies, the Fascist regime explicitly desired such knowledge transfers. This study also
imposes limits on itself by focusing on the senior officers of the Regio Esercito and that
institution’s “military culture.”81 Rather than comparing the policies of General Lothar
von Trotha — commander of German forces in Namibia in 1904 — to those of
Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, this study compares the likes of General Rodolfo
Graziani to General Mario Roatta, contemporaries of the same institution operating at
similar levels within the same political system. The present work seeks first and foremost
to understand the behaviour of the army as an institution. Its findings have important
ramifications on our understanding of Italian Fascism, its level of control and influence
over state institutions in Italy, the application of its imperial practices in different
contexts, and how these practices compared to those of its Nazi ally.

An Italian Way to Counterinsurgency?
An examination of the Italian army’s approach to occupation and counterinsurgency
between 1936 and 1943 requires some understanding of the way it undertook such
operations prior to that. To address the broader question of the army’s relationship to
Fascism, we must also ask whether the Italian army had a traditional approach to
counterinsurgency in the first place, and whether it then adopted a peculiarly Fascist style
by the time of the Second World War. The nature of counterinsurgency — characterized
by the primacy of local conditions — makes it difficult to discern patterns of action that
clearly resemble a programmatic institutional approach or doctrine.82 Nonetheless, Isabel
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Hull and Ben Shepherd have convincingly argued that the German army’s dim view
towards insurgency and its obsession with achieving total victories of annihilation
provided a recipe for brutality towards occupied populations that replicated itself in
various contexts.83 How did the Italian tradition compare? During Italy’s recent
participation in operations in Afghanistan, the Italian General Staff promoted a
supposedly “Italian way” to counterinsurgency, based on limited security operations and
dialogue with locals. The term was rooted largely in domestic Italian politics at the time,
with the need to redefine unpopular combat missions as “operations of peace” conducted
according to humanitarian methods and aims.84 Partly resurrecting the myth of italiani
brava gente, this definition had little resemblance to other Italian counterinsurgencies
conducted since unification.
Like the Imperial German Army, the Royal Italian Army developed a traditional
contempt for irregular warfare from its birth. While the German abhorrence for guerrillas
was rooted in its experience fighting against francs-tireurs in France during 1870–71,
Italian perceptions drew from the Brigands’ War [brigantaggio] that ravaged the South of
Italy through the 1860s. Following their incorporation into the Kingdom of Italy, a broad
range of southern Italians rejected the new order and formed guerrilla bands with various
political, social, and ideological dimensions. Their ranks included former bandits,
Bourbon legitimists, Papal loyalists, Neapolitan soldiers trying to avoid penal camps, and
peasants seeking to avoid conscription, taxes, or domination by the urban middle class.85
The Italian army perceived these combatants with ignorance and contempt. Giuseppe
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Garibaldi, the most famous guerrilla of his time, had gained hero status through the
Risorgimento, and the writings of Giuseppe Mazzini and officers of the Garibaldini were
widely published in Italy.86 But, while the Italian army adopted guerrilla-style doctrine
for its nascent alpine units in the 1870s, it wholly rejected the Garibaldian model of a
“people in arms,” opting instead for a traditional, conventional, professional force.87 The
Italian army responded to brigandage in the South with an influx of heavy weapons and
equipment and with escalating brutality, including mass reprisals and the burning of
villages. This was an institution with a “fanatical hatred of partisan movements.”88
Studying the writings and reports of Italian officers from the 1860s, John Dickie
has demonstrated that the army conceptualized brigands as a primitive “Other,”
irreconcilable to its view of Italy as a modern European nation. Italian officers portrayed
the Brigands’ War as a conflict between civilization and barbarism, and they deployed
racist imagery against their hidden and unknown enemy. Considering anti-guerrilla
warfare to be “an inglorious and even dishonourable task,” they accepted that the rules of
war could not be applied to enemies that did not fight by conventional means.89 Northern
newspapers justified the destruction of southern villages and the execution of civilians as
necessary acts against barbaric brigands that enjoyed the support of local populations.90
That these views remained widely held by Italian elites on the eve of the invasion
of Ethiopia is demonstrated by an entry on “brigandage” in the Enciclopedia Italiana of
1930. Three quarters of the 4,000-word article were dedicated to the Brigands’ War in the
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Italian South. Brigandage, the authors explained, was a phenomenon endemic to
backwards cultures, and that appealed to the basest groups of society who resisted the
power of the state. The article described the southern Italian brigands as “draft evaders,
deserters, soldiers of the former Bourbon army, escaped convicts and, finally, all those
who, with blind generosity, had been pardoned in the early days of the insurrectional
movement in 1860.” Papal or Bourbon propaganda merely took advantage of the
gullibility of southern peasants. On the other hand, the entry praised the “sacrifice” and
“valour” of the counterinsurgents, even if they “failed to prevent the plague from
becoming even more widespread in the Mezzogiorno.” The article credited the stronghanded Pica law of 1863 and the tactical innovations of General Pallavicino — based on
the “prompt, intense, tireless persecution of the brigands” by large but mobile forces —
for finally defeating the insurgents. The state then consolidated the military victory by
“punishing the guilty without mercy and rewarding those who provided information or
fruitful labour,” so that “the entire South in fact gave a sigh of relief, when public order
and respect for law was established and firmly maintained.”91 In short, the encyclopedia
article presented irregular warfare as a characteristic of primitive societies that needed to
be ruthlessly suppressed in pursuit of modernity. King Vittorio Emanuele III himself
reiterated this view when he brushed aside initial reports of Ustaša excesses against Serbs
in 1941 as part of a necessary phase in the process of consolidating a modern nation-state
in Croatia, similar to Italy’s own war against “brigandage.”92
Despite the long-lasting legacy of the Brigands’ War, it was in Africa where the
Italian army most frequently encountered guerrilla warfare in the twentieth century and
developed a doctrine to counter it. Shortly before its invasion of Ethiopia, the Italian
army had concluded a decade-long campaign to “reconquer” Libya from indigenous
bands employing guerrilla techniques. Angelo Del Boca, Giorgio Rochat, and John
Gooch all have described the Libyan campaign of 1922–31 as a distinctly “fascist”
example of counterinsurgency. Unconcerned with international and public opinion, the
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Fascist regime favoured violence over compromise and confiscated land from “rebels” to
be settled by Italian colonizers.93 The Libyan campaign provided the most immediate
point of reference for Italian generals confronting the tasks of occupation duty and
counterinsurgency as they entered Fascism’s imperial phase.
Did the experience in Libya establish a clear doctrine to follow in East Africa and,
later, the Balkans? Doctrine can be understood as “institutionalised beliefs about what
works in war.”94 Such beliefs are not necessarily enshrined in theoretical texts. Although
educational literature can reveal what an institution codified as “official” doctrine, Italian
officers published few serious works on counterinsurgency or colonial warfare.95 This is
not surprising given the degree of local variation associated with such operations and the
lack of prestige granted them by most European armies, whose theorists preferred to
focus on conventional warfare and the integration of new technologies.96 If the Italian
army had an official doctrine for occupation policy, it came from the practical experience
gained in Libya and was espoused through a small corpus of educational literature based
on that experience. Despite the Fascist emphasis on violent means, this doctrine
recognized the primacy of politics alongside the application of pure military force in
colonial pacification operations.
The closest thing to an official doctrinal manuscript on the Italian army’s
approach to asymmetrical warfare came in the form of a war college text on “colonial
operations” written by Guglielmo Nasi. Nasi’s work drew lessons from the army’s
experience in Libya during the Liberal era and the early stages of the Fascist reconquest
to present an ideal method of conducting colonial warfare. While Nasi specified that his
precepts could not apply to warfare against an independent African state like Ethiopia, he
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foresaw that such a campaign would likely be followed by a period of guerrilla warfare.
For Nasi, colonial warfare mainly involved combating guerrilla activity and large-scale
rebellions. Nasi’s main thesis emphasized the centrality of politics to colonial warfare
and the need for flexibility in geographically, ethnically, and socially diverse areas. The
objective of colonial operations was not to destroy the enemy, but to permanently occupy
a region, bringing order, peace, and material development. “The enemy of today,” Nasi
reasoned, “will therefore be our collaborator of tomorrow.” He favoured occupation
policies that focused on co-opting populations by respecting religion and local customs,
including local elites in the administration of territory, and using indigenous labour in
public works to develop clients for the regime.97 Nasi’s doctrine borrowed from the
nuanced approach of the famous French colonial general Louis-Hubert Lyautey, referring
directly to the latter’s “oil-spot” [macchia d’olio] method of pacification.98
Rodolfo Graziani, who played a central role throughout the entire period of
reconquest in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, also penned a series of monographs on the
subject.99 Graziani’s writings were more self-serving than Nasi’s, directed to a popular
audience to boost his own popularity. Still, they summarized Graziani’s philosophy and
techniques of colonial warfare. Coming from a man who claimed to have brought the
rebellion in Libya to a definitive end, they contributed to Italian doctrine. Like Nasi,
Graziani believed that colonial operations made up a specialized type of warfare where
success depended on a careful balance of military and political measures. Without
showing signs of weakness towards the local populations — which Graziani believed the
Liberal government had done by conceding statutes and special citizenship status to
Libyans in 1919 — the colonial soldier must act justly and respect local traditions and
religions in order to establish a “political bloc in favour of the government” among local
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chiefs and their followers.100 In his assessment of Graziani’s generalship in Libya, John
Gooch concludes that Graziani developed “a strong sense of the political dimensions of
colonial warfare which more than matched his operational virtuosity.”101 Indeed, Lyautey
had praised Graziani for adopting similar principles and techniques to his own.102
Nasi and Graziani each recognized that in colonial occupations military
commanders must be both soldiers and politicians. They stressed the use of political
means to help establish security and facilitate the exploitation of occupied territories.
However, their definition of “political” was limited. “Essentially,” Cristiana Pipitone has
argued, “the term politics is, in the colonial lexicon, a synonym for control [dominio].”103
This paralleled the Fascist regime’s own equation of the “politics of prestige” with the
ability and willingness to use force.104 Graziani’s strategic precepts from his final
campaign in Cyrenaica demonstrate how his concept of political means was still based on
force, terror, and — a watchword of Italian generals and Fascist hierarchs alike —
prestige. Alongside military measures to disarm the population and strike rebel forces,
Graziani applied legal measures (public executions of rebel supporters after trial by
“flying” courts to give the impression of immediate and inexorable justice), economic
measures (the building of roads “to assert our prestige”), and political measures (to
remove the population from rebel influence and achieve “total control” over indigenous
subjects). The latter took fruition in the near complete internment of the nomad
population of the Jebel Akhdar in Cyrenaica. At the same time, Graziani stressed the
importance of respecting local customs, religion, and women in order to maintain prestige
and respect in the eyes of the native populations.105 It is clear that, for Italian colonial
officers, prestige ultimately was based on military might and the ability to wield it.
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Before the occupation of Ethiopia, then, the Italian army had developed a doctrine
for colonial warfare that at least paid lip service to political means of attraction and that
recognized the importance of the political and administrative roles of officers in occupied
territory. The degree to which this doctrine was in fact assimilated by the officers of the
Regio Esercito is unclear. Giorgio Rochat argues that the experience gained in Libya was
underutilized in Ethiopia. Despite Fascism’s reinvigorated drive towards empire, years of
neglect for African affairs prevented the formation of a corps of qualified colonial
officers as in France; nor was colonial service normally useful to a career in the Italian
army.106 On the other hand, one of Graziani’s biographers credits him for heading a group
of “colonial experts,” including Nasi, Ottorino Mezzetti, Pietro Maletti, Sebastiano
Gallina, Orlando Lorenzini, and Giuseppe Malta, all of whom went on to serve in East
Africa.107 Likewise, Angelo Del Boca refers to a “Graziani school,” but mainly as a
group of ambitious senior officers without scruples, whose military training and
ideological mindset made them perfect functionaries of the Fascist regime.108
Given the continuity in personnel between the Libyan and Ethiopian campaigns
and the fame accrued by Graziani during the reconquest — thanks in part to the
patronage of Giuseppe Volpi, Governor of Tripolitania from 1922 to 1925, and the
Fascist Party, along with his own self-promotional writings — there is little doubt that
Libya was considered a possible model to emulate and build upon in Ethiopia.109
Nevertheless, as governor general of Italian East Africa between 1936 and 1937, Graziani
recognized that conditions in that country differed greatly from those in Libya. Although
his directives and telegrams did make explicit references to Libyan examples from time
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to time, Graziani also voiced the need to avoid any “automatic process of analogical
extrapolation.”110 The governor of Galla Sidamo, Carlo Geloso, agreed that there was a
“difference, sometimes profound, between the mentality, traditions, customs, [and] level
of civilization of the native populations of Mediterranean Africa and those of East
Africa.”111
Entering the very different atmosphere of Ethiopia — larger, more populous, and
more diverse than Libya — Italian generals were reluctant to bring with them more than
general precepts from their previous colonial ventures. For the junior officers that
commanded Italian and colonial troops in the field, and made daily contact with the local
populations, their understanding of colonial doctrine was even vaguer. Arriving in East
Africa as a 24-year-old subaltern in 1936, Ettore Formento confided his assumptions
about colonial warfare.
Here is what I knew:
- Colonial war is a lower [elementare] form of warfare and has no rules [norme].
Great examples or teachings of history are of no use.
- Barbarians and rebels have no impediment, they do not understand lines of
operations, they are not vulnerable at particular points.
- It is necessary to operate according to clear, simple concepts according to the
situation as it presents itself case by case.
- No to the defensive. Our troops are tactically superior, logistically inferior, [and]
so must seek battle.
- Manoeuvre with many columns to converge on the point of battle.
- Any march can result in an engagement.
- Marching formations must be able to transform quickly into those of battle.112
The Italian army entered Fascism’s imperial phase with a set of preconceptions about
colonial and irregular warfare, but the unprecedented scale of occupation in Ethiopia and
during the Second World War would render the period after 1935 unique.

110

“Ordinamento di P.S. per l’A.O.I.,” 17 July 1937, Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
Rome [ASMAE], Ministero dell’Africa Italiana [MAI], pos. 181/55, fasc. 256.
111

“Progetto di ordinamento di polizia per l’A.O.I.,” 10 November 1937, ASMAE, MAI, pos. 181/55,
fasc. 256.
112

Ettore Formento, Kai Bandera: Etiopia, 1936–1941: Una banda irregolare (Milan: Mursia, 2000), 9.

33

Case Studies
The Fascist regime intended the Ethiopian campaign to have a transformative effect on
Italians in general, and in its scope it potentially was transformative for the Italian army
as an institution. The principal assumption underlying the present study is that a
comparative approach is necessary to understand the behaviour and mindset of an
institution. Comparative analysis can help isolate knowledge transfers and discern an
institutional “way” of behaviour. The debate over whether or not Italian generals in
occupied territories “worked towards the Duce” is best addressed by a comparative
approach. To look for patterns and to see beyond the impact of local conditions —
particularly influential when speaking of counterinsurgency — it is necessary to compare
similar source bases from widely divergent cases. This study compares the Italian army’s
behaviour in two areas of primary importance to Fascist imperialism: Ethiopia and
Yugoslavia.
Because the geographic, cultural, and political conditions in both cases were so
different from one another, they must be dealt with separately as individual case studies,
while applying the same methodology and similar standards of evidence to each case.
Within each episode, the actions of different units and levels of command must also be
compared in order to balance breadth of scope with depth of analysis. Institutional
behaviour involves more than the directives emanating from high commands. Units and
personalities at the middle level of the military organization — division and corps
commands — played an important role in forming and demonstrating military culture. As
Ben Shepherd has shown, this is especially true in the context of military occupations,
where division commands exercised considerable autonomy and acted as filters, passing
along what they felt was most important to their units given the circumstances they
confronted.113 This is largely a “history from the middle,” examining how “mid-level
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managers of war” responded to political directives and tried to solve local problems.114
Only by taking into consideration the policies and behaviour of commanders and staffs of
divisions, corps, and armies, along with the directives from higher commands, is it
possible to identify and analyze an institutional approach to counterinsurgency.
The commands selected for the two case studies here represent potentially diverse
experiences; they confronted different conditions from one another, even within the same
theatre of occupation. Because the organization and command structure in Ethiopia and
Yugoslavia were fundamentally different, a direct unit-to-unit comparison is not possible.
Italian forces in East Africa were organized along colonial lines, answering to a governor
general in Addis Ababa — Rodolfo Graziani until he was replaced by Amedeo di Savoia
in 1938 — who in turn reported to the Ministry of Colonies, later the Ministry of Italian
Africa, in Rome. Military operations and administrative tasks were overseen largely by
regional governors. Like the governor general, the governors tended to be military men;
together, their communications provide the bulk of the evidence for the Ethiopian case
study. Specifically examined are the Governorate of Amhara and the Governorate of
Harar. Amhara, under the successive governorships of Alessandro Pirzio Biroli, Ottorino
Mezzetti, and Luigi Frusci was the centre of much of the guerrilla warfare that plagued
Ethiopia after 1936. Harar, on the other hand, enjoyed a comparatively less violent
occupation, under the direction of Guglielmo Nasi until his transfer to Addis Ababa in
1939, at which point the civil official Enrico Cerulli took over.
In Yugoslavia, a more straightforward military organization prevailed. Most of
the Italian occupation zone — with the exception of Montenegro, not included in this
study — was assigned to the command of the Second Army, later renamed the Comando
Superiore Forze Armate di Slovenia e Dalmazia [Supersloda]. Vittorio Ambrosio
commanded Second Army in 1941, Mario Roatta in 1942, and Mario Robotti in 1943.
Here, material for analysis has been drawn primarily from their commands, as well as
those of two Italian infantry divisions that formed part of Second Army, and the corps
commands under which those divisions served. The selected divisions are the 12th
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Sassari Division and the 22nd Cacciatori delle Alpi Division. As already discussed, the
Cacciatori were employed repeatedly in anti-partisan operations throughout Yugoslavia.
Under the command first of Giovanni Angelo Pivano and later of Vittorio Ruggero, the
division served with Renzo Dalmazzo’s VI Corps in Dalmatia and Herzegovina before
joining Mario Robotti and Gastone Gambara’s XI Corps in Slovenia. Unlike the
Cacciatori, the Sassari Division spent most of the occupation in the same general area,
Lika and Bosanska Krajina in the Independent State of Croatia, with its command based
out of Knin.115 Nevertheless, the war diaries of the Sassari Division have been described
as “one of the most interesting items in the archives of the Army General Staff.”116 The
hand-written entries of the chiefs of staff of the division provide information and analysis
that is often lacking at this level of command. The Sassari Division formed part of VI
Corps until early 1942, when Quirino Armellini’s XVIII Corps took over jurisdiction of
its zone. Furio Monticelli commanded the division until May 1942, until he was replaced
by Paolo Berardi, the future chief of the army general staff in the Badoglio
government.117 At the end of 1942 the division was pulled back to Dalmatia for eventual
repatriation to Italy. This was delayed due to operations in January 1943, but the division
war diary ends in December 1942.118
Communications between the multiple levels of command reveal much through
their tone and use of language. A study of military culture must be a study of language.
Therefore, I quote liberally from the directives, orders, telegrams, and reports of the
various commanders. It is important to note that, while quotations within this work are
usually attributed to the commanding officer who signed the original document in
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question, in many cases the documents themselves were authored by staff officers. The
choice of language in their writing thus reflects upon more than a handful of elite
personalities, but broadly upon entire command staffs and, taken together, upon career
officers of the Italian army in general.

Levels of Analysis
I examine each case study according to three overarching themes or levels of analysis:
political-legal; ideological-cultural; and, military-strategic. These themes have been
drawn from the vast body of scholarship on German occupation policy and behaviour
during the Second World War, especially on the eastern front. If Mussolini’s vision of
empire spanned northeast Africa and the Balkans, Hitler’s major imperial objectives were
in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Scholarship on the eastern front has grappled
with the issue of a regular army’s involvement in ideologically driven expansion and
occupation policies, debunking the myth that the Wehrmacht was an apolitical institution
that adhered to international law and emerged from the war with “clean hands.”119 At the
same time, scholars have highlighted the nuanced behaviour and motivations within the
Wehrmacht. Even in the east, there was considerable room for regional variation. For
example, compared to the overbearing Nazi civil administration further to the rear, the
military administration in Ukraine proved more lenient in its approach, at least towards
Ukrainians.120 In northwest Russia, where the Soviet partisan movement was slow to
develop and where relatively few Jews were present, German security divisions tended to
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balance their use of the carrot and the stick.121 Local conditions and the personal views of
commanders and their staffs also resulted in variation between units on occupation
duty.122 At the lowest level of analysis, individual officers and soldiers reflected different
motivations and frames of reference that influenced their behaviour.123
The overall picture that has emerged of the Wehrmacht in the east is complex and
hardly black-and-white. This is worth bearing in mind when drawing the inevitable
comparisons between Italian and German policies and behaviour. One must avoid the
temptation to stretch evidence to show that the Italian army matched up to supposedly
monolithic German levels of brutality. Nor should Italian violence be dismissed as benign
— quantitatively and ideologically — in comparison. Nonetheless, there is broad
agreement in the German case that the room for nuance and variation in the Wehrmacht’s
practices ultimately was restricted by higher-level Nazi policy, which — through the
interference of Nazi Party agencies and the SS, vying for power in their colonial dream
world, and through Hitler’s personal role as final arbiter in policy debates — favoured
radicalization. Whether Italian occupation functioned in a similar way in Fascism’s
imagined colonial space is at the heart of the “working towards the Duce” debate.
The first level of analysis adopted here, then, deals with the political and legal
framework within which military field commands functioned. In the German case,
directives from Berlin undoubtedly steered occupation in the east towards mass murder.
Hitler’s anti-Semitism and quest for Lebensraum were at the heart of his motives for
invading the Soviet Union. The “criminal orders” issued by Wehrmacht chief Wilhelm
Keitel on Hitler’s behalf prior to the invasion reflected these objectives, bestowing the
campaign and occupation with an ideological character from the outset. They demanded
the immediate execution of Communist commissars and they unshackled German
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personnel from the bonds of international law. Higher-level directives immediately
defined the campaign as a “war of extermination” [Vernichtungskrieg] against JudeoBolshevism.124 However, there was no preordained blueprint for the implementation of
policy or for the organization and administration of occupied territory. Hitler lacked a
coherent vision in these practical respects and permitted the chaotic coexistence of
multiple and sometimes contradictory practices throughout occupied Europe. The Nazi
Party, the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the Foreign Ministry, economic
agencies, the various branches of the SS, and the armed forces all had different opinions
on occupation policy, for personal, institutional, jurisdictional, and tactical reasons.125
It is necessary to ask several questions in order to come to grips with the political
and legal context of a military occupation undertaken by a totalitarian regime. First, what
direct orders or policy guidelines did local military commanders receive from central
political and military authorities? Second, how much autonomy did military authorities
enjoy in the territories under their jurisdiction, and to what extent were they allowed to
develop their own policies? Third, what impact did relations between military authorities
and local political functionaries have upon occupation policy, and to what degree did
these relations reflect the level of affinity between the military institution and the central
political leadership?
The second level of analysis draws from scholarly efforts to provide a bottom-up
approach to understanding the motivation of German troops on the eastern front. Led by
the work of Omer Bartov, these studies have evaluated the extent to which the rank-andfile shared or became indoctrinated with the same ideologies that influenced higher-level
policy in the east. Therefore, they have focused in part on the propaganda disseminated
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by the state and military to the common soldier, testing its impact based on official
reports, memoir literature, diaries, and personal correspondence.126 For the purposes of
the present study, interested in the military culture of career officers, the selection and
distribution of propaganda are of primary importance. To what extent was the army
involved in the production of propaganda, and to what extent did the messages
promulgated by military authorities reinforce those emanating from the political
leadership? Did the army employ ideological themes in an attempt to indoctrinate its
soldiers, and how did its propaganda portray their mission, their enemies, and the civilian
populations in occupied territory? In this latter respect, propaganda for the troops played
an integral part of occupation policy; but literature on Italian occupation policies has
largely neglected the field of propaganda.127 A rigorous study of the army’s propaganda
— taking into account the instruments of propaganda available to the military, as well as
the content, form, and reception of the propaganda itself — can break new ground in the
debate over the Fascistization of the Italian armed forces.128
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In evaluating the German army’s behaviour in the east, “history from below” has
focused not only upon the ideological indoctrination of the officers and troops, but upon
the impact that local conditions had on their behaviour. Bartov argues that the Wehrmacht
became increasingly reliant on ideological themes in its propaganda as conditions in the
east worsened. German soldiers grew more susceptible to such propaganda as they
became brutalized by heavy casualties, primitive conditions, and the perversion of
discipline on the eastern front.129 But an analysis of local conditions — environmental,
logistical, and military — has led others to downplay the role of ideology, pointing to
other factors that led mid-level commands and their troops to conform to harsh Nazi
policies. Chief among these factors, at least in rear areas, was the level of partisan
resistance perceived and encountered by security forces in their zones of occupation.130
The third theme for analysis, then, focuses on the military response to resistance;
that is, on counterinsurgency strategy. Alexander Statiev’s study of Soviet anti-guerrilla
warfare in the immediate postwar period provides five elements of strategy that can be
analyzed to evaluate any counterinsurgency: the use of intelligence to identify causes of
unrest; the use of political-social incentives and propaganda to win over elements of the
population; the use of local auxiliaries to free up resources and gain collaboration; the use
of conventional forces, their adjustment to guerrilla warfare, and their level of discipline;
and, the treatment of captured insurgents and the application of collective reprisals to
force the submission of further hostile groups.131 A thematic focus on these five aspects
of strategy provides a means to discern between local exceptions and institutional norms
in behaviour. Did the military follow a doctrine in its repression of revolt, and to what
extent did its strategy converge with political and ideological interests from above?
Working within a self-proclaimed totalitarian system that exalted violence, how reliant
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was the army on the use of violence and terror to achieve its objectives? To what extent
did military units adhere to higher-level policies governing the application of violence?
It is difficult to evaluate, in quantitative or qualitative terms, the level of violence
actually meted out against civilians in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia. Italian statistics rarely
included figures for “civilian” deaths, but it is clear that civilians were targeted by Italian
forces. International law at the time vaguely permitted hostage-taking and reprisals
against civilians that resisted occupying forces.132 There are numerous cases where the
numbers of “rebels” reported killed by the Italians during anti-partisan operations were
disproportionately greater than Italian casualties or the number of weapons recovered
afterwards. This tendency exists in German documentation as well, and has been taken as
an indication that civilians were included in the overall figures, with the caveat that other
factors also contributed to statistical discrepancies. These included the intentional or
unintentional exaggeration of casualty reports, the practice of insurgents to retrieve or
bury weapons before retreating, and the often poor level of armament of the partisans.133
Finally, in order to identify the motives behind violent excesses, it is useful to distinguish
between “hot” violence, arising as an immediate response to the brutality of combat, and
“cold” violence, or “atrocity by policy,” in accordance with calculated directives from
above.134 While instances of the former may provide indications of troop discipline and
morale, the latter can shed light upon institutional attitudes towards repression.

Each case study is organized around these three distinct levels of analysis. The first
chapter of each case study examines the legal and political framework of the occupation.
In Ethiopia, this framework was overtly colonial in nature and it reflected the ideological
importance granted by the Fascist regime to its East African enterprise. The Fascist
regime imposed a hastily conceived but strictly defined model of administration that
theoretically limited the freedom of the military authorities. However, the rise of guerrilla
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resistance, the failure of Fascist colonization, and events in Europe gave the military
greater authority in Ethiopia than the Fascist regime intended. Mussolini eventually
accepted this state of affairs and permitted the administration in East Africa to diverge in
part from his initial precepts. The situation in Yugoslavia was similarly ambiguous. The
context of global war meant that strategic and military interests predominated, yet the
power of the occupying military authorities was challenged by their German and Croatian
allies, and by Italian civil functionaries with conflicting objectives. Again, military
circumstances ensured that the army played a major political role in the occupation. In
both case studies, the Italian army became fully involved in the implementation of
policies imbued with ideological connotations. Despite its disputes with Fascist
authorities, the army’s policies conformed to the broader objectives of the regime.
The second chapter in each case study examines the propaganda apparatus and
themes employed by the army to maintain troop morale. In Italian East Africa, military
authorities produced little print propaganda of their own, but they ensured that personnel
were provided daily newspapers and other periodicals published by private or Fascist
agencies. These adopted the language of traditional colonialism, presenting the Italian
invasion and occupation as a “civilizing mission.” Efforts to spread a colonial mentality
among Italian officials in Africa leaned heavily on racist depictions of the local
populations, whether friend or foe, that justified oppressive Fascist policies and brutal
methods of repression. In Yugoslavia, the Italian army had greater control over the
information that reached its troops, eventually producing propaganda literature of its
own. Yet, here too, military propaganda conformed more or less completely to the
overarching themes prescribed by the Fascist regime. While not exalting the regime to the
same extent as Fascist propaganda organs, the army explained the occupation to its troops
in ideological terms, emphasizing themes of irredentism, imperialism, racism, and anticommunism. The army’s propaganda displayed an obsession with hunting down and
killing partisans, a conscious effort to brutalize Italian troops for anti-guerrilla warfare.
The final chapter of each case study focuses on the techniques employed by the
Italian armed forces in counterinsurgency. In Ethiopia, military authorities
enthusiastically followed Mussolini’s initial directives that demanded the harsh treatment
of “rebels” and the populations that supported them. The type of operations conducted in
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East Africa varied over time, but brutality and terror were hallmarks of Italian policy
from the outset. Violence reached a crescendo in the middle part of the occupation, after
which Rome permitted a more restrained policy based partly on attracting local
populations. However, by this point, it proved difficult to reverse behaviour at lower
levels of command. In Yugoslavia, the army initially employed a lenient approach that
grew more violent in disproportionate response to the development of Partisan resistance.
In both cases, the army tended to rely on overwhelming force in its anti-guerrilla
operations, which often proved ineffective and conducive to excesses or collateral
damage. In both cases, unsupervised irregular troops — viewed with disdain by most
Italian commanders — contributed to the escalation of brutality. Italian intelligence and
propaganda for the local populations were clouded by colonial and racist stereotypes.
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PART I. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE: ETHIOPIA

Figure 1. Italian East Africa, 1937 (Governorates and Commissariats)
Source: ASMAE, MAI, pos. 181/43, fasc. 209.
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1

An Ambiguous Precedent

The invasion of Ethiopia on 2 October 1935 marked a turning point for Italian Fascism,
ushering in its “imperial-colonialist phase” which ended in disaster with the Second
World War. Ethiopia became the focal point of Mussolini’s “relaunched” cultural
revolution. Experience in Ethiopia was intended to transform Italians into a brutal warrior
race conscious of its dominion over others and fully integrated into the Fascist state.1 For
the Fascist regime, the conquest and colonization of Ethiopia was supposed to form the
precedent for future behaviour, not just in Africa but in Europe as well.
The Italian army by necessity was at the forefront of this revolution. Its generals
directed the invasion and commanded the troops who were to be transformed by battle.2
After the “conquest,” the army maintained a strong presence in East Africa. For the next
five years, its officers filled many of the posts in the civil administration of the empire
and were constantly employed in operations to occupy the realm and quell resistance. The
Italian failure to pacify the territory of the new empire and the subsequent need to
maintain between 200,000 and 400,000 metropolitan and colonial troops in East Africa
meant that the Italian presence there in many ways resembled a conventional military
occupation more than a typical colonial one.3
Nonetheless, Italian military authorities operated within a complex legal and
political framework designed to limit their freedom of action. The Regio Esercito did not
function in East Africa as an institution. Rather, all personnel in East Africa, whether
civilian or military, answered to the Ministry of Colonies — in 1937 renamed the
Ministry of Italian Africa — in Rome.4 The intended purpose of this arrangement was to
1
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provide the Fascist regime a greater level of control over colonial occupation policy.
Consequently, as governors and district administrators, army personnel found themselves
fully involved in the implementation of Fascist political, socio-economic, and racial
measures.
Higher-level directives set the tone for the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. They
defined the living conditions in the empire and undoubtedly fuelled Ethiopian resistance
against the colonizers. To an extent, direction from Rome limited the independence of
command of the military authorities, but for the most part Italian officers had few
problems conforming to Fascist styles of rule based largely on a racist mentality. The
frequent disputes between military officials and Fascist civil functionaries were
jurisdictional, tactical, or personal in nature and tended not to involve policy objectives or
ideology.
At the same time, an examination of higher-level policies and the relationship
between military governors in Ethiopia and the regime in Rome reveals a considerable
lack of clarity regarding precisely what defined the Fascist style of rule. The
inconsistency and uncertainty that typified Italian Fascism extended to the imperial
context. The hasty implementation of a legal framework for the empire, the high degree
of local variation in East Africa, and the vast distance separating Addis Ababa from
Rome meant that actual policy on the ground most frequently represented a combination
of Fascist direction and local improvisation. Furthermore, Mussolini himself apparently
reversed course in 1938, when he replaced Rodolfo Graziani as viceroy with the far more
liberal Duke of Aosta. If the colonization of Ethiopia was meant to establish a precedent
for future behaviour, in practice it set a remarkably ambiguous precedent.

Haste and Improvisation
The legal framework within which Italian commanders operated in East Africa was the
result of hasty decision-making in Rome. In large part this was due to Mussolini’s
impatience to kick-start the stagnant Fascist cultural revolution through imperialism, to
bolster Italian national prestige in the face of hostile foreign opinion, and to glean
immediate economic and strategic benefits from his conquests. The legislation that
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established the Fascist empire proved dysfunctional and unrealistic. The regime’s
impatience effectively saddled Italian military authorities on the ground with the political
responsibilities of building an empire well before military pacification, or even
occupation, had been achieved.
Alongside ideological imperatives, the most immediate cause for Mussolini’s
declaration of empire was international relations. When Italian troops entered Addis
Ababa on 5 May 1936, two-thirds of the country remained unoccupied and several
Ethiopian armies continued to resist. Nonetheless, Mussolini rushed to announce an end
to hostilities and to declare the annexation of Ethiopia and the formation of an Italian
empire in East Africa. With Britain expected to extend economic sanctions against Italy
on 11 May, Mussolini hoped to confront the League of Nations with a fait accompli and
gain an end to sanctions by declaring the war over.5 On 9 May, a royal decree affirmed
Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia which, along with Eritrea and Somalia, was placed
under the charge of a governor general with the title “Viceroy of Ethiopia.” King Vittorio
Emanuele III assumed the title “King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia.”6 It was further
hoped that the sudden formal declaration of an empire would prompt the international
community to officially recognize the Italian conquest, again via fait accompli. Foreign
powers would effectively recognize Italian control over Ethiopia as soon as they signed
multilateral agreements or accepted the credentials of Italian ambassadors naming the
Italian king Emperor of Ethiopia.7
The League of Nations repealed its economic sanctions against Italy on 15 July,
but the formal recognition of the Italian empire was not so readily forthcoming.8 Rome’s
need to escape diplomatic isolation had a direct impact on its directives to military
authorities in East Africa during the first year of empire. The army had to make the
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empire, at this point existing only on paper, a reality. Officially, the Italian Foreign
Ministry assured foreign ambassadors that the situation in Ethiopia was calm and
pacified.9 In reality, the Ministry of Colonies bombarded the viceroy in Addis Ababa
with orders to accelerate the physical occupation of the rest of the empire, specifically in
order to obtain recognition from foreign states. The Colonial Minister also asked the
viceroy to provide public statements on the tranquility of life in the empire.10
The increasing likelihood of Italian participation in a war against France or
Britain also urged haste upon colonial authorities. As Mussolini’s programme for
domination of the Mediterranean made headway, Britain became Italy’s most likely
enemy in a future war.11 Relations between the two countries were strained even more by
Mussolini’s intervention in the Spanish civil war and the creation of the Rome-Berlin
Axis in October 1936. Since Ethiopia was bordered on three sides by British colonies,
this was of particular concern to Italian military planners. In the event of a European war,
the Italian Supreme Commission for Defence expected East Africa to be self-sufficient,
capable of defending itself, taking the offensive, and even contributing to operations in
Europe.12 As the viceroy pointed out, self-sufficiency required the rapid development of
communications, industry, and agriculture in Ethiopia.13 Furthermore, Mussolini called
for the formation of a “black army” of 300,000 men — seven times Italy’s peacetime
complement of colonial troops — by 1940 to challenge other colonial powers.14 Strategic
considerations and objectives added further impetus for the swift military, economic, and
racial organization of the Italian empire.
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Italian East Africa thus was formed with immediate diplomatic and strategic
objectives in mind, without first having occupied all the territory of the realm and without
having properly studied its cultural, political, and economic makeup. On 1 June 1936,
less than one month after the annexation of Ethiopia, a second royal decree formalized
more fully the legal foundations and territorial organization of the new empire. Known as
the legge organica, historians blame it for much of Italy’s woes in East Africa. Because
the Colonial Ministry did not know until the final stages of the war whether Italy would
rule Ethiopia directly or as a mandate, it had no plans for administering the new territory.
Once direct rule became a given, Alberto Sbacchi argues, “the Legge Organica was
framed in Italy by people who could theorize over the organization of Ethiopia but did
not grasp the practical problems.”15 For Giorgio Rochat, the administrative system
imposed in East Africa was the end result of Mussolini’s irrational pursuit of prestige.
Prestige demanded that boundaries and legislation be drawn up immediately, that Italian
authorities refuse to collaborate or compromise with traditional elites, and that Mussolini
appear to direct colonial policy personally.16 Matteo Dominioni agrees that the legge
organica was not based on learned studies, but on the ideological whims of Mussolini
and his undersecretary at the Colonial Ministry, Alessandro Lessona, who knew nothing
of Ethiopia. Dominioni contends that the Fascist legislation had a major impact on
subsequent events and on rebellion in Ethiopia in that it alienated Ethiopian elites and
failed to respect local traditions.17
The legge organica divided Italian East Africa into six provinces or governorates.
The original Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somalia were enlarged and made up two of
the governorates. The remnants of the Abyssinian empire were divided between four new
governorates: Amhara in the north, with its capital at Gondar; Harar in the southeast;
Galla Sidamo in the west; and the miniscule Governorate of Addis Ababa — enlarged
and renamed the Governorate of Shewa in November 1938 — which formed a distinct
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municipal administration around the capital of the empire. Governorates were further
divided into commissariats, which were subdivided into districts known as residencies
[residenze] and vice-residencies.18
The hasty organization of the empire resulted in territorial boundaries that did not
always correspond to ethnic, economic, or political realities. The region was so vast and
diverse that a rational distribution of territory required a level of study and consideration
for which the impatient Fascist regime did not allow. The culturally and politically
dominant Amhara inhabited the northern and central plateaus of Ethiopia, whereas
southern regions were populated by Somali, Danakil, Sidamo, and Oromo — who the
Italians referred to as Galla, now considered derogatory — peoples. Linguistic diversity
was even greater, with populations speaking Semitic languages (such as Amharic,
Tigrinya, Harari, and Arabic), Cushitic tongues (including Beja, Agau, Saho, Afar,
Somali, Oromo, and Sidamo), as well as some Nilotic languages. The two dominant
religions were Coptic Orthodox Christianity and Islam.19 The Italians were aware of the
heterogeneous nature of their empire, but were unable to address it effectively.
Governors of Amhara repeatedly deemed it necessary to reorganize the territory
of their governorate. In October 1936, General Alessandro Pirzio Biroli attempted to
redraw political boundaries along historical, geographic, and economic lines. He divided
Amhara into five commissariats with a total of twenty-five residencies and sixty-three
vice-residencies between them. However, since Pirzio Biroli lacked any proper
cartographic studies of Amhara, he avoided defining any boundaries in absolute terms.20
By the time Ottorino Mezzetti replaced Pirzio Biroli as governor in 1938, jurisdictional
boundaries had still not been mapped. Mezzetti proposed another territorial
reorganization to split up unwieldy large commissariats that his predecessor had
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created.21 According to Mezzetti, “the political evil from which Amhara suffers is the
insufficient political organization of the periphery.” Italian centres of government were
too far from the population — sometimes beyond 150 kilometres distant — and political
boundaries did not coincide with local economic needs. Mezzetti’s solution was a costly
programme of re-staffing and road building that failed to resolve the problem.22 By 1939,
the five commissariats that Pirzio Biroli started with had become thirteen. Nonetheless, a
third governor, Luigi Frusci, complained that Amhara’s territorial boundaries had been
drawn up along ethnic lines instead of economic and political ones, so that local needs
could not be met. Frusci created a new level of command by distributing the
commissariats into four sectors, but the advent of the Second World War interrupted his
efforts.23
As the Amhara border question demonstrates, the rapid formation of Italian East
Africa burdened governors with structural problems that could not easily be overcome.
Perhaps the most serious consequence of the regime’s haste involved administrative
personnel. Italian administration was plagued at once by too strong an effort of
centralization by the Fascist regime and a shortage of qualified personnel to carry out
Rome’s orders. Combined with the constant state of rebellion in Ethiopia, the practical
result was that the military played a larger role than envisioned by Fascist planners.
According to the legge organica, the governor general, or viceroy, was the
highest political and military authority in Italian East Africa. He answered exclusively to
the Ministry of Colonies and was responsible for overseeing the execution of ministerial
orders as well as coordinating Italian armed forces in the theatre. The three viceroys
between 1936 and 1940 were all military men. Pietro Badoglio was Chief of the Armed
Forces’ General Staff and, like his successor, Rodolfo Graziani, had commanded and
governed in Libya. Like all Italian royals, Graziani’s replacement, the Duke of Aosta, had
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a military background. After participating in the reconquest of Libya, he transferred from
the artillery to the air force and commanded an air division before his appointment as
governor general.24 Each governorate was ruled by a governor nominated by the Colonial
Ministry. Governors also tended to be military men who represented the ethos of the
Regio Esercito. All three governors of Amhara were army generals. The more peaceful
Governorate of Harar was under the command of General Guglielmo Nasi until May
1939, followed by a civilian, Enrico Cerulli, until the outbreak of the Second World War.
The governors applied the general political, administrative, and military directives issued
by the viceroy and Ministry of Colonies. In theory, this system required all decisions to
be made in Rome, with the viceroy and governors acting as mere functionaries.25
With 4,500 kilometres separating Rome from Addis Ababa, such an arrangement
was not practical. Experienced governors had to conform to sweeping directives from
Rome that did not always appreciate local conditions. On the other hand, more junior and
inexperienced personnel had a great deal of autonomy and political responsibility as local
administrators. It was impossible for individual governors, let alone the Minister of
Colonies in Rome, to centralize control over the vast territorial network of commissariats
and residencies. As the face of Italian dominion over Ethiopia, local administrators —
commissioners, residents, and vice-residents — had important responsibilities. For Nasi,
the resident was akin to an “apostle,” preaching on his feet by visiting villages in his
jurisdiction and making personal contact with the populations. It was a position that
demanded a keen ability to take the “pulse” of the indigenous population, to juggle Italian
imperatives and local customs so as to avoid misunderstandings, and to be firm without
being threatening.26 It was a position for which most functionaries were not prepared.
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The hasty formation of a massive colonial bureaucratic apparatus left qualified
civilian personnel stretched thin. Despite the steady growth of the colonial bureaucracy
under Fascism, the number of functionaries needed to exercise direct rule over a territory
as large and as populous as Ethiopia dwarfed the Colonial Ministry’s previous allocations
for Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia. Thanks to the Liberal legacy of empire on the cheap and
to Fascist disinterest in rational planning, there was no suitable training programme in
place to bridge the gap.27 A 1938 report to the Duke of Aosta commented that lower
levels of the colonial administration were staffed by “incompetents” [incapaci], inexpert
in African matters and too frequently concerned more with lining their own pockets than
performing public duties.28 Pirzio Biroli had recognized this deficiency in Amhara at the
end of 1936. He therefore tried to assign his best officers to residencies, admitting that
vice-residencies were staffed by personnel who were “not entirely prepared for
independent commands.”29
Considerations of competence aside, Pirzio Biroli did not have enough civilian
functionaries to fill all the posts in his governorate. As a result, he had to appoint many
army officers, mostly reservists, as district administrators.30 From the outset, government
organs in Amhara were made up largely of army officers from the disbanded Eritrean
Corps that had taken part in the invasion of Ethiopia.31 The lack of personnel and the
spread of rebellion prompted governors of Amhara at times to combine military and civil
powers in the hands of the same person. For example, the military zone commander
might also be a civil commissioner, or a garrison commander could administer a
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residency.32 The preponderance of military personnel among colonial functionaries
typified Italian colonial practices since the Liberal era.33 Colonial administration thus
represented a military occupation as much as a civil Fascist enterprise.
Administration in the relatively tranquil Governorate of Harar was also heavily
militarized. Hampered by tight budgets, Nasi had to suspend recruitment of civilian
officials, instead plucking officers from military commands. Even so, by the end of June
1937, ten vice-residencies in Harar remained vacant.34 Statistics from October 1938 are
even more revealing: of 8 commissioners, only 3 were civilian functionaries; of 23
residents, 5 were civilians; and, of 33 vice-residents, 8 were civilians. Residencies were
normally held by captains; vice-residences usually by lieutenants or even second
lieutenants.35 Throughout the empire, military personnel played a disproportionately large
role in the civil administration without receiving any special linguistic, cultural, or
political training for their new tasks. Nasi feared that the deficiency in personnel
combined with the constant growth of the administrative apparatus “risks compromising,
or, at the least, setting back the good results that one has reason to expect in the political
and economic field.”36
Not surprisingly, given the high degree of local autonomy and the haphazard way
by which colonial officials came upon their charges, corruption was rampant. The
situation in Amhara was particularly bad. The frequent misuse of government positions
and resources compelled incoming Governor Mezzetti to launch a widespread purge
through the governorate, part of a broader purge ordered by the Duke of Aosta to rid the
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empire of corruption.37 In Harar, Nasi repeatedly found it necessary to issue missives
against corruption. These included gentle reminders that Italian functionaries were not
permitted to conduct business, speculation, or to accept bribes. Nasi was convinced that
colonial officials were skimming from public funds and exploiting the illiteracy of their
African clientele by doling out less in subsidies than they recorded in their ledgers. Given
the delicate security situation in East Africa, Nasi considered corruption a serious threat
to the prestige of government representatives, who risked being seen by the indigenous
population as no different from their old masters.38 He publicized the court martial of two
officers for corruption and, later, the repatriation of a vice-resident for misappropriation
of public funds.39 Nasi also tried to lead by example and gained a reputation for being
overly thrifty.40 Despite his efforts, by September 1938 Nasi still complained of “gold
fever” within Harar’s administrative apparatus and of his need to punish far too many
officials for corruption and misconduct.41
Corruption and lack of training were closely related to a tendency among lowerlevel administrators towards arbitrary behaviour. Carabiniere Colonel Angelo Cerica
deemed this combination of factors partly responsible for the outbreak of revolt in Shewa
and Amhara in 1937. Commissioners and residents either lacked the training or the
“cultural basis” to conduct government functions, they were too young, or they were
“inclined, simply, to make ends meet, taking as much advantage as possible from their
position.” The result, according to Cerica, was an array of weak, autocratic, or morally
compromised officials who treated their isolated posts as personal fiefdoms.42
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The most infamous example of this latter type of official was Captain Gioacchino
Corvo, whom Cerica singled out for sparking revolt in the Commissariat of Gojam in
Amhara. Corvo was resident of Bahir Dar from March 1937 to January 1938, during
which time he became subject to a long list of accusations. These included:
miscegenation; the excessive taxation of the population; the arbitrary administration of
justice; the personal administration of public floggings and beatings; administrative
improprieties; unwarranted mass executions; brutal methods of execution, including the
drowning of victims in Lake Tana; the burning of villages and the execution of their
inhabitants; the execution of loyal collaborators; and, the execution of elites and their
followers, including a twelve-year-old boy. Perhaps most telling, however, is that the
results of the official inquiry into Corvo’s actions were inconclusive. The inquiry
confirmed that most of the accusations were real, but also that there were mitigating
factors at play. Chief among these was that Corvo was not unique among colonial
functionaries. The report found that Corvo did not bear sole responsibility within his
residency and that he largely conformed to higher-level policy.43 Moreover, Cerica
considered displays of weakness to be equally damaging.44 Neither the autonomy of local
administrators nor their provenance from the Regio Esercito prevented them from
functioning in a typically arrogant and violent “fascist” style, and the colonial military
leadership was reluctant to restrict the application of fear and terror altogether.
The frequent conflicts of interest that occurred between Italian military officers
and civil authorities from the Ministry of Colonies or the Fascist Party must be
understood in this light and should not automatically be conflated with a fundamental
ideological divide between them. Animosity between rival agencies characterized other
totalitarian regimes and Mussolini’s was no different. During the invasion of Ethiopia,
relations between the leadership of the Italian army on one hand and Fascist party
officials and militia commanders on the other were strained. Mussolini considered the
participation of MVSN divisions necessary for propaganda reasons, depicting the war as
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a popular and voluntary one fought with Fascist spirit. The army opposed their
deployment as a dispersal of resources — the Regio Esercito had to outfit the seven
Blackshirt divisions with both equipment and officers — and a threat to the army’s
autonomy. In the end, political meddling won out, but Badoglio kept a tight leash on
MVSN units. Army officers and soldiers despised the militia as volunteers who never had
to experience the deprivations of barrack life, who received favourable treatment from
the press, and who supposedly received better pay whilst being spared from heavy
fighting.45
The period of occupation after the conquest was characterized by animosity
between military authorities and civilian or Fascist party officials. Army officers jokingly
referred to functionaries of the Ministry of Italian Africa as members of the “Swiss navy”
— based on their white uniforms and the notion that they were about as useful as a navy
was to a land-locked country — an epithet which Nasi hoped to purge from the colonial
vocabulary.46 The situation eventually forced Graziani to issue a directive on the matter,
defining more clearly the jurisdictions of regional political and military authorities.
Forwarding the directive to his commands, Pirzio Biroli urged his military and civil
officials to work “with a spirit of understanding, consciousness, and collaboration.”47 No
doubt, one reason for jurisdictional quibbles was that many of the civil authorities were
also military men that felt competent to handle military affairs. In 1938, Nasi punished a
garrison commander and a vice-resident, also an army officer, with repatriation and ten
days arrest for not being able to get along on the job.48 The fact that fellow army officers
also failed to get along suggests that disputes were not primarily ideological in nature.
Higher-level disagreements too were based on jurisdictional conflict. In 1938, the
Court of Auditors [Corte dei conti] in Rome tried to impose the legge organica in Harar,
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declaring that commissioners and residents should all be civilian officials. Nasi
responded that such an order lacked any “adherence to reality”; military officers took up
four-fifths of those positions and without them “the entire state machinery would come to
a halt.” Nasi pointed out that the first phase of any colonial occupation was military; he
warned against rushing to normalization.49 The latter comment was clearly opposed to
Rome’s demands for the rapid establishment of a colonial apparatus in Ethiopia, but the
conflict stemmed from concerns in Rome that the army wielded too much influence in
East Africa.
On the other hand, the army complained when civilian administrators overstepped
their bounds and encroached upon military prerogatives. General Quirino Armellini —
the commander of troops in Amhara who three years later would find himself embroiled
in a bitter jurisdictional dispute with a Fascist governor in Yugoslavia — cast much of
the blame for a military disaster on the resident of Bichena for not observing proper
jurisdictional channels. Displaying “either an excessive and condemnable spirit of
authority or a lack of regard for what were his duties,” the resident ordered the garrison
commander of Debre Werk to go to the aid of a village besieged by rebels. The resident,
who according to Armellini should have limited himself to informing the garrison of the
threat and signalling the commissariat and sector commanders for instructions, neglected
to share vital intelligence on the whereabouts and size of the rebel forces. In an act of
imprudent generosity, the garrison heeded the resident’s orders and quickly found itself
surrounded by rebels. Five Italian officers, one Italian non-commissioned officer, and
thirty-seven colonial troops were killed in the ensuing battle, which also resulted in the
loss of the battalion’s standard.50
Personal matters could exacerbate jurisdictional disputes, at times culminating in
charges against an official’s Fascist credentials. For example, the head of the Fascist
Party office in Gondar accused Governor Mezzetti of “animosity towards the
Blackshirts,” which he denied vehemently, pointing out that his wife had been dubbed
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“Mother of the Blackshirts.” According to Mezzetti, the feud stemmed instead from his
decision to fix Gondar as the capital of Amhara — whereas certain civilian personnel had
vested economic interests in its transfer to a new location — and to his recent purges.
Mezzetti admitted to treating severely any functionaries, whether belonging to the regular
army or to the militia, whom he deemed “pusillanimous, dishonest, or altogether
incompetent.” Indeed, Mezzetti had personal clashes with other army generals, including
Pietro Maletti, one of Graziani’s close collaborators.51
Jurisdictional and personal considerations also lay behind the well-documented
series of disputes between Viceroy Graziani and Minister Lessona between 1936 and
1937. Graziani’s biographers portray him, first and foremost, as a careerist and arriviste
who enjoyed an ambiguous relationship with Italian Fascism. More than to the party or
ideology — but also more than to the King — Graziani was personally loyal to
Mussolini, primarily because the Duce’s position made him the arbiter of Graziani’s
destiny. Nonetheless, his Fascist credentials could not be disputed. In his speeches and
writings during the early 1930s, Graziani praised the regime’s imperial programme and
declared his principles “clearly fascist.”52 As Rochat argues, Graziani was a true Fascist
in that he was not part of the monarchist “establishment” in the Regio Esercito.53 He
remained loyal to Mussolini after 1943 and became Minister of Defence in the Salò
Republic. After the war, he was the honorary president of the neo-fascist Movimento
sociale italiano.54
In Ethiopia, Graziani enjoyed a strong relationship with the civilian governor of
Addis Ababa, Alfredo Siniscalchi, who referred to Graziani as “our beloved viceroy.” He
also lauded the viceroy’s role in establishing a Fascist Party branch in the capital, for
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which Graziani earned the sobriquet of “first Fascist of the Empire.”55 But, whereas
Graziani got along well with most civilian and party officials in East Africa, his
relationship with Lessona in Rome was a rocky one. Despite both being avowed Fascists,
Lessona and Graziani disagreed on many aspects of policy. Angelo Del Boca attributes
their conflict to the differing conditions under which they worked — Graziani, after all,
found himself in Addis Ababa surrounded by 20,000 rebels — and to a clash of
personalities.56 Indeed, both were confrontational figures. Graziani was particularly
sensitive to personal slights and apt to hold a grudge. He rejected Lessona’s proposal to
appoint Ugo Cavallero as his second in command, primarily on the grounds that the two
generals hated one another.57 Graziani also had a spat with General Ettore Bastico in
October 1936, when the latter published an article in Il Popolo d’Italia which failed to
mention Graziani’s role in the conquest of Ethiopia.58 The seeds of his personal dislike
for Lessona may have been sown by the Colonial Minister’s opposition to Graziani’s
candidacy to command the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. According to Lessona, Graziani
sent his wife to lobby on his behalf, but Lessona told her that Graziani’s lack of training
or experience as a commander of large conventional military units made him unsuited to
the task.59 Lessona later tried to prevent Graziani from succeeding Badoglio as supreme
commander in Ethiopia.60 For his part, Lessona gained a reputation among other Fascist
leaders, including the Foreign Minister, Galeazzo Ciano, as a troublemaker and ingrate.61
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His own memoirs are replete with episodes of internal rivalries and power struggles
between himself, the army, and other Fascist leaders and ministries.62
The chief debates between Graziani and Lessona largely boiled down to
disagreements over jurisdictional competencies. Graziani complained to Mussolini that
Lessona had effectively decentralized the empire by creating “five republics
[governorates] under the Ministry of Colonies.” Graziani hoped to remove some of the
limitations imposed by the legge organica on his powers as viceroy and gain control over
communication between Rome and the provincial governors. However, Mussolini
confirmed his faith in Lessona and sent him on a trip to East Africa in hopes of patching
things up. The journey, during which Lessona’s train came under rebel fire, only made
matters worse.63
In 1937, Lessona sought further to reduce Graziani’s influence and to strengthen
that of his Ministry by establishing a special colonial police force. Prior to that year, the
carabinieri reali — the Italian military police — carried out much of the ordinary police
work in East Africa. As a branch of the Italian army, the carabinieri in East Africa were
under the direction of a high command attached directly to the viceroy’s office in Addis
Ababa. This command, and therefore Graziani, was responsible for the recruitment and
training of indigenous gendarmes [zaptié] as well as the deployment, discipline, and
promotion of personnel. The commander of troops in each governorate as well as local
garrison commanders could dispose of carabinieri detachments like any other military
unit. Furthermore, according to Graziani’s reading of the legge organica, the carabinieri
were responsible for ordinary policing functions for the maintenance of public order, an
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interpretation that the Colonial Ministry did not share.64 During the early stages, when
Italian forces were only beginning to occupy the western reaches of Ethiopia where
Italian colonial administration had not been established, Graziani entrusted the
carabinieri with some political functions. Lessona saw himself cut out of the chain of
command and Graziani was forced to defend his dispositions on the basis that they were
merely temporary and followed a practice commonly applied “in North Africa and
elsewhere in the infancy of conquest.”65
The language and policies of the commander of the carabinieri in East Africa,
Colonel Azolino Hazon, fell fully within the realm of Fascist orthodoxy. Hazon
established networks of local informants to report on public sentiment, he housed white
carabinieri in separate barracks from indigenous zaptié, and he affirmed his devotion to
Fascism’s imperial mission:
It is a duty of honour that we all must feel towards those who bathed this land in
their generous blood, it is a duty that we have towards the entire Branch
[carabinieri] and to ourselves; we who contributed with full passion to the
conquest of this Empire, we must defend it, take care of it, strengthen it, draw it
closer to us with the assiduous work of penetration and pacification, assuring it
security and order; it is only upon our organization that one can and must surely
base and develop the political-administrative system.66
Lessona’s objections to Hazon’s report — the underlined sections were highlighted in red
pencil by someone at the Colonial Ministry — had nothing to do with ideological
sentiment. There is no reason to believe that the carabinieri behaved any differently in
East Africa than the colonial police later did. Lessona’s main concern was that Hazon’s
office in Addis Ababa had too much autonomy and responsibility.
Lessona’s colonial police force — later called the Polizia dell’Africa Italiana
[PAI] — was established by law in June 1937 and was intended to take over the
maintenance of public order throughout Italian East Africa by the end of 1938. Granted
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“totalitarian functions” by the Duce, the colonial police was promised the funding
necessary to make it a strong institution “worthy of fascism and the Empire.” The
carabinieri were to limit themselves to military police work and were to be reduced to a
peacetime size of three companies.67 Hazon protested against this reduction in force size.
Since Italian East Africa was made up of six governorates with six troop commands, each
of the three carabinieri companies would have to be divided into two. The resulting
administrative confusion, he claimed, would make the allocation of funds and issuing of
orders less efficient. Hazon requested that six companies remain in East Africa,
especially given the regime’s plans to raise a “black army” of indigenous forces, which
would require twice as many military policemen.68 In fact, the carabinieri and colonial
police would continue to operate in parallel, resulting in overlapping jurisdictional
responsibilities that were never effectively solved.69
The conflict over the establishment of the colonial police is a further example of a
jurisdictional dispute between military and civil authorities that sprang from the hasty
formation of the empire and the need thereafter to improvise and adjust, both to realities
on the ground and to fluctuating institutional objectives. The army generals employed in
East Africa as governors or on gubernatorial staffs found themselves constrained by a
prematurely conceived legal framework, imposed by the Fascist regime’s haste to accrue
political and diplomatic benefits from its conquest. The foundational laws of the empire
curtailed their freedom of action in favour of oversight from Rome. In contrast, these
laws also required the establishment of a vast bureaucracy with a relatively high degree
of local autonomy. This presented Italian commanders with new problems in the form of
personnel shortages, incompetence, corruption, and jurisdictional quarrels which posed
difficulties for the execution of policy. Such issues plagued Italian leaders in Ethiopia
from the outset and never were resolved.
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Super Direct Rule
The legge organica provided for central control from Rome at the expense of the
autonomy of Italian governors. It also placed local administration in the hands of Italian
functionaries at the expense of traditional Ethiopian elites. Together, these characteristics
formed the basis for what Matteo Dominioni has called “super direct rule.” It set Fascist
imperialism apart from French and British models of indirect or direct rule, where civil
powers were either delegated to indigenous elites or placed in the hands of a powerful
and independent governor.70 The exclusion of native elites from administration stemmed
from Fascist racial thinking as well as Mussolini’s totalitarian objective of centralized
control.71 By seeking the complete political dissolution of indigenous societies, the model
of super direct rule was inherently genocidal and made violent resistance more likely to
occur.72 Scholars agree that the policy was a primary reason for the failure of Italian
colonialism in Ethiopia and that it represented a missed opportunity. The loyalty of the
great Ethiopian nobles, the rases, to the exiled Emperor Haile Selassie was questionable.
His efforts after 1930 to centralize Ethiopia’s government and administration had
alienated many traditional feudal elites without eradicating their influence in society.73
Mussolini could have exploited these sentiments; instead, he insisted on rule by the
catchphrase “no power to the ras” as the best demonstration of Fascist dynamism,
control, and strength.
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“No power to the ras”
At first, colonial military leaders were skeptical of the Duce’s programme. Towards the
end of the invasion of Ethiopia, the Italian army had directed propaganda towards local
elites and clergy in an attempt to win them over to the postwar administration.74 Between
May and July 1936, the Italian viceroys Badoglio and Graziani presented Mussolini with
alternatives to super direct rule. Badoglio provided two options for the political
organization of Ethiopia: direct rule or control by local intermediaries. Badoglio
conceded the possibility that the general population might respond better to direct rule,
but he suggested also that it would alienate traditional elites. On the other hand, co-opting
nobles through concessions to the old order would help normalize conditions and achieve
stability more rapidly. Rather than adhering rigidly to either model, Badoglio favoured
applying one method or the other based on the particular conditions of the various
territories. In addition, he believed that Italy could take advantage of the old state
institutions in Addis Ababa by incorporating the bureaucracy into the Italian
administrative system.75 Badoglio’s model, which would have given the viceroy and
governors considerable authority over decision-making and would have involved at least
some degree of collaboration with indigenous elites, did not fit Mussolini and Lessona’s
vision for super direct rule.
Badoglio’s plan had the support of Fulvio Suvich in the Foreign Ministry, who
thought that co-opting the Ethiopian nobility, possibly through the return of “purely
formal authority,” might speed the process of foreign recognition for the Italian empire.76
However, within a month, both Badoglio and Suvich had vacated their posts. Suvich was
sent as ambassador to Washington when Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini’s son in law, became
Minister of Foreign Affairs in June.77 His proposals having been rejected, Badoglio
claimed that the high altitude of Addis Ababa caused him respiratory problems, and he
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returned to a hero’s welcome in Rome. Badoglio reportedly took with him crates of
stolen artifacts and half the contents of the Bank of Ethiopia.78
Marshal Rodolfo Graziani took over the acting role of governor general upon
Badoglio’s departure on 21 May and he was formally named viceroy on 11 June 1936.79
Like his predecessor, Graziani initially was ambivalent towards the Colonial Ministry’s
desire to exclude Africans from administrative duties. Although claiming to have
followed similar policies towards elites in Libya, Graziani pointed out that the situation
was different in Ethiopia. With its rigidly structured feudal hierarchy, Italian authorities
in Ethiopia found themselves dealing with “the sons of kings, nephews of kings, sundry
princes, etc.” who pulled real weight, especially in the periphery. Graziani assured
Lessona that this would not prevent him from dealing with such personalities in “fascist
style” but, in response to the minister’s peremptory orders regarding the “total exclusion”
of former Abyssinian administrators from any charge, he complained that such rigid
directives limited his “freedom of action” to “exploit various and particular situations
towards the sole end to be reached, and that is pacification, disarmament, affirmation of
[our] rule.”80
The only official outlet for Ethiopian participation in the colonial administration
was the “Council of the Empire,” which according to the legge organica was supposed to
include six indigenous leaders — one representing each governorate — and meet at least
once a year. Graziani, initially unsure of which notables he could trust, failed to appoint
anyone to the council and, with the entrenchment of Rome’s policy of “no power to the
ras,” it never met.81 Although unable to involve former Abyssinian dignitaries and
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functionaries in the actual administration of territory, Graziani tried to maintain the
loyalty of collaborating notables by offering stipends generous enough to give them the
semblance of a “position of privilege.”82 However, Graziani complained that the men he
was able to woo through such means tended to be relative unknowns. The nobles with
real influence over the masses were the great feudal lords who were less willing to
renounce their old powers and privileges. Graziani blamed this latter group for instigating
a sudden revolt in July 1936, which for a time cut off Addis Ababa from the rest of the
empire. Graziani responded to the revolt with force, but afterwards he posed Mussolini
with two stark choices: “Either hold everywhere with force or collaborate for now in
some manner with the Chiefs [Capi].”83
However, the July revolts only reinforced Mussolini’s belief that Ethiopian elites
were not to be trusted. He informed Graziani that he would not modify his directives
regarding former rases and Abyssinian chiefs, “who simply must obey.” Instead, he
offered Graziani reinforcements from Libya.84 At the end of July, Graziani confirmed that
he would carry out the Duce’s directives faithfully, but he still asked for the freedom to
use alternative means to pacify the notables, pointing out that even Caesar’s conquests
had involved a combination of military and political activity. Graziani wrote, “I should
not be deprived of all the weapons that allow me to find a favourable solution to the
problem.”85 Regardless, a week later, Lessona — who had been promoted to Minister of
Colonies in June — confirmed the policy of “no power to the ras” as one of his
“fundamental principles.”86
Graziani’s resistance to Rome’s policy towards Ethiopian elites must be
understood within the context of the Italian army’s doctrine for colonial warfare,
jurisdictional disputes between rival agencies within the Fascist regime, and local
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conditions in East Africa. Graziani’s doctrinal thesis coming out of Libya centred on the
appreciation and use of political means in colonial operations, even if his definition of
political was limited. Experience in Libya also had demonstrated the need — explicated
by both Graziani and Nasi — for local initiative and an ability to adjust to conditions as
they arose, which demanded a great deal of autonomy for colonial authorities. Combined
with Graziani’s authoritarian personality, this provided the basis for a jurisdictional
dispute between the viceroy and the Ministry of Colonies. Graziani’s autonomy was
threatened by Lessona’s insistence on “no power to the ras.” Graziani found himself in a
difficult military situation: while his troops tried to destroy the remaining Ethiopian field
armies and occupy the rest of the country, armed rebellion threatened the supposedly
pacified capital of Addis Ababa. Conciliation with powerful elites, whether genuine or
temporary, was tactically prudent.
Lessona’s absolute refusal to accommodate indigenous elites helped define
Rome’s concept of super direct rule, based on totalitarian control without compromise.
This gave Lessona’s colonial policy a distinctly and self-consciously “fascist” tone. In the
end, Graziani and other military authorities easily — even wholeheartedly —
accommodated themselves to the line coming from Rome. Graziani’s vacillation over the
policy of exclusion of elites ended with an assassination attempt against him on 19
February 1937. During a public ceremony at the viceroy’s palace, two Eritreans in the
crowd threw seven hand grenades at the viceroy, severely wounding him. Graziani’s
biographers agree that the assassination attempt transformed Graziani and his
viceroyship.87 According to Edoardo Borra, the doctor who treated Graziani after the
attempt, the viceroy became traumatized and paranoid, transforming his hospital into a
small castle [fortilizio] protected by machineguns, trenches, armoured cars, and
spotlights.88

87

Sbacchi, Ethiopia under Mussolini, 189; Canosa, Graziani, 159; Mayda, Graziani, l’africano, 10–11,
112.
88

Edoardo Borra, Amedeo di Savoia: Terzo duca d’Aosta e viceré d’Etiopia (Milan: Mursia, 1985), 65.
Four years later, Graziani suffered a nervous breakdown during the successful British offensive against his
forces in Libya. Knox, Common Destiny, 163.

69

In addition to paranoia for his own safety, Graziani lost any faith he once had in
the Ethiopian nobility. On the basis of scant evidence, Graziani was convinced that
indigenous elites and collaborators were involved in the assassination plot. The official
report compiled by Judge Advocate General Bernardo Olivieri concluded that notables
were not directly involved in the plot but that they must have known about it. They had
motive and their passive response to the crisis seemed to prove their complicity.89 Now,
Graziani claimed always to have doubted the loyalty of elites from the old regime and to
have desired their “elimination from the local scene” through deportation. He announced
that his “patience, generosity, kindness, et cetera, et cetera,” towards Ethiopian notables
was at an end. “Nine months of tough experience” led Graziani to conclude that “Amhara
chiefs must disappear first of all from Addis Ababa and in the second place gradually
from other regions.” Acknowledging the impossibility of half measures with the policy of
“no power to the ras,” Graziani deemed it pointless to try to win them over. The great
chiefs had no reason for loyalty to a system that aimed to destroy them.90
Thereafter, Graziani assimilated fully Rome’s desire to persecute rather than coopt the Ethiopian nobility. He justified the wholesale deportation to Italy of all former
high-ranking notables, whose presence in Ethiopia was “damaging to our policy of
absolute right to rule.”91 Graziani also made sure that the various governorates followed
the policy. Although he previously gave some leeway to the Governor of Harar, after the
assassination attempt Graziani criticized Nasi for continuing to employ former
Abyssinian functionaries in his administration. Graziani demanded that they be
eliminated to prevent the formation of “centres of Abyssinian intrigue” and to give the
indigenous populations the sensation that Abyssinian rule was finished and that no local
elite stood as intermediary between them and the Italian government.92
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This was echoed by a renewed drive to oust elites in the Governorate of Amhara.
One of Pirzio Biroli’s founding points upon the formation of the governorate in June
1936 was that former Abyssinian elites and functionaries “must be kept out of any
activity or charge.”93 However, like Nasi, the Governor of Amhara found this difficult to
accomplish given his own lack of Italian administrative personnel, but also because some
of these notables had spontaneously rallied to the Italian side during the invasion. Under
pressure from Graziani even before the assassination attempt, in December 1936 Pirzio
Biroli reported on his efforts to carry out ministerial orders by “supplanting in full the old
leaders and their assistants, replacing them completely [totalitariamente] with Italian
functionaries, who thus will have immediate and direct political-administrative contact
with the populations.”94 By May, again according to Pirzio Biroli, the “weighty Negussite
framework of chiefs and notables” in Amhara had been eliminated. The new system
granted offices only to meslenié (district leaders) or cicca (village leaders) with “modest”
responsibilities. Many district leaders were not locals at all but were promoted from the
veteran ranks of the askari, the colonial troops that had helped conquer Ethiopia. Pirzio
Biroli claimed that they enjoyed the approval of the population, but his successors
considered such appointments to be among the causes of popular dissent in Amhara.95
By the end of his tenure as viceroy, Graziani had become a full practitioner of “no
power to the ras,” overseeing the application of the policy in the governorates regardless
of local circumstances. In a letter to his replacement, the Duke of Aosta, Graziani warned
that “all the rases and chiefs, here or in exile, great or small, [dream] of again being
granted a command and territorial government.” Graziani still believed that the exclusion
of Ethiopian notables from government was “the fulcrum of the entire resistance in
Amhara and Shewa,” but having assimilated Mussolini’s policy he pursued it ruthlessly.
Graziani’s letter of advice concluded that notables could perform a useful role in the
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political pacification of rebellious areas, but that ultimately they were not to be trusted
due to the “greater temptation of human nature.”96

Indigenous Policy
Rome provided rigid guidelines not only for the treatment of elites in East Africa, but for
the general indigenous population as well. Alongside the exclusion of elites, Rome’s
indigenous policy contributed to dissent and revolt. Scholars disagree as to how Fascist
policies towards natives compared to other colonial models. According to Luisa Ruiu,
Italian policy was based on collaboration, placing it somewhere between the British
system of separate living and working conditions for whites and blacks, and the French
system based on assimilation of natives to the customs and institutions of the mother
country.97 On the other hand, a score of historians have described Italian indigenous
policy as the near equivalent to apartheid.98 While the economic and military exploitation
of East Africa required collaboration with the indigenous populations, it was always on
the basis of their subjugation to the superior Italian race and civilization. Indeed, the
legge organica defined Ethiopians as “Italian subjects” rather than citizens, thereby
providing the basis for further racial discrimination.99 Fascist indigenous policy was first
and foremost a racist policy, based on segregation and hierarchy, that permitted only
rudimentary efforts to gain the loyalty of the masses.100
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As Matteo Dominioni points out, the main individuals behind Italy’s racist policy
were Lessona and Mussolini, not Graziani.101 Lessona and other Fascists seem genuinely
to have believed that, having liberated the Ethiopian masses from the feudal oppression
of the rases, they would naturally fall in behind the Italian government, and that
demonstrations of Italian military, moral, and cultural superiority would cement these
bonds of loyalty.102 In the list of “fundamental principles” distributed to Graziani in
August 1936, Lessona insisted that any political action taken by the governors must
conform to the Colonial Ministry’s indigenous policy, which was based on establishing
and maintaining white prestige. First, in connection to the policy of “no power to the
ras,” the population had to understand that Italy was strong enough to govern without
sharing power. Second, the superiority of the white race must be affirmed through a strict
system of segregation, whereby whites lived a completely separate life from natives.103
Graziani dutifully forwarded Lessona’s instructions to the governorates.104
The most infamous element of Lessona’s programme was the battle against
madamismo which, although directed largely towards the white population, became a
cornerstone of Fascist indigenous policy. Madamismo referred to common-law
partnerships between Italian men and indigenous women. Given their isolation and the
paucity of white women in East Africa, it was not uncommon for Italian soldiers, settlers,
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or functionaries to take a madama, even if they had wives and families waiting in Italy.
The derogatory term madama referred to the keepers of bordellos, revealing how the
relationship was in most cases very different from marriage and more similar to
concubinage and prostitution.105 Giulia Barrera argues that madamismo, therefore, was
not necessarily due to an Italian predisposition towards camaraderie and fraternization;
nor was this the primary reason for legislation against madamismo. Rather, Italian race
laws in the colonies came about as a result of the rapid pace of colonization and Rome’s
totalitarian intention to shape colonial behaviour. This made Italian East Africa unique
compared to other colonies, where shared rules of behaviour, including segregation, were
developed over time by the settlers and colonial authorities themselves.106
Mussolini’s first instructions to Graziani called for a “ruthless fight against any
inclination towards miscegenation [meticismo].” He ordered that all guilty parties were to
be deported immediately to Italy.107 Indigenous women were not considered agents in the
process and therefore were not punished, but the law held Italian men accountable for
damaging Italy’s racial prestige.108 Following the occupation of the western half of
Ethiopia, Graziani demanded the “rigorous observance” of the Duce’s policy against
madamismo, ordering each governorate to report on the subject directly to him: “The
orders of His Excellency the Head of Government relating to connivance with native
women are final and I intend that they be fully observed.”109 Governors thereupon issued
directives prohibiting common-law relationships between Italian nationals and
indigenous women “both for the salvation and prestige of the white race.”110 During
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Graziani’s term as viceroy, twenty-nine officers were placed on trial and ninety-seven
repatriated for crimes against racial prestige.111
Enforcement of the law was not helped by rumours of Pirzio Biroli’s conduct in
Amhara. According to the carabiniere Angelo Cerica,
it is public knowledge that His Excellency the Governor has a particular
predilection for pretty native girls; sometimes he visits their huts accompanied by
loyal askari. Also, when visiting one of his garrisons he does not disdain spending
the night with some native women or prostitutes.
Cerica also claimed that Pirzio Biroli’s subordinates followed his example. Despite
laziness in their official duties, they showed no lack of zeal when it came to tracking
down “young native beauties.” As a result, Amhara became known throughout the empire
as the “jolly governorate.”112 In fact, Pirzio Biroli’s own reports lamented that many of
his functionaries were either arrogant or excessively familiar towards the population, to
the detriment of “racial prestige” and the image of the Italian empire “as the most pure
and typical expression of romanità, reborn in the Fascist Era.”113 Although Cerica’s
report may have been coloured with personal antipathy, there was likely an element of
truth to it. It demonstrates the lack of quality leadership and the corruption, inconsistency,
and poor discipline of Italian functionaries in East Africa, rather than the official attitude
of Italian army generals.
Although they found madamismo difficult to curtail, Italian generals largely
shared Rome’s opinion that it threatened their pacification efforts. As Nasi pointed out in
a circular distributed to Italian commands in Harar, there were practical reasons to
combat madamismo. He complained that excessive familiarity with indigenous women,
photography of nudes, and “the more or less raunchy forms of dress (let us speak plainly)
indicate a progressive going native [insabbiamento]” which threatened Italian prestige,
especially in Muslim areas. In classic Orientalist fashion, Nasi wrote that “the native
woman, in the east, moves but is not seen. These are the ABCs for living and governing
in the colonies.” Nasi offered his men the grim choice between “either power or
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pleasure” [aut imperium aut voluptas].114 Italian generals shared the Fascist emphasis on
prestige as a key component of colonial rule and they had few qualms over extending this
concept to include cultural and racial prestige.
Racial prestige also was a guiding line for Fascist programmes of colonization
and urban planning in East Africa. The regime’s main justifications for its invasion of
Ethiopia had included the necessity of colonies to absorb Italian emigration —
demographic colonialism — and the higher level of civilization that Italian occupation
would bring the Ethiopian people through law and public works.115 As one Fascist Party
official noted in a confidential report, demographic colonization required two separate
roles for Italian and indigenous populations. The main task of Italian nationals was the
exploitation of the new territories through agriculture. Natives, on the other hand, were to
be organized for the purpose of exploitation, both as soldiers and manual labourers.
Construction and urban planning was necessary to give Italians access to the same
infrastructure and services as in the mother country while convincing colonial subjects of
Italian superiority.116 The civilizing mission was pure propaganda; Italian colonization
and urban planning aimed at the permanent subjugation and segregation of the indigenous
populations. As Sbacchi notes, whereas Italian peasants were to be transformed into
landholders, Ethiopians were transformed from landowners to day labourers.117
Due to continued resistance in Ethiopia, the bankruptcy of the Italian state, the
impending war in Europe, and the hastiness that characterized so much of the regime’s
114
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work in Ethiopia, Fascist schemes for the rural colonization of the empire made little
headway between 1936 and 1940. Italian agricultural policy was improvised, incoherent,
and conducted without a full understanding of Ethiopian systems of land tenure.
Although the Ministry of Italian Africa claimed to have settled 3,550 families on 113,760
hectares of land by April 1940, Haile Larebo estimates that in reality the number
amounted to 400 peasants, of whom only 150 had been joined by their families: “As an
outlet for emigration, Ethiopia was a total failure.”118
In this context, the Italian army took a lead role in the Fascist colonization and
agricultural programmes. Since security concerns and a lack of capital prevented private
firms from making progress even around Addis Ababa, military units enthusiastically
planted fields and orchards in “available” land near their bases.119 There was also an
effort at “military colonization,” whereby the Italian government offered land to
demobilized soldiers and Blackshirts who settled in East Africa. Few took the
government up on its offer, and those who did tended to drift away from agriculture
towards more lucrative commercial pursuits.120
Land granted to colonizing agencies often came at the expense of Ethiopian
landowners. Anti-Italian propaganda took advantage of this fact, warning locals that the
Italians gradually would gather all property into their hands. Italian authorities feared that
such propaganda was effective, particularly amongst the Amhara population, who they
considered to be especially protective of their property rights.121 Indeed, changes to the
system of land tenure in the Governorate of Amhara were seen as partial causes for revolt
in 1937. Until that year, the region had retained its traditional gulti system of
sharecropping, whereby local chiefs and priests assigned plots of land. When Italian
commissioners and residents — acting on their own initiative, but nonetheless working
towards higher-level Fascist objectives — absorbed this function for themselves, they
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effectively stripped notables and clerics of their traditional roles and means of wealth,
pushing them into rebellion.122
Facing open revolt, Pirzio Biroli set aside most colonization projects for his
governorate in summer 1937. He limited any continued Italian settlement and
exploitation plans to large centres on main communications lines.123 His successor,
Ottorino Mezzetti, further advocated slowing down the rate at which Ethiopians were
being dispossessed of their farmland so as not to give the population an economic motive
to join the rebels. He argued that Italian colonists should not be granted the limited
amount of easily cultivated land that had to sustain the indigenous population, but rather
should be given unclaimed land that they could make productive thanks to their racial and
technological superiority.124 Fearing the spread of revolt to Harar, Nasi followed similar
measures in his territory. Many of the land concessions made in Harar had to be revoked
after appeals from peasants who wanted their land back. Nasi considered the economic
cost a lesser evil to alienating the local population.125 Agricultural colonization was a
central component of Fascist imperialism — and one which saw more significant results
in Libya — but in this case for Italian governors in Ethiopia, military and economic
realities trumped ideological objectives.126
Italian settlement policy had negative repercussions on relations with the
indigenous populations and was seen at the time as a cause of revolt. Moreover, in the
five years of Italian occupation, it failed to meet any of its economic objectives for selfsufficiency. The economic exploitation of Ethiopia was hampered by a general lack of
knowledge of the region and its assets. The first year of occupation in Amhara was purely
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experimental, as the Italians surveyed for mineral resources — with disappointing results
— and tried to determine which crops and livestock were best suited to the climate.127
Revolt thereafter prevented the successful application of any knowledge the Italian
authorities may have gained. Economic exploitation did not run any more smoothly in the
relatively peaceful Governorate of Harar. Nasi lamented the “clandestine exodus” of
leather to foreign markets and he complained that the production of bricks was plagued
by quality issues, due to low-grade clay and poor craftsmanship. In May 1937, Harar
imported 7,144,407 lire worth of goods from Italy, while its exports — almost
exclusively coffee — amounted to 1,574,590 lire.128 On the whole, exports from Ethiopia
declined in 1937 and ceased altogether in 1938.129 As the economy stagnated, the cost of
living in East Africa spiralled upwards. By 1940, Italian authorities in Harar noted a
troubling tendency among colonists to cross illegally into French or British colonies in
search of work, something that did not bode well for Italian prestige.130
In theory, Ethiopia was supposed to provide an outlet for Italian peasants and
working-class families who otherwise would have emigrated abroad. At the same time,
racial prestige demanded that Italian settlers not perform the same type of work as natives
or, at least, that whites and blacks not be employed in the same roles together. The
recruitment and employment of indigenous labour is therefore a topic of critical
importance, but it has not been the subject of thorough study. Although official Italian
histories denied the presence of forced labour in East Africa, it is unlikely that Italy
differed greatly from other colonial powers that requisitioned indigenous labour to
varying degrees.131 An Italian law from 1935 allowed for obligatory labour in the
colonies, provided that the work was for public ends, authorized by the Ministry of
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Colonies, and reimbursed at local rates of pay.132 This law was abused by local Italian
authorities who sometimes requisitioned labour on behalf of private agricultural and
industrial enterprises that had claimed larger plots of land than they could work. Nasi
considered such practices detrimental to security and reminded Italian agencies that the
government did not participate in the African slave trade [tratta del negri]. However,
Nasi still allowed forced labour for large-scale public works, which he believed the
indigenous masses would understand as necessary and temporary.133 In fact, even this
form of exploitation could become cause for revolt as, for example, when the population
of Meketewa rose up against its vice-resident in June 1937 in immediate response to the
coercive recruitment of labourers to build roads in Gondar.134
For some Italians, the problem with Fascism’s native policy was not the overexploitation of the indigenous population. One report to Graziani, signed only
“Cusmano” — possibly an army officer, given his thesis — complained on the other hand
that the regime did not exploit indigenous labour fully enough.135 Despite Fascist
demographic policy, it was expensive to employ large numbers of Italian workers in
Ethiopia. Cusmano argued that even if white workers were twice as productive as natives,
they still cost ten times as much to employ, given the logistics of transporting them from
Italy and housing them in a country where the rainy season prevented them from working
for half the year. In Cusmano’s alternative system, the only whites in East Africa would
be soldiers, who he compared to the legionaries of ancient Rome. They would police the
colonies, exploit local agricultural resources, and perform technical tasks. This would
alleviate problems of “sexual hygiene” and “humiliating promiscuity,” since whites and
blacks would not perform the same work. East Africa could still act as a demographic
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outlet, since unemployed Italians could enlist as soldiers in this expanded colonial
army.136
Cusmano’s report demonstrates that disagreement with Rome’s policies did not
necessarily stem from ideological disjuncture. The report was highly critical of the
handling of colonial affairs by the Ministry of Italian Africa, and its proposed solution
would have granted the Italian military complete authority over colonial policy, at least
until the security situation had been stabilized. Cusmano considered the superimposition
of an Italian civil administrative apparatus on the empire in 1936 as premature. No doubt,
such a view reflected friction between military and civilian authorities in East Africa,
while trying to deflect blame from the army for the rebellion. However, there was nothing
anti-Fascist about Cusmano’s critique or proposals. Whether by careful selection of
language or genuine belief, the report conformed to Fascist objectives for a racially
conscious and segregated society, a militarized colony, and demographic colonization
based on the model of ancient Rome. Such criticism was more reflective of the
jurisdictional disputes between rival agencies — in this case, the army and the Ministry
of Italian Africa — common to totalitarian regimes, and the impossibility of enacting
fully Rome’s policies in relation to realities on the ground.137
The Fascist regime’s emphasis on agricultural colonization was paralleled by
grandiose urban plans for Ethiopia’s cities. Closely supervised by Rome, urban planning
also imposed racial segregation upon the empire. As Mia Fuller demonstrates, Italian
“planners often wrote as if they were in fact constructing entirely new cities, ones in
which the city center would be both new and strictly Italian.” They did not see anything
of historical value in Ethiopian cities — there had been, after all, no Roman presence
there — and they believed that they therefore had a blank slate to work with.138
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Directives for urban planning in Italian Africa called for large amounts of open space to
avoid crowding and for the establishment of native quarters, separated by at least 500
metres from white areas. This would have required the forced transfer of hundreds of
thousands of city dwellers throughout East Africa, something that was avoided only with
the onset of the Second World War.139
As the seat of central government, Addis Ababa saw the greatest amount of Italian
construction. The city’s governor and career civil colonial official, Alfredo Siniscalchi,
praised Graziani’s dedication to constructive work in the “Capital of the Empire.”140 The
most impressive project was Flavio Dessy’s planned Torre d’Italia [Appendix A].
Standing taller than the Empire State Building, topped with a gigantic Italian flag,
comprising 7,750 offices named after illustrious Italians, and with plans for night-time
illumination, the tower would have affirmed Italy’s “moral primacy” in the world.141 Not
surprisingly, given the shortage of construction materials, machinery, railway capacity,
and time, the tower never became a reality.
In fact, Addis Ababa’s “native quarter” came the closest to realization, since it
was constructed on relatively virgin land and did not require major demolitions or
relocations.142 The city and its environs were rezoned into five districts: industrial;
commercial; residential; central; and, native. This new plan “naturally” involved the
expropriation of private property from Ethiopians who were reimbursed and allowed to
rebuild in the native quarter, but Siniscalchi admitted that it was not always possible to
ascertain the “legitimate proprietors.” Buildings in the native quarter were standardized
concrete huts with straw roofs. By way of permanently separating blacks from whites, the
native quarter had its own police and fire brigades as well as a separate market.
Siniscalchi hoped that the rational organization of the native market would “make the
native shopkeeper understand that which he had never before comprehended: discipline,
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order, and cleanliness.” With racial prestige on the line, only indigenous merchants were
allowed to sell wares at the native market. An African could not be seen paying an Italian
for services rendered.143
The capitals of the governorates were to be transformed as well, applying the
same criteria towards racial segregation and domination. Much of the early construction
work in Harar focused on public buildings to reinforce the impression of Italian rule. Nasi
also tried to clean up neighbourhoods in his city through the destruction of rabid dogs,
followed by an operation to “purge” unemployed Africans from urban centres in order to
reduce crime rates.144 Architect Gherardo Bosio’s urban plan for the city of Gondar, the
capital of Amhara, called for the city to be centred on the main government building as a
“symbol of conquest and power, which must dominate it architecturally.” Bosio deemed
it necessary to absorb the current native village, which was to be rebuilt further downhill
and downwind in an area “completely separate from the new city.”145 [Appendix B]
However, a series of budget reductions, bureaucratic delays, and baffling decisions —
including aborted plans by the governor to relocate the site of the capital twelve
kilometres to the southwest — prevented much of Bosio’s scheme from becoming
reality.146 When colonial functionary Aldo Milioni arrived in Gondar in summer 1937, he
found that the European quarter “consisted only of shacks and tents. There were no
cinemas, theatres nor radio sets, public gardens or parkways.” For public servants like
Milioni, there remained little to do but gossip with colleagues or play cards.147
Italian urban projects, colonization, and economic exploitation all failed
miserably to achieve their desired results. Yet, they all made their impact felt on
indigenous policy in East Africa. The colonized were physically segregated from the
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colonizers, and their economic livelihood was threatened as they became mere tools for
exploitation by the colonial regime. Italian military officers did not develop these
policies, but as governors and administrators they were responsible for and deeply
involved in their execution. Rome’s legislation and policies coloured relations with the
local populations and undoubtedly contributed to the unpopularity of the Italian regime
through much of Ethiopia. Military authorities were constrained by Rome’s tight control
over indigenous policy, but it did not conflict with their own notions of prestige and racist
conceptions of Italy’s subject populations.
Nor did Rome necessarily curtail all means of attracting support for the colonial
regime. The Fascist leadership at least paid lip service to the potential value of a heartsand-minds approach. At the same time that he demanded segregation to permanently
reduce indigenous populations to a state of servitude, Lessona expected progress towards
the establishment of Mussolini’s “black army.” To this end, he called for the use of all
means of propaganda to gain the support of the population.148 In terms of indigenous
policy, the means left available by Fascist directives were limited to welfare and religion.
Italian authorities provided welfare services for impoverished natives, mainly to
win their loyalty and affirm Italian dominion and racial prestige. A major aspect of Italian
welfare policy was the emancipation of slaves. The Italians placed great propaganda
value, domestically and internationally, on the abolition of slavery in Ethiopia, which was
officially recognized in the traditional Ethiopian legal code and had not been eradicated
by the time of the Italian invasion.149 This abolitionist policy was not particularly
enlightened or novel — imperial powers during the nineteenth-century “scramble for
Africa” had justified their expansionism by adopting a stance against slavery.150 Pirzio
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Biroli commented that freed slaves made excellent farmhands [lavoratori dei campi], but
it is questionable how much this actually improved their quality of life.151 Ciro Poggiali
doubted whether freedom meant much to former slaves: “Probably after the Italian
conquest even the slaves will know that they have the right to demand their freedom. But
for them this word is devoid of meaning. To be free, that is not to have a master, would
mean death by hunger.”152 In fact, slavery continued to exist in some remote areas of
Gojam because slaves looked to their lords as their only means of sustenance.153
In Addis Ababa, Siniscalchi admitted that many former slaves remained loyal to
their old masters and filled the rebel ranks. To prevent a mass exodus to join the rebel
forces, the Italians provided daily food rations and “adequate subsidies” to destitute
natives. The policy was supposed to set Italian governance apart from that of the Negus,
whose functionaries, Siniscalchi claimed, did little more than dole out a few Thalers here
and there. “Instead, our authorities,” he wrote, “immediately placed great impetus on
public welfare, for which the native populations had dire need.” One project especially
dear to Graziani was an asylum for indigenous mothers and newborns [Ricovero per la
Maternità ed Infanzia Indigena] named after his mother, Adelia Clementi Graziani.
Placed under the charge of the Canossian Sisters, the institution provided care for
abandoned infants, delivery rooms for indigenous women, and clinical services.154 Such
institutions paralleled developments in Italy, where greater state interference in family
welfare was coupled with renewed Church influence through charitable foundations.155
But whereas the expansion of welfare in Italy was closely connected to Mussolini’s
objective of Italian demographic growth, the system in Ethiopia had distinct motives. As
Siniscalchi explained, “Fascism, after having conquered these populations by force of
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arms, conquers them now, not only with the force of labour [forza del lavoro] and its
civilization, but also with charity.” Because it offered separate care for Africans,
Graziani’s facility was touted as “one of the best institutions intended by the regime for
the health of the [Italian] race.”156 Welfare initiatives, like the more negative aspects of
Italian policy, served first and foremost to bolster Italian prestige and subjugate the
indigenous population.
Another element of positive attraction that the regime allowed colonial authorities
to use to their advantage involved policy towards religions. Graziani’s three-part policy
conformed “exactly to the directives of the Duce”: the Coptic Church continued to be the
official church of Ethiopia; all other religions were tolerated; and, “special consideration”
was given to Muslims.157 Since Coptic Christians made up the majority of the population
throughout much of Ethiopia, relations with the Coptic Church became a fundamental
element of Italy’s indigenous policy. Formal discussions towards defining the
relationship between the Italian government and the Coptic Church were conducted by
the Ministry of Colonies, but Graziani immediately opened a direct dialogue with Abuna
Kerlos “based on compromises that gave him and the other church leaders the feeling that
the government intended to help and respect religion.”158 However, the Coptic Church
lost income through the abolition of feudalism and Italian authorities came to see the
clergy — so closely bound to the prewar Ethiopian state — as supporters of revolt,
secretly if not openly.159 The execution of the anti-Italian Bishop of Wollo in July 1936
had aroused considerable indignation among the clergy.160 The massacre of monks at the
Debre Libanos monastery in response to the assassination attempt on Graziani, described
in Chapter 3, did little to improve relations.
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One of Graziani’s last major accomplishments in East Africa was overseeing the
formation of an autocephalous Ethiopian Coptic Church. In November 1937, the
Ethiopian Church severed its ties with Alexandria and proclaimed itself independent from
foreign control. This probably had as much to do with Mussolini’s totalitarian tendencies
for centralized control and his increasingly anti-British stance — the Italians were
convinced that Alexandria was under the influence of the British “Intelligence Service”
— as it did with winning over the Ethiopian population. Nonetheless, Graziani believed
that Coptic clerics wielded enormous influence. Having terrorized the Coptic leaders after
the assassination attempt, Graziani now aimed to co-opt and control them through acts of
clemency and reform. After months of negotiations between the Italians and Abuna
Kerlos, the Coptic Primate fled to Egypt and denounced the Italian occupation. Graziani
influenced the bishops tasked with electing Kerlos’s replacement, promising to maintain
the status quo of church property for a decade, to provide stipends and subsidies to the
clergy, and to free priests and monks from concentration camps. In return, the new Abuna
Abraham swore an oath of loyalty to the Italian government: treachery committed by the
Abuna or those under him would result in the curse of Judas.161 The Italian government’s
relationship with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church remained underwritten by terror.
Italy’s policy of religious toleration in East Africa was announced before the
conquest, clearly as part of a divide-and-conquer strategy aimed against the Ethiopian
government and for propaganda motives, especially in the Muslim world.162 Since the
early 1930s, Mussolini had followed an aggressive policy towards the Middle East, trying
to exploit rising Arab nationalism and Zionism at the expense of Britain and France.163
Graziani’s pro-Muslim policy, then, was based on the Duce’s broader efforts to win over
the Arab world — in 1937 he unscrupulously proclaimed himself “protector of Islam” —
and expand Italian interests in the Levant before a European war broke out. More
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immediately, it was an attempt to co-opt Ethiopian populations that previously had been
subjected to Amhara overlordship. In this respect, religious policy was closely related to
the elimination of old elites through “no power to the ras,” taken to a point that bordered
ethnic cleansing. Graziani explained to Nasi that the natural conclusion of pro-Muslim
policy in Harar was to “eliminate all the Amhara and Shewans from territories of
Abyssinian conquest truly to give the impression to the native populations that now we
are the masters [padroni].”164 Harar was to be purged of its Christian Amhara minority
populations, forcing them to return to their “countries of origin.”165 Italian support of
Islam must be considered another contributor to rebellion in Amhara and Shewa.166
At times persecuted by Ethiopian rulers and always subject to social prejudice,
Ethiopian Muslims now found themselves favoured by the new regime. Graziani
subsidized Muslim clerics, mosques, and communities in Addis Ababa.167 Pirzio Biroli
did the same in Amhara, claiming that the local Muslim population were “devoted and
faithful subjects by proof of facts” whereas Coptic leaders could not be trusted.168 Special
attention was given to Harar, with its Muslim majority. For this reason, Nasi had more
freedom of action than other governors to adopt a benevolent approach, particularly when
it came to collaborating with indigenous elites.169 By November 1936, an Islamic court
had been set up in the city of Harar for the practice of Sharia law. Civil, commercial, and
lesser penal charges could be brought before the Islamic court, so long as both parties
were Muslim. The Italian government provided funding for the court and appointed its
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president from among the local Muslim elite. An Italian report on the establishment of
the court described it as “a simple act of administrative shrewdness.”170
Italian policies towards the indigenous populations were characterized by
unscrupulous pragmatism in some areas and ideological rigidity in others. As the Fascist
leadership took advantage of the abolition of slavery, welfare programmes, freedom of
religion, and an anti-Amhara line as part of a divide-and-conquer strategy, its policies
more or less guaranteed the alienation of large and powerful sections of Ethiopian
society. Mussolini and Lessona’s insistence on super direct rule involved the total
subjugation of the Ethiopian populations. Traditional elites were excluded from any role
in the new administration and the general populace was denied the rights of Italian
citizens and subjected to a strict system of segregation. Economically, the Amhara and
Oromo populations were no better off under Mussolini than they had been under Haile
Selassie.171 Italian generals worked as governors and administrators within this legal
framework and guiding policy. Rome’s directives allowed generals like Nasi to achieve a
degree of calm in places like Harar, but placed men like Pirzio Biroli in Amhara in a
nearly impossible situation that was aggravated by the inconsistent behaviour of Italian
administrators. Combined with the natural opposition against a foreign invader, failure
almost was preordained.

Repudiation of Policy
Graziani under Attack
The revolt that broke out in Shewa and the Governorate of Amhara in the summer of
1937 signalled the definitive failure of Italy’s occupation policy in Ethiopia. The
governor on the spot, Pirzio Biroli, initially took the lion’s share of the blame. Hazon
criticized Pirzio Biroli for ignoring Graziani’s warnings about the disloyalty of Ethiopian
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nobles and for trusting them too much.172 At the same time, he was held responsible for
Corvo’s “arbitrary dishonourable acts of ferocity and abuse of authority” in Bahir Dar
and blamed for “having tolerated a policy of excessive rigour.” 173 The “jolly
governorate” epitomized the lack of centralization, coordination, consistency, and good
sense that plagued the entire administration in East Africa. Alongside Pirzio Biroli’s
alleged sexual adventures, he was blamed for appointing incompetent and corrupt
relatives to important positions and for alienating the Coptic clergy by leaving lesser
clerics destitute while granting their bishop an annual purse of 120,000 Lire. Reports also
accused Pirzio Biroli’s office of spreading rumours that Graziani was soon to be replaced,
a grave error given that the “primitive populations” universally deemed Graziani an
“invincible condottiero, protected by God.”174 Here lies the crux of the matter; for Pirzio
Biroli was Lessona’s cousin and confidant.175 He became a scapegoat for Graziani’s own
failings as viceroy in the context of Lessona’s consistent efforts to undermine his
authority.
Pirzio Biroli would be repatriated in some disgrace at the end of 1937, although
incredibly he was appointed three years later as the military governor of occupied
Montenegro. Neither Graziani nor Lessona survived him. All three personalities fell
victim to a major shuffle in the leadership of the Ministry of Italian Africa and in
Ethiopia itself.176 Contrasting the policies of Graziani and his successor, the Duke of
Aosta, it is easy to see them as the result of two opposed personalities and viewpoints.
For Del Boca, “while Graziani was ignorant, impulsive, and merciless, the Duke was
cultured, moderate, and generally lenient.”177 Sbacchi characterizes the Duke of Aosta as
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a liberal who “sometimes followed his own judgment rather than the duce’s orders.”178
Whereas Graziani represented the prototypical Fascist “new man,” Giulietta Stefani
argues that the Duke of Aosta better characterized the moderate and paternalistic “old
colonials” [vecchi coloniali] of the Liberal era.179 These interpretations are not incorrect,
but the shift in policy also was made possible by a change in attitude within the central
leadership in Rome, namely with Mussolini himself. Graziani’s removal signalled the
repudiation of his policies as viceroy. In turn, this meant that the official Fascist approach
to occupation had to be transformed. However, it never became clear precisely what the
new official line was.
According to Lessona’s memoirs, Mussolini made the decision to remove
Graziani after the assassination attempt in February 1937.180 Certainly, Graziani’s
deranged and brutal response to the attempt had not helped Italian diplomatic
negotiations with the British and French towards formal recognition of empire.181
Graziani’s extreme brutality contradicted the regime’s official propaganda abroad
concerning Italy’s civilizing and modernizing mission.182 However, Graziani was
difficult to remove from his post for a number of reasons. First, Graziani was genuinely
popular among the functionaries and Italian population in East Africa. Siniscalchi
reported to Rome that “everyone is proud to serve under his command and everyone
values his praise, which is the most sought-after award that anyone can wish for.”183 As
late as September 1940, with Graziani now commanding Italian forces in Cyrenaica
against the British, censor reports from the colonial police noted the total trust and
veneration for the old “Condottiero” among Italian and indigenous populations in
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Harar.184 A second factor impeding Graziani’s removal was that some leading Fascists
blamed Lessona, rather than the viceroy, for failure in East Africa.185 Third, Mussolini’s
hesitation may have been due to his continued belief in Graziani’s military
competence.186 Over the past decade, Graziani had become a darling of the regime who
could not readily be disowned.
Finally, on 11 November 1937, Mussolini informed Graziani that his mission in
East Africa was finished and that he would be replaced as viceroy by the Duke of Aosta.
Graziani tried to convince Mussolini to allow him to remain in the theatre to serve as the
Duke’s commander of troops, but the position had already been assigned to Ugo
Cavallero and the new viceroy reportedly insisted that Graziani return to Italy. Graziani
acted as military commander until Cavallero’s arrival whereupon, on 10 January 1938,
the former viceroy departed by car for the port of Mogadishu and a ship home.187
It was clear upon Graziani’s return to Italy that the attitude in Rome had changed.
Graziani found himself under attack for conducting policies that the central regime had
thrust upon him. Receiving Graziani at the train station in Rome, Mussolini commented
to Ciano that “he fought well but he governed poorly.”188 The Duce explained his
replacement of Graziani to the Supreme Defence Commission in February as being
necessary since Graziani’s policy had been wrong. John Gooch describes this as “a
remarkable volte-face” given Mussolini's previous support of Graziani’s methods.189
Graziani himself noted on his return that “public opinion” was against him. He came into
possession of a colonial police report that summed up common perceptions of his tenure
as viceroy. It criticized Graziani for pursuing first a phase of “sweet talk” but then
overreacting to the assassination attempt, inaccurately blaming the entire Ethiopian
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aristocracy and thereafter eschewing collaboration with locals in favour of an
authoritarian policy based on terror which “alienated the sentiments of the natives and set
the stage for revolt.” The report concluded that the Ethiopians could become loyal if
treated properly, and cited Nasi’s Governorate of Harar as a model to follow.190
Pirzio Biroli added his weight to the mountain of criticism piling on top of
Graziani in a personal letter to Mussolini. Seeking to rehabilitate his own reputation,
Pirzio Biroli argued — with supporting documentary evidence — that all the actions he
had been accused of were the result of Graziani’s shift in policy after February 1937.
Pirzio Biroli claimed merely to have followed the viceroy’s directives while he himself
favoured an approach based “more on love than fear.” Corvo, as the official inquiry
found, had applied Graziani’s draconian orders. Specifically, Pirzio Biroli criticized
Graziani’s treatment of indigenous elites and the Amhara population as part of the
viceroy’s “flawed policy” that ended in rebellion.191 Similarly, a ministerial report in
1939 summarized the “mistakes” made by Graziani’s regime. These included the
replacement of truly influential chiefs with a multitude of non-entities largely imported
from Eritrea, the exclusion of natives from any economic activity or employment, a lack
of understanding in religious matters, the overzealous sequestration of indigenous lands,
the excessive and arbitrary use of violence, as well as “having identified racial policy
with that of ill-treatment and subjection.”192
The charges against Graziani, while largely accurate, were astonishing in that they
came from the same central authority that had imposed the system of super direct rule in
the first place. Graziani made an equally strong case that he, in fact, had merely followed
ministerial directives. In a letter to the King, Graziani complained that hierarchs in Rome
had labeled him an “executioner” [fucilatore], forgetting that at one point they had
charged him with weakness and ordered him to apply the “terror.”193 In addition,
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Graziani responded to the attacks against him with yet another manuscript — this one
never published — on “The Second Year of Empire.” In it, Graziani again placed the
blame for revolt on Pirzio Biroli, whose overly rosy reports from Amhara had resulted in
the Italians being taken by surprise. Like Pirzio Biroli, he compiled a long list of
telegrams demonstrating how Rome had forced draconian measures upon him. Graziani
claimed that his own philosophy, based on twenty years of experience in North and East
Africa, combined the carrot and the stick: “The good, the honest, the loyal found in him a
man of peace; the traitors and rebels, a man of inexorable war.” 194 Both sides in the
dispute were disingenuous when it came to their role in the formulation and execution of
the failed policy in East Africa.195 Both pursued the damaging indigenous policy with
equal vigor, especially after February 1937.
The attacks on Graziani and the subsequent bickering within the colonial
leadership make clear two points. First, past policy was rejected at the highest level as
flawed and incorrect. Second, a more enlightened and conciliatory approach was in order.
What this meant for the ideal Fascist “style” of occupation was less clear. What had
begun as a process of radicalization for Italian Fascism had bogged down into a state of
entropy, reflecting the regime’s broader tendency to vacillate between radicalization and
normalization.196 More specifically, the replacement of Graziani effectively reopened
debates within the Fascist Party and Italian colonial administration over the role of
violence and definitions of prestige that dated to the early transitional years of the
regime.197 Whereas Mussolini’s directives in 1936 had exalted violence and disparaged
compromise, Italian generals now were criticized for having adopted such an attitude.
Perhaps the generals proved more “fascist” in their execution of policy than the Fascist
regime itself was willing to allow, at least once it became clear that the revolt in Ethiopia
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was not going away. Central directives from Rome, which in 1936 were so clear and
resolute, now became confusing and equivocal in the void left by Graziani’s departure.

The Duke of Aosta
Into that void stepped Amedeo di Savoia, the Duke of Aosta. At first glance, Mussolini’s
appointment of a member of the royal family to represent the Fascist empire was an
unusual one.198 However, for a regime seeking a change in direction to its colonial policy,
the Duke was a more than suitable choice. From an early age, he had been fascinated by
Africa. He accompanied his adventurer uncle, the Duke of the Abruzzi, on an expedition
to Somalia in 1919. After a spat with the King — reportedly, Amedeo was overheard
making fun of Vittorio Emanuele’s short stature and the Montenegrin origins of his wife
— he spent another two years in exile in the Belgian Congo in the guise of a worker at a
soap factory. Upon his return to Italy, he enrolled in the Faculty of Law at the University
of Palermo, graduating in December 1924 with a thesis on “Juridical Relations between
Modern States and the Native Populations of their Colonies.”199
Although commonly regarded as a liberal and an admirer of the British colonial
system, the Duke of Aosta was not devoid of traits that appealed to the Fascist regime.
His father, Emanuele Filiberto, was recognized as a member of the “pro-fascist” group at
the Italian court. As first cousin to the King, Emanuele Filiberto was the subject of
various rumours involving Fascist or military coups that would have placed him on the
Italian throne.200 Amedeo had a colourful military career, supposedly becoming the
youngest soldier in the Italian army in 1915 before receiving a medal for valour in the
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First World War and commanding camel-mounted sahariani troops in Libya between
1925 and 1931. Like Mussolini, he was passionate about airplanes and learned how to fly
before requesting a transfer to the Italian air force in 1932.201
Nor were his thoughts on colonial government wholly incompatible with Fascist
concepts. Although his thesis approved of the modern emphasis on the progressive
elevation of natives, it attacked Liberal Italy’s Libyan “statute” as a total failure and
criticized efforts to develop indigenous civilization at too rapid a pace, as the French had
done by trying to assimilate “subjects” into “citizens.” For Amedeo, native subjects
inhabited a different level of civilization and should be allowed to develop according to
their own limited capacity.202 This did not differ significantly from Fascist literature of
the 1930s that advocated perpetual European domination over African peoples.203
Although far from a champion for native equality, the Duke of Aosta saw
dialogue and collaboration with local populations, including indigenous elites, as the
foundations of his political strategy. To this end, he praised Nasi’s work in Harar as the
model for a revamped Italian policy. Nasi’s engagement of indigenous chiefs and
notables in the administration of justice, his economic support for the Coptic Church and
Islamic centres, his language education programmes for both natives and Italians, and his
collection of statistical data all were cited as “aspects that demonstrate both the working
efficiency of the Governorate and its organs, as well as the excellent situation of public
order [...] without recourse to exceptional means.”204 Whereas Lessona and Graziani had
criticized Nasi for being too lenient on the Amhara population in Harar, the Ministry of
Italian Africa applauded his pro-Amhara policy. Lessona’s replacement, Teruzzi, hoped
that Nasi’s “balanced political sense and realistic spirit” would be echoed by the other
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governors.205 In 1939, Nasi was nominated Vice-Governor General — the viceroy’s
deputy — and placed in charge of the newly formed Governorate of Shewa.206 Upon
taking over in Shewa, Nasi distributed a circular to all functionaries and officials of his
governorate. Entitled “My ‘Creed’” [Il mio ‘Credo’], the circular comprised a series of
orders and decrees issued by Nasi during his time in Harar. They embodied the method or
style in which he expected his commands to operate.207
The Duke of Aosta and Nasi certainly intended to bring a new direction to Italian
governance in East Africa. However, in most cases the practical results of their policies
fell short of their objectives. In part, change simply came too little and too late. The
fundamental framework for the empire was established during Graziani’s tenure as
viceroy. Functionaries on the ground were set in their ways — Nasi frequently bemoaned
the inability of Italian functionaries to govern with patience and sensitivity — and much
of the damage done to Italian relations with local elites and populations was not easily
reversed.208 Furthermore, three years of war and guerrilla fighting had taken a heavy toll
on the Ethiopian economy. Italian forces consumed more local resources while the
amount of cultivated land declined due to the inability to maintain security in the
countryside. Combined with a drought in the spring of 1938, Nasi feared that these
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factors placed the population of Harar in serious danger of famine and, subsequently,
popular discontent.209
With recalcitrant personnel, socio-economic factors, and time working against
them, Amedeo and Nasi also had to deal with confusing and contradictory orders from
Rome. Despite its clear repudiation of Graziani’s policy and its outward show of support
for the new administration, the Ministry of Italian Africa proved reluctant to abandon key
policies where it felt political and racial prestige was at stake. Mussolini, who took over
personal control of the Ministry from Lessona and appointed Teruzzi as his
undersecretary, made this clear to the new viceroy when the two met in June 1938. The
Duce reaffirmed his commitment to the policy of “no power to the ras.” Racial
considerations required a clear separation between whites and blacks, including rases,
who could be offered honorific or consultative posts in Addis Ababa but were by no
means to be granted “territorial command.”210 Later that year, Teruzzi confirmed the
Ministry’s position on the matter by rejecting Mezzetti’s plan to appoint three provincial
chiefs [dejaz] as regional commanders. Such an appointment would have amounted to a
“territorial command,” threatening Italy’s colonial programme “that excludes any form of
government by sharecropping [mezzadria] or indirect government.”211 Alberto Sbacchi
attributes Mussolini’s unwillingness to befriend the Ethiopian aristocracy to his
“ignorance and lack of interest in colonial affairs” as well as to his acceptance of
“second-rate administrators” like Teruzzi.212
Thus, direction from Rome proved contradictory. The criticism of Graziani’s
treatment of indigenous elites seemed to provide the Duke of Aosta with a new mandate
for collaboration, which he genuinely sought. On the other hand, central directives
limited his ability to win support from previously hostile elements. Fortunately for
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Amedeo, he enjoyed considerably more freedom of action than had his predecessor. In
the first years of empire, Mussolini had played a central role in colonial events. He was
informed of everything, signed off on everything, and sent countless directives to East
Africa.213 However, once the propaganda value of the Ethiopian campaign was fully
tapped, Mussolini lost interest in colonial affairs and left the Ministry of Italian Africa
without guidance. Mussolini gradually allowed his undersecretary, Teruzzi, to run the
ministry before formally appointing him minister in October 1939.214 Although the Duke
of Aosta had a troubled relationship with Teruzzi, he was able to implement a more
“elastic” policy than that of Graziani, especially in 1939.215 Despite the various
challenges and limitations that stood in the way, the incorporation of indigenous elites
into the administration remained a cornerstone of Amedeo’s policy even after the
commencement of hostilities against Britain in June 1940.216
With the approval of Teruzzi, the Duke of Aosta also emphasized the need to
respect local customs. This included a more frequent recourse to traditional disciplinary
measures, such as flogging, when applying criminal sanctions. Authorities seeking
confinement for non-political crimes [reati comuni] were supposed first to sound out the
opinion of local leaders and notables. The policy appealed to conservative populations
and elites while also reducing the budgetary strain of incarcerating large numbers of
colonial subjects.217 On the other hand, it contradicted earlier Fascist claims regarding the
export of Roman justice to Ethiopia as part of Italy’s civilizing mission, which rejected
the use of heinous corporal punishments instead of jail time as barbaric.218
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Amedeo reinforced Italy’s longstanding policy of religious tolerance and tried to
smooth over Graziani’s troubled relationship with the Orthodox clergy by compensating
them for the loss of feudal rights that had enabled them to collect tribute.219 These
policies came much to the consternation of Vatican Secretary of State Eugenio Pacelli,
who complained that the attitude of Italian authorities towards the Catholic Church in
East Africa had deteriorated markedly after Graziani’s departure.220 In July 1938, Pope
Pius XI himself protested that Italian authorities in East Africa furnished more support to
Islam and Protestantism than to Catholicism.221 The Vatican expected favourable
treatment for its missionaries in East Africa in return for its neutrality during the ItaloEthiopian conflict.222 When its representative in East Africa, Monsignor Giovanni Maria
Castellani, tried to bring the new autocephalous church under the influence of the
Vatican, Amedeo sought his deportation from the colonies. Italian authorities deemed
Castellani’s attempt at “conversion from above” dangerous, as it risked sparking a
religious revolt.223 Difficulties with the Catholic Church must be understood as part of a
general worsening of relations between the Fascist regime and the Vatican by 1938, but it
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also demonstrates the Duke of Aosta’s commitment to using traditional customs and
institutions as a means of attracting indigenous support for the regime.224
Despite the Duke of Aosta’s conciliatory policies towards indigenous hierarchies
and traditions, his tenure as viceroy overlapped with a renewed impetus for racial
discrimination coming from Rome. In January 1938, the Fascist press launched an antiSemitic propaganda campaign to prepare the Italian population for the state-sanctioned
persecution of Jews, formalized in a series of laws issued between November 1938 and
July 1939. Mussolini’s official endorsement of anti-Semitism in 1938 traditionally has
been interpreted as a tactical move to shore up the Rome-Berlin Axis by eliminating a
source of friction with Nazi Germany.225 However, more recent scholarship has seen it as
part of Fascism’s “vast re-education project” for the Italian people. In this respect, antiSemitic policies in Italy were closely related to the regime’s imperial racist measures,
which were intended to establish racial consciousness among Italians.226 The substance of
the anti-Semitic legislation, which bore similarities not just to the Nazi Nuremberg Laws
but also to Fascist colonial legislation, reflected these links.227 Certainly, the regime
justified the propaganda and legislation as a necessary corollary to its efforts to instil
racial consciousness amongst Italians for the imperial age.228
In one of the few critical accounts of Amedeo’s viceroyship, Richard Pankhurst
argues that “despite his liberal pretensions the Duke of Aosta was responsible for
implementing the increasingly rigorous racial discrimination introduced at this time, and
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was indeed an apologist for it.”229 In fact, Fascist racial policy was perfectly compatible
with Amedeo’s philosophy of allowing indigenous populations to develop at their own
pace and within the bounds of their own level of civilization. In one of his first circulars
after taking charge as viceroy, Amedeo reiterated Mussolini’s policies on racial prestige
and the need for segregation. He reminded all governors to maintain a clear distinction
between the type of work given to indigenous labourers and their Italian counterparts,
assigning the former to the lowest and most menial tasks.230 In his June meeting with the
Duke of Aosta, Mussolini insisted that natives were to be allowed only an elementary
education with technical instruction focused on agriculture and basic military training.231
Nasi immediately distributed orders limiting the education of natives, which he justified
by arguing that educating the indigenous masses “tends to put individuals out of their
class,” drawing them away from the fields and into the towns where they would compete
with Italians for jobs. Education, therefore, was restricted to the sons of chiefs and
important notables so they could serve as interpreters or hold minor offices. Nasi
concluded that these directives were of a “very secret character, and should be applied
without divulging the real motives.”232
As preparatory propaganda for the race laws in Italy increased, Nasi held a
meeting with his leading officials in Harar. Measures taken for the “defence of the race”
included the organization of assistance to unemployed nationals, purging of compromised
nationals, and assistance for the transfer of families from Italy to East Africa. In addition,
Nasi called for the severe application of a 1937 decree against meticci [mixed-bloods].
Government assistance for the mothers of meticci was limited to the basic necessities,
after which children would be taken away and cared for in a distant institution. Nasi

229
230
231
232

Pankhurst, “Secret History of the Occupation of Ethiopia,” 70–71.
Amedeo di Savoia to governors, 4 January 1938, ASMAE, MAI, pos. 181/55, fasc. 255.
Meregazzi to Teruzzi, n.d. [June 1938], ASMAE, MAI, pos. 181/55, fasc. 255.
“Indirizzo per l’istruzione degli indigeni,” 5 June 1938, DIWC, I, 53.

102

asked commissioners to inform his office of all meticci births.233 Colonial authorities,
including army generals, remained fully involved in the execution of Fascist racial policy.
As with the battle against madamismo — which continued with even more severe
penalties — measures to ensure “racial prestige” appeared paradoxically to target the
Italian community in East Africa.234 The Jewish population in East Africa was sparse and
difficult to identify; once accounted for, the colonial police found little reason to suspect
their loyalty.235 Instead, ordinary Italians were expelled for “behaviour detrimental to the
prestige of the race,” indiscipline, lack of morals, stealing from natives, or exhibiting
“doubtful fascist faith.”236 In December 1939, colonial police in Harar laid charges
against two men for threatening “racial prestige” and “Italian dignity.” One had rented a
room from an Ethiopian; another drew obscene graffiti on a wall in the native quarter of
Dire Dawa. Because the graffiti was viewed by natives, it was handled as a racial
crime.237 Assaults against indigenous subjects — including the sexual assault of a minor
— were considered crimes not on their own merits, but because they threatened the
“dignity and superiority of the [Italian] race.” Colonial police desired that “brutish
elements […] who maintain an irreprehensible attitude towards the natives, are removed
from the territories of the Empire as undesirables. In such a way, one will be able to
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obtain the clear distinction between Italians and natives demanded by our laws for the
protection of our civilization.”238 Sanctions against the white community for racial crimes
therefore bolstered both the long-term aim of the Fascist regime to instil a colonial
consciousness amongst Italians as well as Amedeo’s calls for greater respect and
understanding in relations with indigenous populations.
According to a sympathetic biographer, the Duke of Aosta genuinely believed that
African cultures deserved individual respect, that indigenous traditions and laws
remained valid and should be preserved, and that the delegation of some power to the
indigenous population was the best way to achieve the illusory goal of harmonious
collaboration between the dominator and the dominated.239 Certainly, he and Nasi
changed the tone and some of the rhetoric within the administration in East Africa.
However, they never managed completely to overhaul the system bequeathed to them.
Likewise, in its critique of Graziani the Fascist regime appeared to take lessons from the
first two years of imperial rule — namely, that super direct rule was unrealistic and that
the hasty imposition of a civil apparatus in East Africa had caused serious structural
dysfunction — but it offered no alternative arrangements. Instead, Mussolini distanced
himself from colonial policy and provided no clear direction. The result was a confusing
model for behaviour, both in the present and for the future.

Experience in Ethiopia set an ambiguous precedent for the political administration
of Fascism’s empire and the army’s role within it. In theory, civil powers were the
preserve of functionaries trained by the Ministry of Italian Africa. In practice, military
officers exercised many of these functions, from the level of viceroy down to district
administrators. As a result, the armed forces were fully involved in the application of
Fascist policies, including the segregation of colonial society, the imposition of racial
legislation, colonization, urban planning, and the exploitation of local resources. These
policies were imposed by the regime and driven by ideological considerations, primarily
238

“Relazione sui servizi d’istituto esplicati dalla questura del Harar durante il mese di febbraio 1940,” 3
March 1940, ASMAE, MAI, pos. 181/53, fasc. 247. Reports from July through November 1940 suggest
that charges for racial crimes dropped in number after Italy’s entry in the Second World War.
239

Borra, Amedeo di Savoia, 106–107.

104

the desire to create the “new Fascist man,” but senior officers of the Regio Esercito
managed to justify most of them according to military necessity and expediency. By
behaving as traditional imperialists, preoccupied with the maintenance of white prestige,
Italian military officers largely conformed to Fascist objectives.
When given a clear line from Rome, army officers dutifully worked towards it.
After 1937, however, Rome’s line became less clear. The regime distanced itself from
Graziani and his policies towards indigenous elites and populations, which it recognized
as contributors to revolt. The appointment of the Duke of Aosta as viceroy ushered in a
new phase of conciliation, but this too received criticism from the regime. There is no
evidence to suggest that Mussolini was in the end any more pleased with the Duke of
Aosta than he had been with Graziani, but it was not politically expedient to recall a
member of the House of Savoy.240 The behaviour expected of Italian colonial
functionaries, civilian or military, was less clear in 1940 than it had been in 1936.
Regional variation added to this ambiguity. Separated from Italy by thousands of
kilometres and isolated even from the viceroy and governors, local administrators often
were left to their own devices. Governors themselves had to respond to local ethnic,
socio-economic, and military conditions. The regime permitted different policies for
different parts of the empire for pragmatic and — in the case of pro-Muslim policy —
political reasons. Thus, while Italian forces struggled to pacify the Governorate of
Amhara, Teruzzi’s last visit to Harar at the end of February 1940 suggested the
possibility of a smoothly functioning empire that could count on the enthusiastic loyalty
of both colonizer and colonized. Warmly received by Italian colonists and Harari locals,
Teruzzi applauded the Duke of Aosta’s “unfaltering” rule over the “revived empire.”241
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2

Fascist Propaganda for a Fascist War

Central directives and the legal framework of the colonial administration in East Africa
limited the autonomy of military commanders in matters of policy. In a similar fashion,
the army’s influence over the creation and distribution of propaganda for the troops in the
colonies also was curtailed. A decade of rule under an aspiring totalitarian regime that
sought to control the flow of information to the population diminished the army’s role in
all aspects of propaganda. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia was first and foremost a
Fascist war, fought for the Fascist regime to rekindle the Fascist spirit of revolution. The
conflict therefore saw an unprecedented level of control by Rome over its propaganda
organs and the themes they presented to the Italian public. These themes sought to justify
Italian aggression against Ethiopia, to establish a colonial consciousness among Italians,
and to devalue the local populations and delegitimize the resistance that Italian soldiers
met in East Africa. Although military commanders interfered more frequently in the
direction of propaganda during and after the Italo-Ethiopian war, the top-down structure
of the propaganda apparatus in the colonies limited their capacity to produce original
works for their men. Propaganda for the troops in East Africa tended to be formulated by
civilians under the supervision of Fascist agencies. But, when military commanders and
governors addressed their officers and men, they too echoed the official line from Rome.

The Fascist Propaganda Apparatus in East Africa
For the Fascist regime, propaganda was a broad concept. It involved not only the creation
and presentation of overtly political messages, but more generally the control over news
and information that reached both domestic and foreign populations. Between 1925 and
1935, propaganda came under the exclusive control of a single body within the Fascist
regime. Mussolini’s Press Office conducted a gradual process of centralization, evolving
into the Undersecretariat of Press and Propaganda in September 1934 before being
upgraded to a full ministry in June 1935. Following the extension of its responsibilities to
include the censorship and coordination of intellectuals and artists as well as the media,
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the ministry was renamed the Ministry of Popular Culture [Minculpop] in May 1937. 1
Mussolini had a central role in establishing this propaganda apparatus and staffing it with
loyal bureaucrats. Moreover, the central line found enthusiastic mouthpieces at the local
level, whether for ideological or socio-economic motives. As Nicola Labanca argues, “in
any case, the impulse and coordination came from the centre.”2
The Fascistization and centralization of propaganda applied to the Italian army as
well. Although the army had developed a sophisticated propaganda apparatus during the
First World War, it was dismantled in the interwar period. After the rise of Mussolini’s
dictatorship the army, like other institutions, lost any active role in propaganda.3 The
regime allowed the army to control only a few publications of technical nature, but even
the run of the Rivista Militare — the army’s main journal for technical and theoretical
debate on military art and science — was interrupted in 1933 because its authors were not
permitted to express independent thought.4 The army of course remained active in
providing moral assistance to the troops through welfare programmes and basic
education, but its influence over political propaganda was limited to advertising the
publications of Fascist agencies or ministries. As an institution, the Italian army entered
the Ethiopian campaign unprepared and lacking experience in the coordination of
propaganda.
The invasion of Ethiopia enabled the Italian army to claw back some autonomy in
the direction of propaganda. The complex nature of the propaganda campaign during the
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Ethiopian crisis forced the Propaganda Ministry to delegate certain tasks to the army and
other ministries. Its office in Asmara was staffed largely with military personnel. On
grounds of military secrecy and security, General Badoglio strictly controlled the press in
East Africa, limiting the movements of correspondents and even suggesting which topics
they ought to cover.5 The army used its newfound influence in the field of propaganda
primarily to limit potentially useful intelligence from reaching the enemy and to improve
its reputation in Italy and abroad.
Following the declaration of empire, the organization of propaganda was plagued
by the jurisdictional conflicts that characterized relations between the viceroys and
Fascist ministries. The Propaganda Ministry tried to impose control by staffing the East
African press office, now in Addis Ababa, with civilian personnel and establishing
subsidiary offices in the various governorates.6 However, the ministry complained that
Graziani and colonial officials in East Africa obstructed its work. The main problem was
that Graziani, like Badoglio before him, did not keep the press office current on news and
events; nor did local authorities run drafts of newspapers past the office prior to
publication.7 At the same time, Lessona accused the Propaganda Ministry of treading on
his heels. He insisted that the press and propaganda office, like all agencies in East
Africa, answered only to the Ministry of Colonies.8 The result was a three-way
jurisdictional tug of war between the Minister of Press and Propaganda, the Minister of
Colonies, and the Viceroy of Ethiopia.
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The Propaganda Minister, Dino Alfieri, took the issue straight to Mussolini, who
allowed the office to remain in East Africa.9 Finally, in October 1936, representatives of
the Colonial and Propaganda Ministries came to an agreement regarding jurisdictional
boundaries for Italian East Africa. The press and propaganda office was considered a
section of the Propaganda Ministry employed by the Governor General — the viceroy —
in Addis Ababa. Manpower derived exclusively from the Propaganda Ministry, but the
office reported and answered only to the Colonial Ministry. In return, Lessona was to
provide Alfieri with daily news reports.10 Although the parties involved remained most
interested in controlling the flow of information back to Italy, the jurisdictional dispute
had ramifications on the organization and coordination of propaganda for the troops in
East Africa, since the same office was ultimately responsible for all these tasks. The
arrangement curtailed military control over and participation in propaganda.
Essentially, the model for the coordination of propaganda in the mother country
was transplanted into the colonies. The tasks of the press office were manifold. It
provided communiqués to the Agenzia Stefani, the official and only news service in Italy,
and it issued licenses to foreign journalists. In addition, it organized propaganda for
Italians and natives, overseeing the newspaper press and radio in East Africa.11 The head
office in Addis Ababa approved all actions of the subordinate branches in the
governorates. In theory, it was supposed to maintain unity of direction while avoiding
duplication or dispersal of effort in the field of propaganda.12
In practice, jurisdictional squabbling remained a problem. By summer 1937,
Minculpop representatives considered the problem of propaganda in East Africa to be
“serious and urgent.” The viceroy, they complained, continued to interfere in the press
office’s work and the governorates tended to operate independently. Again, the main
9
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point of conflict remained that military authorities did not furnish correspondents with
useful or interesting news.13 Nor was jurisdictional overlap remedied. In 1939, the Duke
of Aosta complained that the Inspectorate of Labour, the MVSN, the Fascist Party, the
political affairs office, municipal offices, and other agencies all were involved in the
organization of propaganda in East Africa.14
Despite these jurisdictional complexities, so typical of Fascist Italian bureaucracy,
the propaganda that reached the troops conformed more or less completely to the official
line emanating from Rome. The army used its influence through the office of the viceroy
to control the flow of news abroad rather than to develop propaganda material for its
soldiers. Having lost much of its creative capacity over the course of the previous decade,
the military relied on civilian sources of propaganda. The newspapers, magazines, books,
radio broadcasts, and films to which Italian soldiers had access echoed and in many cases
were the same as what was available to them in Italy under the close guidance of the
Propaganda Ministry.
The newspaper press was the most important propaganda organ for the Fascist
regime. Mussolini’s own background in journalism prompted him to take daily interest in
the Italian and foreign press. Although most Italian newspapers — and the most
successful ones — remained in private hands, by 1926 Mussolini had established
conformity within the Italian press. His Press Office and later the Ministry of Press and
Propaganda controlled content by pressuring proprietors and managers, limiting the
power of editors, and restricting access to the journalistic profession, as well as by issuing
daily “orders” to editorial staffs that outlined the regime’s expectations. By the mid1930s, the regime generally could rely on the press to self-censor its publications.15 This
institutional culture was exported to Ethiopia, either directly through the provision of
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reading material printed or written in Italy or through the entrepreneurs that started new
local papers in the colonies.
A unique example of self-censorship during the Italo-Ethiopian war came in the
form of illustrated postcards that middle-class officers and soldiers kept as mementos or
sent to acquaintances in Italy. Whereas the official postcards supplied by the army and
regime were blank or adorned with generic symbols or maps, these were supplemented
with more colourful privately produced specimens.16 Individual military units, especially
from the MVSN, and opportunistic illustrators produced postcards that nonetheless
reflected the main themes of Fascist ideology and imperial propaganda. Often through
caricature and satire, postcards emphasized Fascist militarism, racism, and concepts of a
“civilizing mission.”17
Periodicals and literature were the main sources of information and satire sought
out by officers and soldiers in East Africa. Unlike the First World War, where the army
produced its own “trench newspapers,” the vast majority of reading made available to the
troops in Ethiopia was developed by Fascist agencies or private publishers subject to
Fascist censorship. Soldiers in East Africa read the newspapers and magazines that were
most popular back home.18 Literature intended specifically for the troops was developed
externally before being endorsed by the War Ministry and army. With the build-up of
forces in East Africa prior to the invasion, the periodical L’Azione Coloniale, published
by the Fascist Colonial Institute since 1931, began printing a weekly edition designed for
the troops in East Africa. Entitled La Tradotta Coloniale, it was inspired by La Tradotta,
the famous trench newspaper of the Italian Third Army in the First World War. Unlike its
predecessor, the contents of La Tradotta Coloniale were not under the control of the
army. Nonetheless, Army Chief of Staff and Undersecretary Federico Baistrocchi
considered that, “since the purpose of the newspaper is that of bringing a breath of
cheerfulness and serenity to the troops, especially in E[ast] A[frica], the initiative of
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‘L’Azione Coloniale’ deserves to be supported.” He ordered all commands to advertise
the periodical among their officers and men and to encourage subscriptions at the rate of
10 lire a year.19 In addition, the army supported the distribution of Gioventù Fascista —
published by the Fasci giovanili di combattimento, the Fascist organization for young
men aged eighteen to twenty-one — since the magazine fed “the flame of faith, valour
and devotion to the noble cause.”20
Following the declaration of empire, the immediate focus of the press office was
the establishment of local newspapers. By the end of May 1936, there were two dailies in
East Africa — Asmara’s Corriere dell’Impero and Dire Dawa’s Corriere Sud-etiopico —
as well as Il Giornale di Addis Abeba, which was published three times a week. However,
according to reports from the Ministry of Propaganda, none of these papers satisfied the
soldiers’ need for daily news; it was necessary to supplement local papers with African
editions of major Italian ones, like Mussolini’s own Il Popolo d’Italia.21 The privately
owned Corriere della Sera, Italy’s largest newspaper with a circulation of 600,000, also
quickly established offices in East Africa.22 Officers of colonial battalions, isolated in farflung garrisons or in combat operations, managed to receive their subscriptions to the
Milanese daily by aerial delivery.23
Efforts to establish a local press in Ethiopia were beset by logistical difficulties,
meaning that the large Italian dailies remained influential. The regime concentrated its
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resources on the Corriere dell’Impero, extending its distribution throughout the empire.24
Its offices were moved to Addis Ababa and it took over the old printing press of the
Ethiopian government, which certainly made it unique but in need of improvement. In
1938, Mussolini approved plans to establish a new printing press in Addis Ababa, but
Minculpop officials estimated that it would not become operational for at least two years.
The Corriere dell’Impero covered national and international news supplied from Italy
and propaganda articles provided by Minculpop, while its local content consisted of
bulletins, economic chronicles, and the reproduction of laws and decrees emitted by the
viceroy and governors.25
In other words, overt political propaganda adhered to the standard set in Italy. The
Corriere dell’Impero was supplemented by various local gazettes of limited propaganda
value. The daily Somalia Fascista lacked originality, merely extracting articles from
Italian newspapers. The Corriere Hararino commenced publication with grand
intentions, but by summer 1937 had been reduced to a weekly bulletin. The ministry
considered Il Bollettino del Gimma to be a complete “miscarriage” [aborto].26 In sum,
given Minculpop’s formal role as supervisory organ, the lack of originality and
communications difficulties within the East African press, and the continued profusion of
major Italian dailies, newspaper content in East Africa did not differ significantly from
that available in Italy.
Written material was not the only means of propaganda in East Africa. The
dispersal of Italian forces throughout the vast empire made radio an important medium
for disseminating information in the colonies. The Fascist regime’s use of radio never
became as sophisticated as that of Nazi Germany. However, because Italian radio
developed almost entirely during the Fascist period, it was relatively easy for the regime
to control. The Propaganda Ministry dictated the content of broadcasts in the 1930s. It
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never devoted more than one-third of broadcasts to direct political propaganda; the
remainder consisted of music and entertainment.27 As with the newspaper press, this
model of centralized control was transplanted to the colonies. Indeed, whereas radio
listeners in Italy always had access to foreign broadcasts, isolation from Europe made it
easier for authorities to control the messages reaching soldiers and populations in East
Africa.
From the commencement of operations in Ethiopia, the Ministry of Press and
Propaganda oversaw special radio transmissions from Italy to East Africa, consisting of
an afternoon programme of news and music. After the conquest, the demand for radio
increased. Authorities experimented with three transmissions per day — news and music
between 11:00 and 12:00, again between 17:00 and 18:15, and news at 19:37 — but
reception problems forced them to cancel the morning transmission. By the end of 1938,
broadcasting from Italy to East Africa consisted of two improved evening transmissions.
Ideological programming typically focused on themes of demographic policy, autarky,
racial prestige, imperialism, and Fascist social achievements.28
In 1937, the East African press office began broadcasting its own transmissions
from the Centro Radio Marina in Addis Ababa. These comprised a brief news bulletin
followed by a second transmission “directed in a particular way to the troops and
workers,” based on news, education, and recreation. Declaring that “every Italian centre
must be equipped with a radio,” the press office also planned to establish “places for
community listening” [posti d’ascolto collettivo] throughout the empire, beginning with
worksites and military posts. Graziani granted the office a sum of 1 million lire for the
project.29 This was a miniscule portion of the overall cost of empire — the invasion had
cost the regime one billion lire per month and by 1940 the Italian government was
27
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spending six million lire per month to maintain the irregular armed bands that helped
police the empire — but, given that a radio set cost 2,000 lire, it was not insignificant.30
Radio was an important means of propaganda in East Africa, particularly because it could
provide isolated soldiers with a voice from the mother country. There is nothing to
suggest that its content differed substantially from that presented in Italy.
After the Ethiopian campaign, motion pictures eclipsed radio as a means of mass
communication in Fascist Italy.31 However, the logistics of providing projection
equipment for the hundreds of garrisons dispersed throughout the empire relegated
cinema to a secondary role in East Africa, behind print and radio media. Whereas the
government ran cinemas for natives — racial segregation was applied to the colonial film
industry — those for the white population were based on private enterprise.32 By 1939,
there were forty pubic cinemas in East Africa, half of which were concentrated in three
major urban centres.33 From time to time, isolated workers or soldiers were able to take in
a complimentary show provided by one of the six “autocinemas” — mobile units
complete with film projector and audio equipment — operated by the LUCE [L’Unione
Cinematografica Educativa] Institute, the government-run film company.34
As with newspapers and radio, film propaganda in East Africa was virtually the
same as in Italy. The LUCE institute maintained a small section in Addis Ababa, made up
of a director, three cameramen, two film developers, an operator for each “autocinema,”
an administrative assistant, and two indigenous orderlies. The section was attached to the
press office and took orders from the Governor General. The viceroy therefore controlled
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what the unit was allowed to film but, whereas still photographs could be developed on
site, all motion film had to be edited and developed in Rome. Therefore, political material
shown in East Africa was largely produced in Italy. As in Italy, cinemas were subject to
government requirements to accompany public showings of commercial films with a
LUCE newsreel, which tended to focus on the accomplishments of the regime, especially
in sports and, at least through 1936, in the colonies. “Autocinema” shows usually
involved a theatrical release preceded by a documentary or newsreel.35 Newsreels
represented the most overt use of cinema as political propaganda by the Fascist regime.
Otherwise, cinema mostly served entertainment purposes, fulfilling the public’s desire to
escape everyday problems.36 In fact, Hollywood productions proved most popular among
Italians up to the outbreak of war; Italian films tended to emulate American styles and
themes in order to compete. Supply shortages meant that most films available in the
colonies were of foreign origin.37
Military authorities in East Africa made use of written, audio, and visual forms of
propaganda supplied to them by the Fascist regime and its agencies. Another type of
propaganda that should not be underestimated in its importance to the military
establishment came in the form of speeches and orders of the day — general directives
meant to be read to the men or distributed through the ranks.38 The speeches of central
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figures like Mussolini, his ministers, as well as the viceroy often were printed in the
press, played over the radio, or shown in newsreels. More difficult to track down are the
speeches made in the field by commanding officers to their men. Even in the case of
printed directives, it is clear that staff officers did not consider all of them worthy of
preservation in unit war diaries. As a result, although the previous chapter made clear that
higher-level communications between commands easily assimilated Fascist discourse and
attitudes, a systematic study of the language of speeches and directives issued to soldiers
in East Africa is not possible.
In some respects, the level of ideological enthusiasm of commanding officers and
the example that they set for their men is questionable. First, the Italian officer corps did
not traditionally enjoy a close relationship with the lower ranks. A “caste mentality”
prevented many regular officers from resorting to demagogic appeals towards their
men.39 The dubious quality of officers in East Africa added to the gap between
commanders and enlisted personnel. By 1940, eighty percent of officers commanding
military units in East Africa were reservists, most of whom, according to one report,
demonstrated “apathy” and an “inability to command.” Many of the regular officers came
from the logistical services and likewise were not trained to command.40
Second, the institutional culture of the army, with its traditional autonomy from
government and loyalty to the monarchy, precluded the wholehearted assimilation of
Fascist propaganda, especially by regular officers. During the invasion of Ethiopia,
Fascist hierarchs complained that the methods they employed to motivate their
Blackshirts — which included embellishing earthworks and fortifications with stone
mosaics of the fascio littorio or with Fascist mottos to demonstrate the omnipresence of
the Duce — were not shared or understood by regular army officers, who it appeared
were not completely “up to date on our Party matters.”41 As Labanca demonstrates, the
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difference in approach between army officers and Fascist leaders continued to manifest
itself after the invasion in the form of memoir literature published during the Fascist era.
The regime censored all such publications and ensured that they served its propaganda
interests but, whereas party and militia leaders almost unanimously presented the
conquest of Ethiopia as a victory for Italian Fascism and Mussolini’s regime, the writing
produced by professional military men tended to depict the war as a triumph of the state
and of the armed forces as an institution.42
Regardless of the enthusiasm of their commanding officers, all soldiers in the
colonies were subject to occasional messages from the Colonial Ministry. Upon taking
over as minister, Lessona issued an order of the day to be read to all military personnel in
Ethiopia, emphasizing “the honour and responsibility of serving Fascism” as well as “the
great works of peace and civilization that await us, and that we will accomplish with the
fast pace that the Duce has impressed on our task.”43 Army officers were capable of using
similar language in appeals to their men. Before their departure from Italy for Africa in
November 1936, the commander of the 11th Regiment of the Granatieri di Savoia
Division addressed his men as the “supreme flag bearers of the destinies of imperial
Italy,” who carried with them the faith “of Italians, of Fascists and of soldiers.”44 The
road to Addis Ababa had been paved by “the sword and pickaxe of Roman civilization,”
and he called for his men to defend it with honour, tenacity, and perfect discipline, “in the
name of the Emperor King, of the undefeated Duce, [and] of the sacred memory of the
fallen.”45
The report on the division’s departure, published in the magazine Le Forze
Armate and proudly preserved in the unit’s war diary, further indicates how the army and
regime could fuse Fascist motifs with traditional nationalism and institutional pride. As
the only large metropolitan unit in Addis Ababa, the Granatieri di Savoia represented
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“the Regio Esercito of Vittorio Veneto, renewed and invigorated in spirit and means in
the brilliant light of the Littorio.” The division, the article went on, “has had its spirit,
heart, and muscle toughened in the generous atmosphere of the Littorio and the House of
Savoy, where Fascism has permeated every mind and every lump of dirt.” While the
division took for its colours the blue of the House of Savoy along with the traditional red
of the grenadiers, it also displayed “the magnificent and warlike spirit of the new
youthfulness of Fascist Italy.”46 The language in the magazine article was more overtly
ideological than the regimental commander’s orders of the day, akin to the differences
between Fascist and military memoir literature noted by Labanca. There is little doubt
that army officers were less inclined than Fascist leaders to resort to full-fledged
bombastic propaganda exalting the regime, but the example of the Granatieri di Savoia
reveals that officers could and did employ ideological language — or at least language
compatible with that of the regime — in their discourses, perhaps because they believed
it made a genuine impact on their men.
At least in terms of outward appearances, the army had submitted to a degree of
Fascistization by the time of the Ethiopian campaign. Military documents and reports
from the occupation almost always included the year according to the Fascist calendar,
beginning in October 1922 with the “march on Rome” and expressed as a roman
numeral. Graziani’s use of Fascist rhetoric is well-known, but the Duke of Aosta also
drew upon the requisite themes and language in his discourses, which he knew could be
made public in Italy. Upon taking over as viceroy, he praised Mussolini as the “founder
and Duce of the empire” and recognized the importance of his mission to the “Fascist
nation.”47 Guglielmo Nasi, too, in his foreword to a book on Harar, voiced his pride in
having “had the opportunity to fulfil one of the most important commandments of the
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Duce that the empire would develop rapidly.”48 Indeed, although it has been argued that
Mussolini’s popularity among the Italian masses had waned by the late 1930s, Nasi
tended to fall back on the Duce myth in order to motivate his men when conditions
became difficult.49
Junior officers and unit commanders were the main point of contact between the
Fascist regime, the Italian army, and the thousands of indigenous troops employed in the
Italian colonies. After 1937, colonial soldiers — made up of Eritrean and Ethiopian
askari as well as Somali dubats — outnumbered Italian military personnel in East Africa
and conducted the lion’s share of the work in counterinsurgency operations.50 This poses
difficulties when assessing Italian propaganda for the soldiers in East Africa. The sources
and themes of propaganda distributed to Italian officers, soldiers, and civilians were not
designed with indigenous troops in mind. Levels of literacy, and even oral
comprehension, were limited by the reluctance of Liberal and Fascist colonial authorities
to educate subject populations.51 The paucity of documentation on askari battalions
provides few clues as to the extent of propaganda directed towards them.
To maintain loyalty and morale in askari battalions, Italian commanders relied
less on sophisticated propaganda than upon unit-level negotiation and discipline. Fifty
years of colonialism in Eritrea created a myth in Italy of the “faithful askari,” a virtual
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automaton bred for war and unwaveringly loyal to the Italian banner.52 Although such
myths allowed for genuine admiration among Italians for the askari — culminating in the
participation of 3,500 Eritrean colonial troops in a grandiose triumphal parade in Rome to
celebrate the first anniversary of the empire in May 1937 — the relationship between the
two never came on equal terms and always was strongly paternalistic.53 Askari — who
could never become officers themselves — often referred to their commander as
gwäitana, meaning “our lord.” The gap between Italian officers and colonial soldiers
widened further with the introduction of racial legislation and segregation.54 Indigenous
intermediaries — non-commissioned officers and, for Orthodox Christians, chaplains
[cascì] — undoubtedly played a crucial role maintaining unit cohesion.55
Although he argued that relationships between Italian officers and indigenous
troops were in many ways closer than those between officers and enlisted men in white
units, Paolo Corazzi, a lieutenant in a colonial battalion, remembered his men in a
stereotypical and patronizing way.
The askari were not able to understand abstract reasoning. Their life was simple:
marching, fighting, satisfying basic needs. They had no complicated problems,
their reports were always accompanied by exaggerated imagery: ‘shifta [bandits]
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be [stare] many like grass or like locusts’. They were at the same time, infantile,
superstitious, violent and cruel as the shifta, but devoted and obedient.56
Similarly, both paternalism and racism were evident in official Italian reports that
described indigenous soldiers as “primitive.” The main tools of motivating colonial
troops were harsh discipline and the authority of the white commander, who was told to
grant his men “praise and rewards when they have done well, censure and punishment
[...] when they have failed.”57
The heterogeneous nature of askari battalions after 1936 further impeded any
Italian efforts at persuasion. Prior to the conquest of Ethiopia, most askari came from the
Eritrean highlands. After the declaration of empire, however, almost all colonial units
comprised a mixture of men with different religions, traditions, ethnicities, and
languages. In this context, discipline and material incentives were the primary means of
ensuring unit cohesion, rather than ideological propaganda. Italian authorities tried to
maintain the morale of colonial troops by improving the general conditions of their
camps and, when possible, allowing families to accompany them there.58 According to
the oral testimony of Eritrean veterans, economic convenience, cultural and social
prestige, and adventurism were the principal motivating factors for the askari.59 The same
can be said for the irregular Ethiopian bands in which Italian officers served as
commanders or liaisons. Ettore Formento, the commander of one such band, found it
difficult to convince his men to fight for something other than plunder and economic
security. Formento told them that the Italians had come to show Ethiopians “the cultural
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and intellectual way to a higher level of civilization,” but he doubted that this argument
made much of an impact on his men.60 Italian propagandists — when they considered
their indigenous troops at all — likely targeted colonial soldiers with the same themes
that they used for the general indigenous population. These exalted Roman power and
civilization, touted values of loyalty, and venerated the askari as model colonial
subjects.61
The Fascist propaganda apparatus in the colonies was unique and complex. It had
to take into consideration both Italian and indigenous populations, military and civilian.
In addition, its structure combined the regime’s totalitarian desire for centralized control
over communications and information with the intricacies of the dysfunctional legal
framework of Italian East Africa. The Propaganda and Colonial Ministries vied to
represent the centre while, in the field, the office of the viceroy issued direct orders to
propaganda organs. In terms of the type of propaganda that reached Italian soldiers, these
internal rivalries in fact were moot. What the army made available to them to read, listen
to, and watch differed little from what soldiers and civilians had access to in the mother
country. A pronounced hierarchical gap distanced many commanding officers from their
men and prompted them to adopt themes similar to and compatible with those supplied
by the regime. Through the viceroy, the army had a role in propaganda, but it did not
choose to depart from the model ordered by Rome. Given the centrality of empire to the
regime and the importance which Mussolini attributed to propaganda, any such departure
necessarily would have been limited.

A War for Empire
The nature of the Fascist propaganda apparatus in East Africa ensured more or less
complete conformity with the directives and themes emanating from Rome. Propaganda
in East Africa responded to international events and reflected Fascist policies in Europe.
For example, the pages of La Tradotta Coloniale exhibited themes of militarism, anti60
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British or anti-League sentiment sparked by economic sanctions against Italy in 1935 and
1936, and anti-communism in response to Italian involvement in the Spanish Civil War.62
Likewise, newspapers covered the development of the Rome-Berlin Axis after 1936 and
the regime’s anti-Semitic turn in 1938. The deification of the Duce and glorification of
the Fascist “new man” were among the central themes of the regime’s propaganda in
general.63 These motifs all were present in East Africa as well as in Italy.
Most importantly, Fascist propagandists presented the conflict in Ethiopia as a
war for empire. Imperial propaganda themes had the potential to inform the behaviour
and attitudes of Italian officers and soldiers in East Africa towards the local populations
and resistance. Selling Italian aggression in Ethiopia as part of a civilizing mission as
well as a means to future prosperity for Italians undermined the dignity of the occupied
populations. Efforts to instil in Italians a colonial and racial consciousness added to this
tendency. Indigenous enemies that resisted Italian occupation were labelled as barbaric
and illegitimate combatants that deserved no mercy.
An examination of print media — the most important organ of Fascist propaganda
— from the invasion and the early stages of the occupation of Ethiopia highlights all of
these themes. The years 1935 and 1936 witnessed a colossal propaganda effort to rally
the Italian population behind the war in East Africa, reflecting the campaign’s
revolutionary intent in the metropole and its status as a “national” war that differed from
typical “colonial” conflicts in terms of public mobilization.64 It was during this period
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that the Fascist regime defined Italy’s mission in East Africa and formed the assumptions
that would govern relations between Italians and natives in occupied territory. After
1936, with the stagnation of Italian colonization and military efforts, discussion of
Ethiopia steadily decreased and few new themes were added.65 Mussolini established the
key themes to be depicted in propaganda through his speeches and the personal input he
continued to provide to the regime’s semi-official newspaper, Il Popolo d’Italia. This
section examines the pages of Il Popolo d’Italia as well as the mainstream Corriere della
Sera, which combined provide a thorough overview of the main characteristics of Fascist
propaganda surrounding the conquest of Ethiopia. In addition, the trench newspaper La
Tradotta Coloniale — although it ceased publication in September 1936 — is a
particularly rich source of satirical literature and cartoons developed specifically with a
military audience in mind.66

Justifying Aggression
During the Ethiopian crisis, the regime justified its aggressive expansion to foreign and
Italian populations through several angles. First, it argued that Italian imperialism merely
followed the example set by other colonial nations; therefore, countries like France and
Britain were hypocritical to oppose Italian expansion. Second, the regime posited the
economic and demographic necessity of colonies to absorb Italian emigration. Third, the
regime touted its civilizing mission, claiming in Catholic circles to be exporting
Christianity while universally defining Ethiopia as a primitive country whose populations
begged emancipation from slavery. Last, Mussolini claimed that Ethiopia posed an
immediate threat to the small Italian colonies in Eritrea and Somalia.67
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The notion of Ethiopia as a security threat dominated the early days of the
campaign in October 1935. Il Popolo d’Italia explained the invasion as a necessary
means “to face the direct and immediate threat constituted by Ethiopian mobilization.”68
Baron Aloisi’s highly publicized speech to the League of Nations presented the conflict
as a defensive war against an aggressive Ethiopian state, which had continued to arm
itself after its 1928 pact of friendship with Italy and had proven unable or unwilling to
control its feudal military system and prevent raids along the Eritrean and Somali
frontiers.69 By April 1936, Mussolini argued that security in East Africa could only be
accomplished through the “total annihilation” of Ethiopian armies.70 This implicit call for
total occupation provided the first justification for establishing an Italian empire.
During the invasion, the Fascist regime also claimed to defend oppressed
indigenous peoples from Abyssinian domination. The theme of liberation provided a
positive message of the Italian mission in Ethiopia as being essentially a humane one. On
the other hand, it was inseparable from the negative portrayal of Ethiopian leaders and
populations as backwards, barbaric, and passive. Both positive and negative forms of
propaganda were evident in an October 1935 article on “The March of Civilization,”
which responded self-righteously to the League’s denunciation of the Italian invasion.
Geneva’s arbitrary judgement can condemn the Italian soldiers and workers that
bring order, justice and civilization to Ethiopia. [...] The Italian advance instead
represents the liberation of oppressed populations. Our soldiers, with perfect Italic
kindness, share their bread with the hungry. Italian doctors take in the wounded
and care for the sick. Chaplains give protection to abandoned children. Our
authorities administer justice. Pillaging [spogliazioni] stops. Banditry disappears.
Workers open roads, dig wells, build bridges, viaducts, aqueducts. Roman
civilization establishes its empire and brings comfort to territories abandoned for
millennia to a dark barbarism.71
Fascist propaganda thereby touted the humanitarian nature of Italian soldiers towards
occupied, or “liberated,” populations.
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Delivered to a crowd of thousands gathered in the Piazza Venezia, Mussolini’s
declaration of empire on 9 May 1936 linked the civilizing mission of the Italian
conquerors to the Fascist revolution.
Italy finally has its empire. A Fascist empire, because it bears the indestructible
marks of the will and power of the Roman Littorio, because this is the purpose
towards which the unbridled and disciplined energies of vigorous young Italian
generations were directed for fourteen years. An empire of peace, because Italy
wants peace for itself and for all and settles on war only when forced to by
pressing, incoercible needs of survival. An empire of civilization and of humanity
for all populations of Ethiopia. It is in the tradition of Rome, who after victory
associated peoples with its destiny.72
The contradictory imagery of Italy as a militaristic but peace-loving nation had both
domestic and international audiences in mind. Mussolini presented Italy as a bastion of
peace in Europe and at the same time fired warning shots across the bows of potentially
hostile foreign governments.
Mussolini’s claims to a civilizing mission in East Africa, which contrasted with
the overbearing policies he immediately enacted there, also were geared towards foreign
audiences. But this humanitarian rhetoric had ideological foundations too. Mussolini’s
emphasis on the symbolism and tradition of Imperial Rome not only reaffirmed Fascist
claims of heredity with the ancient past, it introduced a universal dimension for Fascism
that would grow in prominence through the late 1930s. Like ancient Rome and Christian
Rome, Fascist Rome would provide a guiding model for others. Empire provided the key
to Fascism’s national and universal missions of remaking Italians and remodeling
civilization.73 Although racism and social Darwinism often undermined or negated
civilizing missions in colonial practice, the rhetorical linkage of concepts of domination
and superiority with civilization and liberation was nothing new for Italian and Western
imperialists.74
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For Fascist propagandists, Italy’s civilizing mission was embodied in its liberation
of slaves in East Africa. Throughout the Ethiopian campaign, headlines announced the
end of slavery in the areas under Italian occupation.75 Descriptions of Ethiopian practices
of slavery provided a way to demonize the enemy while justifying Italian aggression.
Italian propaganda rejected as specious Haile Selassie’s proclamations against slavery,
arguing that “slavery truly will be abolished [...] only by the Italian troops who in their
advance collect shackles and chains.”76 After the conquest, a running column in La
Tradotta Coloniale on “The Former Uncivil Code of Ethiopia” focused on slavery as a
prime example of the barbaric systems that the Italian conquerors had to set right in East
Africa.77 The indigenous population was seen as backwards but also as worthy of pity.
In Africa we destroyed a barbaric enemy and have opened roads and schools, built
hospitals and clinics, aqueducts and houses, we have freed slaves, prohibited child
labour, in sum we have given to the oppressed, to the destitute kept in slavery and
in squalor, abandoned to every abuse, to tyranny and to plunder, the civilization of
the Littorio and with it liberation, breath, life.
All this gives Mussolini’s empire a popular, human, character.78
In the context of liberation and abolitionism, the general indigenous population was not
necessarily regarded as the enemy. The war was fought “to overcome the resistance not
of the Ethiopian people, but of the exploitative and abusive chiefs aided and abetted by
foreign intrigue.”79 In liberating an enslaved people and bringing the light of civilization,
the Italian public and soldiers were told that they were performing a good act in Africa.
The regime also assured Italians that their troops were indeed received as
liberators. Newspaper headlines reported the supposed “jubilee of liberated populations,”
who welcomed the Italian soldiers, “offering them eggs and chickens and speaking the
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word ‘Italia’ with an intonation full of respect and admiration.”80 Mussolini himself
claimed that the Ethiopian populations supported Italy, to the point of rebelling against
their former oppressors.
Italians were defined as ‘aggressors.’ The Ethiopian populations welcomed them
with manifestations of joy and with gifts of homage. Dessie is in celebration.
Gojam awaits emancipation. Where the Italians have arrived, civilization has
arrived, in all its manifestations of order, of justice, of welfare, of well-being. [...]
An ‘Ethiopian nation’ does not exist. The empire of the Negus was a jumble of
populations harshly oppressed by a rapacious feudal caste. Tegrayans, the
Danakil, Somalis, Gallas, Gojamites, when the hour of emancipation struck on the
clock face of history, took up arms against the barbaric government of the rases.81
Even the ruling Amhara and Shewa populations, it was said, “threw open the door to the
Italian soldiers,” greeting them with signs of homage and celebration.82
More than two months after the conquest, a song printed in La Tradotta Coloniale
summed up the view of Italians as liberators of a grateful people from barbarism.
Good Abyssinian, / good Abyssinian, / raise your glass, / raise your glass, / Italy
has saved you, / Italy has saved you, / from an assassin, / from an assassin, / and
deserter, / and deserter, / that after having fled / lost his honour. [...] With the king
of kings / with the king of kings / you went by foot, / you went by foot, / now you
have buses, / now you have buses, / first for you, / first for you, / there was terror,
/ there was terror, / You took many beatings / now bread and work.83
La Tribuna Illustrata told the reassuring story of an Italian parachutist who upon landing
was met by “a large mob of spear-wielding blacks” who — grateful for liberation or
awestruck by Italian technology — “prostrated themselves to pay him homage.”84
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The theme of liberation promoted a range of attitudes and behaviours among
Italian troops. It lauded their humanity while reinforcing their sense of superiority. It
promoted kindness towards friendly natives but hatred and disgust towards those who
sided with the old regime. Assurances that they would be welcomed as liberators —
assurances which continued during the operations to occupy the rest of Ethiopia in 1936
— set up Italian officers and men for disappointment when much of the region rose up in
open revolt, especially during 1937.85 This reflected the classic “built-in crisis in any
civilizing programme.”86 The expectations created by the theme of liberation
unintentionally contributed to the harsh and unforgiving Italian response to resistance
from an apparently duplicitous and ungrateful population.
When combined with exoticism, notions of liberation also threatened ideological
and military imperatives to avoid fraternization between Italian soldiers and natives. The
most famous marching song of the war, “Faccetta nera” [Black Face], revealed how
themes of liberation could — with a willing audience — become fused with the erotic.
If from the highlands you glance down toward the sea,
little black woman, you slave among slaves,
you will see, as if in a dream, so many ships
and a tricolored flag will wave for you.
Black face, beautiful Abyssinian,
wait and hope, for Italy is drawing near;
and when we are together with you,
we will give you another law and another king.
Our law is the slavery of love
but freedom to live and think,
we Blackshirts will vindicate
the fallen heroes, and we will liberate you.87

85

During the occupation of the western territories of the empire in 1936, Stefani news releases referred to
the limited “resistance of surviving rebel groups that tried to oppose our advance in order to continue their
detestable exploitation of the populations [...] who everywhere welcome our units as liberators.”
“Comunicato per la ‘Stefani’,” n.d. [1936], ACS, Segreteria Particolare del Duce – Carteggio Riservato
[SPDCR], b. 31, fasc. “Gran Consiglio,” sf. 14.
86
87

Osterhammel, Europe and the Civilizing Mission, 31.

The Italian lyrics to the song are available in Rochat, Il colonialismo italiano, 170–71. The English
translation used here is from Karen Pinkus, “Shades of Black in Advertising and Popular Culture,” in

130

Although the song adhered to most dictates of Fascist propaganda, the allusion to sexual
promiscuity with indigenous women — madamismo — prompted the regime to pull it
from circulation. “Faccetta nera” was dismissed as representing an outdated romantic
view of empire that Fascism intended to replace with disciplined sobriety.88 La Tradotta
Coloniale reminded its readers to “sing ‘Faccetta Nera’, but think of the white face that
waits for you [at home].”89
Although the regime frowned upon fraternization with the indigenous population,
its propaganda organs tried to present Italy’s civilizing mission as uniquely generous and
in touch with local needs. “Roman imperialism that yearns not to rule but to govern, not
to exploit but to civilize,” was supposedly more enlightened than others.90 During the
invasion, propaganda emphasized the medical care provided to natives by Italian
doctors.91 After the conquest, Il Popolo d’Italia described Lessona’s legge organica as
embodying “complete and total respect for the just interests of the native populations.”92
Conviction in Italy’s civilizing mission continued through the period of occupation. In his
preface to Fernando Santagata’s 1940 publication on the Governorate of Harar, General
Guglielmo Nasi wrote that all aspects of Italian policy were “so many branches [armi] of
a regular and methodical march, solemn and austere, that leaves, everywhere, the imprint
of our race.”93
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Themes of the liberating and civilizing mission naturally resulted in a strongly
paternalistic view of the local populations. A cartoon entitled “Ferro e civiltà” [Iron and
Civilization] depicted three Italian infantrymen firing at an indistinct target, with the
caption: “See?... Gunshots are to savages what spankings are for little boys... they wail
when you give it to them but there comes a day when they thank you.”94 Another drawing
entitled “Insegnamenti” [Lessons] portrayed an Italian tractor operator extending his hand
to on-looking and apparently awe-struck Ethiopians in robes, exclaiming: “now that I
have taught you how to fight, I will teach you how to work!”95 Characterizations of
Ethiopians as ignorant, lazy, and backwards could result in their emasculation. In another
illustration, an anonymous “native” pointed out an imposing Italian-built dam to his
child, explaining that “only he who manages to tame the elements has the right to be
called a man.”96
Propaganda on Italy’s civilizing mission in Ethiopia, while primarily intended to
justify the Fascist invasion, thus provided value-laden depictions of the general
indigenous population. Descriptions of natives almost always referred to their filth,
poverty, inactivity, sickness, or degradation, leading to the ineluctable conclusion that
Italian intervention was necessary to improve the situation.97 “Until yesterday,” wrote
Vincenzo Rovi, “one could say — without fear of being mistaken — that every
Abyssinian was a collection [campionario] of illnesses.” He claimed to have known an
Ethiopian who was “almost completely devoured” by a seventy-kilogram tapeworm.98
Ciro Poggiali focused on the laziness of indigenous populations, pointing out how Italian
punishment through forced labour was an effective deterrent to crime: “Incredible but
true; the compulsoriness of labour is a certain impediment to delinquency; because the
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native might not fear prison which allows idleness, but always fears hard work, even if
paid for.”99
Security, liberation, and the progress of civilization all were important
justifications for the Italian presence in Ethiopia. Added to these themes, and of particular
ideological significance to the Fascist regime, was the economic and demographic value
of the new empire to Italy. Upon advancing into Ethiopia, Italian war correspondents
wrote of “the great fertility of all the valleys [...] likely to provide tremendous
agricultural, forestial and horticultural production as soon as the ground is handled with
modern systems and production is removed from the oversight of the barbaric feudal
government of Addis Ababa.”100 Despite a lack of knowledge and data on the true
potential of the region, arguments promoting the economic value of Ethiopia became one
of the most prominent themes of Fascist propaganda in the immediate aftermath of
Mussolini’s declaration of empire. The conquest of Ethiopia was supposed to provide
Italy with the means to achieve economic self-sufficiency or autarky. Writers depicted
the region as a land of untapped riches where ordinary Italians would benefit.
From the beginning of the Italian occupation, propaganda claimed that “Ethiopia
was conquered for the needs of the Italian people, for its future, for its economic
autonomy.”101 Early reports expressed great optimism towards the economic value of the
region and made exaggerated claims regarding the studies underway in the colonies.102
While Il Popolo d’Italia admitted that full-fledged economic exploitation awaited the
results of proper studies — which Haile Selassie’s “barbaric central government,” it
claimed, had refused to sanction out of fear of European penetration — there was “no
doubt” that Ethiopia abounded in gold, as confirmed by Egyptian hieroglyphs. Platinum
and iron deposits also were verified in Ethiopia, but in unknown quantities. The question
of petroleum, on the other hand, was “very debatable” and an “enigma.” The report
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concluded that, while mineral deposits held much promise, Ethiopia’s greatest asset was
cultivatable land.103
If Italian officers and men were not motivated by the prospect of fulfilling the
economic objectives of the state, Fascist propaganda also provided hope for collective
and individual economic improvement. Propaganda presented Italy as a proletarian
nation, a land of peasants and workers whose very survival depended on territorial
expansion and access to new resources and markets. Two days after the declaration of
empire, the Corriere della Sera wrote that “imperial expansion was a question of life or
death for Italy, being an essential condition of work [condizione indispensabile di
lavoro].” The article claimed that this characteristic set Italian imperialism apart from
that of capitalist powers, who merely sought another means of exploiting the masses.104
Empire gave Italy “that place under the sun necessary for its development, for its
wellbeing, for its survival,” and enabled the “expansion of the people [...] giving them
new and greater possibilities for the fruitful work of their sons.”105 Claiming that Ethiopia
had “gigantic reserves of raw materials,” an article in Il Popolo d’Italia voiced “the
impression that God and destiny wanted to reward Italy for its long and undeserved
centuries of political misfortune and economic weakness.”106 The conquest of East Africa
was to provide ordinary Italian families with work and opportunities, if not in the present
then certainly for their children in the future: “Like all the work of Fascism, the conquest
of E[ast] A[frica] is not an end, it is a beginning; in the sense that that large region, rich
in potential resources, must be and will be exploited; it must become and will become the
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legacy of labour and wealth that Mussolini’s Italy bequeaths to the generations of
tomorrow.”107
Some Italian functionaries sought immediate wealth in East Africa. Describing an
Italian major who put his men to work panning for gold, Poggiali commented in his diary
that “everyone wants to find treasure in E[ast] A[frica]. But in reality one only finds mica
and kaolinite in this area.”108 As the deportations for protection of Italian racial prestige
and the numerous efforts against corruption in East Africa attest, the regime frowned
upon this sort of activity. Propaganda on one hand proclaimed Ethiopia’s qualities as a
literal and figurative gold mine, while at the same time demanding further personal
sacrifice in favour of the state. As viceroy, Graziani called for “Fascist comrades” to
tighten their belts and think first of autarky for the empire. He decried the practice of
colonists to waste precious gasoline on trips to the café or barber when in Italy they
would have travelled by foot or public transit. Repeating the Fascist creed, “believe,
obey, fight” [credere, obbedire, combattere], Graziani demanded that restrictions be
“applied with iron Fascist discipline.”109 The viceroy’s speech demonstrated his
assimilation of Fascist language and also characterized the conflicting aims of
propaganda that presented Ethiopia as both panacea and burden.
Closely connected to economic value as a motive for war, according to Fascist
propaganda, was the concept of demographic colonization. Not only would Ethiopia
provide the resources to make Italy economically self-sufficient, it also would furnish
virgin land to be settled by Italian peasants who otherwise would have emigrated to the
Americas. As a classic social Darwinist who considered population expansion a vital
condition for national survival, Mussolini was obsessed with demographics.110 He and
Lessona ensured demographic colonization became a central theme of colonial
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propaganda.111 Il Popolo d’Italia confidently envisioned an Ethiopia populated by two
million whites and claimed that Italy finally had the living space it needed to survive:
“Without Fascism, the empire in Ethiopia was impossible! Without Ethiopia, Fascism
would not have sufficient space or labour to be able fully to accomplish its mission.”112
Propaganda on demographic colonization portrayed Ethiopia as a region to be
exploited, populated, and dominated by white Italians. “Industrial colonization” and
cultivation with the participation of natives was reserved for areas where demographic
colonization was not possible. Otherwise, colonizing action was to be “purely rural,
according to the Roman spirit,” based on large-scale farms operated solely by whites.113
Propaganda assured Italians that, despite the failure of Europeans to settle in large
numbers outside Mediterranean Africa and South Africa, Fascist colonization would
succeed in Ethiopia, thanks in part to the region’s suitable climate. “The vitality of the
Italian race, the extraordinary ability of our people to adapt, the relative proximity of
Ethiopia to Italy, the iron will and broadmindedness of the Fascist government, will take
care of the rest.”114 Particularly high hopes were held for the area around Addis Ababa.
Now we have surveyed and reconnoitred the entire territory — almost as large as
the whole of Italy — where, due to its altitude between one thousand five hundred
and two thousand metres, our farmers are assured a healthy life and an abundant
harvest of all ‘Italian’ produce: from grains to vegetables, from fruit to vines.115
As late as 1940, Fernando Santagata wrote that the highlands of Harar were “perfectly
suited to intense settlement [...] Harar is an extensive area where one lives, and one lives
very well.”116
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Colonial Consciousness
According to the Fascist regime, demographic colonization required that Italian settlers
be imbued with a colonial consciousness. Since the 1920s, Fascist propaganda had
worked to improve knowledge of colonial affairs in Italy and to convince Italians that
colonies were indeed necessary and useful.117 In the months and years following
Mussolini’s 9 May 1936 declaration of empire, Fascist party and state organs worked to
convince the Italian people that they did, in fact, live in an empire.118 At this point,
colonial consciousness switched from a way to establish consensus for the regime’s
African adventures to a means of informing the behaviour and attitudes of Italians in the
colonies themselves. Fascism’s objective of national rebirth remained at the core of this
propaganda. Italians had to be remade as a disciplined people capable of dominion over
others.
Fascist propagandists turned to ancient Rome as the model through which Italians
would regain imperial greatness and colonial consciousness, even though Ethiopia had
never formed part of the Roman empire. Il Popolo d’Italia touted the formation of Italian
East Africa in 1936 as the “reconstitution of the Roman empire” and claimed that the
“Roman mission” was the “sacred right” of the Italian people.119 A year later, the
Corriere della Sera equated Mussolini’s declaration of empire to the rebirth of Italians
through the “resurrection” of ancient Rome.120 The greatness of Rome, one article
claimed, had never died, but had undergone a series of revivals: “Spiritual rebirth, artistic
rebirth and finally also political rebirth. The latter is still in progress, and has recently
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acquired a rapid and irresistible pace. The political rebirth of Italy is called Fascism and
its new historic physiognomy is called Empire.”121
Propaganda often compared the constructive work conducted by Italians in East
Africa to the spread of ancient Roman civilization to barbaric lands.
According to the Roman system, Italy begins to affirm its rule in Ethiopia by
building 2800 kilometres of roads. One must realize, to have an accurate picture
of the significance of the step, that for centuries Ethiopia and roads have been two
opposing words. [...] Ethiopia was one of the very few countries in the world that
for ages and ages, and almost until our times, remained ignorant of the use of the
wheel!122
Soldiers and workers in East Africa were depicted as the new legionaries of Rome. They
built roads and bridges in accordance with the Roman motto that “the road is life” [via =
vita].123 A drawing in La Tradotta Coloniale of two Italians building a large modern
bridge over an Ethiopian river claimed playfully that “after two thousand years they will
also call us ‘ancient Romans’.”124 Landscape transformation became a key theme in
Fascist colonial propaganda, supposedly setting Italy’s “civilising effort” apart as a
uniquely “good colonialism.”125
Colonial consciousness based on representations of Roman superiority easily
became fused with racism. Two years before the application of racist legislation on the
Italian peninsula, the Corriere rallied to the cause of racial prestige in East Africa: “The
defence of the race is a foundation of Italian expansion; our steadfast character must be
even more resilient and stronger to have the right to conquest new lands for Italian
labour.”126 An article by Lidio Cipriani, entitled “Anthropology in Defence of the
Empire,” explained the inferiority of African races using the terminology of classic
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scientific racism that had gained popularity during the previous century.127
Anthropological science, wrote Cipriani, proved that “compared to Europeans, Africans
have less developed regions of vital importance for psychic functions.” Africans, he
continued, were capable at best of “simple repetition,” but unlike whites they could not
develop intellectual ideas of their own. Moreover, these limitations were biological and,
therefore, permanent. Since “every human type has its own material and spiritual
qualities that crossbreeding corrupts inexorably,” Cipriani called for “the strict regulation
of certain relations, difficult to avoid, between Italians and Africans, inspired by dictates
of anthropological science.” The alternative was to fall into decadence, like the French.
Anthropology teaches that the collapse of many peoples in the past had no other
cause than indiscriminate crossbreeding. Those nations that today welcome
indifferently into their fold inferior races — even Senegalese blacks or the like —
and whose members proclaim themselves citoyens, with the same rights as men of
the white race, thereby expose themselves to very serious and irreparable damage.
In domestic animals, as everyone knows, reproduction with an inferior race
always results in a shoddy product. It does not work any differently for men.128
There was nothing particularly novel about Cipriani’s arguments, nor in the way
Italian artists tended to depict Ethiopians with large round pink or white lips as stupid,
ignorant, or subservient, similar to the work of the contemporary Belgian cartoonist,
Hergé, in Tintin au Congo.129 Regardless, combined with discriminatory indigenous
policies and the practice of segregation in East Africa, this propaganda sent a clear
message to Italians in Europe as well as in the colonies. The occupied populations had
nothing in common with their European conquerors, and they were not to be treated on
anything like equal terms.
Although they did not fully correspond to the sombre behaviour demanded by the
Fascist regime, themes of adventurism and discovery also played a role in establishing
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colonial consciousness. Newspapers and publishers printed exotic travel stories from the
new empire and even some official internal reports got carried away in the excitement of
supposedly new discoveries. Nasi described the passage of his troops into the territory of
Bale, “discovering mysterious and wild regions untouched by Europeans and confirming
everywhere the government’s authority.”130 The African hunting adventure also was a
common theme. A serial novel written by Vincenzo Rovi for La Tradotta Coloniale,
entitled “The Pith Helmet,” made reference to the headgear issued to Italian soldiers in
East Africa and the sensation it gave of being on safari [un’avventura di caccia].131 Many
Italians indeed took the opportunity to photograph or shoot at the wildlife they
encountered in the colonies — the Fascist hierarch Roberto Farinacci lost a hand trying to
fish with grenades.132

The Enemy
Propaganda on Italy’s civilizing mission and racial supremacy indirectly bestowed
negative attributes on Ethiopians in general, presenting them as socially, culturally,
intellectually, and biologically inferior. For Fascism, the African was anti-modern and
even subhuman. Added to these representations, the way Italian propaganda depicted its
indigenous enemies helped establish the groundwork for the barbarization of warfare in
East Africa. Propaganda delegitimized first the conventional Ethiopian army and later the
“rebel” enemy as another way to rally Italians behind the war effort while justifying
military methods that flouted the rules of war.133
During the campaign of 1935 and 1936, Italian propaganda granted the enemy the
dignity of combatants in order to justify the huge scale and expense of Italy’s war.
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Nonetheless, Fascist propagandists emphasized the cultural and racial inferiority of their
opponents. Ethiopian forces always were presented as unorganized and uncoordinated
hordes assaulting Italian positions. Enrica Bricchetto has argued that the frequent use of
animal-like stereotypes, through which Ethiopian soldiers were depicted as mice, locusts,
or monkeys, were intended to make it easier for Italian personnel to conduct a war of
annihilation against an enemy that they saw as physically different from themselves.134
Indeed, Ethiopian soldiers were regarded as undisciplined, merciless, and savage.
All the tribes of the Ethiopian empire provide excellent warriors. Their valour and
disregard for death are beyond discussion. Being good warriors however does not
mean being good soldiers. The Abyssinian is not only cruel by nature; he is also
very quarrelsome, as observed especially among the Amhara. [...] The Abyssinian
warrior, to whichever tribe he belongs, knows neither mercy nor sentiments of
chivalry towards the vanquished enemy.135
This merely confirmed the expectations of Italians preconditioned by prewar films and
literature.136 Facing such an enemy, the rules of war granted to civilized peoples — such
as the humane treatment of prisoners of war — need not be applied.
Italian propagandists emphasized the atrocities or breaches of international law
supposedly committed by Ethiopian forces in order to justify Italian reprisals, including
the bombing of civilian targets and — indirectly, since Italian authorities never admitted
to its application — the use of poison gas.137 The Italians accused the Ethiopians of using
explosive dum-dum bullets, abusing the emblem of the Red Cross, and decapitating
Italian prisoners.138 Aviator Tito Minniti, beheaded after falling prisoner, became a
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martyr for the Italian cause. The manner of his death prompted a flurry of outrage against
Ethiopians. An army’s conduct after a battle, an article in the Corriere della Sera
claimed, “best reveals the nature of a people: whether civilized or savage, advanced or
still buried in the barbarism of prehistoric times.” Atrocities like that committed against
Minniti were not, therefore, merely the result of a deranged ruling elite, but were inherent
to the nature of a barbaric people that knew only force. Claiming that Italian commands
had tried to conduct the war without excessive cruelty or casualties, the article
complained that the Ethiopians had refused to respond in kind. A harsh Italian response
was justified: “Only the use of force and the merciless demonstration of our military
superiority can enforce respect of the law of peoples. [...] Against savages one must fight
war without quarter.”139
Neither side took many prisoners during the seven-month invasion of Ethiopia.140
Italian soldiers were told consistently that falling into enemy hands would result in
torture and death. Among the officers of Walter Pierelli’s colonial battalion, “the subject
of castration was always on the agenda, in the mess and in any occasion in which the
officers had the chance to talk among themselves.”141 Following the declaration of
empire, La Tradotta Coloniale managed to combine humour with gruesome descriptions
of Ethiopian atrocities by printing the founding charter of the fictitious EMPIETA, the
Ente Mutilazione Prigionieri Italiani e Torture Affini [Agency for the Mutilation of
Italian Prisoners and Related Tortures]. Directed by the emperor and his rases, the
agency’s executive functions were “imposed directly on Italian prisoners, through
extraction of eyes, scalping, cutting of ears, hands, feet, as well as any other important
human organ,” concluding with “the decapitation of the prisoner, whose body will be
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distributed in equal parts to the executioners, as compensation for special imperial
service.” The final article of the charter prohibited Italians from taking reprisals against
Ethiopian prisoners of war.142 Stories of Ethiopian brutality spurred rumours that Italian
troops were given poison pills to swallow in the event of capture, prompting a concerned
Pope Pius XI to question the Italian government on the matter.143 Although the regime
assured the Vatican that such suggestions were groundless, its atrocity propaganda clearly
encouraged a more brutal conduct of war.
Even during the conventional military campaign against regular Ethiopian armies
and feudal levies, Italian propaganda presented the enemy as illegitimate and undeserving
of humane treatment. How, then, did propagandists portray the rebel forces that
continued to resist the Italian occupation after May 1936? In fact, Ethiopian resistance
received very little lip service after the declaration of empire. If Italian soldiers were
supposed to be welcomed as liberators, the regime could not admit to the continuation of
large-scale armed opposition. As far as Mussolini was concerned, the fighting had ended
with the fall of Addis Ababa on 5 May.
I announce to the Italian people and the world that the war is over. I announce to
the Italian people and the world that peace is restored. [...] Our peace, a Roman
peace, that expresses itself in this simple, irrevocable, definitive proposition:
Ethiopia is Italian! Italian by deed because it is occupied by our victorious armies,
Italian by right because with the gladius of Rome it is civilization that triumphs
over barbarism, justice that triumphs over cruel abuse, redemption of the destitute
over a thousand years of slavery. With the populations of Ethiopia, peace is
already an accomplished fact. The various races of the former empire of the Lion
of Judah have shown the clearest signs of wanting to live and to work peacefully
in the shade of the Italian flag [tricolore].144
Mussolini’s declaration was followed by news of the “rapid occupation of the entire
territory,” during which Italian troops were “joyously received by the populations.”145
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Newspapers gave only the briefest of mentions to the attacks on Addis Ababa at
the end of July 1936, defining the enemy as “rebels” and “raiders” [predoni].146 During
the occupation of western Ethiopia in 1936, the regime allowed references to dwindling
“rebel” resistance, even though the enemy at this point largely comprised Ethiopian
formations that had never surrendered to the Italians in the first place.147 Instead, Italian
reports described them as brigands who, “accustomed to looting and raiding, find it
difficult to return to their villages and to the hard work of the fields.”148 Brigandage was
dismissed as endemic to the region.
Brigandage that, in Ethiopia, has absolutely no political value, but is connected
only with the appalling state of moral and material chaos in which the country has
always been held under its pseudo-sovereigns, and that recently has had a new
incentive with the war, which has put arms in the hands of thousands of
malefactors, bandits and deserters.149
Given its prominent place in Italian collective memory, the use of the term “brigandage”
carried special importance and would have resonated with the public. As in the 1860s, the
term indicated alterity and barbarism, and it deprived enemy fighters of legitimacy.
Equating indigenous resisters with outlaws also drew upon long-established practices in
Italy’s East African colonies.150 In May 1936, the regime redefined continued military
offensives in Ethiopia as “colonial police operations” [operazioni di polizia coloniale],
typical of all colonial conquests.151 The enemy no longer enjoyed any attributes of lawful
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combatants. Even the pursuit and destruction of the armies of Ras Imru and Ras Desta
were described as victories over “raiders.”152
After 1936, the regime became officially mute on the rebel enemy in East Africa.
Towards the end of that year, the Ministry of Press and Propaganda ordered a shift of
emphasis away from police actions towards ethnographic, demographic, industrial, and
commercial reports. Having made many sacrifices for the empire, the Italian population
needed to see that actual progress was being made.153 In February 1937, Lessona sent
similar orders to his governors; since Mussolini had declared to the Senate that the
empire was completely occupied and pacified, journalists could no longer report on
military operations.154 Dispatches from Rome prohibited correspondents like Poggiali
from writing about armed conflict in Ethiopia, because “the war is over.”155
Despite the relative silence on enemy combatants after the conquest, it is clear
that the so-called “rebels,” “brigands,” and “raiders” were presented as illegitimate and
just as merciless as the Ethiopian enemy had been in the seven-month war. Brigands,
viewed as endemic to lands inhabited by “savage people,” were considered prone to
“murder and massacre.” They were believed to mutilate children and kill any male
prisoners they took. They were also deemed to be treacherous; not to be trusted if they
surrendered, it was considered best to execute them on the spot.156 Tales similar to that of
Minniti’s martyrdom continued to manifest themselves in rare references to Ethiopian
resistance in 1937. The Tribuna Illustrata described “the heroic end of two airmen forced
to land among the raiders.” The pilot and his observer emptied their side arms, “thereby
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sowing death among the savages ready to massacre them,” before being overcome by the
merciless horde that clearly did not take prisoners.157
Italian military commanders encouraged accounts of the guerrilla enemy’s
savagery in order to motivate their men. According to Poggiali, who was attached to an
Italian column that was ambushed by thousands of rebels, the column commander told
his men to save their last bullets for themselves rather than fall into the hands of the
“brigands.”158 Silvano Anselmi, a young medical officer who served in Amhara between
1937 and 1939, later recalled being terrorized by stories of two Italian lieutenants who
were decapitated by a rebel scimitar.159 Such attitudes, whether exaggerated or not,
served as they had during the conventional campaign to barbarize the nature of warfare
between Italian forces and insurgents. As guerrilla resistance grew more effective and
widespread, it became easy to transfer the traits of the enemy — which depended on the
support or intimidation of local civilians — onto the general indigenous population as a
whole. In the aftermath of the assassination attempt on Graziani, General Pirzio Biroli
issued an order of the day on “native psychology and imperial demeanour.” The circular
is noteworthy for its conflation of insurgents with natives in general. Ethiopians, it
claimed, had responded to Italy’s repeated “acts of clemency” with “dislike,
misunderstanding and, worse, open rebellion.” Inherent psychological characteristics of
“deceit, treachery, [and] trickery” had turned natives into “masters of duplicity. [...]
Cowardly sheep or ravenous hyenas,” depending on the circumstances. Their “way of life
is vendetta exacerbated by hatred.”160 By connecting rebellion and resistance to the
indigenous mentality, Pirzio Biroli effectively broadened the definition of the enemy and
blurred the line between rebels and the civilians that the Italians had claimed to liberate.
Although Fascist propaganda on the Ethiopian war included nuanced and
sometimes contradictory themes, in the context of guerrilla warfare it took on barbaric
proportions. The regime’s justifications for war — centred on Italy’s liberating and
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civilizing mission and Ethiopia’s potential for Italian economic and demographic growth
— promoted a sense of superiority and entitlement on the part of the Italian colonizers.
Italians had the right as conquerors to exploit the land and its people, all the while
convincing themselves that they performed good and humane deeds. Efforts to instil a
colonial and racial consciousness among Italians reinforced this sense of superiority and
provided the framework to dehumanize natives that did not immediately submit to Italian
rule. The recently terminated conventional war against Imperial Ethiopian armies
provided a legacy of barbarization that carried forward into the period of occupation
when not all Ethiopians chose to welcome the Italians as liberators. “Brigands” and
“raiders,” resisting the regime’s generous efforts to civilize them, were not recognized as
lawful combatants. Within this mindset, the opposition of the rebels, and the apparent
support they garnered from elements of the indigenous population, could only be
resolved by force.

It is always difficult to determine the actual effectiveness or impact of propaganda.
Although this chapter has focused on how Italy’s political and military leadership
presented the Ethiopian campaign to the Italian population and soldiers in East Africa, the
reception of the message needs also briefly to be considered. Did the propaganda
campaign for the war in Ethiopia provide a successful model to be duplicated in the
future? Scholars are divided over the issue. While Renzo De Felice famously described
the period surrounding the Ethiopian war as the “years of consensus” for Mussolini’s
regime, more recently historians have challenged his conclusion that Italians fully backed
the East African adventure.161 Richard Bosworth and Paul Corner both emphasize the
doubts many Italians harboured regarding Italy’s civilizing mission and Ethiopia’s
supposed wealth in resources and suitability to Italian settlement. Fascist propaganda had
difficulty countering the facts that Italy fought a war of aggression in East Africa and that
the great colonial powers of Britain and France had apparently not seen Ethiopia as worth
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conquering for themselves. The status and living conditions of Italian peasants even
prompted doubts as to their superiority over their Ethiopian counterparts.162
De Felice, Bosworth, and Corner focused their research on the Italian home front.
It is even more difficult to isolate the impact of propaganda on those who actually fought
in East Africa, leaving aside the dilemma of accounting for the tens of thousands of
colonial troops serving under the Italian banner. Official reports on the morale of Italian
personnel in East Africa generally were positive, although they hinted at problems caused
by illness and long tours of duty away from home.163 Such reports did not analyze the
effectiveness of individual themes of propaganda. Another factor to consider is literacy.
During the war and occupation, written propaganda remained the most important means
of indoctrination, but perhaps one in five Italian soldiers were illiterate.164 What this
meant for Italian propaganda is not clear. In theory, a modicum of literacy was necessary
to access the message of propaganda in the first place, but full literacy that imparted a
sense of skepticism on readers may have been counterproductive.165 Some peasant
soldiers gained an elementary level of literacy while serving in the army and others
would have had access to propaganda through communal reading, so the negative impact
of illiteracy in the army may in fact have been less than in Italian society in general.
Gianni Dore’s analysis of the memory of Sardinian veterans regarding the
Ethiopian campaign suggests that, for some soldiers at least, Fascist propaganda themes
left a lasting impression. Some of Dore’s interviewees recalled being drawn in by
promises of land, which they lacked in Sardinia; some remembered Ethiopia as being
more fertile than their homeland. They also evinced true belief in the Italian civilizing
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mission in Africa, supported by negative views of Ethiopians as lazy workers,
undisciplined soldiers, savages, and even cannibals that tortured prisoners and
wounded.166 One must exercise caution when dealing with memory, but Dore’s findings
suggest that, especially when it came to the indigenous enemy and population, soldiers
managed to reconcile elements of the regime’s propaganda with the conditions they
encountered on the ground.
For Italian officers and soldiers sent to East Africa after 1936, it would have been
much more difficult to reconcile the regime’s claims of peace and progress in Ethiopia
with reality. The relative silence on East African affairs after the first year of empire did
little to prepare Italian personnel for what awaited them.167 The reality of failed
colonization and exploitation and of armed rebellion may well have prompted
disenchantment with Fascism, as had the regime’s domestic failures by the late 1930s.168
However, towards the occupied populations, it may have added to Italian attitudes of
miscomprehension and frustration.
Racist attitudes almost certainly were widespread among Italian military
personnel. Classical racism was the theme that tied the sometimes inconsistent traits of
Italian propaganda together. Fascist concepts of liberation and exploitation both were
based on the racist belief that Ethiopians were inherently and permanently inferior.
Traditional racism informed the attitudes and behaviour of many Italians towards the
local populations in East Africa. In a remarkable but singular order to his subordinate
functionaries and commanders, Nasi warned against the dangers of “racism,” which
included arbitrary behaviour by officials, moral deficiency, ignorance, an inclination
towards cruel orders, the sadistic use of justice, and pretentions towards ius primae
noctis, the fictitious right of a feudal lord to his vassal’s marriage bed on the wedding
night. Nasi claimed that the Italian race was less afflicted by racism than others, but he
asked his officers to look for “initial symptoms” of racism, since its effects reduced
Italian prestige and inhibited pacification. The only “therapy,” he concluded, was a return
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to “higher latitudes.”169 One of the only direct critiques of racism by an Italian general —
and somewhat hypocritical, given Nasi’s other racist directives — the circular suggests
that racism was widespread among soldiers and administrators to the point that it
impeded good governance. Among soldiers confronted by a population that looked and
behaved differently from them, Fascist propaganda may have found a receptive audience.
The Italian army in East Africa lacked the legal authority and institutional
tradition to develop unique forms of propaganda for military personnel in the region. In
the colonies, propaganda — broadly defined as the control of information and political
messages into and out of East Africa — was a realm contested by the Ministry of
Colonies and the Ministry of Press and Propaganda in Rome. The viceroy used his
influence to control the military news destined for the mother country. A decade of
Fascistization and centralization had brought military publications under the direct
supervision of Rome. The process of centralization of propaganda organs reached new
heights with the invasion of Ethiopia. The pervasiveness of the Fascist propaganda
campaign for Ethiopia left the army little room for deviation. There is no doubt that many
regular army officers, and especially senior commanders, saw the war in Ethiopia more
as a victory for their institution than for the regime.170 However, the propaganda they
made available to their men during the conflict and the ensuing occupation did not differ
significantly from the central themes prescribed by political authorities in Rome.
Those themes focused on rallying Italians behind the war effort, convincing them
of the need for colonies, remaking Italians as racially conscious and confident imperial
legionaries, and dehumanizing the Ethiopian enemy. Fascist propaganda combined
positive and negative components. It encouraged Italians to see themselves as humane
liberators bringing civilization to a victimized population. It also presented Ethiopia as a
land to be exploited and left no question as to the inferior and barbaric nature of
Ethiopians, whether armed or submissive. Fascist propaganda therefore allowed for, and
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seemed to promote, multiple forms of behaviour in the colonies. At the ground level, it
could be interpreted differently, depending on individual prejudices and local conditions.
However, in areas of conflict, the message was not so contradictory. It provided clear
justification for a particularly brutal brand of warfare, both during the invasion of
Ethiopia and afterwards.
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3

Counterinsurgency in Ethiopia

The army’s role in the political organization of Italian East Africa and in the propaganda
effort that sustained Italy’s war of aggression was limited by top-down power structures
imposed by the Fascist regime. Decisions made by Fascist ministries in Rome dictated
policies in these fields, especially during the crucial first two years of occupation.
Conversely, the conduct of counterinsurgency operations was primarily the responsibility
of the military authorities in East Africa, under the direction of the viceroy and his
governors. This chapter examines the conditions and methods of the Italian
counterinsurgency. Even here, Mussolini and his colonial ministers interfered in local
affairs, promoting a clearly Fascist direction not only to civil policy but to military
conduct as well.
Following the “reconquest” of Libya in the early 1930s, Italian generals — when
they considered counterinsurgency techniques at all — recognized that successful
pacification depended on a careful balance of political and military measures, of
repression and clemency. However, their narrow view of politics, their equation of
military power with political prestige, and their traditional view of irregular fighters and
colonial rebels as illegitimate predisposed them towards the doctrine of terror desired by
the regime in Ethiopia. With their political options constrained by the Fascist regime, in
military affairs Italian generals tended to rely on violence.1 They pursued an
unsophisticated and one-dimensional counterinsurgency policy based primarily on the
use or threat of force to destroy insurgents and dissuade the population from supporting
them. Often disproportionate to the level and type of resistance actually encountered,
Italian repression strategies were guided by racist assumptions, an obsession with military
prestige, and by contempt for the resistance that their own policies helped foment.
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Guerrilla Resistance
During their five-year occupation of Ethiopia, Italian forces confronted a widespread and
tenacious resistance movement. As Angelo Del Boca writes, “no more than six days
passed between the end of the war and the beginning of guerrilla warfare.”2 The Italians
never managed to eradicate Ethiopian resistance to their rule and, as a result, their hold
over some of the more isolated parts of the realm remained tenuous. The techniques of
the Ethiopian insurgents and Italian security forces evolved over time and in relation to
one another. Italian counterinsurgency methods and practices in East Africa developed
partly as a response to the type of resistance they faced. At the same time, Ethiopian
resistance hardened in response to Italian socio-economic and military policies.
Resistance and counterinsurgency in Ethiopia can be divided into several phases.
Each phase conformed to changes in leadership, the composition and strength of the
belligerent forces, as well as to foreign and domestic political developments. Between the
conventional warfare of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935–36) and the country’s
liberation through a British-led offensive (1940–41), the Italian occupation underwent
three phases. The first phase, between May 1936 and February 1937, can be considered a
continuation of the invasion of 1935. With large numbers of metropolitan forces still
available in the theatre, the Italians occupied the western half of Ethiopia and conducted
operations against Ethiopian armies whose commanders refused to surrender and
continued to offer resistance en masse. The destruction of these armies and the
withdrawal of much of the Italian invasion force permitted the transformation to irregular
warfare. Even so, the second phase of occupation (1937–1939) continued to employ tens
of thousands of colonial troops in “police operations.” This was the most violent period
of the occupation, as Italian forces responded to the assassination attempt on Graziani in
February 1937 and to the outbreak of major revolt later that summer.3 Under Italian
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pressure, Ethiopian resistance movements became more slender and developed more
sophisticated guerrilla techniques at this time. Although the Duke of Aosta replaced
Graziani as viceroy in 1938, he did not make a profound impact on military affairs until
the repatriation of Ugo Cavallero as commander of troops in April 1939. This ushered in
a third phase (1939–40) in which the exhausted Italians reduced the number and scale of
their operations and attempted to pacify some resistance groups through negotiation.4
Counterinsurgency forces, by nature, tend to be reactionary. They must respond to
local conditions and threats. During the occupation of Ethiopia, Italian authorities
encountered a diverse array of conditions subject to regional variation. Italian East Africa
included zones of relative calm — the old colonies of Somalia and Eritrea and the new
Governorate of Harar, populated by Oromo Muslims — in contrast to regions seemingly
in constant revolt — mainly Amhara and Shewa, where Amhara populations and culture
predominated. It is not surprising that revolt began and remained strongest among the
nobles and populations that had lost the most from the Italian conquest. A host of other
factors contributed to the character of local resistance to Italian rule. These could include
the strength and attitudes of indigenous leaders, the prevalence of traditions of
brigandage, weather patterns, geographic isolation, and terrain. Northern Ethiopia was
particularly well-suited to guerrilla warfare; its mountains, forests, and caverns provided
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refuge for bandits and partisans alike, even in close proximity to administrative centres
like Addis Ababa and Gondar.
While conditions throughout much of Ethiopia were favourable to the
development of guerrilla techniques, it took more than a year for a truly effective partisan
movement to establish itself in Ethiopia. The first year of occupation was comprised
primarily of pitched battles between the Italians and armed groups led by recalcitrant
Ethiopian nobles. In July 1936, the Italians fended off a major Ethiopian initiative to
retake Addis Ababa and spent the following months hunting down the remnants of these
forces. Meanwhile, Italian troops pushed westwards into previously unoccupied parts of
Harar, Amhara, and Galla Sidamo, where they confronted the armies of Ras Imru and
Ras Desta.5 Although the Italians referred to these campaigns as “police operations,” they
involved major engagements in the open field. Ethiopian forces — accustomed to
conventional styles of warfare — actively sought battle with the Italians and were willing
to make defensive stands.6
Between May 1936 and March 1937, the Italians reported few instances of
“guerrilla” activity, including attacks on infrastructure and communications or reprisals
against collaborators. However, the aptitude of some insurgent chiefs caused a degree of
alarm for the Italian leadership. Sporadic attacks on the railroad between Addis Ababa
and Djibouti forced the Italians to adopt a system of armoured trains as early as July
1936.7 By September, Nasi had become concerned that rebels in western Harar appeared
to be adopting “systems of guerrilla warfare that, if not very refined, nonetheless achieve
their objective of keeping garrisons in state of alarm and forcing them to watch
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communications lines.”8 In eastern Harar, “guerrillas” under Fitawrari Bahade led Nasi’s
troops on a chase that lasted the better part of a year before they broke up and fled to
British Somaliland in April 1937. By the end of June 1937, Nasi claimed that the
“pacification” of his entire governorate was complete; only isolated incidents of
brigandage remained.9
The first phase of the Italian occupation thus saw the potential for guerrilla
warfare without it becoming widespread. Between December 1936 and February 1937,
the destruction of the forces of Ras Imru, Ras Desta, and the Kassa brothers dealt a
serious blow to resistance in Ethiopia. Without broad support from the populations —
still in a state of shock following the Italian conquest or adopting a wait-and-see attitude
to foreign rule — localized guerrilla movements were vulnerable, as events in Harar
proved. On the other hand, the defeat of the Ethiopian standing armies, immediately
followed by Graziani’s disproportionate response to the assassination attempt in Addis
Ababa, forced the resistance gradually to adopt the more widespread use of guerrilla
tactics and to develop underground networks for coordination on a nation-wide scale.10
Although it lacked a unifying ideology or political direction, the Ethiopian
resistance movement became particularly effective at spreading propaganda through
traditional songs, leaflets, and underground newspapers.11 In the summer of 1937,
garrisons in western Shewa discovered Amharic leaflets hidden in bamboo shoots
destined for town markets.12 Word of mouth played an important role as well. Italian
authorities repeatedly voiced frustration over the ease with which rumours spread and the
impact they had on the occupied populations. One such rumour was that Italy had run out
of airplanes and that the British would soon intervene in East Africa. When the Italians
8
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responded with an aerial demonstration of force and dropped their own
counterpropaganda leaflets, rebel propagandists merely changed their line to claim that
Italy still had aircraft but now lacked bombs.13
In 1937, the Ethiopian resistance, known as the Patriots [Arbegnoch], became a
genuine mass movement. Estimates of its numbers range widely, from 25,000 to 300,000.
Most Patriot bands included a small number of permanent fighters, largely made up of
former soldiers, which would be augmented from time to time by armed peasant masses.
Individual resistance leaders could be motivated by diverse factors, including regionalism
and religion, but historians agree that the Ethiopian resistance ultimately became a
movement of national liberation directed against the Italian occupiers. Although the
Patriot leadership included parvenus — former bandits or peasants — who proved
exceptional and enduring guerrilla fighters, most leaders remained loyal to Haile Selassie
and did not seek to overturn the traditional social order. In exile, the Negus remained an
important symbol of resistance.14
The great revolt of summer 1937 in Amhara saw the heaviest fighting since the
end of the war. Rebel leaders clung stubbornly to mass tactics in an effort to drive Italian
forces out of the region altogether. Once the element of surprise wore off, the moredisciplined and better-equipped Italians generally had the upper hand in open
engagements. The obstinacy of the Patriots is made clear by the frequency of combat and
the number of losses sustained by both sides during the Italian campaign to suppress the
uprising. On 29 September, the Angelini Column fought a day-long battle, which
included hand-to-hand combat. One Italian battalion lost 5 officers and nearly 150 askari
in the engagement, and Italian reports noted the “particular persistence of rebels to shoot
at our officers.” The Italians estimated that more than one thousand rebels died in the
battle.15 That same day, the Farello Column was involved in combat for five hours after
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attacking a rebel position, losing 2 officers and 53 irregular fighters.16 One day later,
another irregular band came under attack, managing to hold out until relieved by a sortie
from a nearby garrison. The captain commanding the band was killed, along with a
hundred of his men, killed, wounded, or missing.17 Sustained fighting of this sort
continued through October, at great cost to the rebel movement.18
After the revolt of 1937, the Ethiopian partisan movement became smaller but
more efficient. It became increasingly difficult for the Italians to bring the enemy to
battle and force a decision on the open field.19 By 1938, Italian reports confirmed that
“the Amhara have now learned how to conduct a guerrilla war.” They described the
enemy as “very mobile” and “free from any worry about supplies,” with perfect
knowledge of the terrain in which they operated.20 According to Italian estimates, the
largest guerrilla formations counted between 1,000 and 3,000 men, but there were dozens
of smaller bands in Amhara alone.21 Guerrillas like Belay Zeleke avoided costly attacks
on Italian columns and fortified garrisons and instead targeted softer targets, including
local collaborators and detachments of labourers.22 Attacks on workers compelled the
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Governor of Amhara to dissolve some of the smaller work camps outside of Gondar and
concentrate them into larger fortified ones until security could be restored.23
Guerrilla hit-and-run attacks kept Italian forces busy through 1938, even through
the rainy season. Operational columns of varying size incessantly made marches and
countermarches back and forth across Amhara and Shewa without coming to grips with
the main resistance forces.24 Rebel leaders made a name for themselves by avoiding
capture. The Italian practice of placing bounties on their heads may have contributed to
their fame.25 Some Italian officers shared a grudging respect for their most implacable
enemies. According to Silvano Anselmi, Italians dubbed the legendary rebel leader,
Abebe Aregai, the “Garibaldi of Abyssinia.”26 Ettore Formento’s irregular band spent a
year hunting down a group of rebels under Banti Goro, who even addressed letters to
Formento wishing the Italian commander good health and promising him a gruesome
demise upon their next meeting.
Banti seemed elusive: traps, informants, assassins, clashes, a reward of twenty
thousand lire placed on his head by Sector Command, did not work; one night he
was killed by a few villagers [balagher] that lay in wait along a wooded path for
some thieves that had been reported there. Banti Goro at the head of a little group
of five or six men, with a light machinegun on his back, was hit by the only gun
shot fired on that occasion.
For all of us it was almost a day of mourning, we felt deprived of something that
belonged to us, not to mention that we had always admired his courage and
character. We were sorry then that he had died in such a banal way because he did
not deserve it.27
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The escapades of guerrilla leaders, subject to exaggerated storytelling and combined with
an often heavy-handed Italian response, helped the rebels gain sympathy and support
from local populations.
When they found spontaneous loyalty lacking, Ethiopian guerrillas also
intimidated populations by assassinating or kidnapping collaborators and burning villages
that had submitted to Italian rule. Italian authorities recognized the level of coercion
employed by the rebels, and the fact that many villagers were forced to leave their homes
“in fear of sanctions.” However, more generally, Italian commanders took abandoned
villages as “proof of their connivance with rebels.”28 In this way, it became increasingly
difficult for populations in zones subject to guerrilla activity to remain neutral. The
inability of Italian authorities to guarantee the safety of villages dealt a serious blow to
their pacification efforts. By 1939, the Italian presence in the more isolated parts of
Amhara had become so limited that rebels had complete freedom to terrorize local
populations. Whereas in 1936 and 1937 the rainy season provided a challenge for the
Italians — unable to manoeuvre their larger forces and bring to bear their superior
weaponry — by 1939, the monsoon brought a welcome respite from rebel activity.29
For Italian commanders, the nature of guerrilla warfare in Amhara and Shewa
after 1937 was particularly frustrating. In times of Italian success, local populations
would provide intelligence on rebel movements and help capture and butcher those that
fled. But in times of rebel success — for example, if they managed to besiege an Italian
garrison or block an Italian column — villagers and peasants would spontaneously join
with rebel forces, confident in victory and easy spoils. These “occasional rebels” were
armed mostly with spears or hunting rifles but were, according to Formento, merciless. 30
Other Italian memoirists shared Formento’s frustration. Walter Pierelli, an officer in a
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colonial battalion, complained that “both native subjects and native rebels dressed the
same way; they all had the same faces and we distinguished between them only whether
they were armed or not. But they were able to hide any weapons beneath their shammas
[robes].”31 Anselmi, a medical officer, found it hypocritical when villagers sought the
services of Italian doctors: “At least in this respect faith in us was complete and people
who gladly had fired upon us had no qualms over begging for our help.”32 Such attitudes
of mistrust were shared by the Italian military leadership. After the assassination attempt
of February 1937, Graziani repeatedly lamented the hypocrisy and falsity of the
Ethiopian people: “To the generosity and kindness I showed them in every shape and
form for a year they have responded with treason and bombs.”33 In this atmosphere, it
was difficult for cooler and more objective heads to prevail.
By the end of the Italian occupation, all the dynamics of a classic guerrilla war
were at play in Ethiopia. The Italians faced an elusive enemy that employed hit-and-run
tactics against isolated and vulnerable targets, melting away before the Italians could
respond. The ability of guerrillas to avoid pitched battle and to seek cover in difficult
terrain and among indigenous populations invited harsh reprisals from exasperated Italian
troops that too often fell upon unarmed villagers. The impossibility of neutrality in such a
situation forced the population to take sides and made collateral damage difficult to
avoid. All these factors contributed to Italy’s military policy and behaviour in East
Africa.
However, Italian practices cannot be viewed as a proportionate military response
to local conditions of insurgency. It is significant that true guerrilla warfare was slow to
take root in Ethiopia; although the resistance adopted elements of a guerrilla-style
insurgency from the outset, their application did not become sophisticated or widespread
until after the failed revolt of 1937. Up to that point, Italian commanders confronted
either large conventional forces that were relatively easy to identify or small bands that
posed only a limited security threat. Harsh measures of repression targeting non-
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combatants predated the maturation of guerrilla warfare in Ethiopia. Italian military
violence developed and peaked well before the establishment of a mass guerrilla
movement.

Repression and Reprisals
From the first days of the occupation, Italian authorities and security forces responded to
resistance with violent repression aimed at obtaining the population’s obedience and
loyalty through terror. In part, this policy was the result of Fascist directives from Rome,
but the eagerness with which Italian military authorities pursued it reveals that it also
emanated from and conformed to Italian military culture and tradition. In the context of
establishing a Fascist empire — with political leaders not only permitting military
violence to go unchecked but actively encouraging its escalation — Italian commanders
in Ethiopia applied the brutality of the Brigands’ War of the 1860s and the more recent
“reconquest” of Libya with extra vigour. Italian officers widely accepted the application
of force as an effective means of persuading populations not to join the rebel cause, and it
may have helped prevent early resistance movements from gaining popular support.34
However, in Ethiopia the Italian regime’s repression became so indiscriminate and
uncompromising as to render it counterproductive.
The arbitrary nature of Italian policy began with blanket declarations from the
Duce himself, which provided little room for subtlety. Less than a month following the
declaration of empire, Mussolini ordered that “all rebels taken prisoner must be shot by
firing squad.” A month later, he authorized Graziani “to initiate and conduct
systematically a policy of terror and extermination against the rebels and complicit
populations.”35 These brief orders provided the basis for the Italian army’s treatment of
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prisoners in Ethiopia. For any officers that wavered between offering insurgents the
carrot or the stick, Graziani affirmed the need to follow the Duce’s orders that
all those in any way responsible for rebellion in any form must immediately be
shot. Continuing in current demonstrations of uncertainty or reserve will result in
the immediate repatriation of the commanders responsible. It is time to put an end
to weakness of any sort when our fallen soldiers continue to be barbarically
emasculated.36
When Pirzio Biroli reported taking sixty-three prisoners in December 1936, Graziani
rebuked him with a reminder of Mussolini’s policy. Less than a week later, Pirzio Biroli
conveniently made amends, reporting that all sixty-three prisoners had been shot en route
to their trial when they allegedly displayed signs of resistance.37 Indeed, the Italians took
very few prisoners between 1936 and 1940. Officially, they reported 76,906 rebels killed,
compared to just 2,847 taken prisoner.38
Although they took few prisoners in battle, the Italians did establish concentration
camps for politically suspect individuals and their families. During operations, governors
set up temporary camps to detain civilian populations suspected of supporting the rebels.
In some cases women and children whose villages were destroyed in reprisals were
deported or redistributed to other regions of the empire.39 The most infamous Italian
camp was situated at the coastal site of Danane, south of Mogadishu in Somalia.
Originally established in 1935 to hold Ethiopian prisoners of war, the site was later
transformed into a concentration camp administered by the Carabinieri.40 After the
attempt on Graziani’s life, Italian authorities interned Amhara notables and clerics at
Danane with their families. By December 1937, according to official Italian records, the
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population of the camp reached 1,753.41 As many as 6,500 Ethiopians passed through the
camp. Half of them died due to shortages of food and drinking water, unhygienic
conditions, dysentery, and the brutality of camp personnel.42
Unlike his initially lukewarm response to Mussolini’s policy of “no power to the
ras,” Graziani offered no objection to executing anyone that could be defined as a
“rebel.” The definition was intentionally vague and Italian authorities adopted the same
euphemisms used in Italian propaganda for official discourse. During Graziani’s term as
viceroy, Italian correspondence most frequently referred to partisans as “rebels” or
“brigands.” Under the Duke of Aosta, the term “raiders” became more prominent among
dispatches to Rome.43 For the most part, the Italians used the terms interchangeably.
Within the colonial battalions, officers and men referred to anyone that took up arms
against Italy as shifta [bandits], regardless of their actual status.44 Even partisan
formations flying the Ethiopian colours were reported as “raiders.”45
The use of these terms was closely connected to Italy’s premature declaration of
victory in Ethiopia and had important legal ramifications. Italian diplomats recognized
that the formal cessation of war would “reassure the pacifists that the horrors of war have
ceased, without hurting us in the meantime since it would permit the continuation of
military police operations.”46 A consequence of this diplomatic move to avoid sanctions
was to place Ethiopian resistance further outside the bounds of international rules of war.
It ensured that the army had no legal obligation to treat resisters as legitimate combatants.
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“Rebels,” even if they had never submitted to Italian rule in the first place, were deemed
traitors, and for Italian generals “treason against Italy must be punished inexorably.”47
Although Italy’s military penal code officially respected the rights of prisoners and
hostages, such language “exploited the ancient inapplicability of the European and
international rules of war to its farthest limits when confronting non-European forces.”48
In the early phases of the occupation, the Italians made particular example of
captured rebel leaders. Previous experience in Libya and Eritrea convinced Italian
generals that the elimination of indigenous leaders rendered the masses obedient.49
However, if not conducted properly, the killing of prestigious chiefs instead could feed
anti-Italian sentiment amongst fellow elites and the populations of their fiefdoms. The
mishandled execution of the Kassa brothers in December 1936 had major repercussions
on Italian pacification efforts during the next four years. Wondosson Kassa, who had
stirred up revolt in Lasta, was captured and executed on 10 December, but Graziani
offered his younger brothers, Aberra Kassa and Asfawossen Kassa, clemency if they
turned themselves in. On 21 December, the brothers surrendered to General Ruggero
Tracchia who, after offering them coffee, immediately had them shot. Tracchia claimed
that the government had given the Kassa brothers until the 19th to surrender; they had
failed to meet the deadline.50 In fact, Italian authorities had determined months earlier
that “the name of Kassa must disappear from the vocabulary in Lasta.”51 In the short
term, the death of the Kassa brothers dealt a crippling blow to the Ethiopian resistance
movement. In the long term, it made the Italian regime appear untrustworthy and
arbitrary.52
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Although he intervened to spare the life of Ras Imru, who was deported to Italy,
Mussolini approved of the exemplary shootings and demanded that “all rebel leaders that
from now on fall into our hands will immediately be shot by firing squad.”53 This
included Ras Desta, who was captured and executed the following February. But Italian
generals had demonstrated that they did not need Mussolini’s encouragement. Through
1937, Italian military authorities remained convinced that the deaths of rebel leaders
made a strong impression on indigenous populations and discouraged them from joining
in revolt. Under Graziani, notables sometimes were executed by public hanging in native
markets to maximize the impact of their punishment.54
In the case of Hailu Kebede, the leader of another major uprising in Lasta who
was killed in combat, the Italians paraded his severed head through nearby towns and
villages to spread word of his demise. Anselmi, whose unit participated in the operations,
later commented:
It was a macabre barbaric ancient practice, that we could abhor in our hearts, but
that was maybe a necessity, given the mentality of the Amharic populations and
the usefulness of giving an impression of force, the sole quality truly appreciated
by the former subjects of the Negus.55
Other Italian personnel kept photographs of Hailu Kebede’s head, and of other dispatched
Patriots, as reassuring mementos of their superiority and control.56 Italian intelligence
reports credited Hailu Kebede’s death for “producing disillusionment and detachment
among the populations that had followed him.”57 However, the Italians had already lost
the trust of the indigenous populations. In November 1937, the Tosti Column found
villages around Sekota and Lalibela abandoned by populations that recalled “with terror
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the numerous shootings carried out the past year that they claim were conducted despite
having promised a pardon.”58
Executions became commonplace during the first years of the occupation. The
Italians employed several euphemisms to refer to executions. Official telegrams, as well
as speaking of rebels “shot” [passati per le armi], commonly noted the application of
“disciplinary measures” [provvedimenti di rigore] or spoke of “giving a firm lesson”
[dare dura lezione] to rebellious populations.59 The language and tone of Italian
telegrams and reports leaves little doubt that all three terms involved executions. In less
formal discourse, Italian personnel referred to “doing someone in” [far la festa].60
The banality of violence in the first years of the occupation undermined Italian
claims to bring a more just and less arbitrary administration to Ethiopia. Most executions
were carried out by firing squads. In theory, these were supposed to be conducted
according to solemn ritual, providing the sensation of “the most complete justice,” both
swift and consistent. Arrests of “suspects” in the field were to be followed by a “trial
conducted with speed but with all form and pomp by means of an improvised court
martial” with the collaboration of local indigenous elites.61 However, Italian officers
often did away with such formalities. Walter Pierelli’s vivid description of the botched
execution of a man, accused of inciting villagers to flee from the Italians, provides an
indication of the haphazard nature that executions could take in the field.
I summoned a squad of scouts; I had the unfortunate man seized (he was about 35
years old) and took him away, in search of a suitable spot, until I found a hole in
the ground, rather large, about a metre deep; I deployed the squad in front of the
condemned man and ordered them to fire. A volley of shots hit the wretch
[disgraziato]; one bullet struck him in the middle of the forehead; the frontal bone
split in half, with a vertical fracture that, incredibly, changed his features. If I had
not personally followed the scene I would have said that they switched men on
me: before he had a normal face, I would say not ugly [...] Afterwards he seemed
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like a wrinkled and pale old man. I was horrified [Rimasi impressionato]. The
man still moved and I, not wanting him to suffer, ordered that he be given the
coup de grace. An askari shot him, but the man still thrashed about. I ordered
another shot and the man continued to move because the askari fired the so-called
death blow [colpo di grazia] at his body instead of his head. So I took the barrel
of an askari’s rifle and pointed it directly at the head, almost close enough to
touch it and I told him to fire. The askari fired. The man still moved. I did not
know what else to do, so I told all fifteen of the askari in the squad to fire another
shot and the askari fired. The man, who seemed immortal, this time did not move
anymore. I felt almost responsible for his death.62
This episode reinforces the fact — often absent from official bulletins and reports — that
killing can be messy. Many executions in Ethiopia were carried out under the supervision
of young reserve subalterns like Pierelli in the midst of colonial operations where time
and patience were short, and where propaganda and directives consciously transgressed
moral, ethical, and legal limits.
Executions extended beyond actual rebels caught bearing arms against Italian
forces. Italian reports of combat casualties did not include all summary executions or
those shot in reprisals; as a result, the overall figures of civilians killed during the
occupation are not known.63 There were several criteria according to which noncombatants could receive the same fate as rebels. One of the most common charges
resulting in execution involved the illicit possession of firearms. Italian colonial doctrine
considered the complete disarmament of local populations a necessary prerequisite to
pacification.64 Natives caught with guns, or even bullets, on their persons or in their
homes could be shot. Although a policy of disarmament was a normal precaution for a
regime of occupation, it became problematic in Ethiopian society and ultimately
contributed to wider revolt against Italian rule. For many Ethiopians, rifles were a “sign
of virility[,] of strength[,] of prestige.”65 Some Italian officers recognized that for the
populations in particularly isolated regions,
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the rifle[,] more than a sign of prestige, is considered an indispensible means of
living to perform raids and robberies and to defend their constantly threatened
property. Nothing more logical then that the population was reluctant to turn in
their arms so long as they had not seen that our local garrisons and posts
guaranteed their security.66
Ethiopian populations thus viewed arms bans as unjustified assaults on their masculinity
and livelihood. Occasionally, they revolted in direct response to Italian disarmament
campaigns.67
After the conquest of the western territories and the establishment of an Italian
administrative apparatus at the beginning of 1937, the Italians accelerated their policy of
disarming the indigenous populations.68 Despite the policy’s unpopularity, Graziani
insisted on its implementation without prevarication. He asked his governors to
make it well understood by the populations that the only way to live in peace is by
consigning firearms to the government that alone has the right to possess them
and that will provide with its troops for the defence of all. The supreme aim of
disarmament must, that is, be achieved through forceful action accompanied by
sensible propaganda and persuasion. [...] Punitive measures [provvedimento
rigore] against transgressors and holders [of arms] naturally must be applied with
wisdom and complete justice.69
Reflecting the limits of his concept of persuasion, Graziani insisted that “political action
must not slide gradually into apparent negotiations. [...] The government commands, it
does not negotiate.” Column commanders received orders that in carrying out “political
actions” they must not “come to pacts with the population but impose our will by any
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means.” Graziani interpreted the reluctance of the population to turn in their firearms as
an act of rebellion.70
Given the nature of the messages and orders issued by the viceroy, it is not
surprising that searches and sweeps for firearms resulted in excessive violence by Italian
forces. Village leaders who denied the presence of firearms were held hostage and shot
when the first gun was found, as proof to the population that the Italians did not abide
liars.71 Italian forces conducted “exemplary shootings” for the illegal possession of
firearms throughout the empire against all populations, including in Harar.72 By 1938,
after Graziani’s departure, Nasi felt compelled to reprimand his officers for resorting to
torture as a means of unearthing hidden weapons: “I have said that I would prefer that a
hundred rifles remain hidden, rather than passing into history like Torquemada.”73
If they were not shot summarily, villagers caught with weapons had to appear
before a military court. To provide the impression of Roman justice, executions were
carried out after “theatrical” public trials, often involving more than one defendant at a
time.74 However, in the trials witnessed by war correspondent Ciro Poggiali, the
treatment of arms bans violations proved arbitrary. Early in the occupation, an Italian
court sentenced four natives to death for illegal possession of firearms, even though they
claimed to have been sent by their chief to sell the rifles to Italian authorities. The court
responded that “in Addis Ababa rifles are paid for with life and not with Thalers.” To
Poggiali, the judges seemed “lazy, tired, distracted: the sentence was written before the
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trial.”75 A year later, Poggiali recorded a similar tale of a man who had come to the
capital in response to an Italian offer to pay for arms turned in. The man had hidden his
rifles in his cart so he would not be shot as a rebel on his way into town. However, he
was arrested upon his arrival. In the morning, when Graziani was told merely that another
native had been caught bearing arms, the exasperated viceroy ordered an immediate trial
and hanging. According to Poggiali, “the court martial supinely obeyed.”76
Between 10 June 1936 and 31 December 1939, the Italians confiscated 345,514
rifles, 1,960 pistols, 808 machine guns, 19 cannons, and 18,145 hand-to-hand weapons.77
These figures demonstrate one of the major obstacles facing the Italian occupation — a
population with a tradition of and ready access to firearms — as well as the tenacity with
which Italian authorities conducted their policy of disarmament. Even so, the policy
failed. Many of the rifles sequestered and counted were obsolete models or hunting
rifles.78 By mid-1939, the Italians estimated that 100,000 rifles remained unaccounted for
in Amhara alone, leaving the region “at the mercy of a match.”79 The Duke of Aosta was
more lenient and pragmatic than Graziani over total disarmament. He never convinced
the Ministry of Italian Africa to abandon the policy altogether, but he managed to delay
its implementation in regions where it risked sparking revolt.80
In the aftermath of the assassination attempt on Graziani, civilians more
frequently became targets of Italian repression. Massacres in Addis Ababa and Debre
Libanos were the most overt manifestations of Fascist terror. Graziani’s injuries
prevented him from organizing a coordinated response to the assassination attempt on 19
February 1937. During the first forty-eight hours after the incident, Fascist Blackshirts
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and Italian civilians went on a murderous rampage through the capital, burning 4,000
huts, killing anywhere between 1,000 and 6,000 natives, and arresting thousands more.81
Graziani put an end to the uncoordinated Fascist vendetta in the capital without fully
condemning it. “The natives,” he said, “know perfectly well that every form of
punishment that can befall them today is deserved but on the other hand I cannot
machinegun them en masse or put the entire city to the flame[,] forced to concern myself
with repercussions abroad.”82
Graziani blamed the assassination plot on “Abyssinian notables” and the
Orthodox clergy. After executing or deporting much of the Ethiopian intelligentsia,
which by 1941 “virtually ceased to exist,” he turned on the Church.83 Graziani dispatched
a column under his trusted collaborator Maletti to the prestigious monastery of Debre
Libanos, which he considered “a den of criminals, thieves, and assassins.” On 20 May,
Graziani ordered all the monks executed for their supposed role in the plot on his life, but
undoubtedly also to send a message to the Ethiopian population in general. The
executions ran through the night and continued over the course of the following week,
extending to deacons and lay people, as a “Roman example of prompt, inflexible
punishment.”84 Although Graziani reported 450 victims, recent investigations have
determined that the final death toll likely numbered between 1,800 and 2,200, virtually
the entire congregation of the monastery.85
These two incidents were part of a general escalation of violence in the months
leading up to the outbreak of major revolt in Shewa and Amhara. During this time, the
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Italians targeted different segments of Ethiopian society and did not reserve punitive
measures only for those caught with weapons. Graziani regularly sent Rome telegrams
recording headcounts by category, which reveal how Italian violence became ever more
commonplace and arbitrary through the response to the assassination attempt. While
Italian authorities continued to execute “rebels” and those caught with firearms, they now
extended capital punishment to common criminals [delinquenti], spreaders of false news
or anti-Italian propaganda, former Ethiopian army officers, native traitors [traditori],
witch doctors [stregoni], and those deemed generally untrustworthy [infidi].86
Between March and July 1937, Graziani reported 1,918 executions conducted in
response to the assassination attempt. Excluding the monks of Debre Libanos, the single
largest group targeted were common criminals, such as thieves, who normally would not
have been sentenced to death. Some were taken from Italian prisons and shot; others were
grabbed off the street and executed because they had scars on their back, indicating that
they had been flogged as criminals by the previous Ethiopian regime.87 Contraveners of
the Italian arms ban remained the second largest group subject to executions, followed by
witch doctors, diviners [indovini], and storytellers [cantastorie].
The use of Orientalist terminology such as this reinforced the narrative of
Ethiopian backwardness that served to justify harsh Italian measures as part of Fascism’s
civilizing mission. The so-called “witch doctors” likely referred to non-Christian village
elders.88 Graziani blamed them for spreading destabilizing rumours among the “primitive,
ignorant, and superstitious populations.” Later, Graziani added hermits to his list, issuing
decrees that prohibited them from making prophesies. The persecution of witch doctors
began in Addis Ababa but quickly extended throughout the empire. In response to
Graziani’s orders, Nasi had all the notables and witch doctors held in concentration
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camps in Arsi shot.89 Most victims were men, but the Italians executed at least one
female witch doctor.90
In 1937, the Italians targeted these groups on a daily and steady basis. Their arrest
and execution became routine and reinforced the high-handed image that the Italian
regime established for itself in the first two years of occupation. Criminals, priests, witch
doctors, and intellectuals were executed not for what they had done but because of their
social standing. If the cleansing of these strata fit into Fascist plans of socio-cultural
engineering, the main impetus came from the military leadership’s own obsession for
security. The persecution of all these groups was based on flimsy evidence, but Graziani
and his officers considered criminals, notables, and elders to be real or potential sources
of rebellion and disorder. That few of the executions were subject to proper trial
amplified the arbitrary character of Italian repression. Privileging the swiftness and
harshness of Roman justice over fairness, Graziani ordered that the executions be carried
out summarily.91 The practice later was deemed counterproductive. One of the Duke of
Aosta’s first acts as viceroy was to grant an amnesty to clerics and witch doctors, who he
believed had been arrested merely because of their position rather than on the basis of
actual anti-Italian activity.92
Italian disarmament policy was unpopular with the indigenous population and the
arbitrary targeting of notables, monks, witch doctors, and supposed delinquents
undermined the legitimacy of Italian rule. However, the lives and livelihoods of ordinary
civilians — especially in the countryside of Amhara and Shewa — were most threatened
by reprisal actions conducted by local Italian garrisons or by mobile columns in
operations. Unable to come to grips with armed guerrillas and considering the population
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as a whole to be hostile, the Italians allowed their punitive measures to fall collectively
upon villages that happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Italian military
courts heard dozens of trials against entire communities of hundreds of civilians, charged
with “attacking the integrity of the state” [attentato all’integrità dello Stato].93 Hundreds
more villages were burned and suspect inhabitants shot without trial by Italian columns in
the field.
In conjunction with Mussolini’s orders for harshness and the military dynamics of
counterguerrilla warfare, racist thinking also fuelled the violent colonial repression in
Ethiopia. Even while condemning Corvo’s arbitrary violence in Bahir Dar, Cerica
acknowledged the necessity of “summary and severe justice, to which the simple and
primitive mentality of the native bows.”94 Pirzio Biroli agreed that the populations of
Amhara were “always inclined to respect force.”95 Graziani himself advised that
Ethiopian populations responded best to “talion law: eye for an eye[,] tooth for a tooth.”96
In practice, through its increasing reliance on collective punishment, Italian repression
often conformed more closely to the rule of a head for a tooth.
Collective reprisals usually involved the burning of homes or entire villages as
well as seizures of food, money, and livestock.97 These punitive acts were meant to starve
rebel forces of resources and to dissuade populations from supporting them. Italian
authorities resorted to these measures almost instinctively; their use preceded the rise of
major revolt in Ethiopia. In September 1936, deeming Lasta to be a “stronghold” of the
Kassa brothers and therefore “irreparably” rebel territory, Pirzio Biroli ordered the
systematic destruction of villages in reprisal to Wondosson Kassa’s efforts to stir up the
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locals against Italian authority.98 Likewise, Pirzio Biroli responded to what he considered
simple brigandage outside Gondar by ordering that all villages within ten kilometres of
the affected roads be “razed to the ground without quarter.”99 On the eve of the great
rebellion of summer 1937, still without any inkling of the widespread resistance that was
to follow, Italian authorities in Begemder executed seventy-nine notables and natives
who they suspected of involvement in sedition and burned five villages to the ground
after a “hostile demonstration” against the local administration.100
When resources permitted it, local political authorities and garrison commanders
could conduct their own round-ups, “shooting by firing squad all natives suspected of
having taken part in rebellion” and burning villages deemed to have helped the rebels.101
However, most reprisals occurred during counterinsurgency operations carried out by
mobile columns. Even in 1936, “police operations,” “repressive actions,” and “combing
operations” [rastrellamenti] made up a significant proportion of Italian military
activity.102 These types of operation — where Italian forces cordoned off an area and
multiple columns converged to eliminate or capture any remaining rebels — were most
likely to involve collateral damage against the local inhabitants, confronted by soldiers
exhausted from marching and perhaps recently having suffered casualties in battle.
In the midst of large-scale operations, whole populations could be deemed
partisan helpers [favoreggiatori] in order to justify their internment or execution and the
destruction of their homes. Italian operational orders emphasized the need to shoot all
those deemed to have “supported” the rebels.103 Before one such action, Pierelli recalled
that Italian officers distributed boxes of matches to their askari and ordered them to burn
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all the huts they found, “because these tukuls [Ethiopian mud huts with thatched roofs]
were the homes of the rebels.” This supposition seemed confirmed when the askari found
most of the homes deserted. Pierelli later claimed that the whole operation gave him a
feeling that the Italians had preyed on weak families instead of the strong rebels that
threatened them.104
Operations in 1937 reached unprecedented levels of devastation. The figures from
Maletti’s punitive expedition in Shewa, which included the massacre at Debre Libanos,
were horrifying. With 11 colonial battalions and 5,000 irregular troops under his
command, Maletti killed or executed 15,078 “rebels” and destroyed 56,865 dwellings, all
at the cost of 262 killed and 451 wounded.105 Reprisal activity became barely worthy of
mention in telegrams from column commanders, whose language was chillingly
dispassionate.
July 1937: “Burned all villages in the beaten zone abandoned by the
population.”106
September 1937: “Both marches undisturbed. Population fled. Villages
encountered destroyed. No other news.”107
November 1937: “Burned all villages and destroyed all crops.”108
More uncommon were reports like that from the Piumatti Column: “Since no hostile act,
no one shot.”109 In a single day of operations in Gojam in early December 1937, Italian
forces “destroyed” fifty villages.110
Some commanders recognized the counterproductive nature of excessive
violence, without managing to avoid it. The need to issue swift and decisive punishment
to rebels trumped the desire to avoid collateral damage. Giuseppe Pirzio Biroli — the
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brother of the governor of Amhara and commander of a colonial brigade in the same
region — tried to achieve both objectives, demanding “iron, fire, [and] terror” against
brigands and rebels while counselling “humanity [and] justice” for the ordinary
population. His futile efforts reveal the contradictions at play in many
counterinsurgencies. While he considered colonial police actions to be “true and proper
operations of war and therefore [to be] conducted thoroughly with rigour and without
quarter,” he warned that “a few rifle shots by isolated rebels, in proximity of villages,
especially if without consequences, can never justify unleashing an exaggerated reaction
that involves the population[,] generating terror among them.” Efforts to limit the level of
violence in operations were riddled with exceptions or contradictions, and they left much
decision-making to the officer on the spot. The burning of entire villages had to be
approved by higher command, except in cases where actual combat occurred against
rebels. Requisitioned livestock had to be paid for at fair market value, unless it was the
property of rebels or suspect notables. Officers should try not to harm innocents, women,
and children, but certain groups must “of course be killed” [vengano senz’altro
soppressi].111
Italian commanders understandably were reluctant to restrict the independence of
junior officers in the field — such autonomy is indispensable in counterguerrilla warfare,
where small units of men must respond to circumstances in a constant state of flux. That
these officers frequently opted to respond with violence and force was consistent with
their institutional culture. During the first two years of the occupation, directives from
Mussolini and Graziani gave Italian officers the green light to conduct reprisals. Italian
policy sought to treat rebels as traitors and condoned summary executions in order to
stifle the spread of resistance. Operational orders called for the “totalitarian” [totalitaria]
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disarmament of populations and the eradication of rebel movements.112 Racist notions
insisted that the indigenous populations could be persuaded only by force.
If Italian commanders paid lip service to the adverse effects of excessive reprisals
— as Graziani himself did shortly before his removal as viceroy113 — at the same time
they fostered an atmosphere in which allowing rebellious acts to go unpunished became a
greater sin than punishing those who did not commit them. In fact, field officers and
governors could be scolded or disciplined for being excessively lenient towards
“rebels.”114 As a rule, military courts did not punish Italian officers or soldiers for acts of
excessive violence committed as reprisals. Drunkenness, poaching, the private use of
military transport, and looting for personal gain were considered breaches of military
discipline, but not killing, burning, or requisitioning.115 In the case of Second Lieutenant
Natalino Verdeggianti — responsible for a reprisal action during which his platoon of
Italian grenadiers burned a village, killed twenty-six natives, looted property and
livestock, and kidnapped and raped two women — the carabinieri charged him only for
armed robbery. Even this charge did not stick, because Verdeggianti claimed to have
acted under orders with the intention of turning over sequestered property to higher
authorities. Although the court found his behaviour “morally reprehensible,” it did not
find that Verdeggianti had committed any criminal act.116
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Combined with the frustrations of fighting an increasingly adept guerrilla enemy,
these conditions led many officers to disregard the possible ill-effects of collateral
damage. Silvano Anselmi became convinced that in Ethiopia, civilians were merely
“rebels in feigned peaceful attitude” [ribelli in finto atteggiamento pacifico].117 Another
officer, confronted with the fact that he had just executed four innocent bystanders,
allegedly responded “one more, one less, [...] the Abyssinians are many and they are all
equally dangerous.”118 It is not surprising that calls for tact and restraint, when they came,
often went unheeded.119
The brutalization that resulted from Italian military policy proved a major
obstacle to the Duke of Aosta’s efforts to establish a new mode of conduct in East Africa
after 1938. One of the new viceroy’s major contributions to Italian pacification efforts
was his willingness to negotiate with rebel leaders to obtain their submission through
compromise. The policy saw some positive results, but negotiations largely failed
because of a lack of trust between rebel leaders and Italian authorities, worldwide
geopolitical developments, the continuation of large military operations, and insufficient
support from Italian field commanders.120 The most important series of negotiations
conducted between 1938 and 1940 involved Abebe Aregai, who the Italians considered to
be the leader of the Patriot movement in Shewa. Teruzzi’s ministry supported the
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negotiations by offering cataract surgery in Italy for Abebe Aregai’s father.121 The
partisan leader was willing to treat with Sebastiano Castagna, an Italian surveyor who had
spent most of his life in Ethiopia and now traversed the unoccupied parts of Shewa
speaking to various rebel chiefs on behalf of the Italian government. Castagna felt that
Abebe Aregai’s reluctance to surrender derived from his fear of being shot like the Kassa
brothers before him.122 Despite guarantees from the viceroy and his governors, they never
overcame the stigma created by Graziani’s early executions.
Negotiations in 1938 came to an abrupt end when Castagna himself was executed
by rebels in Amhara after he attempted to initiate talks in that region. The rebel leader,
Gurassu Duke, justified the execution by referring again to the fate of the Kassa brothers
and his inability to trust the Italians. Castagna’s death prompted the Duke of Aosta to
sanction military operations and assassination attempts against Gurassu. The rebel leader
managed to escape, but Italian troops remained in the area for weeks “to impose our
prestige on the population among whom signs of repentance [resipiscenza] begin to
manifest themselves.”123 The failure of negotiations typically ended in Italian offensive
military operations that at least appeared to bring more immediate and tangible local
results.124
After the removal of Ugo Cavallero as commander of troops in April 1939, the
Duke of Aosta was able to exercise greater influence in military affairs. Reports to
Mussolini corroborated the view of the new viceroy that, excluding traditional
brigandage, rebellion in Ethiopia was fed
by the poorly restrained action of the troops who during their operations against
very mobile and shifty rebel formations inevitably end up, despite variation
according to their discipline and the energy and authority of their commanders,
badly harming as well largely non-hostile populations which, as an immediate
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consequence, do not find a better or more logical solution than passing to the
enemy camp.125
In May 1939, the viceroy named General Nasi his vice-governor. Together, they
remodelled Italian policy around three main tenets: an end to major operations [grandi
operazioni di polizia]; patient but persistent work of political attraction towards
indigenous chiefs; and, the recourse to force only when political means had been
exhausted.126 The viceroy could count on support from Nasi as well as from the likeminded General Luigi Frusci, the new governor of Amhara.127
However, many operational commanders — senior and junior officers that
commanded troops in the field on a year-round basis — did not approve of the new
policy. In a private letter to his old colleague Graziani, Pietro Maletti criticized the Italian
leadership for appearing weak and pointed out the plight of the Longhi mission, which in
the process of negotiations in 1939 was taken hostage by rebels in Amhara.128 For
officers in combat units, like Silvano Anselmi, the viceroy’s orders to avoid aggression
only seemed to make their task more difficult.
It was our own sort of Sisyphean task, in the delicate situation in which we found
ourselves, right in the middle of enemy territory and given the orders imparted by
the new viceroy, Amedeo the Duke of Aosta, not to assume independent
initiatives, to respond with arms only if attacked and never to commit reprisals or
indiscriminate repression.
While Anselmi claimed that he and his colleagues saw Amedeo’s policies as
humanitarian in theory, their own experience in Ethiopia convinced them that they were
utopian and unrealistic when dealing with indigenous populations that, in Italian eyes,
remained wedded to barbaric notions of vendetta, xenophobia, and tribal or racial hatred.
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For Anselmi, the indigenous populations “appeared to us as a people in which the only,
universally recognized, value was force and only to it did they owe respect, admiration,
absolute obedience.”129
Ettore Formento shared a similar opinion; engaged in combat with rebels since
1936, officers like him were convinced that the only reason rebel leaders might appear
willing to negotiate was because of the pressure they were under from Italian combat
operations.130 Even Frusci had to admit that, while the use of force was best avoided, it
remained necessary when persuasion failed.
It is evident that in some parts of Gojam, Begemder, Ermaccio, and the lower
Semien, where we are not talking about groups of bandits, but of hostile
populations well protected by inaccessible nature, by a considerable armament
and by the self-assuredness of a supposed immunity, political action will not be
able to substitute, but [only] supplement that of the troops.131
The Duke of Aosta’s efforts at negotiation thus never enjoyed complete adherence by
subordinate officers and never completely negated the need for military operations.
These challenges came to a head in 1940, when the Italians renewed their
negotiations with rebels in Shewa. This time, Teruzzi authorized a purse of fifty million
lire to bribe Abebe Aregai and his followers.132 In addition, the viceroy offered rebel
chiefs the position of meslenié and allowed their men to keep their weapons and enroll as
irregular bands in Italian pay.133 Discussions between the two parties resulted in a state of
ceasefire in Shewa — Amhara remained in flames — without achieving the formal
submission of Abebe Aregai. Likely, news of war in Europe and the heightened
probability of Italian conflict against Britain and France buoyed rebel intransigence.
Moreover, rebels once again provided the case of the Kassa brothers and other executed
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notables as justification for their reluctance to submit. This was not helped by incidents in
the midst of negotiations where Italian field commanders executed rebels that had
surrendered.134 Eventually, even the Duke of Aosta had to admit that the indefinite
ceasefire threatened Italian prestige. He gave the rebel leader a firm deadline of 14 March
1940. When this passed, Mussolini — who now claimed always to have harboured
doubts about the negotiations and voiced his conviction that Abebe Aregai was a French
agent — concluded that the rebels were merely trying to buy time and ordered immediate
military operations, resorting if necessary to the use of poison gas. It took the rest of the
month for Italian forces to come to grips with Abebe Aregai, who managed to escape
after a bitter fight.135
As with colonial policy, the contribution of the Duke of Aosta’s term as viceroy
to military policy was enigmatic. By 1939, authorities in Rome accepted that the methods
of Graziani and Cavallero, based on costly and constant punitive operations, had failed.136
Negotiations and moderation gained the tacit, if not wholehearted, blessing of the Fascist
leadership, but the viceroy and his collaborators had difficulty convincing their own
officers of the new policy. New military operations were supposed to be small and
limited, based on the
utmost economy of personnel, equipment, and quadrupeds, and guided by the
concept of making our strength seen, heard, and felt covering the greater part of
the territory, developing at the same time an action of intimidating and punitive
character and forcing the submission and disarmament of hostile populations and
rebels.137
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Although the Italians reported far fewer executions and burned villages in 1940 than they
had in 1937, operations defined as “punitive” always remained open to excess.138
Officially, the Duke of Aosta put an end to reprisals, but Italian forces still launched
operations with the aim of “punishing hostile populations,” and when officers fell in
ambushes, the Italians responded with “exemplary” measures against local
populations.139
Combat between Italian colonial troops and partisans remained brutal. Even with
the Duke of Aosta in charge, the numbers of rebels killed vastly exceeded those captured
and remained disproportionately high when compared to statistics of Italian losses and
rifles captured.140 The habit of summarily executing all rebels captured bearing arms
proved difficult to shake off. For the operations against Abebe Aregai in 1940, Nasi
ordered concentration camps established to hold rebel prisoners. He urged commanders
not to execute captured rebels, but rather to send them to the camps in order to
“extinguish the myth that our troops do not even spare those who surrender.”141 Just three
months before Italy’s entry into the Second World War, these orders came far too late to
make a difference. The Italians did not have time to eradicate the “myth” that had come
to characterize their policy of repression in East Africa. After Mussolini’s first orders in
1936 to shoot all rebels, the army had enthusiastically obeyed. This policy undoubtedly
hardened resistance and resulted in counterproductive collateral damage that brutalized
the nature of warfare in Ethiopia. The Duke of Aosta inherited this system along with a
deteriorating international situation, both of which limited the success of his measures.
Given the failure of negotiations and the continued brutality of guerrilla warfare, Amedeo
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di Savoia’s programme did not bring about a wholesale shift in attitude for the Italian
army as an institution.

Intelligence
Italian repression policy was based partly on racially charged assumptions concerning the
mentality of the indigenous populations. A good intelligence service needs to be humble
and take its enemy seriously and without prejudice, understanding its culture.142
However, official interpretations of indigenous mentalities and rebel behaviour differed
little from the way Ethiopians were depicted in Fascist propaganda. Italian commanders
and intelligence officers considered the local populations in general to be primitive,
ignorant, and superstitious.143 While they accounted for some variation between the
different ethnic and religious groups within the empire, their evaluations remained
wedded to racial stereotypes and martial race theory.
Italian officers believed that the Amhara were “ethnically superior” and more
“intelligent” than other groups, making them “intrepid” fighters. Maletti attributed their
unwillingness to bow to Italian authority to their social code of silence, which — echoing
Liberal-era rhetorical linkages between imperialism and meridionalism — he likened to
southern Italy’s omertà. Moreover, Maletti added, Ethiopian peasants fatalistically
accepted “medieval” traditions of brigandage as a natural part of life.144 Other groups,
like the Oromo, were seen as less adept fighters but strong workers. Like the Amhara,
Formento considered them “false, deceitful, [and] untrustworthy, but it would have been
difficult to find someone who was not in similar circumstances.”145 Conditions of
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guerrilla warfare seemed to corroborate many of the racial stereotypes applied to the
populations.
The tendency of Italian generals to view resistance as an extension of endemic
brigandage contributed to a major intelligence failure in the summer of 1937. While
traditional banditry was a real problem in many parts of the empire — in Danakil, the
Italians had to deal with camel rustlers — the fixation on the campaign against
“brigands” and “raiders” effectively blinded Italian commanders to the political character
of the rebellion.146 Italian officials shrugged off signs of broadening resistance in Amhara
in early 1937 as mere brigandage. Pirzio Biroli was convinced that such brigandage
caused little need for alarm, and that the execution of a few brigand leaders would sway
the population towards Italy’s strength.147 Even after the outbreak of revolt, Pirzio Biroli
failed to see any unifying motive behind the various uprisings throughout his
governorate, which he claimed were “almost exclusively provoked by brigand chiefs.”148
Revolt in July and August 1937 therefore took Italian commanders by surprise. Hailu
Kebede called for “holy war” against the Italians and his forces were able to cut off and
destroy a number of isolated Italian garrisons before Pirzio Biroli and Graziani could
organize major operations to relieve them. Graziani, who through July had continued to
report that the empire was tranquil, blamed Pirzio Biroli for leaving him in the dark.149
Italian commanders did not place great value in the intelligence of their colonial
subjects. General Luigi De Biase blamed the Italian army’s lack of knowledge of the
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whereabouts and strength of rebels in Lasta on the poor quality of its native informants
who, he claimed, were not capable of making basic approximations of rebel force size.
It is known that the natives have limited faculties of counting and they do not
know how to appreciate, numerically, the strength of a mass of men. Concluding:
need always to take the size of rebel forces with a grain of salt. [...] Intelligence,
very difficult to gather anywhere, is particularly so in Africa, because of the
mentality of native informers who do not know how to explain themselves with
precision or with clarity.150
De Biase’s report reflects the prejudice of the Italian officer corps as well as the difficulty
the Italians had gaining even basic information on their enemies. The Italians tried to
establish large networks of informants to gather information. While they enjoyed some
successes, the frequency of ambushes in close proximity to Italian bases suggests that
operational intelligence often remained limited.151
This lack of comprehension and underestimation of the indigenous intellect was
extended to include Italy’s enemies in rebellion. Italian commanders could not believe
that Ethiopian rebels had the organizational capacity to pose the threat that they did
without foreign — specifically European — guidance. In his reports to Lessona, Graziani
blamed continued resistance in Shewa on the spread of propaganda messages from the
exiled emperor, Haile Selassie, transmitted to Ethiopia by hostile foreign nations.152
Likewise, the official inquiry into the assassination attempt on Graziani determined that,
although the main conspirators were Ethiopian notables and clerics, the attempt was so
well-conceived and well-organized that “only through a coordinating European mentality
could they synchronize their movements.” The investigation concluded that the British,
and possibly the French, were behind the attack.153 While it is true that Haile Selassie
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maintained contact with resistance groups in East Africa after 1936 and that the British
and French intelligence services had a presence in the region, Italian authorities
overemphasized their role in the revolt.154 This contributed to the tardiness of the Italians
to appreciate the national or patriotic character of the rebellion against their rule. They
tended to view most revolts as “localized” and they blamed foreign agents and
propaganda for the spread of rebellion to other areas.155 This conviction spread through
the ranks and found an echo in postwar memoir literature.156
Only at a late stage did Italian authorities begin to consider the possibility that the
core of the rebel movement in Ethiopia had national objectives and was opposed to any
form of foreign occupation. After 1938, reports from Italian emissaries conducting
negotiations with rebel leaders provided new sources of intelligence on rebel
organization, motivations, and behaviour. At this point, the Italians began to admit that
rebellion in regions like Gojam — previously understood as the extension of brigandage
— had assumed a “political hue.”157 However, Italian prejudice and contempt for the
Ethiopian partisans continued into the Second World War. Even with Commonwealth
forces pressing from all sides, the Italian command did not foresee full-blown revolt in
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Shewa “because the local chiefs fight for themselves and not for the glory of the Negus or
for the advantage of the English.”158 As a rule, throughout the occupation, Italian military
authorities understood the revolt as the result of unruly chiefs and clerics — upset at the
loss of their feudal privileges — fuelled by foreign propaganda, endemic brigandage, and
an ignorant and gullible indigenous population. Italian analysis of the causes of rebellion
and of the indigenous mentality was simplistic and racist and, as a result, failed to
appreciate the strength of anti-Italian resistance in Ethiopia.

Counterpropaganda
Italian propaganda directed towards the indigenous populations and against rebels in
areas of operations reflected the same prejudices and assumptions that Italian intelligence
services did. The conviction that the African mind was too simple and irrational to
comprehend abstract arguments and that the populations responded most positively to
overt displays of force resulted in unsophisticated propaganda that was, however,
distributed by relatively sophisticated means. LUCE “autocinemas” provided free
showings of propaganda films for natives. The propaganda office selected films that
emphasized the power of Italy’s armed forces, the physical strength of the Italian race,
the beauties and wonders of Italy, and the adoration of Italians for their king and Duce.159
The technology and spectacle of the cinema made it an effective demonstration of white
superiority, but the lack of subtitles or dubbing prompted Ethiopians to write their own
scripts, often mocking Italian actors or rooting for the “wrong protagonists” as a form of
resistance.160 Native cinemas and even the “autocinemas” were only able to reach
populations in urban centres and peaceful regions. Cinema therefore had no direct
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military application. In areas without a strong Italian presence, the air force dropped
leaflets and the political affairs office of each governorate tried to coordinate sympathetic
local elites to spread Italian propaganda by word of mouth or through written letters to
hostile chiefs.161
The main objective of colonial propaganda was the maintenance of Italian
prestige, particularly military prestige [prestigio guerriero].162 Nasi’s prewar treatise
called for little more in the field of propaganda than spreading the word of Italian military
successes and conquests.163 In Ethiopia, viceroys also were hamstrung by Fascist
indigenous policy, which offered few opportunities to employ more positive themes in
their propaganda. As Giuseppe Finaldi has pointed out, “the leverage available to win
consensus among the population of Ethiopia during and after the Italian invasion was
slight.” The influence of the few collaborating Ethiopian intellectuals, who penned
articles in pro-Fascist Amharic weeklies, appears to have been slight.164 Graziani
concluded that the only way to counter enemy propaganda was with force; a “policy of
rigour” [politica di rigore] was his main tool to prevent the populations from siding with
the rebels.165 Italian propaganda, paired with repression and reprisals, thereby aimed at
terrorizing the local populations. As Graziani put it, “better a pinch of fear than a hundred
quintals of good words.”166
Early propaganda in Shewa and Amhara focused on countering harmful rumours
and promoting the image of Italy as a superior and civilized conqueror. Ceremonies
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involving the public submission of Ethiopian elites to Italian rule provided a form of
propaganda and spectacle of their own, conducted with the “utmost solemnity” and with
the presence of dignitaries and honour guards.167 The continued presence in exile of Haile
Selassie provided Ethiopian partisans with a useful source of propaganda; they frequently
claimed that the emperor was about to return at the head of a vast host. Graziani
responded to such rumours with his own decree.
The truth is that Tafari is not here because he prefers to take his baths in England
in the company of pretty women and he does not give a damn [strafregarsene] for
the Ethiopian people. We Italians tell you the truth because it is in our interest that
the Ethiopian people are not deceived and that you collaborate willingly with us
towards the pacification of the country and to the advancement of Ethiopia.168
Through 1936, Italian propaganda tried to convince Ethiopians that they were a
conquered people and that further resistance was futile, while offering vague promises of
civilizing progress, modernization, and economic well-being in a peaceful empire.
In the western territories, these themes were complemented by an effort to win
over minorities through a policy of “divide and conquer.” The Italians used more positive
forms of propaganda here, assuring religious freedom while proclaiming an end to
servitude under the Amhara oppressor.169
Galla populations, listen!
For fifty years you have been slaves to another race that, although numerically
inferior to you, has crushed you, forced you from your villages, made you live in
misery and in a state of inferiority.
Today the Italian government, that by God’s will and the strength of its arms has
taken over the lands of Ethiopia, brings you freedom[,] civilization[,] peace[,] and
well-being under the protection of its glorious flag.
Are you maybe less intelligent for being considered inferior to the other races that
populate Ethiopia?
Today your old rulers try to delude you by speaking of fraternity and equality, but
you know well, having experienced it, what fate they would have in store for you.
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Do not listen then to the delusions of those who after having scorned and tread
upon you today ask for your help to their benefit and not for your good.
Do not listen to the false rumours and tendentious news that these stirrers
[mestatori] spread with the sole purpose of deceiving you.
You should oppose even with force those who want to invade your country to
fight the Italian government, the only [government] today existing in all of
Ethiopia, and you should be obedient to the orders it gives you.170
Such language was part of a general policy of “persuasion” directed towards Muslim and
Oromo populations of Ethiopia in order to develop “an effective counterweight to the
Amhara.”171 Although Graziani’s calls for obedience contradicted his claims to have
brought freedom to non-Amhara populations, this type of propaganda may have
contributed to the relatively successful pacification of regions like Harar.
In operational zones, Italian leaflets offered partisans and rebellious populations
one chance to submit before promising only death and destruction. Nasi did not refrain
from such threats.
The war has been over for almost two months and you have still not submitted to
the Italian government.
What are you waiting for? — Perhaps you hope for help from some European
nation.
An illusion! — England and France, by now recognizing the great power of
Fascist Italy have ended sanctions and live in perfect peace with us.
And you, instead, continue in your raids, you kill people and provoke disorder in
the countryside.
This must cease.
If you make the act of submission and lay down your arms, the government
promises to be very generous with you.
Those that have already submitted to the government can tell you this.
You have nothing to fear.
You will be free, your families, your religion, your property will be respected.
Those that want to enlist under the flag of Italy will be well received.
Those that want to work will be able to do so because the government will
conduct great works for the good of the country.
Those that instead want to return to their villages will be given the necessary
means and will find work in their villages.
Do not think that rebellion can bring you, as in the past, power and honours;
under the Italian government rebellion is punished with inexorable punishment.
This is my last word.
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If you do not listen to it, the government of Italy[,] whose strength and means are
known to you, will destroy you, your families and your homes without mercy.
Do not hope to avoid the punishment that awaits you as men outside the law, if
you choose not to listen to this[,] my last and true offer [parola] of pardon and
peace.172
Through 1936, Nasi urged his subordinates to employ these arguments in their efforts to
gain the peaceful submission of hostile populations in Harar. He believed that his policy
of “demonstrating force but not employing it” was successful during this period.173
After the great revolt of summer 1937 in Amhara, Italian propaganda relied even
more on outright terror. Notions of a civilizing mission were all but forgotten as Italian
authorities gave rebellious populations the stark choice between submission and death. In
September 1937, Italian aircraft dropped 50,000 leaflets over the most isolated parts of
Amhara. Their contents focused solely on the threat of force, without much subtlety.
People of Gojam, Lasta, and Begemder. You have given heed to irresponsible
leaders and are in rebellion. With what hope? Perhaps you believe yourselves able
to resist with poorly armed men the might of Italy who can destroy you all if you
offend it? The Government asks you to return to peace and hand in your weapons,
returning to your abandoned homes and fields. Obey now and you will be
pardoned.174
Although Italian messages to rebels continued to include offers of pardon, the frequency
of Italian executions and the negative image created by the shooting of the Kassa brothers
by this time had made many Ethiopians unwilling to trust Italian promises of clemency.
Other leaflets drew upon the plight of Hailu Kebede as a warning to the general
population that resistance was futile.
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God’s justice has struck down Dejaz Hailu Kebede, who organized the
populations of Lasta in rebellion against the government. Hailu Kebede was
captured by our troops and punished with death. Do not believe those who try to
deceive you by making you believe that Hailu Kebede is still alive. His body was
displayed in the market of Sekota and recognized by all the population. Now his
head has been displayed in the market of Korem and likewise recognized by all
the population. Let me tell you further that areas of Lasta have been punished
putting them to fire and sword and that all livestock of those populations have
been confiscated. I advise you once again to remain peaceful and not to listen to
those who try to drag you into rebellion, otherwise you will meet the same fate as
that of the populations of Lasta and their chiefs.175
Governors throughout the empire drew upon the propaganda value of Hailu Kebede’s
death to dissuade Amhara populations from joining in revolt. In Harar, Nasi emphasized
the fact that Hailu Kebede had been killed by an irregular Oromo band, playing upon the
insecurity of the Amhara minority in Harar.176
The overall impact of Italian propaganda leaflets is questionable. Although they
were meant to inspire fear, much of the population could not read them and rumour
spread that the Italians dropped paper because they had run out of bombs. For his part,
the Duke of Aosta never resorted to verbal violence or threats in his decrees.177 Rather, he
consciously presented himself as a more magnanimous viceroy than his predecessor.178
Similarly, the new governor of Amhara, Luigi Frusci, tried to give the impression of
being a gentler and more understanding authority figure.
People of Amhara
Listen.
You all have seen and heard what I have done from the first day that I arrived in
Gondar as governor of Amhara up until today to bring peace and tranquility to the
entire territory.
Always and in every case I have endeavoured to resolve disputes between chiefs
and the government peacefully with good words [and] without recourse to arms.
It is a point of fact that I have even sent my officers as ambassadors of peace to
rebel chiefs in Begemder to bring them to reason eliminating any motive of
distrust towards the government.
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If I have been obliged sometimes to resort to arms this was the fault of the rebel
chiefs that did not want and still do not want to hear the government’s voice,
which is the voice of reason and peace.
However, I believe it is important for you to know that my desire for peace
remains the same, that I will make every effort and will try every means so that
the people who are still rebels, will become loyal populations of the empire like
the Eritreans and Somalis so that peace, order, quiet, [and] well-being will reign
in Amhara as they do in Eritrea and Somalia.
I know very well that the population all want to be loyal so that they can cultivate
their fields in peace and live quietly in their villages without running the danger of
losing all their belongings and even their lives because of war.
The only obstacle that prevents the population from moving closer to the
government is the rebel chiefs, who, having broken with the government for
injustices suffered in the past or for other motives, now fear coming back over to
the faithful because they are afraid of being punished and they do not believe
[my] promises of pardon.
Now I tell you that this is a big mistake.
On several occasions I have made known by means of decrees and letters that my
absolute pardon is for all those that surrender themselves without exception.
And I keep my promises. [...]
You also know how many people I freed from prison that had already been
condemned by the courts for being rebels, because there is no punishment for he
who surrenders even if he has taken up arms against the askari and soldiers of the
government.
Moreover, all this can be confirmed to you by a great chief, who has now returned
among you, and that is the Honourable Dejaz Ayalu Burru, who having travelled
widely in recent times and having been to Rome, Eritrea, and Addis Ababa,
knows very well the true intentions of Italy towards you.
Chiefs and populations of Amhara, listen.
Many lies have been told and continue to be told against Italy and the Italians.
There are still some people here in Amhara that believe these lies, but he who has
been to Italy and Europe knows very well that these are false intentions good for
leading astray he who knows nothing, because Italy is a great, ancient, strong,
[and] powerful state, that has other powerful states in Europe as friends and so is
not afraid of anyone.
Here in Ethiopia we want to govern peacefully because we consider it our duty to
give well-being and quiet to the populations of the empire. That which we have
done in Eritrea and Somalia Italy wants to and will do here in Ethiopia. [...]
I wanted to say all this to you, people of Amhara[,] because I want you all to
know what I am doing and what are my ideas, because I especially want there to
be reciprocal trust and sincerity between myself who represents the Italian
government and you, chiefs and population of Amhara.
Only thus will I be able with ease to absolve my mission of peace and order
among you, examining and resolving, all the problems that affect you in a work of
loyal and faithful collaboration with your chiefs.
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May God enlighten you and lead you on the right path.179
The difference between Frusci’s decree in 1939 and those of 1936 and 1937 is
remarkable. Its increased length derived from the multiple lines of argumentation
employed to convince populations to remain loyal to the government. These arguments
appealed largely to the population’s sense of reason, assuming a higher degree of intellect
among natives than Graziani would have allowed for. Moreover, Frusci acknowledged
that the public had genuine grievances and he claimed to have rectified past “injustices.”
He tried to prove that Italy’s promises of clemency were likewise genuine and he pledged
not to resort immediately to the use of force.
Ultimately, even after 1938, Italian propaganda continued to rely upon themes of
political prestige and military might to cow the local populations. Although Frusci’s
decree reflected a real shift in attitude within the Italian colonial leadership, by this time
the Ethiopian partisan movement had gained the upper hand in the battle of propaganda
and had placed Italian authorities on the back foot. The Italians devoted much of their
efforts to countering rebel propaganda in the belief that the spread of rumours posed one
of their greatest obstacles.
News in Ethiopia spreads among the natives with the speed of wind, their
mentality distorts and exaggerates events, the populations are easy to stir up and
quick to retaliate; it is all an environment in which sometimes situations can
change by the arrival of false news.180
The deteriorating international situation after 1938, and the way rebel propaganda
exploited it, forced the Italians to respond. They emphasized Britain’s formal
“recognition of the empire” and highlighted such events as the Italian occupation of
Albania in 1939 to demonstrate Italy’s diplomatic and military prowess as well as its
preparation for a European war.181
In conclusion, Italian propaganda tended to be reactionary and unsophisticated,
inspired by racist assumptions of the Ethiopian mindset. Its effectiveness was limited by
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the lack of social or cultural policies that might appeal to the local populations. Efforts at
“divide and conquer” could only go so far, especially in areas with Amhara majorities
where revolt was strongest. Through 1937, Italian decrees escalated their use of terror
until it became the main component of colonial propaganda. This dovetailed perfectly
with the black-and-white concepts of imperial conquest held by the Fascist regime.
Moderation under the Duke of Aosta proved a considerable volte-face, but there is no
evidence to suggest that it was any more successful. After 1938, Italian propaganda was
unable to compete with the realities of insufficient control on the ground and an imminent
war with the neighbouring colonial powers of Britain and France.

Deployment and Tactics
A policy based on terror and the demonstration of force can be effective if offset by
calculated offers of clemency and when backed up by effective combat operations
targeted against rebels to guarantee safety and economic stability for civilian populations.
However, as has been shown, the poorly conceived execution of indigenous elites
nullified the potential value of amnesties and the brunt of Italian combat operations
tended to fall upon civilians at least as much as upon the rebels themselves. In fact, the
deployment of Italian forces in Ethiopia and the techniques they used in combat failed to
provide security for subject populations or Italian administrators in certain parts of the
empire and made collateral damage against civilians more difficult to avoid.
Although Italian strength in East Africa always amounted to more than 200,000
troops, this was not sufficient to garrison an empire in which much of the territory
remained hostile. Based on French and Italian experience in Morocco and Libya, Italian
colonial doctrine — as espoused by Guglielmo Nasi — warned against the use of static
garrisons. Since these were vulnerable to becoming isolated and besieged, Nasi instead
had recommended the construction of a small number of fortified bases, capable of
defending themselves indefinitely, between which mobile groups would operate in
offensive operations against rebels.182 However, in Ethiopia, Rome’s policy of “super
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direct rule” demanded direct contact between local populations and Italian administrators
and thereby necessitated a broad network of small garrisons.183 This practice brought the
political advantage of asserting Italy’s presence throughout occupied territory, which
helped isolate brigands from the population but left Italian forces unprepared and illequipped to confront a larger organized rebellion.184
The initial rebel successes in Amhara in summer 1937 prompted Italian
authorities to question the wisdom of their deployments. Graziani, Cerica, and Hazon
were quick to blame Pirzio Biroli for his “flawed practice of pushing weak columns too
far” and dispersing his forces among small unfortified garrisons, allowing them to be
picked off by rebels one at a time. Even small rebel victories like these could spur the
surrounding population to revolt.185 Ettore Formento recalled the challenges faced by
small garrisons in Shewa, including the constant danger of being wiped out by a sudden
uprising.
Here and there tiny garrisons, held by [irregular] bands or by Eritrean or ArabSomali colonial companies, lost in the immensity of space, several days march
from one another, isolated for every month of the great rains, tried to maintain
peace and order. Miraculously most of the time they succeeded; every so often it
could happen, and not so seldom, that a garrison was swept away, like for
example that of Gedu, not far from Gibati, by the sudden revolt of a chief.
The event was not considered very important: one or two officers less, a few
hundred askari less, they did not matter much, the thing had to be brushed aside
and one did not speak about it. The image of peace and tranquility that the empire
had to give of itself to public opinion could not be disturbed.186
Nonetheless, Italian commanders insisted that even small garrisons could hold out for an
extended time against superior rebel forces, thanks in part to the “special dread of
fortifications” that rebel leaders had. Since withdrawals could become costly and
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embolden nearby villagers to revolt, Italian units were told to hold their ground and await
relief from Italian air support and mobile columns.187
Ultimately, military necessity compelled the governors of Amhara gradually to
withdraw many of their smaller isolated garrisons, leaving large swaths of territory
abandoned to the rebels.188 This presented Italian commanders with a catch-22 scenario.
Italian colonial policy sought to keep rebellion in check by maintaining Italian prestige,
which required the constant presence of Italian boots on the ground. However, dispersed
troops became susceptible to attack, which could bolster rebel prestige. Pulling garrisons
out of vulnerable positions ensured fewer military defeats but made it more difficult to
convince local populations that they could rely upon Italian protection, which also
enhanced rebel prestige. Cognizant of this situation, Frusci admitted that the withdrawal
of garrisons gave the “semblance of truth” to rebel propaganda on Italian weakness, but
he concluded that abandoning territory to the partisans was the lesser of two evils. Since
small garrisons found themselves in a virtual state of siege, they did not carry out their
purpose of imposing Italian prestige through their presence but were instead “dead
weight.”189
Frusci sought a return to Nasi’s original theoretical precepts. He reorganized the
Italian command structure in Amhara by establishing four sector commands, each of
which included a reinforced mobile brigade, “destined to act between the links of
garrisons constituting pivots of manoeuvre, [whose] military activity must be
characterized by a tone of bold dynamism to protect the populations, counter the vain
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aspirations of the rebels, ensure communications and allow the construction of new
roads.”190 The withdrawals continued right up to the Second World War.
Given the number of troops available and the unrealistic political objectives of the
Fascist regime, the problem of garrison deployment in Ethiopia proved intractable. The
situation was not helped by the shortage of qualified combat officers in the theatre.
Officers in colonial units came from multiple branches of the armed forces. While
governors, their staffs, and column commanders often brought with them years of
colonial experience, many junior officers and even some battalion commanders were
reservists.191 In practice, captains sometimes commanded battalions and companies
regularly came under the command of second lieutenants.192 The memoirists Anselmi,
Corazzi, and Formento all began their service in Ethiopia as subalterns in their early to
mid-twenties. Pierelli was thirty, but still a reservist whose only African experience was a
forty-five-day “pre-colonial” course at Civitavecchia that he took before shipping out.
When Corazzi was called up at the end of 1938, he had to take a five-month course in
East Africa, which included riding lessons and Amharic. This was his first contact with
Africans before being assigned to command a half company in the 13th Colonial
Battalion.193
Junior commanders frequently came under criticism from superiors for their
incompetence. Mezzetti blamed the “painful episode” of an engagement in July 1938 —
which cost the Italians two officers, twenty-four askari, and eight irregulars killed — on
the “inexperience of the garrison commander.”194 Maletti complained that the
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commander of a fort near Gondar, “a fat and placid reservist captain,” failed to come to
the aid of an Italian supply convoy that was ambushed just five kilometres away.195 This
episode demonstrated how troops and officers of Italian garrisons could submit to a siege
mentality. Nor did Maletti hold his criticism for combat officers in mobile colonial units.
The coloured battalions, poorly organized, even more badly employed, have
become a wretched thing. The officers, when they encounter the enemy, open fire
and then wait to see what happens. They do not direct the action and do not have
any concept of manoeuvre: they shoot and that is it!196
At the ground level, Italian combat units frequently were directed by men with little
military experience and no special training in colonial guerrilla warfare.
In part, poor leadership was overcome by the relatively high quality of Italy’s
colonial troops, whose light armament and willingness to execute rapid marches made
them well-suited to guerrilla warfare. During 1936, the high cost of maintaining
metropolitan units in the theatre prompted Rome to repatriate most of the Italian
personnel that had participated in the invasion of Ethiopia.197 Over the course of the
occupation, the ratio of indigenous troops to Italian soldiers in East Africa steadily
increased. By April 1940, Italian strength consisted of 167,763 colonial troops compared
to 65,461 Italian soldiers and officers. The Italians had to keep more than half of their
forces in Amhara and Shewa alone.198 As in Libya, Eritrean askari bore the burden of
colonial police operations. Already by 1935, forty percent of Eritrea’s male labour force
had been recruited into the colonial army, placing considerable strain on local agriculture
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through 1941.199 From time to time, the Italians employed Blackshirt militia units in
operations as well, but these more regularly performed garrison duty or road work.200
Traditionally, the askari enjoyed a middling position between regular and
irregular troops. The Italian military viewed them as auxiliary forces separate from the
national army — and therefore never considered for operations in Europe — but whereas
irregular bands were formed directly by local authorities, askari units came under the
direction of the Royal Corps of Colonial Troops [Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali].201 Prior
to the conquest of Ethiopia, Italian commanders recognized that the light armament and
equipment of the askari made them manoeuvrable and adept at guerrilla warfare.202 A
small number of askari received specialized training as artillerymen or engineers, but the
vast majority were employed in colonial infantry battalions. Italian troops tended to fulfil
technical tasks whereas the askari provided a body of more expendable riflemen and
machine gunners.203
Colonial battalions generally comprised 1,000 men divided between 3 rifle
companies, a machinegun company, and a command unit with logistical services and a
reconnaissance platoon. With 150 to 200 mules to carry supplies and equipment, these
formations were more “slender” and flexible than regular infantry, and were capable of
autonomous employment. Armament typically consisted of Austrian rifles and
machineguns taken as booty after the First World War, supplemented with modern lightmachineguns and hand grenades.204 This level of firepower made them more than a match
for most rebel formations. Their suitability for independent action in difficult terrain
meant that colonial battalions were in constant demand for counterinsurgency operations.
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For the Italian officers and indigenous soldiers in these units, life was “an uninterrupted
carousel of combing operations [rastrellamenti]” where not even the rainy season
provided respite.205
The tactics employed in these operations did not change drastically over the
course of the occupation. Combing techniques in Ethiopia were little different than those
practiced previously by the Italian army in Libya’s Jebel Akhdar or even in southern Italy
during the Brigands’ War of the previous century. In areas of relative calm, Italian
commanders ordered rastrellamenti to make Italy’s presence and strength felt by the local
populations. Company-sized patrols would criss-cross regions, making contact with
villages, collecting intelligence, and performing searches for hidden arms.206 Proper
combing operations against known guerrillas required considerable forces to cordon off
an area. Italian columns tended to range from three to five battalions in size, with some
larger operations deploying multiple columns.207 Every evening, column commanders
made radio contact with their superiors to report their position. The following morning,
they received orders for that day’s objectives in an effort to coordinate the movement of
Italian units to surround rebel areas and converge on a single point, thereby forcing an
engagement.208 Success depended upon the accuracy of Italian intelligence on the
whereabouts and size of rebel formations and the ability of all participating units to reach
their objectives in a timely fashion. If Italian forces managed to engage and disperse
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rebels in combat, column commanders would divide their men into multiple “patrols”
[pattuglioni] of fifty men each “to comb the ground and prevent the rebels from
employing the same tactic of division.” In Maletti’s operations in the summer of 1937,
these patrols covered an area twenty kilometres by twenty-five kilometres in size.209
Excessive violence against civilians during these operations was, as has been
demonstrated, first and foremost the result of Italian reprisal policies and attitudes
towards rebellion. Most executions and destruction fell under the category of cold
violence sanctioned by authorities, augmented by the lack of discipline of colonial troops.
Disciplinary problems stemmed from ethnic hatred and the brutalization of colonial
troops by Italian commanders.210 Italian colonial doctrine sought to exploit tribal and
religious rivalries not explicitly to promote ethnic cleansing but as a means of
guaranteeing the loyalty of indigenous troops.211 Regardless of the rationale behind this
policy of “divide and conquer,” it promoted violence.
Italian authorities reported difficulties controlling Eritrean askari against Amhara
populations.212 Harsh disciplinary measures to maintain unit cohesion further brutalized
colonial troops. Deserters were shot in the back after being captured while those accused
of drunkenness or insubordination were punished by floggings administered with a whip
made from thick hippopotamus leather.213 At the same time, colonial officers tolerated
looting in order to live off the land and maintain the loyalty of their troops. Poggiali
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described the progress of Gallina’s colonial brigade: “Everywhere they went they
destroyed everything, they took everything; herds of cattle, sheep, trophies of live
chickens tied to bayonets.”214 Through 1940, Nasi battled ineffectually against the
general assumption among his subordinates that colonial troops could not be kept loyal
without plunder.215 The harsh treatment of colonial troops combined with their constant
employment in operations and their commanders’ disregard for collateral damage
promoted brutality in the field.
Between 1937 and 1939, when Italian authorities became exasperated by guerrilla
activity, they launched grand operations involving dozens of battalions. In 1938,
Cavallero and Mezzetti planned extensive series of operations months in advance,
covering the whole of Amhara.216 The time required to concentrate such large numbers of
troops and supplies usually gave the partisans ample warning for what was to come.
These costly operations dealt significant hardship on the impacted populations without
necessarily coming to grips with the rebels. In April 1938, Governor Mezzetti led a force
of fifty battalions — the equivalent of two army corps — into Gojam. Two powerful
groups operated between Bahir Dar and Debre Markos, seeking to trap the rebels between
them. However, Mezzetti’s massive army was ponderous; it marched in a long column,
with a van and rearguard of three battalions each, deployed in a line one kilometre wide.
According to Pierelli, whose unit participated in the operation, this formation — which
had worked splendidly for Mezzetti a decade earlier in Libya — proved unwieldy in the
rough Gojam region. Moreover, the tractors [caterpillar] loaded with supplies at the
centre of the column could not exceed a maximum speed of three kilometres per hour in
open country and subjected the force to significant delays when traversing mountain
paths. The column advanced never made contact with the enemy, which fled the area.
After this failure, a frustrated Mezzetti broke up his army into smaller groups to punish
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nearby villages, burning huts, taking livestock, and killing any able-bodied men they
came across.217
Italian commanders also were hindered by the steady erosion of their colonial
units through attrition. The quality of colonial battalions diminished over time, with the
recruitment and hasty training of new units and reinforcements throughout the empire.
Between 1935 and 1941, half of the eligible male population in Eritrea served as
askari.218 Italian authorities had to find recruits in the newly occupied territories as well.
Nasi was not impressed by the Oromo units he recruited in Harar. He claimed that “the
deficient warlike qualities of the race,” along with their limited intelligence and
“brigands’ instinct” made them difficult to train.219 When the 70th Colonial Battalion
suffered a significant defeat to the forces of Belay Zeleke in 1939, the commander of
troops in Amhara, Quirino Armellini, pointed his finger at the lack of preparation of the
unit’s multiethnic askari.
The battalion suffered from — it must be said — its shameful origins (it was
hastily established in Addis Ababa with — one could say — street urchins [gente
per la strada]); from having been closed up for about a year in the fortress of
Martula Maryam and from having been kept equally immobile in the garrison of
Debre Werk.
Armellini added that the newly appointed Amhara non-commissioned officers [graduati]
lacked authority over their heterogeneous unit which, as a whole, lacked discipline and
training. He warned that other units in Amhara suffered from the same limitations.220
Failures like those that befell the troops of Mezzetti and Armellini in 1938 and
1939, whether they involved the defeat of Italian forces in battle or simply the inability to
locate and dispatch rebel formations, dealt serious blows to the credibility of Italian
promises of protection for local populations. Furthermore, the inability of Italian forces to
avoid collateral damage in the midst of operations lessened Ethiopian faith in the
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government. Collateral damage was not only the result of Italian reprisals and
indiscipline; it also stemmed from the army’s unwillingness to fully adjust its techniques
and weaponry for counterguerrilla warfare. Although the askari provided a reasonably
specialized arm for light operations that in theory did not necessitate the destruction of
settlements and private property, the Italians continued to rely upon heavy weaponry in
concert with their colonial battalions.221 Italian commanders valued destructive
technologies — including artillery, aviation, and poison gas — as a means of
demonstrating prestige and superiority while reducing their own casualties.
Conditions prevented the Italians from making much use of armoured vehicles in
Ethiopia. The disaster that befell an armoured column at Dembeguina Pass in December
1935, when Ethiopian infantry trapped and destroyed six CV 35 tanks in a defile,
demonstrated the limitations of armour in rough terrain.222 The CV 35 lacked the range to
be used in major operations and the Italians did not have enough heavy trucks to transport
them. The armoured cars that the Italians fielded lacked sufficient protection for their
crews even against rifle shots, and rebels soon learned to render them immobile by
aiming for their engines.223 Due to these limitations, the Italians restricted the use of their
limited armour to patrol duty along major communications lines.224
On the other hand, most Italian commanders made ample use of artillery wherever
and whenever they could. Colonial artillery tended to be packed on mules [someggiata]
for ease of transport even on mountain paths. Italian commands attached 65-mm or 75mm howitzers and 81-mm mortars to their mobile columns as needed. Most column
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commanders relied on artillery to soften up rebel positions and reduce the casualties
suffered by their men. Once they established contact with the enemy, they would wait to
deploy their artillery and establish a base of fire, often giving time for the rebels to
escape.225 Giuseppe Pirzio Biroli lamented the tendency of Italian officers to resort too
quickly to the use of artillery. Too often, sporadic enemy fire was followed by “a
disproportionate reaction with the inopportune use of artillery that frightened the
populations.” These heavy-handed tactics gave villagers caught up in operations little
option but to flee their homes in fear. This was a counterproductive by-product of
considering colonial police operations to be “true and proper operations of war” in which
commanders sought “combat” and “conquest” as if involved in a conventional conflict.226
Although the Italian air force repatriated many of its units after the conquest of
Addis Ababa, by 1940 the viceroy still had 320 aircraft at his disposal in East Africa.227
Italian commanders made use of aviation in a number of ways. Aircraft dropped
propaganda leaflets to indigenous populations as well as supplies to distant columns and
isolated garrisons, in the process helping to raise the morale of the beleaguered troops.
They also provided Italian columns with fire support through bombing or strafing.228
Because it was difficult to locate guerrillas, the air force focused its bombing on villages
where informants had signalled the presence of rebels.229 After-action reports from
operations in Lasta in 1936 reveal that “rebel villages were methodically destroyed” by
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Italian aircraft.230 Graziani’s orders for operations in Shewa in 1937 called upon the air
force “to conduct systematic work for the destruction of inhabited centres, rebels, [and]
populations that until now have not submitted.”231
Aerial action went hand-in-hand with Italian repression and terror. When
informants reported that rebel propaganda was stirring up the population in parts of
Gojam, Pirzio Biroli immediately ordered “aerial activity in grand style” to ward off
revolt.
Need to bomb and burn all above-named centres not sparing the churches or
livestock. The lesson must be firm, severe, [and] devastating, to give a tangible
demonstration of our superiority and strength to the populations. The same action
should be repeated on the 17th and 18th, because only in this way, in this
moment, can the future of Gojam turn decisively in our favour.
Given that the population had not yet actually risen in revolt, this response was
disproportionate.232 Aircrew reported that most villagers managed to flee and take cover
in nearby woods, so they targeted huts and livestock with fragmentation and incendiary
bombs.233 With apparent relish, Pirzio Biroli noted that the “[dry] season is propitious for
the spread of fires and the lesson will be very effective.” The Governor of Amhara
deemed the operation a success when villagers began to seek out Italian commanders and
beg them for the bombing to stop.234
Clearly, there was little effort or desire to avoid collateral damage in these
operations. Indeed, incidents of friendly fire were not uncommon. Formento’s own
irregular band came under aerial bombardment on several occasions as the air force
“bombed and burned some defenceless villages, [and] enthusiastically machine-gunned

230

“Relazione sul concorso dell’aviazione alle operazioni di polizia coloniale compiute, dalle truppe del
Governo Amara, nel periodo agosto-dicembre 1936,” 23 March 1937, AUSSME, D-6, vol. 172.
231

Graziani to Maletti, 7 April 1937, ACS, FG, b. 29, fasc. 29, sf. 33c. In the draft manuscript for his work
on “Il secondo anno dell’Impero,” Graziani crossed out the word “destruction” and replaced it with
“subjugation.”
232

Pirzio Biroli to Graziani, 15 November 1937, ACS, FG, b. 27, fasc. 29, sf. 33a.

233

“Bombardamento territori del Goggiam Meridionale” and “Bombardamento Goggiam Meridionale,” 16
and 18 November 1937, ACS, FG, b. 27, fasc. 29, sf. 33a.
234

Pirzio Biroli to Graziani, 27 October and 25 November 1937, ACS, FG, b. 27, fasc. 29, sf. 33a.

210

throngs of innocent fleeing peasants and herds of terrorized cattle.”235 Italian
commanders continued to rely upon bombing up to the Second World War, convinced
that aerial bombardments “had strong moral repercussions on populations.”236 During the
first four months of 1940, including the truce with and operations against Abebe Aregai,
the Italian air force flew 229 sorties in Ethiopia, dropping 124,898 kilograms of bombs
and firing 9,750 rounds of machinegun ammunition.237
The air force also provided the means of delivery for chemical weapons. The
Italians made widespread use of poison gas against rebels and indigenous populations
well after the fall of Addis Ababa. Although the use of gas was restricted by the 1925
Geneva Protocol, which Italy had signed, Mussolini authorized its use during the invasion
of Ethiopia and immediately thereafter against “rebels.”238 The chemical weapon used
most frequently during the occupation was the C 500-T bomb. It weighed 280 kilograms,
of which 212 kilograms was mustard gas [iprite]. The air force timed the bomb to
explode 250 metres above the ground, thereby spreading its contents in an elliptical area
500 to 800 metres long and 100 to 200 metres wide, depending on the wind. The
corrosive liquid produced lethal vapours and could penetrate the skin to produce internal
lesions which could result in death days later. Furthermore, it was long-lasting, rendering
the ground impassable for several days.239
These characteristics prevented Italian commanders from employing gas in close
proximity to their own units. They tried, not always effectively, to use mustard gas to
hem rebels in and prevent their escape across affected areas.240 Because gas covered such

235
236
237
238

Formento, Kai Bandera, 21, 29. For a similar experience, see Pierelli, Le mie tre guerre, 2:353.
Felsani to Graziani, 19 September 1937, ACS, FG, b. 27, fasc. 29, sf. 33a.
ASMAE, MAI, pos. 181/47, fasc. 223, “Relazioni militari del G. G. 1939–1940.”
Rochat, Il colonialismo italiano, 168–70.

239

Giorgio Rochat, “L’impiego dei gas nella guerra d’Etiopia 1935–1936,” in I gas di Mussolini: Il
fascismo e la guerra d’Etiopia, ed. Angelo Del Boca (Rome: Editori riuniti, 1996), 63–64. Giorgio Rochat,
“The Italian Air Force in the Ethiopian War (1935–1936),” in Ben-Ghiat and Fuller, Italian Colonialism,
41–42.
240

Nasi reported, perhaps with some astonishment, that the guerrilla leader Fitawrari Bahade managed to
escape with six-hundred men across an area covered with mustard gas [zona ipritata]. Nasi to Graziani, 16
November 1936, AUSSME, D-6, vol. 169.

211

a large area and was difficult to control, it lent itself naturally to collateral damage, but
commanders like Pirzio Biroli did not care. His operations in Lasta against Wondosson
Kassa employed “asphyxiating gas of all types in areas where it is presumed that
Wondosson has recruited men, without distinction between subjects and non-subjects.”241
Most Italian documentation is not so forthcoming, as army commanders maintained a
general attitude of secrecy about the use of gas. The reports from the punitive operation
that followed the murder of the Italian surveyor Castagna in October 1938 are revealing.
The viceroy ordered an immediate “aerial bombardment” followed by a ground attack by
seven colonial battalions. However, the after-action reports reveal that the mopping-up
operation was delayed for two weeks while the Italians waited for the “toxic effects” of
the “bombardment” to dissipate.242 Through 1938, any aerial bombardment potentially
could have involved the use of gas. The war diaries of Italian air force squadrons record
with some consistency the deployment of bombs loaded with mustard gas or, less
frequently, phosgene gas. According to this data, Graziani employed chemical weapons
by average on a weekly basis. Conversely, the Duke of Aosta significantly restricted their
use and ended it completely after the repatriation of Cavallero.243
Italy’s massive use of poison gas in Ethiopia must be understood within the
context of Fascism’s obsession with “modernity” and “totalitarian tactics.”244 Mussolini’s
personal role advocating and permitting the employment of chemical weapons
demonstrates its importance to the regime. The generals that employed these weapons
were driven by a connected but distinctly military logic that they shared with other
European military cultures. The previous decade, Spanish aircraft in Morocco had
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deployed prodigious amounts of mustard gas.245 As Giulia Brogini Künzi has argued, the
use of gas and large-scale bombing during the invasion of 1935–36 conformed “to the
futuristic vision laid out in Europe’s military academies, military journals, and general
staffs” that was intended to avoid stalemate and produce shorter wars. It also conformed
to a colonial doctrine that relied heavily on violence and moral factors.246 Italian generals
continued to employ gas after the conquest for the same reasons that they relied so
heavily on conventional bombing and artillery: these weapons helped reduce their own
casualties while demonstrating Italian military might and prestige in the bluntest of terms.

Irregular Forces
Alongside employing heavy weapons, the Italians recruited large numbers of irregular
bands [bande] to help reduce their own casualty rates and to make up for deficiencies in
manpower to police the new empire. Italian officers harboured reservations over their
recruitment, subscribing to the general axiom that irregular forces could be relied upon in
times of success, but were best done without under more difficult circumstances.247
Experience in Cyrenaica, where locally recruited bands frequently provided insurgents
with arms and intelligence, prompted Italian generals to rely on Eritrean battalions.248
Nevertheless, as conditions in Ethiopia grew more difficult, Italian commanders accepted
irregulars as a necessary evil, to be used for lesser tasks.249 Throughout the occupation,
Italian authorities constantly struggled to balance the need for boots on the ground with
the counterproductive effects of ineffective, unreliable, or undisciplined militia.
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The Italians employed different types of bands in their service. Residential bands
provided permanent service as garrisons. In theory, local auxiliaries were well-suited to
this defensive role. They were less expensive to maintain than regular troops and their
local knowledge helped to gather intelligence and target insurgent infrastructure. Their
presence offered protection to villages and helped isolate guerrillas from the
population.250 However, these benefits became nullified if irregular troops were not
strong enough to fend off local insurgents. Hastily recruited and trained, residential bands
did not earn a strong reputation among Italian officials.251 In September 1937, Ciro
Poggiali recorded his conversation with an “intelligent functionary” who pointed out that
the Italian administration now had established more than one thousand residencies and
vice-residencies in East Africa, each with a band of one hundred men.
But which men? Not warriors, who led by good officers could give excellent
protection to our rule and prestige. But for it [we have] more shepherds, peasants,
unemployed beggars, who enlist in the bands for the glory of carrying a rifle,
which in Abyssinia means rising many ranks in the estimation of the masses.252
The following month, one such band in Amhara broke up and dispersed in the midst of
battle after its commanding officer, an Italian lieutenant serving as vice-resident, was
wounded.253 Despite setbacks like this, manpower shortages compelled the governors of
Amhara to recruit and arm more civilians for local defence. Many of the weapons that
Italian authorities doled out eventually found their way into rebel hands, either through
defeats in battle or the desertion of disloyal units.254
In addition to residential bands, the Italians incorporated some bands of former
rases — largely made up of Amhara warriors — into their order of battle. These units
came with a level of esprit de corps and cohesion that enabled their employment as askari
in operations. However, these same traits made them unreliable from the Italian point of
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view, especially with the regions of Amhara and Shewa in revolt. The Italians allowed a
group of bands under Ras Hailu to operate together until 1937, when they determined that
the ras no longer could be trusted. After this, they parcelled the bands out to garrison
distant locales and reinforce mobile columns throughout Shewa and Amhara.255 Ettore
Formento, the commander of one of these bands, admitted that they had a tendency to
switch sides.
Many irregular bands in our pay were made up of former neftegna [Amhara
soldiers sent to garrison non-Amhara territories of the Abyssinian empire] that
likewise provided the backbone of the rebel formations, with the result that there
was always the possibility of dangerous exchanges and arrangements. In fact it
happened on more than one occasion that a few bands made up exclusively of
neftegna rebelled, butchering the officers.256
Italian authorities tried to guarantee the loyalty of permanent bands by paying them well.
By 1940, they cost the Italian government six million lire per month to maintain.
Although Nasi wanted to disband them, he ultimately kept them in Italian pay, hoping
that it would keep them from joining the partisans en masse.257
Finally, the Italians recruited temporary bands, usually to carry out tasks of basic
policing and patrolling or to provide reconnaissance and act as screens for mobile
columns. These tasks brought them into contact with populations — often of different
ethnicities, in accordance with the Italian strategy of “divide and conquer” — and
involved them in the process of reprisals.258 The makeup of temporary bands ran the
gamut from hardened warriors to green villagers. Their equipment also varied. With
captured Austrian stock running low, Italian authorities sometimes could only provide
bands with obsolete Model 1870/87 Vetterlis. In other cases, they simply carried
spears.259 Colonel Uberto Raugei, who commanded a column made up of Oromo bands
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in Lasta in 1937, concluded that his men were brave fighters but poor shots, prone to
desertion or looting, and had a tendency not to obey their leaders.260 As an officer in a
regular battalion, Walter Pierelli held these types of bands with disdain: they “operated
according to Abyssinian methods and even if they were supposed to be structured into
platoons and squads, you could not tell because they always marched like a flock of
sheep.”261 By 1939, Quirino Armellini concluded that irregular bands of armed villagers
were almost worthless in combat and, although he acknowledged the administration’s
shortage of personnel, he recommended that such bands be abolished.262
In areas with strong insurgent movements, then, irregular bands failed to provide
a reliable means of security for the Italian administration. Equally damaging to the Italian
occupation was the lack of discipline among irregular units. In counterinsurgency, the
ability to monitor auxiliary forces and curtail counterproductive looting or random
violence is vital.263 However, Italian authorities failed to impose strict control over their
irregulars in Ethiopia. Sometimes, bands were led by local chiefs and left to their own
devices.264 Even if an Italian officer was present, this did not guarantee a satisfactory
level of command and control. Formento was a twenty-five-year-old second lieutenant
when he took command of an irregular band of five-hundred Amhara and Tegrayan
warriors with its own internal hierarchy. This left Formento — the only officer in the
unit, with an Eritrean as his interpreter and an Amhara noble for a deputy — isolated.
We officers did not know our men, their customs, their mentality; the Eritrean
learned in the colonial battalions did not help, of the Amharic tongue we knew
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only a few words gleaned from nocturnal contacts with local women [donne del
posto] and... not all useable.
Formento feared that if he did not make a good first impression, his men simply would
desert.265
Doubts over the loyalty of their men prompted Italian commanders of irregular
units to tolerate looting and pillaging to a greater degree than in regular colonial
battalions. They considered such behaviour to be an unchangeable characteristic of the
African race. According to Anselmi, who served as the medical officer for an irregular
band in 1937, looting was “typical of irregular formations, to whom were conceded
privileges that were not codified but tacitly were accepted by commands.” In lieu of fixed
economic compensation and rations, the government tolerated their “ancestral tradition of
plunder” [razzia].266 Nor did Anselmi believe that Italian commands could prevent the
burning of villages, an unfortunate and “harsh law of war in the bush” [boscaglia].267
More senior commanders, like Colonel Raugei, held similar views when summing up the
traits of the typical Oromo [Galla] irregular.
He is by nature greedy and selfish and to satisfy this thirst, he is inimitable: he
walks day and night in search of villages to pillage, [and] people to decapitate and
castrate. [...] Once he has satisfied his instinctive thirst for plunder, he no longer
wants to fight and he defends only all that which he stole. [...] The Galla answers
only when he has the safety and freedom to plunder, if this is not conceded no one
would answer to the chitet [the traditional call to arms throughout the Horn of
Africa], or answering, would defect en masse the same day.268
Italian commands understood that irregular forces were prone to inflict collateral damage,
but they made little effort to restrain their men. Although they brushed aside violent
excesses as a natural part of warfare in East Africa, this behaviour further gave the lie to
Italian claims of bringing a more just and civilized administration to Ethiopia.
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Italian counterinsurgency policy in Ethiopia made virtually no effort towards winning
over the hearts-and-minds of the local populations. Rather, Italian authorities and field
commanders easily conformed to Fascist precepts of imposing dominance by force and
terror. Insurgents and those deemed guilty of assisting them as a rule were shot out of
hand before any amnesty could be applied. In identifying the causes of rebellion and the
mentality of the insurgents, Italian generals frequently reflected the same cultural and
racial biases evident in Fascist propaganda. Poor intelligence impeded the effectiveness
of the army’s propaganda among the occupied populations, propaganda based primarily
on the threat and display of force. Repression fell indiscriminately on non-combatants,
the result of reprisal policies, heavy-handed tactics, and undisciplined or frustrated
troops. Despite making good use of colonial light infantry against guerrillas, the
continued reliance on overwhelming firepower, including the use of poison gas, proved
ineffective and made it difficult to avoid collateral damage against civilians. Irregular
forces recruited by Italian authorities were equally inefficient and undisciplined.
Frustrated by guerrilla warfare, Italian forces committed apparently arbitrary acts of
violence which often went unpunished or condoned by the military leadership.
Italian counterinsurgency was a failure and the Fascist leadership recognized it as
such. The uncompromising practice of shooting rebels and brigands captured in combat
tended to make even demoralized and defeated partisans less willing to surrender.269
Italian columns inflicted heavy losses on insurgents, but guerrilla activity and popular
rebellions continued to surface. Authorities in Rome repudiated Graziani, not only for his
indigenous policy and treatment of elites but for his reliance on force and application of
terror.270 The Duke of Aosta made fundamental changes to many aspects of Italian
military policy — he ended the arbitrary targeting of civilians; he restricted the scope of
operations and reprisals; he offered clemency to rebels and tried to negotiate with their
leaders; he acknowledged the grievances of the indigenous populations and sought to win
them over through appeals to reason; he ended the indiscriminate use of chemical
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weapons. However, the policies of the new viceroy did not meet with resounding success.
Italian military authorities never found a viable alternative to the harsh measures of 1936
and 1937, which had come to them so instinctively, based as they were on previous
practice and upon commonly held racist assumptions of the mentality and value of life in
Africa. By 1940, there was little indication that the Duke of Aosta had transformed Italian
colonial or military culture. In many respects, Graziani’s methods prevailed.
Despite their rank and pre-eminence, figures like the Duke of Aosta, Guglielmo
Nasi, and Luigi Frusci had difficulty changing the general attitudes of Italian officers in
East Africa. They constantly had to harangue junior and senior officers on the need for
moderation, but many of these continued to take the all-or-nothing approach to
pacification that they had embarked upon in 1936 and 1937. The commanders that
adopted more nuanced approaches towards indigenous populations struggled against a
military culture that tended towards extremes, at least in the case of colonial revolt or
guerrilla insurgency. For most colonial military officials, natives either were loyal
subjects or irrevocable insurgents; there was no middle ground. Taking command of the
“Eastern Theatre” after the outbreak of war with Britain and France in 1940, Nasi
imparted directives demanding greater “tolerance” towards suspect populations, seeking
to reform internal dissidents through “persuasion” rather than “compulsion.”271 This was
another case of too little, too late.
The Second World War underlined the failure of Italian counterinsurgency in East
Africa. In April 1940, Pietro Badoglio warned Mussolini that the offensive operations
planned for the theatre likely would not be possible due to the unfavourable internal
situation. As far as the Chief of the Italian General Staff was concerned, Ethiopia
remained in a state of “emergency” [di urgenza], with “internal pacification” demanding
the attention of all the forces of the empire.272 While Harar remained calm after six
months of war against Britain, Italian control in Amhara had weakened.273 After the war,
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the former commander of troops in Amhara, General Martini, attributed the Italian defeat
in large part to the “unhappy” internal situation in Amhara. This, in turn, he deemed the
result of a simple-minded population but also of “crude” administrative policies and
counterproductive reprisals carried out by junior officers. Initial Italian successes
maintained relative calm until November 1940, when the British broke through Italian
defences at Gallabat. After that point, previously loyal chiefs began to join the rebels
who, supplied by the British, were able to mine roads in the Italian rear. Rebellion spread
in 1941 and Martini criticized the viceroy’s decision to continue supplying local
populations with arms that largely went straight into rebel hands. Rebellion in Gojam
became so severe that the Italians abandoned it altogether in February 1941.274
Besieged in the mountain stronghold of Amba Alagi, the Duke of Aosta refused
the offers of the Ethiopian Ras Seyum to negotiate, claiming haughtily that “a prince of
the House of Savoy does not treat with a traitor.”275 Ironically — now that Italian forces
found themselves confronted by Commonwealth forces superior in armour, artillery,
motor transport, and aircraft — Amedeo called for the adoption of something resembling
guerrilla warfare. He urged his remaining commanders to form bands of soldiers and
loyal civilians “for attacking by surprise when stronger, avoiding combat when weaker
with a single purpose: to be present and active until the end of the war” so that Italy
might retain its imperial claims.276 The Duke of Aosta surrendered to the British in May
1941. Nasi followed suit in November, signalling the end of Italy’s East African empire.

274

“La guerra nell’Amara dal 10 giugno 1940 al 4 febbraio 1941,” 15 June 1950, AUSSME, L-13, b. 159,
fasc. 6.
275
276

Berretta, Amedeo d’Aosta, 152.

“Situazione dell’Impero,” 14 February 1941, DSCS, 3/II:191–94. Although their strategic impact on
the war was negligible, some of the bands remained active into 1943. On the Italian guerrilla movement in
East Africa, see Alberto Rosselli, Storie segrete: Operazioni sconosciute o dimenticate della seconda
guerra mondiale (Pavia: Iuculano, 2007). For a popular biography on one of the more colourful Italian
officers that waged guerrilla warfare against the British in East Africa, see Sebastian O’Kelly, Amedeo: The
True Story of an Italian’s War in Abyssinia (London: Harper Collins, 2002).

220

PART II. EUROPEAN EMPIRE: YUGOSLAVIA

Figure 2. Western Yugoslavia, 1941 (Occupation Zones)
Source: Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder: The Second World War in
Yugoslavia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), xvii.
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4

Between Allies and Empire

While the Duke of Aosta held on at Amba Alagi, Mussolini carved out a new Fascist
empire in Europe. After a year of war that had seen few Italian territorial gains — limited
to a small strip of land along Italy’s western border with France — Axis victories over
Greece and Yugoslavia in April 1941 expanded exponentially the amount of foreign soil
under Italian occupation. The Regio Esercito now found itself responsible for maintaining
security throughout most of Greece, an enlarged Albania, Montenegro, Herzegovina,
western Bosnia, Dalmatia, western Croatia, and half of Slovenia. Although Italy directly
annexed only small parts of these territories during the war, all of them formed part of
Fascism’s vaguely defined spazio vitale or Imperial Community.1 Italian generals once
again were thrust to the forefront of Mussolini’s imperial policy.
Many of the experienced colonial officers — including Gallina, Tosti, Galliani,
Lorenzini, Raugei, and Nasi — remained in Africa to be killed or captured by
Commonwealth forces. Nevertheless, some generals who had previously held important
positions in East Africa received commands in the Balkans. The supreme Italian
commander in Greece was Carlo Geloso, the former Governor of Galla Sidamo. In
Montenegro, Alessandro Pirzio Biroli, the once disgraced Governor of Amhara, exercised
military and civil powers. Initially, military authority in Dalmatia was assigned to Renzo
Dalmazzo, who had commanded a brigade in Pirzio Biroli’s Eritrean Corps during the
conquest of Ethiopia. In 1942, he was joined by Quirino Armellini, former commander of
troops in Amhara. Ugo Cavallero, Graziani’s immediate replacement as military
commander in East Africa, now presided over the Comando Supremo in Rome.2 These
men, appointed solely on the basis of seniority, brought their recent experience of
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imperial administration and colonial warfare to their new assignments.3 Continuity
between the Ethiopian and Balkan campaigns was personal as well as institutional.
The Italian Second Army took part in the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia in April
1941, launching an offensive from northeastern Italy. In the following months, the
formation was transformed into an army of occupation, losing most of its motorized units
and much of its artillery. However, the army and corps commanders remained with their
staffs to oversee the occupation of western Yugoslavia. Through 1941, Mario Robotti’s
XI Corps established itself in Slovenia; the V Corps under Riccardo Balocco occupied
northern Croatia; Dalmazzo’s VI Corps held Dalmatia and parts of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The three corps commanders answered to Vittorio Ambrosio, who directed
Second Army out of Sušak, on the outskirts of Fiume [Rijeka].4 Of the former territories
of Yugoslavia under Italian occupation, only Montenegro and the lands appended to
Albania remained outside the purview of Second Army.5 In January 1942, Ambrosio
switched places with Mario Roatta as Chief of the Army General Staff [Stato Maggiore
del Regio Esercito, or SMRE]. The following month, Roatta was joined by Quirino
Armellini, whose XVIII Corps was slotted between the V and VI Corps in Dalmatia. In
May 1942, Second Army was officially renamed the Comando Superiore Forze Armate
di Slovenia e Dalmazia [Supersloda].6 With upwards of 200,000 men at their disposal, the
commanders of Second Army were responsible for defending the new territories annexed
by Italy in Slovenia and Dalmatia, as well as maintaining security along the Adriatic
coastline, including parts of the nominally Independent State of Croatia.
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In some respects, the generals of Second Army enjoyed greater independence of
command than had their colleagues in East Africa. They did not take orders from a
colonial ministry or other civilian body, but instead reported up the traditional military
hierarchy. In 1941 and 1943, Second Army answered to the SMRE. In 1942, it came
under the direct supervision of Cavallero’s Comando Supremo.7 The latter arrangement
theoretically enabled Mussolini to exercise tight control over occupation policy, since
Cavallero answered directly to the Duce. However, in practice, Mussolini remained
disinterested in the mundane tasks of imperial administration, especially while
conventional warfare raged on in other theatres. The lack of clear direction from
Mussolini’s office gave the army something of a free hand in occupied Yugoslavia, but
its authority was not unlimited. Italian generals had to work alongside civilian Fascist
administrators as well as allied Croatian and German officials. These ill-defined and
challenging relationships governed the political dimension of Second Army’s activity in
the Balkans. Politics, lamented an Italian staff officer after the war, always remained the
central “problem” for the army. Military concerns were of secondary importance. 8
This chapter examines how Italian military authorities responded to two
overarching political conditions. The first of these conditions was the incorporation of the
Province of Ljubljana and the Governorate of Dalmatia into the Kingdom of Italy. Their
annexation came as the result of Mussolini’s imperial ambitions and impatient
opportunism. The decision was unpopular with the majority of the local populations and
hindered the development of an effective counterinsurgency strategy. It also brought the
army into conflict with the civil authorities tasked with Italianizing and Fascistizing the
new provinces. Initially, Second Army’s responsibilities were supposedly limited to
securing the borders against external threats. This provided the basis for jurisdictional
disputes once it became clear that local police could not guarantee the internal security of
the new provinces.
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The second condition was the presence of foreign allied powers in the theatre.
Italian officials could not ignore the interests of their Axis partners, given Germany’s role
in defeating the Yugoslavian armed forces in 1941 and the need thereafter to coordinate
the counterinsurgency efforts of Axis armies in southeastern Europe. Italian generals
became involved in a struggle against Germany for hegemony in the Balkans, but they
sometimes disagreed with Fascist diplomats as how best to protect and expand Italy’s
sphere of interest. Second Army’s concern over German interference was surpassed only
by its contempt for the government and armed forces of the Independent State of Croatia.
Established as an Axis puppet state, the Ustaša regime further destabilized the situation in
Yugoslavia and fed insurgency, while providing another jurisdictional labyrinth that
Italian authorities had to navigate after occupying half of the country. In addition,
coalition relations were at the heart of the Italian army’s two most controversial policies
in Yugoslavia: its support of the Serb Četnik movement and its protection of Jewish
refugees in the midst of Nazi-Ustaša genocide.
The pressures of empire-building on one hand and coalition relations on the other
turned Italian generals once again into politicians and diplomats. Despite the ongoing
conflict against the Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, the United States, and
Yugoslavian Partisans — as well as Fascist Italy’s increasing reliance on and
subordination to Nazi Germany — the commanders of Second Army did not adopt a
narrow military approach to their task. They operated as functionaries of empire in their
own right, generally working to expand Italy’s political influence and control. Their
clashes with Fascist civil authorities and their German and Croatian allies typified the
jurisdictional chaos of Europe under Axis administration. Politically, the generals of
Second Army remained loyal, and occasionally effective, functionaries of the Fascist
regime.

Fascism’s Adriatic Empire
The war against Yugoslavia and the subsequent occupation of the country by Axis forces
in 1941 came about unexpectedly. As late as 15 March, Mussolini had told his generals
not to take additional security measures along the Albanian-Yugoslavian frontier, since
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he anticipated that Yugoslavia ultimately would join the Axis.9 Indeed, preparing to bail
out their Italian allies in Greece and seeking to shore up their southern flank in
preparation for the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Germans convinced the Yugoslavian
government to join the Tripartite on 25 March.10 When a group of Serb officers
orchestrated a pro-Allied coup in Belgrade on the 27th, the Germans and Italians had to
draw up invasion plans overnight. The resulting offensive mirrored the Wehrmacht’s
successful campaigns in Poland, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France.11 Due to
the unanticipated timing of the invasion, the speed of its success, and the decisive role
played by Germany towards that success, Italy was unprepared for the reorganization of
territory that followed. Nonetheless, Mussolini’s immediate political need to claim a
victory for the Fascist regime through territorial annexation, partition, and occupation
resulted in imperial expansion across the Adriatic.12
Despite the improvised nature of the territorial settlement in Yugoslavia,
Mussolini’s expansionist aims in the country did not come as a surprise to the Italian
military leadership. The partition of Yugoslavia was one of Mussolini’s central foreign
policy objectives well before the invasion of Ethiopia had reached the planning phase.
Like many Italian nationalists, Mussolini considered the settlement of 1919 a “mutilated
victory,” largely because Italy had failed to gain the territories along the Adriatic that had
been promised by the British and French when it entered the Great War in 1915. After
seizing power, Mussolini adopted a revisionist policy intent on dismantling the new
Yugoslavian state and expanding Italian influence in Southeastern Europe. During the
1920s and early 1930s, he worked to isolate and destabilize Yugoslavia by creating
alliances with its neighbours and supporting extremist movements within the country.
9
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While these initiatives failed to bear fruit, the Italian armed forces focused most of their
military planning on a prospective land war against Yugoslavia.13
With the shift of emphasis towards African expansion in the mid-1930s, the
Fascist regime adopted more peaceful means towards achieving Balkan hegemony,
culminating in a treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia in 1937.14 However, the removal of
pro-Italian and quasi-fascist Milan Stojadinović as Prime Minister of Yugoslavia in
February 1939, followed shortly thereafter by Hitler’s partition of Czechoslovakia, the
Italian occupation of Albania, and the signing of the Pact of Steel caused ItaloYugoslavian relations to deteriorate once again. While working to draw Yugoslavia into
the orbit of the Axis on one hand, Ciano maintained contacts with separatist movements
in Croatia. At Mussolini’s behest, he promised military assistance in the event of an
insurrection. The price for such assistance would be the establishment of an Italian
protectorate over Croatia. Based on the Albanian model, Italy would maintain troops and
a lieutenant governor in the new Croatian state. By the end of May, Mussolini was
fixated, in Ciano’s words, on “breaking up Yugoslavia and annexing [annettere] the
Kingdom of Croatia.”15
Although the Croats balked at the one-sided Italian offer, Mussolini continued to
muse about potential Balkan conquests. In mid-August, aware of Hitler’s plans to invade
Poland, Mussolini saw an opportunity to claim “his share of the booty in Croatia and
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Dalmatia.” He ordered the armed forces to prepare attacks against both Yugoslavia and
Greece. An army under Graziani was kept at the ready to invade Yugoslavia while the
Foreign Ministry worked to mobilize radical Croats inside the country. Mussolini only
rescinded his offensive plans at the end of the month when he acknowledged the army’s
unreadiness for war, the weakness of his potential Hungarian and Bulgarian allies, the
unreliability of German aid, and the likelihood of conflict with Britain and France.16
Nonetheless, by the beginning of 1940, Mussolini and Ciano once again were scheming
about intervention in Yugoslavia to establish a large Croatian state in a personal and
customs union with Italy.17 Following Germany’s invasion of Norway, Mussolini
believed he could take advantage of the chaos by attacking Yugoslavia.18 By the summer,
with Italy now engaged in war against Great Britain, invasion plans had reached an
advanced stage. However, Hitler — content with a politically “coordinated” Yugoslavia
— insisted that Mussolini leave the Balkans alone for the time being. The failure of the
Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain gave Mussolini the confidence to switch gears and strike
out on his own against Greece, but the disastrous Italian offensive at the end of 1940
forced him to shelve his plans against Yugoslavia indefinitely.19
The timing of the conquest of Yugoslavia was out of Mussolini’s hands, but
Italian military planning and foreign policy during the 1920s and 1930s demonstrates that
the Fascist regime followed a programme for expansion at Yugoslavia’s expense.
Mussolini favoured direct conquest, with the formation of protectorates closely bound to
his regime, over more subtle or patient means of expanding Italian influence in the
region. However, like his Liberal predecessors, Mussolini was limited by the realities of
Italy’s industrial and military might, which relegated the country to playing the role of

16

Ciano diary, 31 May, 13 and 22 August 1939. Gooch, Mussolini and his Generals, 485–87. Mallett,
Mussolini and the Second World War, 205–206. Frank Marzari, “Projects for an Italian-led Balkan Bloc of
Neutrals, September–December 1939,” The Historical Journal 13, no. 4 (1970): 770.
17

Meeting between Ciano and Pavelić, 23 January 1940, DDI 9, III, 194. Ciano diary, 21–22 January
1940.
18
19

Ciano diary, 9 April 1940.

Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 169–70, 177, 193. Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 47.
Anfuso to Ciano, 8 December 1940, DDI 9, VI, 260.

228

“the least of the Great Powers.”20 During the 1920s and 1930s, Italian military strength
was not sufficient to guarantee success in an isolated war against Yugoslavia, let alone in
a conflict that involved stronger allies. Thus, Mussolini’s Balkan policy had to be
opportunistic. On several occasions he came close to launching operations against
Yugoslavia, but favourable circumstances did not coalesce until the coup of March 1941
and the arrival in the theatre of thousands of German troops.
For the same reasons, the army and monarchy did not always greet Mussolini’s
schemes with enthusiasm. Through 1931, Badoglio opposed the Duce’s plans for a twofront war against Yugoslavia and France on the basis that it was suicidal without strong
allies.21 Army Chief of Staff Alberto Pariani viewed the possibility of war against
Yugoslavia in 1939 with greater optimism and he developed detailed plans for an
invasion. However, other Italian generals criticized his lack of realism. After Pariani’s
dismissal in October 1939, Italy’s military leadership adopted a more pessimistic attitude
towards offensive plans against any nation and urged Mussolini not to intervene in
Hitler’s war until the armed forces were properly re-equipped.22 According to Ciano, the
King too was skeptical of Italy’s chances of success for operations in Yugoslavia without
the agreement of Britain and France.23 Since the armed forces had yet to recover from
their expensive campaigns in Ethiopia and Spain, these concerns were justified. Doubts
over the army’s readiness for war, rather than questions of principle, best explain the
military’s less than whole-hearted commitment to war in the Balkans prior to 1941.
Of greater significance was the army’s opposition to the annexation of territory in
the Adriatic after the capitulation of Yugoslavia in April 1941. Roatta, representing the
Army General Staff, favoured a “political solution” and considered “dangerous any
extremist demands regarding Dalmatia.” Similarly, the King opined that annexing
Dalmatia would bring more problems than it was worth. He was more interested in
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Montenegro, the birthplace of his wife.24 In his memoirs, Giacomo Zanussi, a close
collaborator of General Roatta, claimed to have been opposed in principle to Italy’s
mission of expansion in Yugoslavia.25 Roatta’s own postwar account was more revealing.
He at once criticized Mussolini for taking the unpopular step of annexing Dalmatia and
Slovenia, with their primarily Slavic populations, and for acquiring too little territory,
which was impossible to defend.26 Whereas the Italian navy supported a “maximalist”
programme in Dalmatia, in favour of its strategy to dominate the Adriatic Sea, the direct
annexation of territory in the Balkans offered few advantages to the army.27 Institutional
interests played an important role in Roatta’s apparent opposition to the regime’s
expansionist project in Yugoslavia, which he clearly deemed premature. If the army
needed to allocate resources for the occupation of territory in the region, it would have
preferred a straightforward military occupation where the armed forces enjoyed total
authority on an interim basis.
Even so, the army was not wholly opposed to the concept of annexation. The
commander of Second Army, Vittorio Ambrosio, pushed for the annexation of Ragusa
[Dubrovnik].28 At the local level, division commanders like Furio Monticelli
optimistically passed on reports that populations in the Dalmatian hinterland welcomed
annexation to Italy.29 Before any decisions had been announced, Italian military
authorities paved the way for the annexation of Dalmatia by ordering the removal of
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Croatian flags, disbanding Croat militias, and buying off [azione di accaparramento]
local notables in the region.30
In fact, Mussolini agreed with Roatta that he would rather have an independent
Croatia in his political orbit than “a bit more land populated by hostile Croats.” However,
he could not renounce the prestige to be gained through annexation.31 When he entered
the war in 1940, Mussolini had confidently announced that “the New Europe . . . could
not have more than four or five large states” and that the small ones would “have to
disappear,” suggesting that his immediate inclination was towards the direct annexation
of as much territory as possible.32 On top of this, Mussolini and Ciano faced pressure
from a vocal irredentist lobby that demanded the seizure of the entire Croatian
coastline.33 From his discussions with Italian diplomats, the industrialist Alberto Pirelli
ascertained that the regime’s initial intention was to do just that, but that complaints from
Mussolini’s Ustaša allies required an “intermediate solution.”34
The result was a poor compromise. On 3 May, the Italian government announced
the annexation of the Province of Lubiana [Ljubljana] — never an objective of even the
most radical irredentists — mainly in response to the German occupation of northern
Slovenia.35 Then, on 18 May, the Rome Accords formalized relations with the
Independent State of Croatia while a royal decree expanded the borders of the province of
Carnaro [Rijeka] and established the Governorate of Dalmatia, comprising the provinces

30

Arduini to Ciano, 8 May 1941, DDI 9, VII, 73.

31

Ciano diary, 26 April 1941. Mario Dassovich, Fronte jugoslavo 1941–42: Aspetti e momenti della
presenza militare italiana sull’opposta sponda adriatica durante la seconda guerra mondiale (Udine: Del
Bianco, 1999), 8–9. Gobetti, L’occupazione allegra, 45.
32

Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 138.

33

Ciano diary, 24 April and 1 May 1941. For an example, see Dudan to Mussolini, 4 May 1941, DDI 9,
VII, 53. Gobetti emphasizes the difficulty of Ciano’s task “to satisfy the ambitions of various centers of
power.” Gobetti, “The Royal Army’s Betrayal,” 191, 195.
34
35

Pirelli, Taccuini, 298.

Cattaruzza, L’Italia e il confine orientale, 210. Gobetti, Alleati del nemico, 12–13. Marco Cuzzi, “La
Slovenia italiana,” in Caccamo and Monzali, L’occupazione italiana della Iugoslavia, 223–25.

231

of Zara [Zadar], Spalato [Split], and Cattaro [Kotor].36 The amount of territory given to
the Dalmatian provinces was limited and the Independent State of Croatia retained large
stretches of coastline. Civilian functionaries admitted that the new regime imposed on
Dalmatia was marred by “a hasty technical preparation, a lack of expertise, [and] an
amateurish thoughtlessness.”37 Given the circumstances, it is unlikely that Mussolini or
Ciano would have renounced any form of annexation in the region, but their vision for
empire in the Adriatic clearly was malleable.38 Through the partition of Yugoslavia, the
regime sought to balance competing ideological, strategic, economic, political, and
diplomatic interests. Roatta was hardly unique in advising an alternate course of action.

The Imperial Community
During April and May 1941, Fascist propaganda made it clear that annexation was not a
necessary corollary to empire. After 1936, Fascist ideologues had developed new
concepts of empire that went beyond traditional notions of colonial expansionism,
domination, and enslavement. In part, this was intimately connected to the regime’s effort
to relaunch the Fascist revolution during its imperial and racist phase. Theorists eschewed
narrow-minded traditional nationalism in favour of a palingenetic ideology focused on
empire-building. Italians, as bearers of a “New Civilization,” became the focal point of a
new “Imperial Community” in Europe. But the ideological debate — and its European
rather than African focus — also developed in response to the changing balance of power
in Europe and to Italy’s increasingly close and eventually subordinate relationship with
Nazi Germany. The regime needed to adjust its propaganda and ideology to account for
geopolitical transformations that were already under way.39
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Discussion of the concepts of Imperial Community, spazio vitale, and a New
European Order peaked in 1941–42, only after the Axis conquests in the Balkans. Even
then, it remained inchoate and impractical, lacking much direct guidance from Mussolini,
who did not want to commit to any specific programme before the end of the war. In
theory, the Fascist Imperial Community was based on the voluntary gravitation of smaller
satellite nations around greater imperial nations like Italy, which espoused principles of a
superior civilization. In this respect, the concept of a “civilizing mission” became more
central and sincere for Fascism’s European expansion in the 1940s than it had been in
Ethiopia five years earlier. Italian Fascists recognized and emphasized that their notions
of Imperial Community and spazio vitale set them apart from Nazism’s annihilationist
concept of Lebensraum.40 On the other hand, Fascist literature on the Balkans never fully
embraced these new “modern” ideas of empire. Justifying Italy’s role in the region by
invoking the empires of ancient Rome and Renaissance Venice, authors retained an
imperial vision that regarded traditional territorial expansion as legitimate.41
Because the details of how the Imperial Community was supposed to function
continued to be fleshed out through 1943, Fascist ideology provided the field
commanders of Second Army with few precise guidelines to follow. It is not clear how
many Italian generals actually read the books and articles published on the topic during
the war. However, they would have been familiar with the “Albanian model” established
after the occupation of that country in 1939, characterized by a personal union with the
House of Savoy, the export of Fascist institutions, and its protectorate status that
subordinated Albanian national interests to imperial ones. They also knew that the
inclusion of Dalmatia and Slovenia in Italy’s piccolo spazio [small space] through
annexation differentiated those territories from the rest of Croatia, which became a
member of the Imperial Community in Fascism’s grande spazio [large space].42
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The upshot was that Fascism’s vision for empire in the Balkans was not a carbon
copy of its programme in East Africa. Whereas Mussolini had demanded super direct rule
over his African subjects in 1936, Fascist concepts of racial hierarchy allowed for indirect
rule over Slavs.43 Yet, it was undoubtedly clear to the officers of Second Army that their
entire zone of occupation was to be considered part of Fascism’s future empire and living
space, in which Italy alone would be fully sovereign.
The Fascist regime ensured that this much was understood by Italians, even those
who did not follow the leading ideological periodicals. In April 1941, the Minister of
Popular Culture, Alessandro Pavolini, explained his understanding of the Imperial
Community to Italian journalists.
Our mindset, as it relates to that area [Dalmatia], cannot be the same mindset as in
the time of the D’Annunzian enterprise of Fiume […] Our mindset in the Adriatic
is an imperial mindset (infinitely greater than what we had before). Now the
Italian Imperial Community (is a Community that) holds peoples of different
races: as we have received the Albanians so we may tomorrow receive, with
varying measures and intensity of relations, but in a same orbit, Montenegrins and
maybe the Croats themselves, and certainly the Slovenes.44
Leading up to the Treaty of Rome, Pavolini further explained that the limited extent of
territory bequeathed to the Governorate of Dalmatia — and the fact that its borders were
not contiguous — was unimportant because Croatia had become a member of the
Imperial Community. Under an Italian monarch, Croatia would be “closely bound to us”
with “a common foreign policy.” He added that Croatia, “without being in the same
relation to us as an expanded Albania or Montenegro, is a nation tightly connected to
ours. So the Italian citizen who finds himself in Croatia is a citizen that finds himself in a
country belonging to our imperial community.”45 Pavolini’s statements reveal the
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interplay between propaganda, circumstances, and ideology on the formation of Fascist
imperialist thought. The propaganda minister clearly intended to rationalize Italy’s
inability to claim more territory directly after the defeat of Yugoslavia, while drawing
upon existing theories and maintaining continuity with Fascism’s emphasis on reestablishing a Roman Empire.
Both the reorganization of territory in the Balkans and the ideology sustaining it
were the result of hastily conceived compromises between Mussolini’s long-term plans
and the realities that confronted them. The failure of Fascism’s “parallel war” by the end
of 1940 and Mussolini’s subsequent reliance on Hitler meant that Italy lacked complete
freedom of action in its own declared spazio vitale.46 Mussolini could not dictate terms in
Yugoslavia. Settling for less than it had hoped for, the regime justified the new borders
across the Adriatic in terms of an Imperial Community in which newly annexed
provinces as well as semi-autonomous states looked to Rome for guidance and
leadership. However thin this ideological scaffolding might have been, it provided Italian
functionaries — including those of the Regio Esercito — with one basic guiding principle
to work towards: the expansion and protection of Italian influence, power, and prestige in
the name of empire.

Governing the Annexed Territories
The role of Italian military authorities as empire builders in the annexed territories was,
by definition, limited to that of security against external threats. Considerations of
prestige demanded that the formally annexed zones of Dalmatia and Slovenia be
governed by civilian administrators in accordance with the laws of the Kingdom of Italy.
But these officials enjoyed greater authority and autonomy than did prefects in other
Italian provinces. The High Commissioner of the Province of Ljubljana, Emilio Grazioli,
and the Governor of Dalmatia, Giuseppe Bastianini, answered directly to Mussolini —
rather than the Ministry of the Interior — and they ruled by decree.47 To give the outward
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appearance of normalcy, the Fascist regime moved quickly to curtail the powers of army
commanders stationed in the new provinces. Civil authorities quickly took over police
powers, including border control and the surveillance of the population.48
Alongside economic development, the civil authorities in Dalmatia and Slovenia
prioritized the Italianization and Fascistization of the new provinces. The implementation
of these policies, and the army’s contribution to them, differed between the two regions.
Bastianini’s approach in Dalmatia was the most radical and ambitious.49 Within the
Imperial Community, Dalmatia was intended to serve as the economic “outlet” for
Croatia. The regime planned to exploit Dalmatia’s hydroelectric potential, transforming it
into an industrialized hub fed by natural resources from Bosnia.50 Bastianini also hoped
to settle Italian colonists in Dalmatia, both to alleviate Italy’s demographic situation and
to overwhelm the local Slavic populations.51 These grandiose economic and colonial
schemes for Dalmatia would not come to fruition during the Second World War, but
Bastianini’s efforts to forcibly denationalize and Italianize his provinces made an
immediate impact.
Mussolini provided the guidelines for Italianization in a speech on 10 June 1941.
After justifying the regime’s limited annexation of territory in Yugoslavia on the basis
that “states which burden themselves with too many ethnic minorities have a difficult
life,” he used the same criteria to legitimize the denationalization of Slavs caught within
the borders of the new Italian possessions. Ultimately, Mussolini concluded, when ethnic
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lines do not coincide with geographic boundaries, “it is the ethnic group that must
move.”52 Davide Rodogno has argued that Italian civil functionaries in Dalmatia
thereafter zealously worked “towards the Duce,” expelling former Yugoslavian officials
from the civil service, revoking the rights of Slavs to work as professionals, and forcing
courts to adopt the Italian language. Bastianini sought to exclude Slavs from eligibility
for Italian citizenship, while Fascistizing and Italianizing eligible youth by forcing them
to learn Italian and join Fascist organizations.53
Reminiscent of the situation in Ethiopia, the regime lacked the funds and
administrative personnel to successfully implement all of these measures.54 Symbolically,
however, Italianization proceeded rapidly. Slavic place names were replaced with Italian
ones, drawing where possible upon historical Venetian nomenclature. Therefore, Kotor
became Cattaro and Split became Spalato. Biograd reverted to Zaravecchia and Herceg
Novi to Castelnuovo. The village of Plisko Polje on the island of Vis became Pliscopoli
on the island of Lissa.55 At the same time, Italian authorities sought to erase signs of the
Slavic or Habsburg past by banning cultural associations, nationalizing former
Yugoslavian enterprises, and demolishing public monuments.56 The population of Split in
particular was upset by the relocation of the statue of Gregory of Nin, a masterpiece by
the renowned Croat sculptor Ivan Meštrović.57
The policies of forced denationalization and Italianization undoubtedly were the
cause of much popular resentment throughout Dalmatia and especially in Split, Croatia’s
second city. As early as July 1941, military authorities reported on the popular backlash
against the governor’s measures to impose an “Italian character” on the city. Intelligence

52

Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire, 265. OO, XXX, 90–101. Fascist newspapers in Dalmatia
reproduced the text of the speech in full. “Gli accordi per la pace adriatica,” San Marco, 12 June 1941, 2.
53

Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire, 263–72.

54

Gobetti, Alleati del nemico, 17. Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire, 267.

55

“Denominazioni italiane dei comuni e delle frazioni dei territori dalmati annessi al Regno,” 29
September 1941, ACS, MCP-Gab, b. 135, fasc. “Dalmazia.”
56
57

Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire, 268.

“Notiziario informativo n. 40,” 5 November 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 514, DS 22nd “Cacciatori delle
Alpi” Division, November–December 1941, allegati.

237

officers of the VI Corps cautioned against forcing Italianization upon the largely Croat
population.58 Judges in Split openly protested against Bastianini’s orders to pass all
judgements “in the name of H.M. the King and Emperor Vittorio Emanuele III.”59 This
was followed in September by a protest involving two hundred students that refused to
join the GIL [Gioventù Italiana del Littorio, the Fascist youth movement] and wanted to
receive their records [certificati di studio] in Croatian. The Carabinieri broke up the
protest and the recalcitrant students were expelled, but the adult population disapproved
of the arrests made by Italian authorities.60 The following year, the civilian population of
the city almost completely abstained from participating in ceremonies to commemorate
the anniversary of the Italian entry into the city.61
These difficulties were the inevitable result of forcing a nationalist irredentist
policy onto a territory where less than nine percent of the population was Italian. The vast
majority of Italian Dalmatians were concentrated in the city of Zara, which had been
under Italian administration since 1918.62 Two months after the declaration of
annexation, the command of the Sassari Division, operating out of Šibenik, concluded
that “the italianità of Dalmatia is truly felt by few.”63 Military authorities were not alone
in coming to this conclusion. Prior to the Treaty of Rome, the Italian consul in Split,
Luigi Arduini, warned that local officials and the general population considered their city
Croatian. Once it became clear that the Italian government was preparing to annex parts
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of Dalmatia, attitudes in the city became “ambiguous if not really openly hostile.”64 As in
Ethiopia, the hasty annexation and imposition of an Italian administrative apparatus
severely handcuffed the ability of military and political authorities to keep order.
The policy of Italianization in Dalmatia was outside of the army’s jurisdiction.
However, despite concerns that the policy threatened public order, military authorities
were not universally critical of Bastianini’s objectives. Certainly, they had supported
similar measures in the past. In the Venezia Giulia after 1922, military interests had
merged with political, economic, nationalist, and imperialist ones to favour an aggressive
form of “border fascism,” favouring state centralization at the expense of local interests
and the elimination of German and Slavic nationalism in the frontier region.65 Ambrosio
proposed bolstering the level of italianità in Dalmatia by resettling Italian civil servants
of Dalmatian origin in the new provinces.66 Following episodes of urban guerrilla activity
in Split and Šibenik in November 1941, the commander of the Cacciatori delle Alpi
Division, General Angelo Pivano, concluded that “halfway measures could be rather
harmful, in that they could nourish illusions.” Considering the local Slavic populations
already a lost cause, Pivano recommended cultivating enthusiastic support from the
Italian minority through an even more forceful policy of Italianization.67
The army’s obsession with national and institutional prestige also prompted
symbolic acts to support the Italianization and Fascistization of Dalmatia. For example,
military authorities joined government and party officials leaving the Basilica of Trogir
[Traù] in protest when a priest read an epistle in Croatian instead of Latin. It was later
established that the priest had not intended to be inflammatory; the prayer had been read
for years in Croatian, with permission from the Holy See.68 The military also participated

64

Arduini to Ciano, 8 May 1941, DDI 9, VII, 73.

65

Elio Apih, “Fascism in North-Eastern Italy,” trans. R. J. B. Bosworth and G. Cresciani, Altro Polo: A
Volume of Italian Studies (1979): 116.
66

Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire, 274.

67

“Notiziario informativo n. 40,” 5 November 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 514, DS 22nd “Cacciatori delle
Alpi” Division, November–December 1941, allegati.
68

“Notiziario informativo n. 51,” 17 November 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 514, DS 22nd “Cacciatori
delle Alpi” Division, November–December 1941, allegati.

239

in public ceremonies, in which they adopted Fascist symbols and themes with apparent
ideological sincerity. High-ranking representatives of the Army, Navy, and Party
attended the funeral of a soldier killed in one of the guerrilla attacks in November. The
commander of the soldier’s regiment — described as “a true Piedmontese gentleman, tall,
lean, cold, fussy and brave,” the typical career officer — read the “Fascist roll-call”
[appello fascista].69 This was a “particularly fascist ritual” that usually followed the
Catholic mass and concluded with all attendees simultaneously shouting “present,”
symbolizing Fascism’s emphasis on unity and its culture of death. The Italian military
and veterans associations had adopted the appello fascista with relative enthusiasm
during the ventennio.70 In the atmosphere of occupied Dalmatia, these symbolic acts took
on even greater political importance and contributed to the Fascist character of the Italian
occupation.
Compared to Dalmatia, the Fascist regime initially adopted a more moderate
stance towards Slovenia. Mussolini’s 10 June speech offered Slovenes “special
treatment” and “privileges” in return for expectations of absolute loyalty.71 Slovenian
continued to be taught in schools and remained an official language in the civil
administration. Slovene functionaries, including judges and police, remained at their
posts. High Commissioner Grazioli governed in collaboration with a Consulta [council]
that included fourteen Slovene representatives.72 The Province of Ljubljana thus enjoyed
a special autonomous status within the Kingdom of Italy, without forcible Italianization
or Fascistization. Slovenes were exempt from conscription and were not forced to join
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Party organizations, whose membership was mostly limited to Italian citizens who
arrived after occupation.73
The relatively liberal policy implemented in Slovenia in 1941 was made possible
by the regime’s lack of ideological interest in the region. The decision to occupy southern
Slovenia was only prompted by the speedy advance of the Germans during the invasion
of Yugoslavia in April 1941. Fearing the restoration of a “neo-Habsburg” frontier on
Italy’s eastern border, Rome established the Province of Ljubljana as a strategic buffer
zone.74 In addition, the policy corresponded to military intelligence reports that
optimistically highlighted the willingness of Slovenes to collaborate with Italian
authorities. According to SIM [Servizio Informazione Militare, the Italian army’s
intelligence service], the majority of Catholic Slovenes viewed Italy with “sympathy and
a certain inclination,” while fearing annexation by an anti-clerical Germany, whose
occupation policy in northern Slovenia had already proven quite harsh.75 In his diary,
Ciano revealed that Italy’s “liberal treatment” of Slovenia was specifically intended to
contrast Italian and German policies.76 Although the ultra-conservative Bishop Rožman
of Ljubljana immediately pledged loyalty to the new regime, SIM likely overrated the
popularity of the radical Catholic and quasi-fascist groups that offered collaboration in
April and May 1941. Collaboration among Slovenes did not become significant until
1942, in response to Communism rather than identification with their Italian overlords.77
The apparent leniency of the Italians in Slovenia had limits. Ultimately, Grazioli
— a Julian Fascist who had supported the denationalization of Slovene minorities in the
territories added to Italy after the First World War — aimed at the gradual Italianization
of Slovenes. He ensured that the administration, while including local civil servants and
police, was directed solely by Italians. In practice, Grazioli did not use the Slovene
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Consulta, and its members resigned. Disappointed by the outbreak of revolt in June 1941,
Rome began to second-guess its policy for an autonomous Slovenia and Grazioli
accelerated his policies of denationalization.78 Over time, many of the Slovene civil
servants originally retained by the regime were dismissed or pensioned off.79
Italian military authorities proved the least committed to applying a liberal
occupation policy in Slovenia. As revolt grew, the army complained that Grazioli’s
government appeared weak.80 This was the basis of a long running verbal feud between
Grazioli and the commander of the XI Corps in Slovenia, General Mario Robotti. Upset
that the special status of the province effectively subordinated his command to Grazioli’s
office, which employed Italian troops in police operations against rebels, Robotti
demanded autonomous control over repression in Slovenia. When Grazioli proved
incapable of stemming the revolt, Mussolini sided with the army, declaring Slovenia a
war zone on 3 October 1941. In January 1942, the military received full powers over
public order in Slovenia.81
With the army ascendant in Slovenia by 1942, the process of denationalization
and Italianization peaked. Robotti distrusted the Slovenes and, while civil policy
remained the purview of the High Commission, he sought to curtail the political
incentives that had been offered in 1941. He warned that membership in the GIL was
merely a “formal expression” of loyalty not to be taken seriously.82 He complained that
too many Slovenes remained in public offices and that the maintenance of Yugoslavian
legal codes and the Slovenian language in provincial courts rendered judges
untrustworthy.83 Taking his cue from an article in Il Popolo d’Italia on “The
Responsibility of the Slovenes,” Robotti concluded that past treatment had been
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excessively soft, that Slovene leaders had proven unequal to the task of self-government,
and that “we need, therefore, starting now, to think of the totalitarian and deep
Italianization of this province destined to become the eastern bulwark of the peninsula.”
For Robotti, Italianization meant first of all removing elements of the population likely to
adopt an anti-Italian attitude, including the unemployed and university students.84 The
resulting policy of internment, adopted equally by Grazioli and Robotti, proved the most
extreme manifestation of the regime’s denationalization policy in Slovenia.85 Robotti’s
support for Italianization derived primarily from security concerns, his harsh approach to
counterinsurgency, and his racist contempt for Slavs. Nonetheless, by adopting Fascist
rhetoric and citing the semi-official Fascist newspaper for his mandate, Robotti
demonstrated that he also understood his mission in terms of cementing Slovenia’s place
as a metropolitan province within Fascism’s empire.
“Speaking Ill of Garibaldi”
In the annexed territories, the military was not completely free to act as it willed. The
political reality of the annexation of Dalmatia and Slovenia meant that civil policy was
largely out of the army’s hands. In the context of internal rebellion, which by spring 1942
had become significant throughout Second Army’s zone of occupation, this separation of
powers inevitably became a source of conflict between the military and Fascist civil
authorities. While Robotti quickly gained the upper hand in Slovenia, relations took a
very different course in Dalmatia. The intense dispute between the commander of the
XVIII Corps, General Quirino Armellini, and the Governor of Dalmatia, Giuseppe
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Bastianini, ended on 25 July 1942 with Armellini’s dismissal, “by order of the Duce.”86
The conflict has been presented as evidence of a fundamental gap in objectives and
methods between the army and the regime, and even of anti-Fascist dissent on the part of
the military.87 But, such an interpretation can be misleading. Far from a confrontation
between opposing ideologies, the Armellini-Bastianini feud was, first and foremost, a
jurisdictional struggle between rival agencies that spiraled out of control because of the
uncompromising nature of the personalities involved.
Giuseppe Bastianini was a forty-three year old “Fascist of the first hour.” Having
served with the arditi in the First World War, he became an important leader in the
Umbrian squadrist movement and obtained a national presence prior to the March on
Rome. He was a polarizing figure, but one of the more charismatic Fascist leaders. In the
late 1920s, Bastianini entered the Italian diplomatic corps, where he enjoyed a speedy
rise. He served as ambassador to Poland and Great Britain, with a stint in between as
Ciano’s undersecretary at the Foreign Ministry.88 Remembering Bastianini as “cautious,
honest and loyal” — referring primarily to Bastianini’s support for non-belligerence in
1939 and his lukewarm attitude towards Germany — it was Ciano who put forward his
name for the governorship in Dalmatia.89
Like many other Fascists, Bastianini had little esteem for the leadership of the
armed forces, which he considered thoroughly “discredited” after the first seven months
of war. He criticized the apparent timidity of the army and navy, and advocated “the need
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to re-establish assault units” as in the First World War.90 His contempt for the army grew
after participating on the Greek-Albanian front in early 1941.91 Arriving in Zara to take
over as governor on 7 June 1941, Bastianini quickly came to regard the local military
authorities as the greatest threat to his power and autonomy. The example of Montenegro
— where Mussolini abolished the civil High Commission and granted the army full
powers at the end of July — weighed heavily on Bastianini, who may have taken this as a
cue to adopt “strong-arm methods” [maniera forte] of his own.92
At first, Bastianini and his staff in Dalmatia found the commander of the VI
Corps, Renzo Dalmazzo, relatively “agreeable.”93 However, on 18 February 1942,
Dalmazzo transferred his command to Dubrovnik to oversee the occupation of southern
Croatia and the tiny Province of Kotor. Replacing Dalmazzo in Split — with jurisdiction
over the provinces of Zara and Split as well as parts of Lika and western Bosnia — was
the new command staff of the XVIII Corps, under the leadership of Quirino Armellini.94
Ten years Bastianini’s senior, Armellini brought a wealth of operational and colonial
experience to his new command. Having graduated with distinction from the Military
Academy of Modena, Armellini served in the Libyan War and First World War. He
commanded troops in Somalia, served on Badoglio’s staff during the invasion of
Ethiopia, and afterwards led Italian forces in Amhara. When Italy entered the Second
World War, Armellini rejoined Badoglio as his aide at the Comando Supremo in Rome,
where he remained until Badoglio’s dismissal in December 1940. Before taking
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command of the XVIII Corps, Armellini presided over the newly formed La Spezia
Division, which was training for an airborne assault on Malta.95
Armellini was an energetic officer — the war diary entries of the Sassari Division,
deployed far from Armellini’s headquarters in Split, reported frequent visits and
inspections conducted personally by the corps commander.96 Second Army staff officer
Giacomo Zanussi considered Armellini a “man of great ability and a model of probity.”
Zanussi believed that Armellini’s inclination to “call a spade a spade” became
problematic in dealings with the “big-headed” [montato] Bastianini, for Armellini was
“tough, bony, [and] obstinate, beyond any limits.”97 The son of an independent farmer
[coltivatore diretto], Armellini was not raised in an atmosphere of high politics.98 His
diary entries suggest that he felt out of place amidst the cliquism and subtle intrigue that
prevailed in Rome.99 By his own admission, Armellini’s “temperament” favoured a rigid
approach to discussions coupled with an aversion to compromise.100 Indeed, he attributed
his unexpected repatriation from Ethiopia to “incompatibility of character with Teruzzi,”
the Fascist Minister of Italian Africa.101
Armellini, then, had run afoul of Fascist hierarchs before. There is considerable
evidence of a genuine aversion to Fascism on Armellini’s part. However, much of this
evidence came to the fore after Mussolini’s fall in 1943, and must therefore be treated
with caution. His postwar manuscript, La crisi dell’Esercito, sought to restore the
reputation of the Italian officer corps by casting the blame for military collapse on the
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environment created by Fascism. The regime’s inflated version of military spirit, he
argued, disguised a crass ignorance of military affairs and a desire ultimately to replace
the regular army with a Fascist militia.102 The same thesis is evident in Armellini’s diary
from his time with the Comando Supremo, also published after the war.103
Armellini’s diary entries suggest that his growing disillusionment with Fascism
stemmed in large part from the regime’s treatment of his superior, patron, and mentor,
Pietro Badoglio.104 Accusations of sycophancy on Armellini’s part do not take into
account his own technical competence and ability, but he undoubtedly shared a strong
relationship with and admiration for Badoglio, as demonstrated by his eulogistic
publication from 1937, Con Badoglio in Etiopia [With Badoglio in Ethiopia].105
Armellini blamed Mussolini’s micromanagement of military affairs and ideological
interference in matters of strategy for handicapping Badoglio’s work. Pointing out that
Mussolini had fixed the anniversary of the March on Rome as the date for the invasion of
Greece, Armellini lamented that the war was being conducted “according to squadrist
doctrine.”106 His relatively humble origins made his career dependent upon the patronage
of an influential general like Badoglio. By the end of 1940, with Badoglio’s forced
resignation, Armellini concluded that the Duce was “undoubtedly and only a demagogue,
a politician, a journalist.”107 He told the King’s aide, General Puntoni, that Mussolini was
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“an ‘abnormal’ man” [un uomo ‘anormale’].108 Anticipating his later dispute with
Bastianini, Armellini clearly believed that the war effort should be run exclusively by the
military, without political interference.109
Armellini’s dissent, then, was not primarily ideological in nature. Not unlike
opposition to Hitler within the German Wehrmacht, personal career status and the
regime’s system of command and direction of the war were the decisive factors fuelling
dissent.110 He shared the regime’s desire to militarize society “to make a single army out
of the entire Nation,” but believed that this was best achieved under the professional
auspices of the Regio Esercito.111 Certainly, Armellini was no supporter of Liberal Italy,
whose neglect of the armed forces he later blamed for allowing Fascism’s rise. Armellini
accused the Liberal urban population of attacking “militarism” and insulting army
officers who had no recourse because “challenges, in homage to certain modern theories
against the duel, were not accepted.”112 Added to his lack of political tact, Armellini’s
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reactionary conservative sense of honour made de-escalation in personal conflicts less
likely. His diary shows that, while he generally enjoyed the respect of his fellow officers,
he held grudges and contempt for those generals — like Cavallero — that had a
dishonourable penchant for politics and who bypassed traditional military procedure or
channels of seniority.113 For Armellini, the politicization and subsequent corruption of the
armed forces was Fascism’s greatest error.
The extent to which Armellini’s dislike for the Fascist regime translated into
meaningful opposition or resistance before 1943 was limited. At the end of 1940,
Armellini tried to convince Mussolini through metaphor to reduce his meddling in
military affairs, but without success.114 More tangibly, as commander of XVIII Corps,
Armellini openly resisted the interference of the Fascist Party in military propaganda. He
insisted that material for the troops should focus on the practice of war, discipline,
subordination, and hierarchy, while glorifying the army, armed forces, patriotism, and the
monarchy.115 From Dalmatia, Armellini maintained contact with dissident figures in
Italy, including Emilio De Bono.116 Leaving aside his dispute with Bastianini, Armellini’s
greatest contributions against Fascism came only after 25 July 1943, when the King
arrested Mussolini and appointed Badoglio prime minister. Badoglio gave Armellini the
task of de-Fascistizing the MVSN, which he wanted to transform into an integral part of
the Italian army. Armellini immediately changed the uniforms of the Militia and
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introduced a prayer for the King [preghiera del Re] to replace that of the Duce.117 On the
other hand, his laudatory inaugural address to the MVSN has been singled out as a
“grotesque” example of continuity between the Badoglio regime and Fascism.118 The
confusing events following the Italian armistice in September 1943 left Armellini in
hiding in Rome.119 Despite his monarchist leanings, he established a good working
relationship with the capital’s leftist Committee of National Liberation. According to
OSS reports, “personally [Armellini] was respected and was willing to work as an
indipendent [sic] figure.”120
In terms of his personality and his relationship with Fascism, Armellini was
enigmatic. In many respects, he was the typical career officer: conservative, monarchist,
authoritarian, nationalist, militaristic, with a high sense of honour, duty, and institutional
loyalty. These characteristics permitted an uneasy compatibility with Fascism, but he also
proved able to work with the leftist resistance movement against the Nazis. That he owed
his rise not to family connections but to merit and to Badoglio’s patronage may have
reinforced his opinions on the independent nature of the military establishment,
especially after Badoglio’s fall from favour with the regime, while inflating his concepts
of honour and discipline. These traits, combined with a lack of delicacy, made a
relationship between Armellini and any equally dogged political authority unlikely to
bear fruit. At the same time, his absolute loyalty to the military hierarchy meant that, had
he received a direct order from his superior, Roatta, to give in to Bastianini, he would
have done so. That such an order was lacking suggests that Armellini’s military
117
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colleagues in the Balkans largely shared his views on the issues at stake in his conflict
with Bastianini.
The issues at play within the actual dispute between Armellini and Bastianini
were as enigmatic as the personalities involved in it. The two figures argued over
garrison deployment, the Italianization of Dalmatia, and squadrist violence; they fought
for control over Dalmatia’s various forces of repression and they questioned each other’s
technical competence. However, while Armellini had some genuine anti-Fascist
credentials and his arguments sometimes strayed into the ideological field, his feud with
Bastianini cannot be described in black-and-white terms as a conflict between Fascist and
anti-Fascist. At the heart of each dispute were divergent tactical judgements and tensions
generated by jurisdictional overlap. The dynamics of the Armellini-Bastianini conflict
were similar to that in East Africa between Graziani and Lessona, two devoted Fascists.
Indeed, like Graziani and Lessona, Armellini and Bastianini rarely saw one another. That
Armellini’s headquarters in Split was more than 100 km away from the Governor’s
offices in Zara likely made it more difficult for cooler heads to prevail.121
The first argument broke out almost immediately after Armellini’s arrival in
February 1942. This had to do with orders from Roatta for all Second Army commanders
to reduce the number of garrisons in their sectors and to concentrate their forces in
powerful mobile units. Armellini thereby ordered the consolidation of smaller garrisons
and border posts in Dalmatia.122 As a result, he could no longer guarantee the safety of
Bastianini’s political organs in the countryside, and he suggested that they be
withdrawn.123 Bastianini refused to accept such a solution, so he appealed directly to
Roatta, complaining that, if the army had protected the borders properly in the first place,
they wouldn’t be in this situation. Abandoning the border altogether would be a blow to
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Italian prestige and would allow Communist Partisans to enter from Croatia, further
threatening security in Dalmatia.124 Armellini later retorted that Bastianini would have
built a Great Wall of China around Dalmatia if he could, but that the army should
develop its system of garrisons according to its own needs, without giving too much
consideration to the inexpert opinions of civilian officials.125
These first shots across the bows revealed two fundamentally different concepts
of each other’s mission and jurisdiction in Dalmatia. Both sides drew upon different
decrees issued by the Duce to provide the legal basis behind their respective positions.
Bastianini took his mission from the decree law which formalized the annexation of
Dalmatia back in May 1941. Over a month after Armellini’s arrival in Split, Bastianini
sent him a patronizing memorandum that outlined, very specifically, the territory that
comprised the Governorate of Dalmatia and the legislation that established its three
provinces “in absolute identity with that of the other provinces of the Kingdom.” He
therefore insisted that Dalmatia be treated as if it were part of metropolitan Italy, where
the army did not exercise civil authority.126 Civil authorities repeatedly fell back upon the
May 1941 decree, arguing that Armellini’s line amounted to a “disavowal” of the Duce’s
project.127
On the other hand, Armellini’s understanding of jurisdictional boundaries was
based on the same decrees that had given the military full control over repression in
Slovenia. After 20 January 1942, Dalmatia, Slovenia, and occupied Croatia were defined
as a “zone of operations.”128 Prior to Roatta’s appointment as Second Army commander,
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he and Cavallero had agreed that this legal change was necessary to give military
authorities full control over public order. It was also intended to improve troop morale:
soldiers stationed in the theatre now received full battle honours and their families were
guaranteed larger pensions.129 As war zones, the annexed territories were potentially
subject to martial law, but Mussolini allowed the provincial governments to retain most
civil powers, including ordinary policing. Civil authorities could call upon the army to
intervene in the interest of public order, and military authorities could intervene on their
own initiative in extreme circumstances.130 After Bastianini complained directly to
Mussolini, on 24 January Rome modified the decree as it pertained to Dalmatia. Military
authorities could not intervene in matters of public order on their own initiative.131 Roatta
interpreted this to mean that tasks of public order in “normal” situations were to be left to
civil authorities; however, where civil police forces were deficient, control could be
ceded to the military upon request of political authorities. As soon as military units
became involved in the defence of public order, the army assumed full control over the
conduct of operations and could give orders to civil functionaries and police. Military
units were never to come under the command of political authorities. Moreover, Roatta
considered operations against “armed formations of rebels” to fall strictly within the
military’s sphere.132 All this was in place prior to Armellini’s arrival in Split. He would
frequently cite the decree of 20 January and Roatta’s interpretive order of 12 February,
conveniently neglecting the modified text of 24 January.133
Both personalities exacerbated the situation by addressing one another in
patronizing tones. Bastianini treated Armellini like an inexperienced newcomer with no
handle on Dalmatian affairs, which Bastianini claimed to have mastered after ten months
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of rule.134 For his part, Armellini made clear his conviction that Bastianini and his
functionaries were military dilettantes whose opinions on the deployment and use of
armed forces counted for nothing. Armellini, whose troops were spread out in areas under
Croatian civil control, Croatian territory under Italian military control, as well as in
Dalmatia, believed that it was useless to distinguish between zones, as political
authorities insisted on doing. Rebels were everywhere, and the greater war effort required
the concentric and economical use of force according to “a single system and single
vision of military command.”135 Armellini accused Bastianini of “feigning ignorance that
Dalmatia is already in full revolt.”136 He preferred to envision the role of his corps within
the context of the overall war effort — it was part of a struggle against a Balkan-wide
insurgent movement and the army needed to economize on resources that were badly
needed for frontline operations in North Africa and Russia.137 In this context, Armellini
could care less whether or not the provinces of Dalmatia functioned normally.
After working together for just over a month, communication broke down
entirely. Armellini ordered his units to stop informing political authorities of operational
plans.138 An exasperated Roatta ordered Armellini to address any jurisdictional matters to
him, and he asked Bastianini to do the same. Roatta hoped to find a compromise whereby
Zara and Split were treated neither as normal Italian provinces nor purely as “zones of
operations.” He reminded Bastianini that the military garrisons he so badly wanted
retained in Dalmatia did not exist in peaceful Italian provinces, but he agreed that
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political considerations warranted maintaining some smaller garrisons, even if they were
militarily useless.139 Armellini duly postponed the withdrawal of small garrisons in
Dalmatia.140
The question of garrison deployment was a strictly jurisdictional struggle between
military and civil authorities to control the various tools of repression in Dalmatia. These
included the units of XVIII Corps that were stationed in Dalmatia; namely, the Truppe
Zara and the Perugia Division, as well as independent battalions attached directly to
Armellini’s command. Bastianini had at his disposal various forces of public order,
including detachments from the Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, Guardia alla Frontiera
[border police], and MVSN.141 Armellini saw Bastianini’s interference with the
deployment of his garrisons as a jurisdictional infringement and as an attempt to
subordinate military forces in Dalmatia to political authorities.142 Likewise, Bastianini
had taken exception to Armellini’s suggestions that the Guardia di Finanza — armed
financial and customs police that, while technically a branch of the armed forces,
answered to civil authorities — concentrate on coastal defence, since its work in the
interior of Dalmatia was “less important.”143
The issue of garrisons returned to plague relations in July 1942, when Armellini
again ordered reductions following the departure of the Perugia Division.144 To no avail,
Armellini had lobbied Roatta to allow him to keep the division, which would permit him
to maintain a “heavy checkerboard of garrisons” in annexed territory.145 Again, and not
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entirely without reason, Bastianini blamed “the absence of our armed forces” in
Dalmatian towns for the growth of the Partisan movement.146 Armellini argued that
Bastianini needed to adapt himself to XVIII Corps’s manpower situation, which did not
permit such dispersal of force.147
If Armellini was on solid ground defending his forces from civilian intrusion, his
opposition to the establishment of civil government in Dalmatia treaded more
dangerously. As shown, the army’s attitude towards the annexation of the new provinces
in 1941 varied between caution and enthusiasm. Armellini’s initial experiences in the
theatre prompted him to question the wisdom of forming a civil regime so hastily in
Dalmatia. At the end of March, he confided to Roatta that it was an “error — almost
universally acknowledged and maybe unavoidable [insopprimibile] — having
prematurely [anzitempo] established in Dalmatia three Italian provinces.”148 Again in
May, he blamed Bastianini for causing revolt and then fuelling it with counterproductive
measures.
The premature constitution of an Italian civil government and the policy taken by
this government — intent on obtaining the rapid Italianization of the country —
has brought, after surprise, discontent. The population, almost totally anti-Italian
and anti-Fascist, which during the phase of military occupation maintained a
correct — if not cordial — attitude, has thus become more and more isolated.
Isolation, interpreted as hostility — and maybe it was — caused reaction from the
Italian part. Thus, one passed from isolation to detachment and — in spirit —
revolt.149
By questioning Bastianini’s very existence in Dalmatia, Armellini certainly ran
afoul of the Fascist regime that had placed him there. However, these criticisms did not
amount to a questioning of Italian imperialism that “veered toward anti-Fascism,” as has
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been argued elsewhere.150 Armellini’s rationale reveals that his main problem with the
establishment of civil government in Dalmatia was one of timing. First, it was foolish to
announce the unpopular move of political annexation when Italy was still at war with
Britain. Second, in the midst of a world war and a rebellion, the existence of a civil
regime prevented “necessities of a military nature” from gaining “full and undisputed
supremacy.”151 Accepting annexation as an accomplished fact, Armellini concluded that
political means could accomplish little; the problem facing Dalmatia was a military one
that required a military solution.152 Like his colleagues in 1941, Armellini believed that a
military government would be easier to manage. Third, like a classic imperialist, he did
not believe that the local populations — “by tradition, instinct, a Balkan people” — had
obtained the proper level of civilization to allow for their immediate incorporation into
the metropolitan sphere. It was a basic precept that “in every occupation of territory
against the will of the inhabitants […] civil organization must follow military
occupation.” For Armellini, these arguments were based primarily on observations made
in the Balkans, but “could be justified by my experiences during my long colonial life,
whose environment is strangely similar to this.”153
Armellini called for Bastianini to adopt a more “conciliatory attitude” towards the
local populations, at least by reining in his project of Italianization.154 Like Badoglio and
Graziani in Ethiopia, Armellini saw little value in immediately alienating a large part of a
still unpacified population through exclusionist policies, something that even Rome
appeared to repudiate after 1938. But, as in Ethiopia, this dose of utilitarianism did not
result in a wholly different approach to repression. As will be shown in Chapter Six,
Italian army commanders during 1941 generally lauded Bastianini’s tough handling of
resistance. In July 1942, Armellini himself oversaw one of the most destructive
150
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operations conducted by Italian forces in the Balkans, when his corps laid waste to the
area around the Velebit mountain range to the north of Dalmatia’s border with Croatia.
He credited supposed improvements in Croatia, where Italian military authorities enjoyed
full powers, to “the firm lessons inflicted by our troops, using not rash but inexorable
reprisals.”155 When news of the Armellini-Bastianini dispute reached the command of the
Sassari Division — deployed on the Dalmatian border — in June, staff officers there
credited it to the “naturally” different ways of thinking between a military authority
favouring “strong-arm methods” [maniera forte] and a civil authority preferring “gentle
political action.”156 Armellini did not advocate a soft approach to counterinsurgency;
merely a consistent one.
It was Armellini’s criticism of the inconsistent and counterproductive violence
meted out by Bastianini’s Blackshirt militia units that brought the corps commander
closest to adopting an openly anti-Fascist stance. By the time that Armellini arrived in
Dalmatia, Bastianini had collected a small army of Blackshirts sent by the MVSN in
Rome to conduct police operations in the provinces. These included a mixture of “M”
battalions and squadristi battalions. The “M” battalions were made up of seasoned
veterans from the Greek campaign. Military authorities considered them combat worthy
and claimed that they fell within the army’s jurisdiction.157 For several months, Bastianini
insisted that the “M” battalions were within his competency, but pressure from Armellini
and Roatta eventually forced him to accept that they belonged to XVIII Corps. Bastianini
therefore requested more squadristi battalions from Rome.158 By the end of the summer,
Bastianini had four of these battalions — between 2,000 and 3,000 men — under the
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direct control of his Governorate.159 The squadristi battalions were made up of older
reservists, mostly veterans of the Blackshirt movement of the 1920s.160 Whereas
Armellini had nothing but praise for the Blackshirt units that were attached to Italian
infantry divisions, he considered the squadristi units second-rate and undisciplined.161
The behaviour of the 68th “Toscano” CC.NN. Battalion in Split, where Armellini
kept his headquarters, was particularly troubling. On 10 June, during celebrations for the
second anniversary of Italy’s entry into the war, men from the battalion — “already
known for its bad conduct” — added to the fanfare by vandalizing a hotel. The next day,
they randomly beat up civilians in the main square of Split. Finally, on 12 June, twenty
squadristi stormed a Jewish synagogue, attacking bystanders performing religious rites,
and burning furniture, tapestries, and documents “of great historical value.” The Catholic
Bishop of Split, Dr. Kvirin Bonifačić, lodged a complaint, assuming the militia were
under Armellini’s command. In turn, Armellini warned Bastianini that such behaviour
alarmed the local populations and fed rebellion in Dalmatia. Bastianini ordered such acts
to cease, but at the same time claimed to Armellini that, if this behaviour was damaging
sixty percent of the time, then the other forty percent was useful. The corps commander
lamented the existence of a “squadrist” mentality among political authorities, who had in
some cases openly supported the violence.162 Armellini recognized that his criticism of
the squadristi verged on anti-Fascism.
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This is a delicate subject since it is easy for someone to say: he spoke ill of
Garibaldi. No one denies — just as no one denies the existence of the sun — that
squadrismo saved Italy. But the environment of 1919–20–21–22 in Italy is not the
environment of 1941–42 in Dalmatia. The way of the truncheon and castor oil is
no good here.
Italians […] were almost all desirous of order, discipline, fruitful labour. They
have nothing in common with the Dalmatians who — by tradition, instinct, a
Balkan people — in almost their totality refuse to suffer any government —
especially a government of a nation considered by them to be an enemy and
towards which they have always cultivated the most furious hatred.163
But, even the issue of squadristi violence overlapped with the more insidious
threat, in Armellini and Roatta’s view, that the militia posed to the army’s jurisdiction
over the repression of revolt in Dalmatia. Bastianini used his militia and police to conduct
operations of an increasingly military character against Dalmatian rebels. Armellini
complained that the coexistence of “two armies, two heads, two systems is harmful, it
disperses means that are not very abundant, it squanders forces and energies that must
instead be vigorously spared.”164 This situation not only contravened basic military
principles on the dispersal of force, Armellini argued, it went against “the sole and total
control that constitutes one of the tenets of Fascism.”165 According to the general,
Bastianini wielded his “Gubernatorial army” [esercito Governatoriale] without a
coherent strategy. Moreover, his forces relied on XVIII Corps for provisions and
ammunition, and their actions frequently required intervention from Armellini’s units.166
Military personnel had died coming to the aid of rash political authorities who proved
unable to organize even a basic combing operation. Armellini lamented the excessive
camaraderie that had led his units to be “dragged in” to Bastianini’s poorly conceived and
conducted operations. He reminded his subordinates that, according to Mussolini’s 20
January decree and to Roatta’s Circular 3C, operations against rebels were “true and
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proper operations of war” that should be conducted by military authorities in accordance
with military criteria.167 Armellini demanded that the “gubernatorial army” be disbanded,
that Bastianini’s military cabinet [Gabinetto Militare] limit itself to liaison functions, that
his Blackshirt units be reduced to police forces subordinate to the Carabinieri, and that
XVIII Corps take over police functions outside of major urban areas.168 Roatta agreed
that the existence of two armies with two commanders operating in the same region
towards the same objectives was “absurd,” but he could not issue orders to Bastianini any
more than Armellini could.169
With this, relations between Armellini and Bastianini reached a critical breaking
point in mid-July 1942. Guerrilla activity was on the rise in the Province of Zara — its
prefect had been killed in an ambush at the end of May — and Bastianini blamed this on
the inactivity of XVIII Corps.170 Privately, and citing colonial precedent, he urged
Mussolini to establish “a single military command for Dalmatia able to collaborate
directly with the political authorities,” by which he meant a command that answered to
the Governor’s office.171 From Armellini, he demanded immediate action to normalize
the situation, and insisted that civil government must remain in Dalmatia for reasons of
prestige.
As long as I am in my position and you are in yours, the reciprocal attributes are:
the civil authority, with all its organs, are under my orders and the military
authority with its assigned troops are yours. I carry out administrative policy and
you fight the war. […] You consider the government of Dalmatia a thing that has
no reason for existence and that it should be abolished […] Nevertheless, as long
as there is a governorship in Dalmatia, do me the favour of letting it carry out its
work in peace. I am not one of your subordinates or one you merely tolerate. I
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have been serving my country and my leader in peace and war for a quarter of a
century. I am more inclined towards action than polemics.172
Armellini penned Bastianini a long response that summed up the issues that
plagued relations between civil and military authorities in Dalmatia. Armellini
complained that civil authorities treated him as if he was “an executive body of the
Governor.” He repeated his belief that the establishment of civil government had been an
error. He argued that his deployment of fewer but stronger garrisons was dictated by his
lack of troops, which prevented imposing by force “a policy that the population had not
accepted voluntarily.” He complained that Bastianini, despite his claims of limiting
himself to the realm of policy, had in fact been making quite a bit of war, intentionally
keeping XVIII Corps in the dark about his plans for anti-partisan operations. Finally,
Armellini addressed the veiled charges of anti-Fascism laid against him.
You say that you have served the country for a quarter of a century; I have served
it for 35 years and, more than a quarter of a century ago, I first shed blood for my
country. And I have always served — believe you me — exactly as the Duce
wants: with absolute dedication, with conscious discipline, demonstrating love for
combat, making habit of danger [...] demonstrating frank honesty in personal
relations. I have served, that is, according to how the Director of the Party
recently proclaimed, as the perfect Fascist even before Fascism existed.173
This claim in itself could be considered subversive, but Armellini was not being
sarcastic.174 His career path and personality reflected a mentality that shared much with
Fascist ideology.175
After being informed of this last tirade, Roatta ordered Armellini to abstain from
any direct communication with Bastianini.176 Already by the end of June, Roatta had
decided that either Bastianini or Armellini would have to go. He clearly sided with
Armellini, who he considered exchanging posts with the commander of the V or VI
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Corps.177 Giacomo Zanussi, a Second Army staff officer, later criticized Roatta for failing
to protect a general of Armellini’s stature against political intrigue. Both Roatta and
Armellini were caught off guard by Bastianini’s unannounced trip to Rome that resulted
in the corps commander’s dismissal on 25 July.178 It is likely that Mussolini intervened in
Bastianini’s favour because anything else would have appeared an admission that the
Fascist project in Dalmatia had failed.179 Timing may also have played a role.
Bastianini’s visit caught Mussolini immediately after a trip to North Africa; the Duce
blamed his generals for failing to achieve a great victory while he was there.180 Concerns
over Armellini’s anti-Fascist tendencies do not appear to have played a role in his
dismissal. Armellini was not disgraced in the eyes of the military or regime. Cavallero
considered Armellini as a replacement to command the XXI Corps in North Africa.
Mussolini approved Armellini’s appointment to this important theatre but Armellini
declined, citing medical reasons.181
From Armellini’s point of view, his feud with Bastianini was primarily
jurisdictional in nature. Armellini’s final hand-written note to Roatta after receiving
orders to vacate his post took a parting shot at the “ridiculous” military organization of
the Governor and the dispersal of force that it caused. Armellini did not mention the
episodes of Fascist violence conducted by the squadristi. His main concern was
Bastianini’s “intransigent” refusal to give “all the available forces, all the responsibility
to the military authorities to avoid big trouble.” On this topic, Armellini declared, he
“could write a novel.”182 While he criticized Bastianini and Rome for making his task
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more difficult, he did not question Italy’s imperial mission.183 Although he largely
avoided demagogic Fascist themes in his addresses to his troops, Armellini had himself
affirmed that “Italy is, and will be an Empire.”184 While he opposed Italianization in the
short term, he did not challenge the eventual inclusion of Dalmatia and Croatia within
Italy’s Imperial Community. Certainly, Armellini was no Fascist of the first hour; yet,
despite evidence of his genuine opposition to the regime, his dispute with Bastianini did
not amount to anti-Fascism. That an otherwise unremarkable jurisdictional squabble
ended with the removal of a corps commander was mainly due to the incompatible
personalities, rather than ideologies, of the two antagonists.
The Armellini-Bastianini feud in Dalmatia was fundamentally similar to that
between Robotti and Grazioli in Slovenia: in both cases, military authorities directly or
indirectly criticized the political annexation of the territory their forces occupied in order
to gain total control over the repression of resistance. There are several reasons that
Armellini failed where Robotti had succeeded. Robotti’s willingness to adopt Fascist
rhetoric and to support Italianization may have ingratiated him to the Duce, but other
factors were more significant. First, Bastianini ensured that his approach to repression did
not appear soft compared to the army’s policy. Second, Slovenia was a politically
marginal region where the regime held few long-term interests; Dalmatia had greater
symbolic value for Mussolini. Third, Grazioli, the former Fascist Party head in Trieste,
was a far less influential or prestigious figure than Bastianini, who enjoyed national fame
and a close relationship with the Duce.185 Finally, Robotti’s dispute with Grazioli
coincided with a conflict between the High Commissioner and the ministerial
bureaucracy in Rome, which by mid-1941 sought to limit the autonomous position of the
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Province of Ljubljana.186 In short, the regime had less invested in Grazioli and Slovenia,
and Mussolini could curtail his powers without risking a significant loss in prestige.
This is not to say that Robotti’s task of concentrating power in the army’s hands
in Slovenia went smoothly. The 20 January decree allowed for considerable overlap in
responsibilities and Robotti found many civil functionaries, including police in Ljubljana,
unwilling to subordinate themselves to the military.187 Robotti, too, complained of
undisciplined terror employed by Blackshirt units in an effort to remove their
uncooperative commander from Ljubljana.188 Robotti continued to blame civil authorities
for the rise of revolt, and he complained of plots to usurp his powers.
It is simply disgusting to see how the blood of our soldiers, killed in fulfilment of
their sacrosanct duty, has become the object of speculation of petty politicians.
[...] Our task here in Slovenia, hindered, obstructed, hampered in a thousand
sneaky ways by the civil authorities, that know how to disguise their true work
with a varnish of collaboration that can deceive the naïve and provides a purely
formal ‘alibi’, grows more bitter and difficult every day.
Our every step finds a political trap: our every measure is seen through a prism
that distorts its aims and alters its nature: and all this veiled, obstinate, wicked,
underhanded hostility is disguised by an outward cordiality, by an apparent
collaboration that is nothing more than a supine, cold acceptance of our requests.
We soldiers find this type of hostility repugnant.189
The use of such language indicates that Armellini’s stance was shared by other generals
of the Regio Esercito. It reinforces the conclusion that the Armellini-Bastianini dispute
was part of a broader jurisdictional struggle that became particularly acute in Dalmatia
because of personalities.
Armellini’s removal ended the clash of personalities in Dalmatia, but it did not
change the nature of the conflict between civil and military authorities. The staff officers
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of the corps command in Split had liked and respected Armellini; now they adopted an
even cooler attitude towards their civilian counterparts.190 Armellini’s replacement,
Umberto Spigo, was a “passionate exponent of [Italian] penetration in the Balkans,” was
more willing to adopt Fascist rhetoric in public, and benefited from a partly mollified,
partly chastened Bastianini, but military and civil authorities continued to jockey for
position in Dalmatia.191 Roatta retained his interpretation of the 20 January decree and
lobbied Comando Supremo regarding Bastianini’s “inappropriate” arrogation of military
responsibilities. Cavallero now agreed that Bastianini only had control over public order
in the cities. In a discussion with Bastianini, Cavallero insisted that operations against
rebels were for the military to decide, remarking “that one cannot command in two.”192
They came to a compromise whereby the upgraded Zara Division would answer to XVIII
Corps for border and coastal defence, but would adhere to requests from the Governor
concerning the garrisoning and policing of the provinces of Zara and Split.193 Bastianini’s
“gubernatorial army” of police and squadristi were placed under the command of the
Zara Division, but in practice Spigo found that he had little control over the squadristi,
which the Governorate continued to deploy for “police” duties.194 Overall, though,
Bastianini’s position had weakened. As XVIII Corps withdrew from Croatia to
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concentrate on the defence of Dalmatia, something for which Bastianini had advocated
for some time, civil authorities found themselves “overwhelmed by generals.”195 The
redeployment bolstered the army’s jurisdictional claims over public order in Dalmatia. In
February 1943, Bastianini himself left Zara, bumped upstairs as part of a major cabinet
shuffle to take over as undersecretary of state for Foreign Affairs.196
The army’s political behaviour in the annexed territories of Slovenia and
Dalmatia revealed apparent contrasts with the policies of the Fascist regime. Officially,
these territories made up the “small space” of Italy’s spazio vitale, the point where
metropolitan Italy engaged with the rest of its Imperial Community in the Adriatic.
Important generals like Roatta cautioned against annexation, and local military
authorities like Armellini and Robotti later criticized annexation and its connected
policies of Italianization and Fascistization as premature. Yet, official ideology was
hardly crystal clear and was, in part, established to justify the systems and boundaries so
hastily imposed after the conquest of Yugoslavia. Within the vague framework
established by Mussolini, Italian generals believed they had room to manoeuvre; and, for
the most part, Mussolini let them. He intervened at a late date to remove Armellini, only
to reduce Bastianini’s powers afterwards. The army’s struggle against Fascist authorities
in Slovenia and Dalmatia stemmed from its institutional doctrine that, once hostilities
were under way, the entire war effort should be controlled by the military to achieve
unity of command and effort. For most generals, these basic precepts were not at odds
with Fascist totalitarianism or imperialism. Military occupation, they believed, was the
simplest way to permanently make those lands Italian.
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The Dysfunctional Coalition197
The generals of Second Army had to deal not only with Fascist functionaries, but also
with the civil and military representatives of its Axis partners. At its height, the army’s
zone of occupation shared a demarcation line in the north and east with Germany. This
line cut through Slovenia and extended southeast to Montenegro, including the Dalmatian
coast with a hinterland up to 200 km deep, much of which belonged to the Independent
State of Croatia, an Axis member since June 1941. Behind the demarcation line, the
Italians differentiated between three zones: Zone I comprised the annexed territories
governed by Fascist civil authorities; Zone II, the so-called “demilitarized zone,”
extended into sovereign Croatian territory halfway to the demarcation line, forming a
coastal belt of immediate strategic interest to the Italian armed forces; Zone III included
the Croatian interior up to the Italo-German demarcation line. Zones II and III were coinhabited by Second Army and by Croatian civil and military personnel; their legal
relationship to one another and level of authority varied during the course of the war.
As a result of this complex arrangement, Italian generals were fully involved in
coalition relations with their German and Croatian allies.198 These relations were
notoriously poor. Indeed, with its failure to develop unified political objectives, joint
planning, or a coherent grand strategy, the Axis has been labelled a “dysfunctional
coalition.”199 In terms of strategy and frontline operations, the lion’s share of the blame
must fall on Germany’s shoulders: Hitler’s ideological ambitions left little room for
others; the Germans balked at supplying their allies with much-needed technology; and,
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German liaison officers frequently came across as arrogant.200 However, in regions like
the Balkans — far from the main fighting and of secondary importance to Hitler’s
objectives — lesser powers enjoyed considerable autonomy, enabling them to pursue
their own political and ideological agendas. As a result, the Axis coalition tended to be at
its most dysfunctional in occupied territory.201
In handling its allies the Italian army again appeared to challenge the official line
coming from Rome, especially in terms of the army’s hostility towards the new Croatian
state. Yet, the extent to which Italian generals adhered to the long-term imperial project
of the Fascist regime in the Balkans is remarkable. Political factors, as much as military
ones, guided the Italian army’s approach to coalition relations in Yugoslavia. Towards
the Germans, Italian generals adopted a defensive line, aiming to limit German
encroachment upon Italy’s sphere of interest. Towards the Croats, on the other hand, the
army worked to expand Italian influence at its ally’s expense, as long as it had the
military capability to do so. Within this framework, Second Army adopted controversial
policies in favour of the Serb and Jewish populations being persecuted by the Nazi and
Ustaša regimes.

Italo-German Relations
Scholarship on the occupation of the Balkans has emphasized the conflicting interests of
Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in the region. Their rivalry was rooted in ideology,
diplomacy, and economics. Ideologically, Mussolini and Hitler held competing visions
for a postwar New European Order. Despite the failure of his “parallel war” in 1940–41
and his subsequent reliance on German military might, Mussolini clung to the belief that
Fascist Italy would emerge from the war an equal partner of Nazi Germany, with the two
major Axis powers dividing Europe between them. According to this vision, the Balkans
— and certainly the Adriatic coast — fell solely within the Italian sphere of interest.
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Hitler repeatedly, and perhaps sincerely, agreed that Croatia belonged to Italy’s spazio
vitale, but Nazi leaders did not view the German and Italian empires in equal terms; the
latter would be subservient to the former.202 Mussolini’s diplomacy in the late 1930s had
aimed to solidify his Mediterranean empire through alliance with Nazi Germany. But, the
cost of this alliance was Anschluss — the union of Austria with Germany — which
placed the Danube basin firmly in German hands. Inheriting Habsburg strategic interests,
the Nazis sought to limit Italian influence in the region.203 Control of the Danube
enhanced German economic power throughout Southeastern Europe. Italy had been
Yugoslavia’s main trading partner prior to the invasion of Ethiopia and the imposition of
sanctions by the League of Nations. Germany filled the void and Italian economic efforts
in the area never recovered. The parts of Yugoslavia that Italy annexed or controlled after
1941 lacked industrial or natural resources and suffered from food deficits. On top of this,
the Nazis and Ustaše signed a secret protocol that granted Germany full access to
Croatian resources and ensured that Italian trade with Croatia would never match
Germany’s.204
Mussolini, Fascist ministers, and Italian industrialists caught wind of the protocol
immediately. The Duce feared that the Germans were developing “what seems to be a
four-year plan in Croatia through which we will not even get a crumb.”205 The Director of
Commercial Affairs for the Italian Foreign Ministry, Amedeo Giannini, complained that
202
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the protocol “does not reconcile itself with the inclusion of Croatia in Italy’s spazio
vitale.”206 The situation was even worse in Slovenia, where the Germans kept the richest
areas for themselves. As a result, Alberto Pirelli observed, “Ljubljana has lost any raison
d’être; the aqueduct and power plants go to Germany. Not to mention the mines, cotton
mills…! The Tarvisio railroad…”207 Thus, despite their military alliance in the ongoing
war against Great Britain, the Italian and German regimes immediately found themselves
locked in an economic rivalry in occupied Yugoslavia that favoured the latter.
Rome sought to compensate for its economic impotence by extending its political
influence in the Balkans. Ciano repeatedly sought reassurances from Ribbentrop that
Croatia belonged entirely within the Italian sphere of interest, citing previous German
assertions to that effect. When Ribbentrop questioned Rome’s decision to annex parts of
Dalmatia that were inhabited mostly by Croats, Ciano responded that Italian annexation
was not based on ethnic lines but on principles of “living space” [spazio vitale]. During
negotiations concerning the partition of Yugoslavia, Italian diplomats proved particularly
touchy over perceived threats to the integrity of Italy’s sphere of influence. When in
April 1941 the pro-German General Kvaternik proclaimed Croatian independence in
Zagreb, praising the German Reich but failing to mention Italy, the Italian Foreign
Ministry worked quickly to ensure that the text was not published in Italy or Germany.
The Italian ambassador in Berlin, Dino Alfieri, accused Germany of undermining Italy’s
position by appearing to favour a Greater Croatia. Alfieri argued that Italy had earned the
right to complete suzerainty in the region, having already sacrificed an empire — Italian
East Africa — for the cause of the Axis. Confronted by such protests, Hitler and
Ribbentrop repeatedly confirmed Germany’s “political disinterest” in the region. 208
However, thanks to Germany’s military supremacy, Yugoslavia was partitioned
according to German, rather than Italian, aims. Fundamental aspects of the territorial,
political, and legal makeup of the Axis occupation therefore depended upon the whim of
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the Führer. For example, although Hitler initially declared that Italy would determine the
fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he then established a demarcation line that left most of
those regions within the German zone. The Italians had little choice but to accept the
proposed demarcation line, with minor changes, at the end of April 1941.209
From the beginning of the invasion of Yugoslavia, Italian generals involved
themselves in Rome’s efforts to maximize and consolidate its political control in the
occupied territories. As we have seen, the Province of Ljubljana was intended primarily
as a buffer that would halt further German penetration into Southern Europe. According
to Zanussi, it was thanks to Roatta’s personal intervention as army chief of staff that
Ljubljana was occupied by a makeshift group of bersaglieri on motorcycles before the
Germans arrived.210 The minor changes made to the demarcation line through Slovenia
and Croatia at the end of April were due largely to the intervention of Italian military
authorities. Although the boundary drawn up in the middle of the month was supposed to
be “definitive,” Second Army and the SMRE worked to expand the territory under Italian
control. Citing practical military reasons, but also the need to affirm Italian prestige,
Italian military authorities argued that the demarcation line in Slovenia and Croatia
needed to be redrawn. While they failed to establish a more defensible border for the
Province of Ljubljana along the Sava River, they managed to bring the important railroad
hub of Karlovac under Italian control.211
Once the location of the demarcation line was agreed to at the end of April, the
Italians moved quickly to physically occupy all the territory on their side of the line,
much of which remained in the hands of the invading German Second Army. While
urging his troops to “behave themselves in the most cordially and comradely form
towards the representatives of the allied army,” Ambrosio made it clear that he wanted
German forces out of the Italian occupation zone as soon as possible. If German units
refused to abandon their positions and lodging, Ambrosio ordered his subordinates to
209
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proceed with occupation regardless.212 In fact, Ambrosio had already chastised an Italian
unit for abandoning a town near the demarcation line to German troops, demanding that
“such an episode must not repeat itself.”213
Agreements between the Italian and German commands created bureaucratic
obstacles and established a system of reciprocity that limited the frequency of visits
across the demarcation line.214 Ambrosio wanted to reduce travel by both sides in order to
define his occupation zone as an exclusively Italian sphere of influence. As demonstrated
by events in Slovenia in December 1941, this came at the expense of effective military
cooperation between Axis forces. Following an incident earlier in the month when a
German police unit was ambushed and completely destroyed by Partisans just north of
the demarcation line while Italian forces across the border looked on, XI Corps’s Mario
Robotti asked Ambrosio for clarification on his responsibilities towards the Germans
should such a situation repeat itself.215 The clarified policy was to avoid crossing the
demarcation line and setting precedent for future German interference. When on
Christmas Eve the Germans asked for urgent intervention to help a surrounded unit, the
Italian response was dilatory. In part, this was due to problems deciphering and
translating German messages, but the Italians were also following policy. Taddeo
Orlando’s Granatieri di Sardegna Division received the German appeals and forwarded
them to Robotti, who instructed Orlando to seek a request in writing before crossing the
demarcation line. In the end, Orlando again contented himself with a blocking action on
his side of the border.216 A similar Italian aversion to joint operations may also have
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prevented the Germans from capturing the Partisan leader Tito that same month. When
his beleaguered command fled German-occupied Serbia and crossed into Italian-held
Montenegro, the Germans failed to pursue, ostensibly reluctant to antagonize the Italians
with a foray into their territory.217
While the Italians eventually consented to joint operations in Croatia in 1942, the
annexed territories always remained impenetrable to German units. Robotti, Roatta,
Ambrosio, and Cavallero all agreed that, since the Province of Ljubljana was considered
Italian “national territory,” public order must be guaranteed solely by Italian means. They
repeatedly turned down German proposals to coordinate counterinsurgency strategy in
Slovenia, arguing that such agreements would only benefit the Germans.218 Robotti also
instructed his divisions not to share details on hostages or reprisals with German police,
since he could “not understand what interest the German police could have with the
requested information.”219 Italo-German cooperation in Slovenia remained limited to
sealing off the border, heavily strewn with landmines, during each other’s independent
operations.220 Stemming from political and imperial rivalries, the unwillingness of Italian
generals to cooperate with their German counterparts on matters of security undoubtedly
hampered their war against a guerrilla movement that was not necessarily restricted by
political boundaries. Counterinsurgency in Slovenia was conducted as two separate
battles at a time when Second Army was urging unity of action between its own district
commands against the rebel enemy.221 The treatment of the demarcation line in 1941 and
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1942 demonstrated how Italian generals consciously allowed political objectives to trump
military pragmatism.
Another upshot of this policy was that, despite their rivalry, open conflict or
dissent between German and Italian military personnel was rare. As Davide Rodogno
points out, “contacts between the troops of the two armies were less frequent than one
might imagine.”222 The Germans did have a presence around Mostar, where trade
agreements with Croatia gave them access to bauxite mines. Local Italian commands
complained that the Germans failed to inform them of the movements of their personnel,
for whose security the Italians were responsible.223 The German army also maintained
liaison units attached to the command of Second Army. Italian intelligence officers kept a
close eye on German liaison officers and their staff, petulantly complaining of their
disrespectful attitude towards Italian officers and self-consciously reporting German
criticisms, especially pertaining to Italy’s “excessive liberal [generosa] humanity [that]
has allowed rebellion to rise and spread.”224 This touchiness reflected an inferiority
complex that stemmed from the failure of Mussolini’s “parallel war.”225 The same sense
of insecurity fed Italian fears of German agents in both annexed and occupied territories.
Already in June 1941, the VI Corps alarmingly reported the presence of Gestapo
personnel in Split.226 In November, a V Corps garrison commander detained and expelled
three officials of the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg — a Nazi agency responsible for
considerable theft of cultural goods throughout occupied Europe — who claimed to be
travelling through Italian-occupied Croatian territory “to conduct studies on the history,
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habits and customs of Croatia.”227 The army’s responses to apparent German intrusions in
an Italian sphere paralleled the concerns of the Italian Foreign Ministry which, for
example, sought to prevent Germany from establishing consulates in Croatian cities on
the Italian side of the demarcation line.228 In reality, the expansion of German influence
in Croatia was not part of an elaborate scheme, but occurred incrementally in response to
military circumstances. After mid-1942, increased insurgency and the new external threat
posed by potential Allied landings in southeastern Europe prompted the Germans to play
a greater role in Croatian military affairs, at the expense of Italy’s regional hegemony.229
After that point, the Italian and German leadership clashed more frequently over Balkan
affairs and strategy, especially — as we shall see — over the treatment of Serbs and
Jews.

Italo-Croatian Relations
During the formative first months of the occupation — and arguably into 1943 — Italian
military authorities were far more concerned by their relations with the Ustaša regime
than with their German allies. The demarcation line, coupled with Hitler’s unwillingness
to allocate military resources to occupied Yugoslavia, kept any serious German threat at
bay. On the other hand, Italian military personnel frequently came into contact with
representatives and functionaries of the Independent State of Croatia. Almost invariably,
this contact was negative. If German power undermined Italian influence in the Balkans
and posed a distant threat to undo it, Italian commanders and staff officers quickly came
to regard the Ustaše as the most immediate obstacle to their policy of expansion and
consolidation in Yugoslavia. Although the 18 May Rome Accords technically established
the Independent State of Croatia as a protectorate in a dynastic union with Italy, and
while Croatia officially joined the Tripartite in June 1941, by the end of the year Italian
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generals had reoccupied Croatian territory up to the demarcation line and had all but
abandoned the notion that Pavelić’s regime could function as a useful ally for Italy,
militarily or politically.
Historians have argued that Italian officers developed their own “line” on
Croatian affairs that diverged from Rome’s official pro-Ustaša stance and, therefore,
marked a fundamental break between the Regio Esercito and the Fascist regime.230
However, this is an oversimplification. The regime’s line towards Croatian policy was
anything but clear. Mussolini, the Comando Supremo, the Fascist Party, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, as well as gubernatorial, provincial, and military functionaries on the
spot all held contrasting views towards the Independent State of Croatia. The army’s
repudiation of the Ustaše did not amount to ideological disloyalty: it occurred within the
context of internal competition between multiple rival agencies, and it came largely in
response to local circumstances and as the result of political calculations aimed at
extending Italy’s imperial reach in the region.
Eric Gobetti has questioned whether Rome ever adopted an “official line” on
Italo-Croatian relations. The most unflinching support for the proto-fascist Ustaša
movement came from within the Italian Foreign Ministry, which invested much financial
and political capital in the Ustaše.231 Following King Alexander’s declaration of
dictatorship in Yugoslavia in January 1929, Ante Pavelić and other radical Croat
separatists formed the Ustaša revolutionary movement and went into exile, where they
intended to coordinate terrorist activity against the Yugoslavian state. Pavelić himself
arrived in Italy in May 1929, where his organizational activities — and eventually 550
paramilitaries — were subsidized by the Italian Foreign Ministry. Mussolini’s decision to
support Pavelić was consonant with his revisionist desire to undermine Yugoslavia and
apply pressure on the European great powers. This policy contributed, at least indirectly,
to the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles in 1934. The 1937 Italo-Yugoslavian
pact of friendship formally outlawed the Ustaše in Italy as well, but this had practically
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no impact on Pavelić’s freedom, and the Ustaše factored into Mussolini’s renewed
expansionist plans after 1939.232
Nonetheless, Mussolini’s support for the Ustaša movement was never
unequivocal and always tactical. Mussolini and Ciano’s plans to foment revolution in
Croatia in 1939 centred on Vladko Maček’s more popular and moderate Croat Peasant
Party.233 Only after being rebuffed by Maček, and having determined that the Peasant
Party was either too closely tied to Anglo-French patronage or too pro-German, did the
Foreign Ministry again give Pavelić and his Ustaše pride of place in its Balkan
schemes.234 Even so, Italian diplomats continued to voice their doubts over the level of
mass support for the Ustaše in Croatia, and after the Treaty of Rome they tried to
establish a rapprochement between Pavelić and Maček, who had already rejected a
German offer to assume leadership of the Independent State of Croatia. These efforts
quickly collapsed and the Italian Foreign Ministry thereafter wedded itself to Pavelić
rather than the democrat, Maček.235
While committing himself to an Ustaša regime in April 1941, Ciano did not
consider it an equal partner of Italy. Rather, the Foreign Minister envisioned a “political
pact, which in practice puts all of Croatia under our control.”236 Leveraging the influence
he believed to have gained over a grateful Pavelić, Ciano intended the Independent State
of Croatia to function as a Fascist puppet. However, any pro-Italian sentiment that existed
among the returning Ustaša exiles — not all of whom had found their experience of
“internment” in Italy particularly endearing — was immediately compromised by the
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Italian annexation of Dalmatia, which Croat nationalists claimed as their own.237 As we
have seen, the decision on annexation itself was subject to much debate within Italian
political, diplomatic, and military circles. Some favoured appeasing the Croats to prevent
them from turning to Germany for protection, while others warned that “it would be a
terrible blow for us if we do not totally exclude the Croats from Dalmatia.”238 Few were
willing to renounce the concept of annexation altogether, and the establishment of the
Governorate of Dalmatia proved the initial and chief obstacle to Italo-Croatian relations
in spring 1941. Although Mussolini and Pavelić signed a border agreement on 7 May, the
two sides continued to quibble over territorial arrangements through the summer.239
Partly in response to annexation, the Croatian government never agreed to the customs
union that would have bolstered Italy’s economic influence in the country and enabled
Dalmatia to function as Italian spazio vitale.240 By the end of June, even Ciano feared the
presence of a growing Croatian “imperialism,” or irredentism, against Italy’s interests.241
Pavelić’s most consistent backer within the Foreign Ministry — and, as a result,
the most vocal critic of the army’s policies in Croatia — was the Italian ambassador in
Zagreb, Raffaele Casertano.242 Casertano and Pavelić shared a strong working
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relationship and held one another in high regard.243 Casertano admitted that Pavelić
lacked popular support after his long absence in exile, and that the resulting insecurity led
him too easily to give into the intransigent demands of his ultranationalist collaborators.
However, Casertano remained convinced that Pavelić himself was loyal to Mussolini and
Fascism, and that he posed the most effective obstacle to German influence in Croatia.244
Well into 1943, Casertano continued to champion the idea of establishing Croatia as a
protectorate within the Fascist Imperial Community, by way of a personal union.245
Casertano’s optimism that Pavelić and other political figures in Croatia remained proItalian ensured that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs never considered its alliance with the
Ustaše a completely lost cause.246
Mussolini’s own views towards Croatian affairs remained ambiguous. His main
interest in the Ustaša movement through the 1930s involved its potential role as a fifth
column to disturb the status quo in Yugoslavia. With the disintegration of the
Yugoslavian state, this role was no longer necessary and the Ustaše became expendable,
especially if they stood in the way of Mussolini’s continued aspirations for permanent
Italian expansion in Croatia.247 Mussolini therefore left all doors open in 1941, which
resulted in contradictory policies subject to infighting. Certainly, Mussolini’s
preoccupation with German interference in southeastern Europe led him to see Pavelić as
one of the few obstacles to German domination over Croatia.248 But, this did not stop
Mussolini from delaying the formal recognition of Croatian independence in April,
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pressuring Pavelić to give into Italian demands over Dalmatia.249 By June 1941,
Mussolini realized that the Germans had the upper hand in Croatia, economically and
politically. He confided to Ciano his doubts that a Savoia prince would ever sit on the
throne in Zagreb, despite the dynastic union established on paper the previous month.250
At this stage Mussolini mainly blamed German intrigue for his problems, but he also
began to regret his decision not to annex more territory in Dalmatia, lamenting that “it is
not possible to share sovereignty” [non è possible una sovranità in mezzadria].251
In August, during a meeting with Bastianini, Mussolini now admitted that his
reliance on Pavelić had been a mistake: “I begin to ask myself if I have not bet on the
wrong card!” Bastianini considered this an “indication of a new direction [orientamento]
of the Duce.”252 Days later, Mussolini ordered Italian troops to reoccupy sovereign
Croatian territory. The well-connected industrialist, Alberto Pirelli, had the impression
that the occupation of the remainder of the Dalmatian coast was not merely a military
expedient but was intended to be “forever.”253 As Gobetti argues, Mussolini had given
up on a useful Croatian alliance by summer 1941, at which point he reverted to a
“decidedly nineteenth-century imperialist policy, based on territorial conquest rather than
political-economic hegemony.” This was a policy which Italian generals were perfectly
able to comply with.254
As we shall see, Italian military authorities in Yugoslavia had been lobbying for
such a policy for some time. But they were not alone. The army found allies within the
regime, from Fascist hierarchs and diplomats that were unsatisfied with the Rome
Accords. Initially, this included Luca Pietromarchi, who headed the Foreign Ministry’s
Croatia Office. And, despite their conflicts in other areas, when it came to Croatian
affairs Italian generals frequently saw eye to eye with the Governor of Dalmatia,
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Giuseppe Bastianini.255 The diaries of Bastianini’s secretary, Egidio Ortona, reveal that
functionaries within the Governorate — including those with diplomatic backgrounds —
considered the Foreign Ministry incompetent in its handling of negotiations with Pavelić,
and thought that Casertano was too closely bound to the Croatian point of view.256
Bastianini and Ortona felt that the Croats were “more intransigent on the border
question” than the Germans; from their perspective, the Ustaše were the most immediate
threat to Italian interests in Dalmatia.257
Indeed, conflict between Fascist and Ustaša militias had resulted in fatalities when
the Italians entered Šibenik in April. Through the remainder of 1941, Bastianini accused
Zagreb of supporting anti-Italian resistance in Dalmatia and of halting the flow of
foodstuffs to the annexed territories. This led Italian civil authorities in Dalmatia to share
the army’s point of view, and indeed to cooperate with their military counterparts, when
it came to implementing anti-Croatian and anti-Ustaša measures.258 Alongside
Pietromarchi, Bastianini — arguing that Croatia had become a “little Austria,
administered by functionaries of the old monarchy, but enfeoffed by Berlin,” and that
Pavelić was too weak a leader to hang on to power against the pro-German clique in
Zagreb — played a key role convincing Mussolini to authorize the military occupation of
Croatian territory in August, not only to secure Dalmatia from the threat posed by the
anti-Ustaša rebellion underway in Croatia but also with a view to extending Dalmatia’s
borders after the war.259
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Although the army was hardly unique in its opposition to the Croatian alliance, it
nevertheless faced charges of disloyalty and anti-Fascism based on its aversion to the
Ustaša movement and regime. Casertano’s frustration with the army largely stemmed
from jurisdictional jealousy: he complained that Italian functionaries in Croatia followed
two different lines of conduct, “one military and one political.”260 But the most polemic
diatribe against Second Army came from Eugenio Coselschi, the Fascist Party’s delegate
in Zagreb, who deemed the army’s anti-Croatian and pro-Serb attitude “not only
ambiguous and absurd but even paradoxical.” Coselschi attributed the army’s anti-Ustaša
bias to ignorance of Croatia’s history, but also to anti-Fascism among Italian officers,
citing similar opposition in military circles to the “anarchic” Italian squadristi of the
1920s.261
Coselschi’s personal background provides the context for his opinions. Despite
his invocation of the squadrist past, Coselschi did not join the Fascist Party until 1924
and has been considered a relatively moderate figure within Italian Fascism.262
Nonetheless, serving as Gabriele D’Annunzio’s private secretary in Fiume had
bequeathed him a deep-rooted hatred of the Yugoslavian state and the Serbs who
dominated its politics.263 Coselschi became a prominent propagandist during the Fascist
period and served as head of the Comitati d’Azione per l’Universalità di Roma [CAUR],
which emphasized a transnational “universal” brand of Fascism.264 Thus, it is not
surprising that Coselschi would advocate collaboration with the proto-fascist Ustaša
party. As Gobetti argues, the Foreign Ministry’s reliance on political alliances with
ideologically kindred groups in its Yugoslavian policy largely fit into this vision, whereas
the army — but ultimately also Mussolini — adopted a more traditional imperialist
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policy based on territorial conquest.265 But, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
Coselschi belonged to a relatively marginal strand of Italian Fascism — a strand whose
legitimacy and importance was renewed through the ideological transition towards the
transnational concept of an Imperial Community, but whose proponents nonetheless
remained on the fringes of the regime.266 Even Casertano could not stand Coselschi and,
together with Ambrosio, he petitioned for Coselschi’s replacement at the end of 1941.267
Coselschi’s allegations of anti-Fascism on the army’s part were largely hyperbole,
but it remains necessary to ascertain the motives behind Second Army’s policy towards
its Croatian allies. There may well have been an anti-Croatian predisposition among
Italian officers, particularly among those who fought in the Great War against AustriaHungary. For decades after Italian unification, public opinion in Italy tended to equate
Croats with the Austrian Empire that had stood in the way of Italian unity.268 During the
First World War and the Paris Peace Conference that followed, Italian military
propaganda had portrayed Croats as particularly beastly enemies whose territorial
aspirations, like Austria’s, conflicted directly with Italy’s.269 Some of the Croatian
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generals of 1941 had indeed served in the Habsburg Royal-Imperial Army. Their proGerman leanings now rekindled traditional enmity held by Italian officers and elites
towards their old enemies. Ambrosio considered the Croatian commander-in-chief,
Slavko Kvaternik, to be “100% Austrian,” exhibiting the political “mentality of the
Habsburg army of 1914.”270 As late as 1943, Second Army’s intelligence officers
justified their hostility towards the Pavelić regime in precisely such terms, pointing out
— like Bastianini — that Croatia had taken the place of the Austrian empire in the
Adriatic: “Our interests for this sea are clearly in conflict and we cannot help revive and
worse still rebuild, in a Great Croatia, the old Austria.”271
In this respect, an anti-Croatian bias on the Italian side had similarities to the
Serbophobic tendencies of many German officers — especially those of Austrian origin,
drawing upon their collective memory of the First World War — that contributed to their
brutal treatment of Serbs and to their commitment to support the Ustaša regime. In terms
of the mentality of Wehrmacht commanders serving in the Balkans, Ben Shepherd
argues, there was a great deal of continuity between 1914 and 1941.272 From the Italian
perspective, too, the Balkan campaign can be understood as the culmination of a thirty
years’ war. But for Italian generals, it was not the Serbs who represented the old enemy
or who inhabited the unredeemed lands that Italy’s “mutilated victory” had failed to
acquire. Rather, the Independent State of Croatia assumed the mantle of Habsburg
Italophobia and obstructionism in the Adriatic.273
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The legacy of the First World War was vital both to the army’s self image and to
Fascist mythology.274 Italian and Croatian memory of that conflict coexisted uneasily in
former Yugoslavia. For example, Italian units held ceremonies and erected monuments
on Croatian territory for their fallen compatriots from the Great War. With local Croatian
dignitaries present, the Sassari Division reinterred twenty-two Italian prisoners of war
that had died in Habsburg custody while working on the Sušak–Ogulin–Split railroad.
Speeches to commemorate the dead awkwardly sidestepped the fact that Italians and
Croats had fought against one another in that war. The commander of the Sassari’s
CC.NN. Legion feebly affirmed that the newly entombed soldiers could now be treated
with honour as “friends of a free Croatia.” But, the presiding chaplain claimed that the
prisoners, through their forced labour on the railroad, had brought “civilization and
progress” to the region, and represented the ideal Fascist worker-soldier.275 It is not clear
what the Croats present at the ceremony made of these words, which seemed to belittle
their own level of civilization, or whether they were translated into Serbo-Croatian at all.
For their part, Croatian authorities irked the Italians by awarding benefits to decorated
veterans of the Austro-Hungarian army and by celebrating historic Habsburg victories in
which Croats had participated, including the 1866 naval battle of Lissa [Vis], where an
Austrian fleet decisively defeated a much larger Italian one.276 The legacy of past conflict
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probably was harmless on its own; but, combined with geopolitical calculations and local
circumstances, it served to heighten antipathy between Italian military authorities and
Croatian functionaries.
The most immediate motivations for the army’s anti-Croatian attitude were
administrative, military, political, and moral in nature. As proved the case in annexed
Dalmatia and Slovenia, Italian military leaders in Croatia favoured a straightforward
military administration that would not limit their freedom of action.277 They would rather
not share power with Croatian authorities. Militarily and politically, it soon became
apparent to the generals of Second Army that the Pavelić regime had failed miserably as
a puppet government. If the purpose of establishing Croatia as a satellite was to guarantee
security with little Italian expense and to extend Italian political and economic influence
in the region, the Ustaša regime fulfilled none of these roles. Instead, Italian generals
believed that it actively threatened Italian spazio vitale and functioned as a tool of
German influence. These concerns were accompanied by genuine moral outrage towards
the brutal persecution of Orthodox Serbs by the Ustaša. The war diaries of the Sassari
Division reveal how attitudes towards the Ustaša regime and, to an extent, Croats in
general steadily worsened through 1941, due to this combination of motives.
During the first half of May 1941, the Sassari Division was deployed to western
Bosnia and southern Lika, with garrisons spread out over 120 kilometres between Šibenik
and Drvar, and 60 kilometres between Knin and Gračac. The division’s commander,
Furio Monticelli, immediately concluded that the region was made up mostly of Serbs,
“currently favourable to Italy.” Monticelli believed that local Serbs feared annexation by
the new Croatian state and preferred incorporation into Italy, for political and economic
reasons.278 However, the 19 May Rome Accords recognized Croatian sovereignty over
almost all the territory occupied by the Sassari Division. Legally, Italian forces were now
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considered “troops stationed on the territory of the friendly and allied Independent State
of Croatia,” without policing powers. Pavelić and Kvaternik requested their withdrawal
as soon as possible; but, Ambrosio ensured that the redeployment of Second Army took
place gradually, and Monticelli delayed ceding military and civil powers to the Croats.279
In the meantime, Monticelli and his immediate superior, VI Corps commander Renzo
Dalmazzo, urged their officers “not to play politics” or make “futile” interventions in
“conflicts and massacres” between Croats and Serbs.280
Very quickly, Italian commanders concluded that maintaining impartiality in
internal Croatian affairs without jeopardizing Italian prestige as “the victorious army”
and self-proclaimed “defenders of order” was impossible.281 The Sassari Division
witnessed first-hand the escalation of ethnic cleansing measures against Serbs in the
Independent State of Croatia. Ustaša ideology cast Serbs as the inferior, eastern, or
Balkan “other,” and blamed them for the “subjugation” of Croats in the old Yugoslavia.
The Ustaše envisioned an independent Croatia as an ethnically homogenous nation-state.
The country’s 2.2 million Orthodox Serbs, amounting to one-third of the new state’s
population, were to be eliminated through violent persecution or forced assimilation.
Ustaša mass violence against Serbs thus had ideological roots and, to an extent, was
centrally directed, but it was not systematic. Levels of violence varied, according to local
demographics, the responses of the victims themselves, the proximity of Italian and
German personnel, the level of Partisan or Četnik resistance, and the extent of popular
participation in the expropriation and expulsion of Serbs. During spring and summer
1941, Ustaša violence accelerated from individual murders to mass arrests and occasional
massacres before a concentration camp system was established. During this period, some
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100,000 Serbs were killed and another 200,000 expelled to German-occupied Serbia.282
Ustaša mass violence prompted an anti-Croatian response among Italian officers, for
humanitarian but also political-military reasons.
Coselschi and Casertano both complained that Second Army’s misplaced
humanitarianism, or “pietism,” towards persecuted Serbs and Jews was the main obstacle
to cordial relations between Italy and Croatia.283 There is no doubt that many Italian
officers reacted strongly against the inhuman treatment of Serbs by the Ustaše. Even
before the Treaty of Rome, Dalmazzo commented that among his men “the word ‘ustaša’
is becoming synonymous with devil.” The general diplomatically urged his officers to
distinguish between the “true” or legitimate Ustaša military and political authorities —
who should be considered allies — and the “thugs” that sought profit from plunder and
violence.284 However, as Italian and Croatian personnel increasingly came into contact
with one another, relations in the field deteriorated. This was partly in response to the
“haughtiness and reservedness” with which Italian soldiers were met by Croats who
resented their presence in now sovereign territory, and partly because of the cruel
violence meted out by the Ustaše before Italian eyes. The chief of staff of the Sassari
Division, Colonel Gazzino Gazzini, later complained that “the Croats did not even have
the political sensitivity and respect to wait for the departure of our troops, before giving
free vent to their beastly instinct for revenge and blood.”285
Southeastern Lika, where the Sassari Division was stationed, became a hotspot of
Ustaša terror in June. Militia raided Serb villages, searching for weapons, arresting ablebodied men, and looting or killing along the way. The violence culminated at the end of
the month with the deportation or “cleansing” of entire Serb communities from parts of
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Lika.286 The officers and men of the Sassari Division bore witness to these measures,
recovering bodies from rivers and photographing the evidence, and they received daily
pleas for help from persecuted Serbs. Gazzini was particularly struck by the illegal and
arbitrary manner with which the Ustaše plundered Serb property — “even the beds” —
and by their increasing tendency to target women and children in mass slayings.
Numerous children were slaughtered because they were the offspring of Serbs.
Terrible, undocumented, rumours ran among our troops: that the children were
asked by their executioners to make the sign of the cross; those children who
made the sign of the cross in the Orthodox fashion had their throats slit.287
As guests on allied territory, all the Italians could do legally was to appeal to Croatian
authorities. But local Ustaša leaders and functionaries proved unrepentant or claimed to
be acting under orders from Zagreb. Through these exchanges, the officers of the Sassari
Division came to grasp the extent of the ethnic cleansing envisioned by the Ustaša,
although Monticelli found it hard to believe that the total removal of the Orthodox
population was seriously being contemplated, given the region’s dependence on Serb
peasants for agricultural production.288
Ultimately, individual officers and soldiers offered limited aid to fleeing Serbs
who were fortunate enough to reach them. The command of the Sassari Division
supported, tolerated, and participated in this behaviour, even if it undermined Croatian
sovereignty. Gazzini claimed that, given “the traditional goodness and chivalrous spirit of
our soldiers, they could not remain indifferent for long to the pleas for help from the Serb
population.” Officers lodged themselves in Serb homes, rendering those dwellings
inviolable; hundreds of Serbs found refuge behind barbed wire at Italian barracks;
soldiers shared their rations with Serb refugees and escorted them to Dalmatia. Several
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standoffs between Italian troops and Ustaša militia threatened to become violent.289
Confronted with protests from Ustaša authorities, Monticelli defended the “humane”
behaviour of his troops and promised that Italian interference would cease as soon as the
Ustaša “regime of terror” came to an end.290 Monticelli warned Dalmazzo that he could
not guarantee that his men would continue to avoid violent intervention. His informal
letter to Dalmazzo reflected genuine humanitarian concern. Monticelli complained that
the arbitrary targeting of Serbs went “against any sense of humanity and justice,” and that
he felt a moral duty to intervene: “Remaining inactive spectators, one has the feeling of
becoming complicit in this violence and brutality that will certainly be condemned by
history.” A by-product of this humanitarianism was the utter contempt with which the
officers of the Sassari Division came to hold the Ustaše and Croats in general. According
to Monticelli, his men now shared
a feeling of contempt and repugnance for this rabble that is neither capable of
controlling itself nor of exercising control and that is not equal to the task of
governing like a civilized people. Any feeling of sympathy for the Croatian nation
ceased when forced to witness these excesses.291
Likewise, Gazzini concluded “that the political maturity of the citizens of the free state of
Croatia was still very much deficient and backward.”292
Undeniably, moral concerns played a prominent role informing the Sassari
Division’s blatantly pro-Serb and anti-Croatian attitude during spring and summer 1941.
But, humanitarianism was not the only, nor necessarily the strongest, factor behind the
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army’s decision making. Monticelli’s moral qualms were inseparable from his own
obsession with Italian military and political prestige. The legal conditions established by
the Rome Accords had made his troops appear impotent in the face of brash Ustaša
activity. When Monticelli appealed for calm in Knin, the seat of his command, and
promised that “no reprisals could be tolerated as long as Italian troops remained in the
area,” many Serbs nonetheless opted to head for the hills, demonstrating a lack of faith in
Italian strength and status.293 Like Monticelli, the commander of the Bergamo Division
also warned that standing idly by in the midst of Ustaša atrocities threatened “the
authority and prestige of our army.”294
Military prestige was connected closely to the ability to impose order and
normalcy; Italian commands had less of a problem with the persecution of Serbs, per se,
than with the chaotic nature of Ustaša methods. Initially, Monticelli and his staff hoped
merely to force Croatian authorities to adopt “a legal form of action against the Serbs.”295
Moreover, humanitarian concern did not necessarily result in humanitarian action. With
reports of Ustaša excesses mounting throughout VI Corps’s zone of occupation at the end
of June, Dalmazzo’s response was to withdraw garrisons of the Bergamo and Marche
Divisions in order to better concentrate his forces, but also “to prevent our units from
being witnesses to the conflicts and reprisals between Serbs and Croats.”296 This order,
which anticipated the scheduled withdrawal of troops from sovereign Croatian territory,
effectively abandoned persecuted local populations to avoid further conflicts between
Italian troops and Ustaša militia. The Sassari Division pulled back to Dalmatia in midJuly, but it maintained a garrison at the important railroad hub of Knin.297
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With their troops garrisoning Croatian and Dalmatian territory, Monticelli and
Dalmazzo also came to share Bastianini’s political concerns regarding the irredentist
claims of the Ustaše over Dalmatia. While a border commission worked to clarify the
precise boundary between Croatia and Dalmatia, Italian and Croatian authorities — and
occasionally military patrols — bickered over the location of border posts.298 Meanwhile,
Italian military intelligence accused Zagreb of inciting local Croats to spread irredentist
propaganda and provoke “incidents” in Dalmatia.299 In July, the VI Corps reported the
existence of an underground Ustaša movement in Split, numbering 2,000 members, that
was preparing an insurrection against Italian authorities.300 The Carabinieri arrested
Dalmatian Croats suspected of sharing intelligence with relatives in Zagreb, forwarding
them to Second Army tribunals.301 The Sassari Division blamed Ustaša propaganda,
alongside the food shortages that were likewise attributed to Croatian intrigue, for
damaging its relations with the native Croatian population of Dalmatia.302 The Cacciatori
delle Alpi Division — which transferred from Montenegro to Dalmatia in September
1941 and had not, therefore, encountered the worst of the Ustaša massacres firsthand —
quickly adopted a similar impression, noting that former Ustaše continued to harbour and
spread anti-Italian irredentist sentiment.303 By this point, staff officers of VI Corps were
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convinced that irredentism, above all else, had placed the Independent State of Croatia
firmly in the German camp.304
Mutual political suspicion extended to sovereign Croatian territory as well,
resulting in petty disputes that demonstrated the touchiness of Italian commands to any
threats to their prestige and Italy’s imperial grasp over the region. They complained that,
while Croatian government publications and speeches exalted the role of the Ustaše and
Germans, they gave no thought “to Italy and the Italians that did so much for the
independence of the new state.”305 The Sassari command in Knin noted that ordinary
Croats and local Ustaša authorities disparaged Italy and the Italian army, while
implementing prohibitions against such things as Italian playing cards.306 Monticelli
complained when Croatian authorities unexpectedly shut off the water supply to the
barracks of an Italian artillery regiment, and he was troubled by rumours that next time
they intended to poison the water.307 Trivial and spiteful matters of this sort repeatedly
arose between Italian and Croatian officials, in the very midst of Ustaša massacres and
Serb revolt. More so than other Italian functionaries, military personnel worked in close
proximity to local Croatian authorities, with whom they had a vaguely defined legal
relationship. This lower-level squabbling, which further contributed to the army’s
increasingly intransigent opposition to the Croatian alliance, was the result.
By July 1941, Monticelli and Dalmazzo had lost patience with the Ustaša regime.
Doubting that Pavelić could draw upon popular support even among Croats, they
regretted that Maček had not been given the reins in Zagreb.308 Their various complaints
and criticisms filtered up to the command of Second Army. Ambrosio himself became

304

“Notiziario n. 56,” 27 June 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 582, DS VI Corps, June 1941, allegati.

305

“Croazia – Propaganda paveliciana,” 17 May 1941, DSCS, 4/II:24. “Notiziario giornaliero,” 12 July
1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 523, DS 12th “Sassari” Division, June–July 1941, allegati.
306

“Notiziario giornaliero,” 3 June and 22 July 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 523, DS 12th “Sassari”
Division, June–July 1941, allegati.
307

“Notiziario giornaliero,” 27 July 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 523, DS 12th “Sassari” Division, June–
July 1941, allegati.
308

“Notiziario n. 60,” 1 July 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 582, DS VI Corps, July 1941, allegati.
“Notiziario giornaliero,” 27 July 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 523, DS 12th “Sassari” Division, June–July
1941, allegati.

294

vociferously anti-Croatian. Even before the outbreak of revolt at the end of the month,
Ambrosio wrote Rome that its alliance with the Croats was effectively dead. He laid the
blame entirely at the feet of the Ustaša. Although he considered Pavelić a true friend and
ally, Ambrosio argued that the rest of the Croatian political and military leadership had
adopted a “cold and calculated distrust” of Italy that, along with their Habsburg heritage,
had prompted them to gravitate towards Germany. Ambrosio saw the Croatian
government’s favourable relationship with Germany — in terms of military training and
provisioning and economic deals — as being opposed to the spirit of the Rome Accords.
Moreover, given Italy’s annexation of Dalmatia, Ambrosio argued that Croatian hostility
would be permanent. He hinted that the Italians would do well to seek out new allies
among the Serbs and Jews that looked to Italy for protection.309
The massive Serb uprising against the Ustaše in late July was the final blow to
Italo-Croatian relations. Having already cast doubt on the regime’s political usefulness,
Italian military authorities now blamed Zagreb’s policies for sparking revolt that
threatened to destabilize the entire region and necessitate the intervention of tens of
thousands of Italian troops. The effort to obtain an occupation on the cheap by parcelling
out responsibility to Croatian authorities and security forces had failed. Already at the
end of May, Monticelli had noted that groups of armed Serbs were banding together to
defend their communities from the Ustaše, even before the withdrawal of Italian
troops.310 This trend accelerated through June, as Zagreb’s policies increasingly targeted
Serbs in Lika. Following the first great deportation of Serbs from the Independent State
of Croatia at the end of the month, many Serb villagers fled to the forests of Lika. Ustaša
militia responded with a “cleansing operation” in early July that targeted women and
children in mass executions. These developments, along with growing knowledge of the
Ustaša concentration camp system, rendered life impossible for Serbs. On 27 July, a
general uprising broke out in Lika and Bosanska Krajina that rapidly spread through
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much of the Independent State of Croatia.311 Italian field commands immediately, and
correctly, blamed the revolt on unbridled Ustaša violence.312
Second Army received little guidance from Rome on how to respond to the revolt.
The Comando Supremo was preoccupied with the new situation created by Operation
Barbarossa and by an anti-Italian uprising in Montenegro. Clearly caught off guard, a
confused Cavallero noted in his diary that “in Croatia things are developing in a
somewhat curious fashion.”313 The formation of policy was left to the military authorities
on the spot. Ambrosio was content to allow Croatian military prestige to suffer. He
limited his troops to protecting key railroads and ordered his unit commanders not to
adhere to requests from local Croatian authorities to participate in police operations.314
Dalmazzo, citing the persistence of counterproductive Ustaša massacres even in the face
of revolt, suggested occupying everything up to the Italo-German demarcation line,
“followed immediately by the complete transfer of civil and military powers into our
hands without compromise.”315 This would require many more troops, so Ambrosio
presented both options to the SMRE and Comando Supremo for consideration: either
leave the Croats to fend for themselves or undertake a massive occupation of Croatia
under total control of the Italian military.316 Full backing for the Croatian ally was not
one of Ambrosio’s options. Cavallero, who had been so quick to order Pirzio Biroli to
crush resistance in Montenegro, remained silent over the situation in Croatia.317
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At the lower level, confusion reigned. With Serb rebels advancing on Knin,
Croatian civil and military authorities fled the city on 29 July. The Sassari Division’s
151st Infantry Regiment remained in Knin, and Monticelli assumed civil and military
powers there.318 Although theoretically in contravention of the Rome Accords, this action
received the blessing of Ambrosio, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Bastianini, who
suggested that the Italian army assume control throughout the Dalmatian hinterland.319
Italian officers in Knin feared that counterproductive Ustaša reprisals would undermine
their defence of the city. Monticelli ordered that anyone not belonging to the regular
Croatian army caught in possession of firearms or anyone guilty of committing violence
against persons or property would be summarily shot.320 This decree was aimed more at
local Ustaše than Serb rebels. When a patrol of the Sassari Division mistakenly came
under fire from two Croatian soldiers and an armed civilian, the Italians consigned the
soldiers to the nearest Croatian military command but they shot the civilian as a franc
tireur. In other cases, officers of the division vented their frustration from the previous
months by arresting local Ustaše who had “offended” them.321 Not until 9 August did the
Comando Supremo finally order Monticelli to restore civil powers in Knin to Croatian
authorities.322
Relations between Italian and Croatian military authorities were not uniformly
bad. Italian officers did not consider the regular Croatian army [the Domobranstvo] fully
complicit in Ustaša massacres.323 The command of the Sassari Division got along
reasonably well with the commander of troops in Gospić, General Mihajlo Lukić, who
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readily adhered to Italian requests and suggestions on the conduct of anti-partisan
operations.324 The division also had few qualms over participating alongside Ustaša
militia in operations aimed against Communist Partisans.325 But, on the whole, Monticelli
was unimpressed by the Croatian military response to the revolt:
The material and moral capacity of the regular Croatian units is below minimum.
Units sent against rebels turn to dust by their own accord at the smallest sign of
enemy reaction; units tasked with holding a position abandon it for various
reasons. [...] The capacity of the regular and irregular Croatian forces does not
provide any assurance for the maintenance of order in the area of the Independent
State of Croatia where our troops are located.326
Gazzini described the Ustaša militia and regular army as “supremely cowardly.”327 The
immediate aftermath of the general uprising thus added an additional motive for Italian
field commanders to repudiate the alliance with the Croats: military incompetence.
According to Italian reports, the Croatian army could not even draw upon additional
recruits because so few Croats answered the call to service.328
Disgusted by Ustaša violence, offended by Ustaša behaviour, and convinced that
the Croatian government and military was only dead weight, Monticelli favoured the total
reoccupation of Lika and western Bosnia by Italian troops.
One has the definite feeling that so long as these areas inhabited in absolute
majority by Orthodox populations are subjected to the rule of a Croatian minority
that chooses to assert itself with well-known methods, the situation cannot return
quiet. [...] Likewise one is certain that now and before new factors come into play,
the situation would immediately return to normal after the effective occupation of
the region by Italian troops with the total exclusion of the presence of Croatian
civil authorities and forces.
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Chief among the new factors that Monticelli referred to was the rise of communism. He
feared that well-organized Communist groups — unleashed in the aftermath of
Barbarossa — could take advantage of the anarchic situation to attract Serb rebels into
their ranks. An immediate Italian occupation would prevent the anti-Ustaša revolt from
transforming into something more dangerous to Italian interests: a multi-ethnic rebellion
coordinated by international communism spreading across the border into Dalmatia.329
While correctly seeing the revolt in its early stages as fundamentally anti-Ustaša in
nature, the command of the Sassari Division conceitedly assumed that “the recognition of
our age-old political maturity” would enable the Italian army quickly and bloodlessly to
pacify the region and maintain calm among its Croat, Serb, and Muslim populations.
Monticelli and Gazzini were swayed in this belief by the relative quiet that had greeted
their initial occupation of the zone in April and May 1941.330 They did not consider that
such a response was to be expected following the rapid and shocking collapse of the
Yugoslavian armed forces and state apparatus.
Monticelli’s arguments passed up the chain of command and were reflected in
Rome’s official reasoning behind extending Italian authority into Croatia. The external
threat to Italian Dalmatia and instability in Croatia compromised Italy’s general conduct
of the war. Moreover, as we have seen, by this time Mussolini himself had come to
regard the Rome Accords as temporary, envisioning an enlarged Dalmatia at Croatia’s
expense after the war.331 On 16 August, Mussolini asked Pavelić to consent to the
reoccupation of the Dalmatian hinterland [Zone II] by Second Army. Pavelić initially
refused and tried to negotiate better terms, but German pressure and Croatian military
defeats forced him to give way. Second Army assumed military powers in Zone II on 1
September, followed by full civil powers on 7 September. An Ambrosio decree promised
a return to order and announced the equal treatment of all ethnicities and religions.
Croatian civil functionaries and regular army units remained in the area under Italian
329
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supervision and control. The Ustaše were expelled altogether.332 Humiliated and jobless,
many of these men transferred to eastern Bosnia, where they committed new atrocities.333
Although in some places the Ustaše had accelerated their massacres before the
arrival of Italian troops, Italian military intelligence claimed that the reoccupation of the
demilitarized zone was a resounding success in political terms. Reports indicated that
there was support for permanent Italian expansion in Yugoslavia. One particularly
optimistic officer claimed that the masses of Zagreb hoped that the Italian army would
occupy all of Croatia. At the very least, the army was convinced that its advance had
bolstered its own prestige among the local populations.334 In fact, the peace established
by Second Army was fragile. Italian troops were spread thinly, especially outside the
major urban centres. Locals doubted their ability to keep the Ustaše in check. Italian
commanders admitted that they had no way to identify Ustaša perpetrators, who either
hid in civilian clothing or joined the regular Croatian army so they could remain in
Italian-held territory. Serbs were disillusioned that Italy continued officially to support
the Ustaša regime.335 Nonetheless, Monticelli and Dalmazzo both claimed that their
troops had the unanimous support of the occupied populations, if not the Croatian
political authorities, and Ambrosio declared Second Army’s mission a near total success
in terms of providing security to the region.336
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At this point, Casertano and Pietromarchi were fully on board with the extension
of the military’s presence in Croatia which, they reported, had secured Pavelić’s
leadership over his unruly party and militia.337 When the Germans announced at the end
of September that they intended to send two new divisions to Croatia to conduct antipartisan operations up to the Italo-German demarcation line, Casertano urged that, “for
obvious reasons of our prestige,” a reinforced Second Army should reoccupy the entire
zone behind the demarcation line “and if need be threatened localities outside said
zone.”338 Mussolini had already consented to such a move, and Second Army extended
its occupation from the coastal belt up to the demarcation line in October.339 Italian
troops began reoccupying Croatian territory up to the German demarcation line [Zone III]
on 9 October.340 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that the conditions were in
place to achieve a rapprochement with Zagreb. To appease the Ustaše, Italian diplomats
convinced Mussolini not to give Ambrosio full civil powers in Zone III. But the mere act
of reoccupation had already damaged Italo-Croatian relations irreparably.341
Italian military authorities were less enthusiastic about the results of their
occupation of Zone III. While they promised to bring “order and justice” to the sector, in
reality they had little influence over local Croatian authorities. They were unable to
prevent Ustaša reprisals and they complained of optics that made it appear as though
Italian troops were merely present in order to prop up the Ustaša regime.342 By the end of
1941, Italian authorities noted a growing disappointment among Serbs in Zones II and III
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with Italian rule.343 Italian generals showed no desire to improve relations with Zagreb;
they preferred to impose Italian political influence through territorial occupation.
Dalmazzo and Monticelli even suggested that the Serb populations of Lika and Bosnia
would support annexation by Italy.344 Once again, the generals of Second Army found
themselves in conflict with Italian diplomats that still hoped to salvage something from
their relationship with the Ustaše.
And once again, the army’s relations with Croatian authorities deteriorated,
especially in Zone III where the latter — resentful of Italian interference — wielded its
autonomy in civil affairs. The same issues that had plagued Italo-Croatian relations
through the spring repeated themselves that autumn, leading Italian generals to conclude
that no form of compromise with Zagreb could bear fruit. Indeed, they repeatedly
accused Croatian authorities of sabotaging Italian policy and prestige. The VI Corps
continued to report anti-Italian manifestations conducted by Croatian civil and military
officials. These included the boisterous singing of patriotic and irredentist songs that
were “offensive to the Italian Army [and] the Duce,” as well as drunken boasting that
Croatia would soon be at war with Italy.345 Dalmazzo, who by this time considered the
Ustaše and Communists to be “equally enemies of order,” accused Croatian telephone
service personnel of intentionally obstructing Italian communications.346 The Italian
garrison commander at Varcar Vakuf [Mrkonjić Grad] claimed that local Croatian
officials had set several buildings on fire and then blamed it on Serb rebels in an attempt
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to show that the Italian army could not guarantee security.347 Nor did the lower courts of
Croatia, which still operated for lesser offenses in Zones II and III, deliver the impartial
justice that Italian decrees had promised.348
Moral factors also continued to play a role. Although the pace of Ustaša violence
slowed during autumn 1941, evidence of past massacres kept alive the horrific memories
from the summer.349 Ordered to adopt more “courteous” behaviour towards Croatian
authorities, the officers of the Sassari Division nonetheless continued to document
evidence of Ustaša atrocities.350 In the town of Ključ, for example, Italian officers
uncovered what they described as an Ustaša “slaughterhouse” [scannatoio].
The floor and wooden baseboard are soaked in blood, one wall is riddled with
bullet holes, all the walls are bloodstained with numerous traces of cerebral
matter. A piece of scalp with a tuft of hair is still stuck to one wall. The stairs are
completely soaked in blood because, apparently, the bodies of the slain were
rolled down them and thereafter buried.351
It is impossible to discount the impact that such scenes made on officers and men alike.
As before, moral contempt for the Ustaše reinforced the political and military
calculations of Italian commands in assessing the utility of the Croatian alliance.
In military terms, nothing in the fall and winter of 1941 did anything to alter the
Italian army’s dismissive view of the capabilities of its Croatian counterpart. Internal
bulletins commented wryly that, whereas Italian garrisons managed to fend off attacks by
Communist Partisans, Croatian defences were typically overwhelmed after only “brief
fighting.”352 Others lamented the “exceptional lack of discipline of Croatian soldiers that
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commit abuses and vandalism and spend nearly the entire day carousing in bars.”353 More
sympathetically, a later report attributed discipline problems in the Croatian army to
irregular pay and postal service, insufficient rations, and exhaustion.354 For Dalmazzo,
the ineffective Croatian security forces drained rather than bolstered Italian resources. He
complained that “it is not possible every day to have our units run to wherever the Croats
report trouble, real or imaginary.” When it came to beleaguered Ustaša militia, he
confided that he did not care to help them at all.355 During the winter, units of the Sassari
Division fought alongside Croatian forces, holed up in garrisons cut off by snow and
Partisans. These conditions had the potential to establish a sense of camaraderie between
the two armed forces, but Italian officers remained contemptuous not only of the Croatian
army, but of the general population as well. When the isolated garrisons were relieved in
the spring, Monticelli decided to transport the bodies of his fallen troops towards the
coast, “so as not to leave them abandoned in the hands of populations that are not worthy
of keeping them.”356 There is no doubt that the Domobranstvo, which counted 70,000
men at the end of 1941, was indeed worse than second rate. One commentator has
described Croatian troops as “among the most poorly equipped and unenthusiastic
soldiers in the history of modern warfare.”357
There were examples of effective collaboration between Italian military
authorities and Croatian functionaries, mostly when Italian generals felt that the latter
accepted their subordinate position, or when local Serb rebels adopted an anti-Italian
stance. The commander of the Marche Division, General Amico, got along well with his
Croatian counterpart in Trebinje, who had the wisdom to thank Italy for its leading role in
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bringing about Croatian independence and to acknowledge Croatia’s status as Italy’s
“small but loyal ally.”358 Monticelli and Dalmazzo were pleased with the work of David
Sinčić as vice-prefect and Ustaša party secretary of Knin. They judged him balanced and
capable, with a desire to collaborate with the Italians in favour of normalization.359
However, after Sinčić became deputy civil commissioner attached to Second Army
command — acting as a liaison between the Italian army and Croatian civil authorities —
opinions changed for the worse. Monticelli now complained that Sinčić was stepping on
the feet of Italian military authorities, by issuing his own orders to Croatian police.
Monticelli saw the police as part of a military campaign against guerrillas that should be
conducted solely by military authorities.360 The situation paralleled Armellini’s in
Dalmatia. Indeed, the commander of the XVIII Corps chimed in on the dispute,
lamenting that Sinčić “now believes that he has the commands of Italian divisions under
his orders!”361 The Italian army’s desire for complete administrative and jurisdictional
control in a theatre that it considered an active war zone further limited the chances of a
genuine rapprochement with the Croatian government.
As the revolt in Croatia crescendoed in winter 1941–42, for the first time placing
Italian formations in real peril, the generals of Second Army closed ranks. They
unanimously blamed the revolt on the terroristic methods and unpopularity of the Ustaše,
and they lobbied Rome to formally withdraw its support for Pavelić. Monticelli
considered the revolt “a natural reaction” to Ustaša policy. He was convinced that
Zagreb’s belated calls for dialogue with Serb leaders would amount to nothing, since the
ideological and economic issues behind the revolt remained, and since Croatian officials
were more concerned with demonstrating their sovereignty than effectively addressing
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the problems that limited it.362 Like Monticelli, V Corps commander Riccardo Balocco
considered Ustaša efforts towards ethnic cleansing absurd, since “it is not possible to
think seriously of the annihilation and waste of one and a half million people.” This
statement may indicate that generals like Monticelli and Balocco operated on a different
moral plane than the fascist Ustaše, but it also reflected political and military calculations
on the part of Italian generals: Zagreb’s policies were counterproductive to any Italian
objectives. Balocco criticized the Pavelić regime for its “institutional lack of spirit, the
immaturity of the ruling classes and the distrust and discredit that surround all its
measures.” He still believed that an impartial Italian regime could turn things around, but
not if the population considered the Italian army “tied to the cart of their oppressors.”
Thus, he recommended that the Italian government and Fascist Party withdraw its support
of the Ustaše.363
These opinions were shared at the apex of Second Army. By January 1942,
Ambrosio had become violently anti-Croatian. He brought this attitude with him to his
new posting at the SMRE. After taking over as Chief of the Army, Ambrosio penned a
long report on Croatian policy, in which he claimed “impartial objectivity.” He summed
up the themes espoused by his subordinates in their reports since the summer of 1941
and, although he too claimed that Italian occupation had rectified the military problem in
Croatia, he argued that nothing had changed in terms of Italo-Croatian relations. For
Ambrosio, the only “firm point” in Croatian politics was “the growing aversion to Italy
and the equally firm aspiration to take away from our control the territories occupied by
us,” including annexed Dalmatia. He saw, not without reason, an anti-Italian conspiracy
orchestrated by the Croatian government, military, and Ustaša party, against which the
“weak Italophile” Pavelić offered little help. German and Croatian armed forces
cooperated at Italy’s expense, pushing rebels into Italian-occupied territory. While
Croatian authorities impeded the export of badly needed supplies to Italian Dalmatia,
Ambrosio was certain that “wagons and wagons of goods, corn, fat etc. travel daily
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towards Germany.” He also accused the Pavelić regime of dithering on the reintegration
of Orthodox Serbs into Croatian society. The government had acquiesced to Italian
demands and offered an amnesty to Serb rebels on Christmas, but many Serbs had not
regained their property or livelihood. Ambrosio believed that this was an intentional
effort by Croatian authorities to undermine Serbs’ trust in the Italian army and its ability
to protect them. Likewise, Ambrosio opined that recent attempts by Croatian officials to
negotiate with Serb leaders and rebels were mainly intended to drive a wedge between
Italians and Serbs. Finally, the Croats continued to spread anti-Italian propaganda in
Dalmatia and Ambrosio accused them of providing intelligence to rebels, which had
resulted in ambushes against Italian personnel.364
Mussolini adopted Second Army’s interpretation. As early as November 1941,
Mussolini, Ciano, and Casertano reconsidered their earlier decision to allow the Ustaša to
retain civil authority in Zone III. Mussolini made total occupation up to the demarcation
line, with full powers, the basis of Italian policy in Croatia.365 In a meeting with Hermann
Göring, Mussolini placed the blame for the troublesome situation in the Balkans entirely
at the feet of the Croatian government. In particular, he criticized the regime’s
“oppressive” treatment of Orthodox Serbs as ludicrous, given that Serbs within the
Independent State of Croatia numbered over a million and were tied to the land by
history.366 But Mussolini found Hitler unwilling to abandon the Ustaše. The Nazi dictator
may have had a soft spot for their extremism; certainly, ousting a radical government in
favour of a more conservative one would have been bad propaganda. More importantly,
Berlin had thus far successfully exploited Ustaša mistrust of Italy to give it leverage in
Zagreb, and Hitler did not wish to replace even the useless Croatian forces with German
troops. German-Croatian relations did not reach a breaking point until after Italy’s
capitulation in September 1943, when Second Army was no longer there to act as a buffer
between the two.367
364

“Politica croata nei territory della 2a e 3a zona,” 23 January 1942, DSCS, 6/II:36–41.

365

Monzali, “La difficile alleanza,” 87.

366
367

Meeting between Mussolini and Goering, 28 January 1942, DDI 9, VIII, 211.
Shepherd, Terror in the Balkans, 94–95, 217–18, 237, 241.

307

For Italian military authorities in the theatre, dealings with their Croatian allies
were more frequent, pressing, and frustrating than were their contacts with the Germans.
Several factors were behind this steady deterioration of relations in 1941. As an
institution, the army held an anti-Croatian bias emanating from the legacy of ItaloHabsburg conflict during the Risorgimento and the First World War. Like other armed
forces, the Italian army naturally preferred a straightforward military occupation with
well-defined jurisdictions; this was not the case in Croatia, where its legal status was
constantly in flux and it had to share power with Croatian civil authorities. Contacts at the
local level ranged from feigned cordiality to petty bickering to near-violent confrontation,
as Italian military authorities discovered that the Ustaše were not the compliant political
puppets that Rome had counted on to spread its influence and reduce the costs of
occupation. Croatian irredentism undermined Italian imperial aspirations in Dalmatia and
beyond, and Italian generals were convinced that Zagreb consciously worked to sabotage
Rome’s interests while moving closer to Berlin. The humanitarian response of Italian
military personnel, including senior officers, to brutal Ustaša mass violence played an
important role in worsening relations, but was not necessarily the result of an innately
humane Italian national character. Most German observers — including the Italophobic
Edmund Glaise-Horstenau and local Wehrmacht or SS representatives — also were
“horrified” by Ustaša violence against Serbs, which they considered barbaric and chaotic
in comparison to their more systematic and controlled application of terror.368 Moreover,
moral imperatives dovetailed with cold political and military calculations made by Italian
generals. They considered Ustaša violence counterproductive because it gave Serbs little
choice but to defend themselves through armed insurrection. They criticized Croatian
security forces for their incompetent handling of revolt while offering little assistance
themselves; instead, Italian generals exploited Croatian military failures to extend their
own authority and justify permanent Italian expansion in the region.
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None of these motives betrayed an anti-Fascist stance on the army’s part, either in
ideological or political terms. Local military authorities did not receive clear instructions
from Rome and Mussolini very quickly proved willing to abandon, or at least reconsider,
the alliance with Pavelić that had been a decade in the making. If some Italian diplomats
felt compelled to support the Ustaše as a “totalitarian and revolutionary regime,” akin to
Italian Fascism, this did not necessarily reflect the nationalism of Mussolini and other
Fascists that had never agreed whether fascism really was intended for export.369 Rather
than consciously undermining Fascist policy, the senior officers of Second Army
approached Croatian affairs with the aim of assisting the broader war effort by
maintaining security while spreading Italian influence and prestige the best way they
knew how: with boots on the ground.

Italo-Serb Relations
By the end of 1941, Italian military authorities in Yugoslavia had effectively abandoned
their alliance with the Independent State of Croatia. Division, corps, and army
commanders pressed Rome to formally renounce collaboration with the Ustaša regime. In
its stead, they recommended establishing some form of political and military relationship
with local Serb leaders, including nationalist Četniks, and the armed bands that had
formed spontaneously in response to Ustaša persecution.370 The Italian army’s
employment of nationalist Serb irregulars has been the subject of much debate. Some
argue that, as the primary manifestation of the army’s anti-Croatian stance, the alliance
with Serb nationalists provides evidence of a fundamental divide between the army and
Mussolini’s regime. Rather than accepting Rome’s official alignment with the Ustaše, the
army pursued an alternative policy on its own accord. Mussolini and Cavallero, the
argument goes, opposed Second Army’s pro-Serb orientation but were compelled by
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military necessity to give Ambrosio and Roatta a free hand. According to Luciano
Monzali, the army’s display of autonomy represented its lack of faith in Fascism and
caused Mussolini’s regime to lose its “monopoly on Italian political power.”371 Eric
Gobetti agrees that the army’s commitment to Fascist strategy certainly was most
questionable here.372 The Četniks, after all, were at least loosely coordinated under
General Draža Mihailović, who represented the Royal Yugoslavian government-in-exile
and enjoyed British support. This has led to speculation that British agents infiltrated the
Italian military leadership in Yugoslavia, resulting in the convergence of British and
Italian policies through 1943.373
Others have argued that the army’s decisions concerning the Serbs and Četniks
were driven by practical military and political considerations that ultimately dovetailed
with Fascist objectives. The army’s approach was consistent with Mussolini’s “divide
and conquer” strategy in the Balkans: before 1941, this meant supporting Croat
separatism to undermine Serb-dominated Yugoslavia; after 1941, supporting Serbs
against Croats was a natural extension of this tactic and of the regime’s characteristic
opportunism. Italian commanders saw the Četniks as tools for expansion at the expense
of Croatian and German interests.374 Examining the gradual development of Second
Army’s relationship with non-Communist Serb formations in 1941, it is clear that the
alliance emerged primarily as a response to local conditions, but that Italian generals at
all levels were fully aware of the political ramifications and potential of their actions.
Second Army’s pro-Serb bearing was both a symptom and cause of its opposition to the
Ustaše. Many Italian officers sympathized with the Serb populations, which they
considered innocent victims of pointless excesses. But, in coming to the aid of Serbs and
openly compromising Croatian sovereignty, Italian authorities also hoped to exploit
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Ustaša persecution in order to attract a significant portion of the new state’s population
into Italy’s political orbit.
There is some evidence that the army’s traditional anti-Croatian bias was
accompanied by pro-Serb tendencies. During the Risorgimento and Liberal eras, Italian
popular opinion viewed Serbs as heroic patriots struggling first against Ottoman rule and
later, like Italy, against Habsburg hegemony. The House of Savoy married into
Montenegrin and Serbian royal families, and some nationalists even suggested an alliance
with Serbia against Austria.375 On the other hand, Italy’s experience with Serbia as an
ally during the First World War was not positive, especially from the point of view of the
Italian establishment. As soon as Italy entered the fray in 1915, it became evident that its
territorial and political interests in the Balkans were incompatible with those of Serbia.
Italian irredentism in the Adriatic clashed with its ally’s vision of a Greater Serbia. In
strategic terms, too, the Italian military leadership considered the Serbian army
uncooperative and ineffective at tying down Austro-Hungarian troops. By the end of the
war, Italian military observers were concerned that Serbia had merely replaced Austria as
an impediment in the region.376 Hatred and disdain for the Croats was a more powerful
motivator than any deep-rooted Serbophilia among Italian generals.
Nonetheless, some generals adopted pro-Serb positions well before Ustaša
violence and the anti-Axis insurgency reached its peak, suggesting that political
calculations played a primary role in their decision making. Monticelli explained his
rationale for favouring the Serbs in the Sassari Division’s zone of occupation around
Knin even before the Rome Accords. Because Serbs made up the majority of the
population in his sector, it seemed sensible to Monticelli not to alienate them needlessly.
Moreover, he considered Serbs to be less disposed towards “communist ideas” than
Croats, and he believed that Serbs would welcome the annexation of Dalmatia and
Bosnia to Italy, if only to prevent them from falling under Croatian rule and thereby
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becoming the “slaves of slaves.” Much to the consternation of the Croats, he retained
Niko Novaković — an ethnic Serb and former minister without portfolio in the
Stojadinović government, and whose brother was a prominent Četnik — as mayor of
Knin. Novaković supported a petition to include Knin as part of Italian Dalmatia.377 In
the face of so much anti-Italian hostility from Croats, Monticelli was impressed by the
supplication of Serb leaders seeking Italian protection. He genuinely believed that Serbs
in Lika and Bosnia would loyally submit to Italian authority, and that their support could
be used for long-term political gains.378 While Monticelli undoubtedly overestimated the
level and extent of pro-Italian feeling among Serbs, this calculation — more than preexisting bias or humanitarian considerations — formed the basis of his pro-Serb policy in
the following months.
Dalmazzo agreed with Monticelli that Serb petitions provided an opportunity for
Italian expansion, but he warned that their proclamations of loyalty were only motivated
out of fear of Croatian reprisals: “We need to exploit this state of affairs with much
caution.”379 Meanwhile, Italian diplomats argued that adopting a pro-Serb line was akin
to supporting the concept of a Yugoslavian state, the “forced and fleeting construction of
Versailles,” primarily anti-Italian in its scope.380 But, this feeling was not unanimous. A
pro-Serbian or pro-Yugoslavian current existed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
through the Fascist period, its popularity and potential ebbing and flowing with the
course of events. At its heart was the notion that Croats and Slovenes, rather than the
ruling Serbs of Yugoslavia, posed the greatest obstacle to Italian aspirations in the
Adriatic.381 As we have seen, this is precisely the realization that dawned upon Italian
generals in Croatia during the spring and summer of 1941.
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When open revolt broke out in Lika in July, Serb rebels exploited the political and
moral sympathy they enjoyed from Italian commands as well as a by now full-blown
Italo-Croatian rivalry, entreating the Italians not to engage them in combat. In their
contacts with local Italian authorities, individual rebel leaders deliberately appealed to the
anti-communist and anti-Croatian mentality of the Italians, while shrewdly praising
Italian civilization and military prestige.382 They were largely preaching to the converted;
the Sassari Division had tolerated the presence of armed bands of Serbs that had formed
for self-defence since May.383 At the end of July, when Serb emissaries met with the
commander of the division’s 151st Regiment, they insisted that they were not
communists and that, while they flew the old Yugoslavian flag, “this does not mean that
they want to re-establish Yugoslavia.” The rebels claimed that their objective was “that of
freeing Serbs from the ferocity of the Croats and of obtaining annexation to Italy.” They
promised not to attack Italian units or garrisons and they assured Italian officers that
Croatian prisoners were treated humanely. The regiment’s commander, Colonel
Leonardi, concluded that “their claims seemed truly sincere; I read in their eyes the
distress of their souls [dolore delle loro anime], but also the cold determination to
continue to fight to the last.”384 Negotiations of this sort continued at the lower level
through the summer, with Italian garrison and battalion commanders maintaining regular
contact with Serb leaders.385
After taking over the defence of Knin at the beginning of August, the command of
the Sassari Division actively established communication with rebel leaders and found
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them cooperative, agreeing to halt their advance short of Knin.386 When the Italian army
announced its formal reoccupation of Zone II at the end of the month, Italian generals
expected rebel groups to disband, but they also considered employing them against
Communist Partisan formations. In typically colonial fashion, as they reoccupied Zone II,
Italian column commanders offered “protection” in return for “submission to Italy” and
for “collaborating actively and loyally for the elimination of communists.”387 The
response seemed encouraging: some Serb leaders offered to form armed bands to fight
alongside Italians on all fronts, including in the Soviet Union.388 By the end of October,
the VI Corps had established a system of informal alliances with armed groups of Serbs
in Lika and Bosnia. These alliances had the military aim of quickly stabilizing the newly
occupied territories and the political aim of consolidating Italy’s presence there.
Dalmazzo was convinced that his policies, while alienating some Croats, had gained the
genuine loyalty of the Serb population.389 He officially sanctioned “negotiations with
rebels,” so long as officers did not make any definite promises to them.390
In Zone III, the Italians encountered greater hostility.391 Communist propaganda
had won over many Serb nationalists, who participated in operations alongside Partisan
formations. Monticelli credited this in part to the fact that Ambrosio’s decree in
September, announcing the Italian reoccupation of Croatian territory, effectively admitted
that the Italians would leave at the end of the war.392 Much depended upon the attitude of
individual Serb bands and their leaders. In late February 1942, Partisan and Četnik forces
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launched a joint attack on the Italo-Croatian garrison at Varcar Vakuf. The leader of one
Četnik band, Monticelli reported, “proved himself on this occasion our friend” by
warning the Italians of the attack and keeping his band out of it.393
The attitudes of rebel groups and of Italian commands in Herzegovina were
particularly ambiguous. Events in this region, also under the jurisdiction of VI Corps,
demonstrate that behaviour and Italian policies towards Serb rebels varied according to
local circumstances through winter 1941–42. Armed revolt began in eastern Herzegovina
earlier than elsewhere, at the end of June 1941, but here Italian and Croatian forces
quickly worked to contain it. The Marche Division was involved in sporadic fighting
against “bands of Serb rebels.”394 At the end of the year, Pivano’s Cacciatori delle Alpi
Division took over the sector occupied by the Marche Division. Pivano, too, found Četnik
forces in the area to be hostile. Moreover, he noted that these formations had not banded
together merely for self defence, but that they shared a political aim of obtaining
independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina, while cleansing it of Croats and Muslims.395
The experience of the Kalinovik garrison during the winter left Pivano disenchanted with
the prospects of a general pro-Serb policy. While Četnik emissaries professed their
friendship to the Italian garrison commander, they also issued what amounted to an
ultimatum for the Italians to evacuate Kalinovik.396 Although the Italians had intended to
withdraw from Kalinovik before snow hemmed them in, such an act now would have
been a serious blow to Italian prestige. The garrison commander replied that, “where the
Italian flag waves, Serbs, Croats, [and] Muslims are equally protected and defended,” and
he fortified Kalinovik and the neighbouring village of Ulog. A standoff followed, with
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Italian and Croatian troops remaining behind barbed wire while Četnik bands hunted
down Croats and Muslims in the countryside. Only when the Italians threatened to shell
nearby Serb villages did the Četniks reduce their pressure on the isolated garrisons.397
The experience at Kalinovik prompted Pivano to clamp down on the initiative of
his subordinates in political affairs, asking him to consult his command before
conducting negotiations or deciding policy.398 For his part, Pivano pessimistically saw no
natural allies in Herzegovina: the Croats resented Italian interference; the Muslims would
align themselves with whoever appeared strongest; the Orthodox Serbs wanted to restore
the Yugoslavian state, which paralleled the objectives of the Communist Partisans.399 Nor
did Italy’s military attaché in Zagreb, Colonel Gian Carlo Re, share Second Army’s
enthusiasm towards the Četniks. While hardly a friend of the Ustaše, he regarded the socalled “anti-communist” Serb bands as equally unreliable, being in contact with Moscow
and London and having refused to disarm and return to “peaceful labour” after the
pacification of their home regions. Instead of relying on the Četniks, Re favoured an
influx of Italian troops, ready to occupy all of Croatia when, he predicted, the Pavelić
regime collapsed.400
As with its policy towards the Ustaše, Rome’s official line towards Serbs and
Četniks in 1941 was unclear. That the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposed the army’s
approach is not surprising, given its unwillingness to abandon its long-held anti-Serb
policy or its alliance with Pavelić.401 In September, Mussolini and Cavallero urged
Ambrosio to “do whatever necessary so that our position in Croatia does not exhibit even
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the slightest shade of philo-Serbism.”402 While this seemed like a clear renunciation of
the army’s pro-Serb attitude, it did not carry the weight of a formal decree. Moreover,
Mussolini’s words must be understood in the context of circumstances and events in
Serbia that month, when Mihailović’s Četniks temporarily joined sides with Tito’s
Communist Partisans in open revolt against German occupation forces.403 These
circumstances did not correspond to the situation at the time in Croatia, where Serb
nationalists largely avoided conflict with Italian troops, instead greeting them with shouts
of “Živio Italia” and “Dobro italiano.”404
In an attempt to meet Rome’s recommendations part way, the ardently pro-Serb
Monticelli tried to rein in the Serbophilia of his subordinates, reminding them that their
task was to ensure order and suppress communism in order to consolidate the
Independent State of Croatia. The Serb population, he admitted, was the greatest threat to
stability, whether through communism or pan-Serb nationalism. However, unwilling to
abandon the fruitful relationships his command had established with local Serbs,
Monticelli ordered his men to adopt different attitudes towards communist and noncommunist armed bands. Whereas the former “must be constantly pursued and
inexorably suppressed,” Monticelli asked his officers merely to keep an eye on
formations of armed Serbs and to take action against them only if they directly attacked
Italian troops.405 Monticelli’s contradictory directive demonstrates the Italian army’s
growing preoccupation with the Communist Partisan movement at the end of 1941, when
German divisions drove Tito’s formations out of Serbia and into Italian-held zones.406
This coincided with the end of the alliance between Mihailović and Tito, after which
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Četniks and Partisans engaged one another more frequently in open combat.407 A policy
of attraction towards nationalist Serbs was not just politically useful; it was now seen as
militarily feasible and necessary. By December, Italian dialogue with Serb bands focused
less on protection from Ustaša persecution and more on military collaboration against
communism.408
In neighbouring Montenegro, a pro-Četnik policy had been the cornerstone of
Italian counterinsurgency strategy since the summer. Italian commanders exploited
factionalism within the Montenegrin rebel movement by brokering deals with local
nationalist bands. The military governor of Montenegro and former governor of Amhara,
Alessandro Pirzio Biroli, became the earliest and strongest advocate of a semi-formal
military alliance with the Serbs.409 From across the border, Dalmazzo’s VI Corps
followed Pirzio Biroli’s policies and suggestions closely.410 In August, Pirzio Biroli had
urged Rome to give political backing to Serb and Montenegrin nationalists, on the basis
of racial or tribal stereotypes.
All told, the Serbs, despite their rough nature, still seem the best to me. The
Croats are unctuous and false; true hypocrites, with a deep-rooted cowardliness
that contrasts with the warlike and chivalrous spirit of the Serbs and
Montenegrins.
Aside from the political error of the Serbs in going against the Axis (but this owes
to immoral and corrupt leaders and illusions of Russian strength), it is preferable
to support national aspirations among the Serbs and Montenegrins rather than the
Croats and Albanians. They are all more or less untrustworthy, but the least
untrustworthy are still the Serbs. With the collapse of Russia, in my opinion, it
would not be bad policy to bring the Serbs into Rome’s orbit. [...]
Serbia, referring to the old Serbia, is the most homogenous and compact racial
group and is undoubtedly the best in all the Balkans. Rough and warlike, the Serb
has qualities of spirit, intellectual capacities and temperament that clearly
distinguish him from the Croats, Albanians, Bulgarians and Rumanians.411

407

“Notiziario n. 302,” 4 March 1942, NARA T-821/402/0426–32.

408

“Notiziario n. 230,” 20 December 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 584, DS VI Corps, December 1941,
allegati.
409

See Caccamo, “L’occupazione del Montenegro.”

410

“Notiziario n. 152,” 3 October 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 584, DS VI Corps, October 1941, allegati.

411

“Montenegro,” 12 August 1941, DSCS, 4/II:243–45.

318

Several generals, including Roatta, believed that Serbs belonged to a martial race.412
Quirino Armellini — a fellow veteran of the war in Amhara, where he had opined on the
relative fighting qualities of tribal groups — likewise reported that Orthodox Serbs were
“more combative and seem on the whole more clearly anti-communist; the [Croats] are
persuaded more to fight to protect their homes and property.”413 This tendency to view
the populations of Yugoslavia as indigenous tribal groups that could be divided and
conquered suggests a traditional colonial mindset among Italian generals.414 Yet, it was
not incompatible with more modern Fascist notions of a European Imperial Community.
Pirzio Biroli argued that Montenegrins were capable of forming a “state within the
framework of the Roman Empire.”415
In light of these arguments and the changing military circumstances in
Yugoslavia, Mussolini eased his tone towards a pro-Serb policy at the end of 1941. In
December, when Ambrosio raised the possibility of negotiating with Serb rebels to ease
the potential Italian occupation of Bosnia, Mussolini voiced no opposition.416 Meanwhile,
Second Army’s pro-Serb policy found an unusual ally in the Julian Fascist, Italo Sauro, a
confidant of Mussolini who had advocated the expulsion of Slavs from Venezia-Giulia
before the war. In a letter to Mussolini at the end of January 1942, Sauro argued in favour
of a more or less formal alliance with Bosnian Serbs, supporting their desire for national
independence from Croatia if need be. Sauro believed that Second Army’s policies
genuinely had won over Serbs; full-scale collaboration would enable the army to focus its
military efforts solely against Communist Partisans, it would bring the natural resources
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of Bosnia and Herzegovina into Italy’s orbit, and it would bolster Italy’s position against
Croatian, Bulgarian, and German meddling.417
There is little doubt that army generals were already thinking along similar lines.
As authors like Gobetti, Bucarelli, and Milazzo have argued, the army’s pro-Serb policy
was rooted equally in utilitarian military and political motives. Through 1941, this policy
had developed informally and inconsistently as a response to local circumstances,
including the behaviour of individual Serb bands and their leaders. Early advocates, such
as Monticelli, were driven in part by humanitarian impulses to protect Serbs from Ustaša
persecution, in part by the pragmatic fear of alienating such a large portion of the
population, and in part by the “political intent” of obtaining and protecting Italy’s spazio
vitale against the Germans and Croats.418 Only at the end of the year did operational
military concerns play a central role in the army’s rationale. Mussolini, as in most matters
concerning Balkan affairs, provided little clear direction for policy. By 1942, according
to a note in Cavallero’s diary, he regarded all players in Croatia to be “enemies.”419
Effectively, he permitted Second Army to pursue strategy and politics as it saw fit.

Operation Trio
The Italian army’s interconnected policies towards the Germans, Croats, and Serbs came
to a head in the first half of 1942, when Italian ambitions in Yugoslavia reached their
zenith. This is exemplified by the case of Operation Trio, a joint Italo-German-Croatian
anti-partisan operation conducted in eastern Bosnia during April and May 1942.
Operation Trio illustrates the Italian army’s fear of German encroachment, its contempt
for the Croatian Ustaše, and its use of nationalist Serb and Četnik bands as tools for
Italian political and imperial expansion. Ostensibly undertaken to eliminate Tito’s
Partisans — which had regrouped around the town of Foča near the Italo-German
417
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demarcation line — during its planning stages the operation developed into a thinly
veiled attempt to expand Italy’s political influence and territorial jurisdiction in Bosnia.
Mussolini, the Foreign Ministry, and Second Army had their eyes set on Bosnia
since the autumn of 1941. In November, Pietromarchi asked the army to be prepared to
extend its occupation deeper into Bosnia if requested to do so by Zagreb. Cavallero was
lukewarm to the idea, but Dalmazzo, whose VI Corps already occupied Herzegovina and
parts of Bosnia, was more enthusiastic. He ventured that the 10,000 Serb rebels
threatening Sarajevo north of the demarcation line would melt away if Italian troops
occupied the city, and he claimed that educated opinion there favoured the complete
occupation of Croatia by the Italian army for a period of no less than twenty years. 420
Dalmazzo’s “wishful thinking” was bolstered by the declarations of Bosnian Četnik
leaders, who for their own tactical reasons favoured an Italian incursion into Bosnia at the
expense of the Ustaše and Communist Partisans.421 Dalmazzo believed that Bosnian
Serbs would welcome the idea of a separate state of Bosnia and Herzegovina under
Italian protection. Indeed, Dalmazzo mused, even the Muslims of the region might accept
Italian overlordship, thanks to Italy’s reputation of “civility and liberality” towards
minorities, its respect of the Islamic faith in Africa and Albania, and its Mediterranean
orientation.422 In reality, Italian support of nationalist Serb detachments that raided
Muslim villages rendered such a scenario unlikely.
In mid-December, circumstances appeared to favour Dalmazzo’s schemes. Hitler
decided to pull German forces out of Yugoslavia for deployment on the eastern front, and
he offered Italy full territorial and military jurisdiction over Croatia. Mussolini was
“skeptical” but pleased by the opportunity to solidify Croatia as part of Italy’s
“Lebensraum.” Roatta, who as army chief had previously warned against expansion into
Croatia, now proved “favourable to the thing” as an opportunity to reverse German
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encroachment on Italy’s spazio vitale. Ambrosio likewise saw the German offer as a
chance to “seize [impadronirsi] Croatia, not only militarily, but also politically and
economically.”423 In other words, Mussolini and his generals hoped to use the physical
occupation of territory by Second Army to do what diplomacy thus far had failed to
accomplish: bring Croatia under Italian control as a functioning part of Fascism’s
Imperial Community. But this development — which would have eradicated any
lingering pretenses to Croatian sovereignty — was quickly halted when the Germans
changed course. Facing complaints from Zagreb and Belgrade, Berlin rescinded its offer
on 24 December. The Germans announced their intention to reoccupy territory up to the
demarcation line, and they called for military cooperation between Axis forces in Croatia.
This apparent German-Ustaša plot angered the Italians and would further undermine
effective collaboration between Axis forces.424
Italian generals were not immediately deterred by this reversal. On the contrary,
Ambrosio and Dalmazzo now believed that they had received a specific mandate from
the Duce to pursue territorial expansion in the Adriatic at Croatia’s expense. After
meeting with Mussolini at the end of the month, Ambrosio concluded that the Duce
intended to expand Dalmatia’s boundaries exponentially to include the entirety of Zone
II. Mussolini reportedly informed Ambrosio that
I now consider the current borders imposed by circumstances of the moment to be
superseded. You can gradually and tactfully proceed with the elimination of
Croatian influence in the 2nd zone up to the Dinarides. Respond to U[staša]
action. Expel hostile political authorities and civil servants [capivilla] from the
2nd zone. Prevent the increase of Croatian garrisons.425

423

“Estensione dell’occupazione italiana a tutto il territorio croato,” 18 December 1941, DSCS, 5/II:97.
Ciano diary, 17 December 1941. Ambrosio memorandum, 18 December 1941, DDI 9, VIII, 40.
424

Shepherd, Terror in the Balkans, 172. Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement, 68–69. Pietromarchi to
Casertano, 29 December 1941, DDI 9, VIII, 81. “Riassunto degli argomenti tratti dall'Eccellenza Ambrosio
nella riunione tenuta presso il Comando della 2^ Armata il 30-XII-41,” 31 December 1941, AUSSME, N1–
11, b. 585, DS VI Corps, December 1941, allegati. “Politica croata nei territori della 2a e 3a zona,” 23
January 1942, DSCS, 6/II:36–41.
425

“Riassunto degli argomenti tratti dall'Eccellenza Ambrosio nella riunione tenuta presso il Comando
della 2^ Armata il 30-XII-41,” 31 December 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 585, DS VI Corps, December
1941, allegati.

322

While consolidating their hold over the Dalmatian hinterland, Mussolini and his generals
still hoped to bring Bosnia into Rome’s orbit. Berlin’s call for joint operations — which
the Italian army heretofore had resisted in order to protect their sphere from German
interference — now offered an opportunity to expand. Given the Italian army’s
significant numerical superiority over the Germans in Croatia, and given Hitler’s
unwillingness to expend resources in the Balkans, joint operations could result in more
territory coming under Italian occupation. Mussolini immediately agreed to the idea of
joint operations, starting in Bosnia.426
Logistical difficulties and weather conditions prevented Second Army from
participating directly in operations that the Germans launched in January. Their failure
prompted another call from Wilhelm Keitel of the German armed forces high command
[OKW] for military cooperation.427 Ambrosio and Pietromarchi insisted that the time was
ripe to press for changes to the demarcation line. The Germans had proven incapable of
mastering the situation without Italian help; now Second Army could swoop across the
boundary and, via fait accompli, establish full military control over Croatia, an
“indispensable premise for making it our true spazio vitale.”428 This argument convinced
Cavallero, who tried to define Bosnia as a strictly Italian zone of operations and
influence. He suggested to Keitel that the Italian army would focus its efforts on Bosnia
while the Germans launched supporting operations in Serbia.429 Keitel agreed at least to a
unified command under Second Army’s new head, General Mario Roatta.430 Replacing
Roatta at the SMRE, Ambrosio continued to play a lead role in the project.
After the preliminary discussions between the Comando Supremo and OKW,
Ambrosio, Roatta, and their staffs met with their German and Croatian counterparts in the
Istrian resort town of Abbazia [Opatija] during 2 and 3 March to iron out the details of
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Operation Trio. Keitel and Cavallero’s correspondence notwithstanding, the German
representatives were alarmed by Ambrosio’s insistence that joint operations only take
place on the German side of the demarcation line but under Italian command.431
Ambrosio also argued that the available forces were enough only to tackle one area:
eastern Bosnia. There, the demarcation line would have to be nullified and civil authority
granted to whoever happened to occupy an area.432 These proposals were meant to avoid
German incursions that might compromise Italy’s sovereignty in its occupied and
annexed territories, while paving the way for an extended Italian presence around
Sarajevo. The Croats rightly feared that the Italians intended to remain in eastern Bosnia,
and German Commander Southeast, General Walter Kuntze, privately concluded that “an
effort should be made to limit the presence of Italian troops in the area [...] to the shortest
possible period.”433
Ambrosio came out of the meeting convinced that, while the Germans and Croats
had worked together to try to “exclude us from any interference or penetration in eastern
Bosnia,” the “logic” of his arguments — exploiting the concentration of rebel forces
around Sarajevo and Italy’s material advantage in the upcoming operation — had won
the day. By effectively erasing the demarcation line in Bosnia “indefinitely,” Ambrosio
felt that he had
guaranteed for as long a time as possible the permanence of our troops in the area
beyond the demarcation line. […] I think such conditions can constitute a
favourable starting point for the work that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can
conduct towards making permanent the occupation of the areas in which our
troops will have entered […] to ensure that the well-known ‘spazio vitale’
becomes, for the region in question, an effective reality.434
For Ambrosio and Roatta, the objectives of Operation Trio were primarily political in
nature. They aimed to reverse German encroachment on an Italian sphere of interest,
undermine the hated Ustaša regime, and expand Rome’s influence in territory that Fascist
directives and propaganda had proclaimed to be part of Italy’s Imperial Community. The
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military objective of destroying Tito’s Partisan forces was of secondary importance; at
this stage, Italian generals remained convinced that the formal transfer of territory to an
Italian occupation regime rather than a German or Croatian one would suffice to end the
revolt, such was their faith in the virtues of Italian civilization and prestige. As Eric
Gobetti argues, the army’s project in Bosnia — far from an alternative to the pro-Ustaša
policy of the regime or a manifestation of the army’s anti-Fascism — was consistent with
the concept of working “towards the Duce.”435
But the Abbazia conference was not a complete Italian success. Ambrosio and
Roatta made two concessions that later undermined their schemes. The first was placing
German General Paul Bader in charge of the actual field operations in Bosnia. Although
Roatta still had overall command of Operation Trio, this concession proved significant.
Two weeks after the conference, Ambrosio complained that Bader’s initial marching
orders for German and Croatian troops “constitutes clear proof of their intention not to
allow (or to allow it only for a small depth) our penetration into eastern Bosnia.” He
urged Roatta to use his position to ensure that operational plans would “secure the
presence of our units in the zones beyond the demarcation line for as long as possible.”436
Roatta spent the following weeks fending off German and especially Croatian efforts to
revise the agreements made at Abbazia. Against Croatian complaints, Roatta insisted that
Italian troops would pass through Sarajevo at the beginning of the operation, that military
authorities would assume full civil powers, and that he would have the final say on where
and for how long German and Italian garrisons would remain in operational territory.437
The other concession made by Italian representatives at Abbazia was their
agreement “not to negotiate either with the Cetniks or with the Communists.”438 By the
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beginning of 1942, many of the Serb bands in eastern Bosnia had aligned themselves
with the Bosnian Četnik movement, which was in communication with the Četnik
leadership in Serbia and Montenegro but functioned largely autonomously.439 As we have
seen, despite the difficulties encountered at the local level with some of these bands, the
commands of Second Army and VI Corps wanted to use the Bosnian Četniks to ease their
military task against the Communist Partisans and to establish a base of support for
Italian political expansion in Bosnia. German military authorities in Serbia, including
Bader, shared a similar rationale and favoured some form of accommodation with the
Četniks in order to give Serbia’s collaborationist regime more popular backing and
prevent Serb nationalists from joining Tito’s Partisans. However, Berlin vetoed Bader’s
efforts to negotiate with Četnik leaders in Serbia or Bosnia, partly due to pressure from
pro-Ustaša German political officials in Croatia, partly due to mistrust following the
Serbian Četniks’ temporary alliance with the Communist Partisans in late summer 1941,
and partly due to Hitler’s own Serbophobia and reluctance to accommodate any form of
non-German nationalism in occupied Europe.440 In his discussions with Keitel before the
Abbazia conference, Cavallero had hastily but vaguely agreed to avoid military
collaboration with the Četniks.441 In practice, Roatta continued Second Army’s informal
and decentralized approach from 1941, directing his commands to “avoid any talks
[trattative] with the Četniks,” but permitting “contacts [contatti] with Četniks that could
be advisable for contingent situations and local convenience.”442
Changing circumstances after the Abbazia meetings in March led the Italian army
to re-evaluate the potential role of Bosnian Četniks in Operation Trio. In light of the
German-Ustaša solidarity witnessed at Abbazia, Ambrosio proposed establishing an
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opposing “Italo-Chetnik bloc.”443 Meanwhile, Italian contacts with the Četnik movement
became more concrete. Četnik emissaries convinced Italian generals that their movement
was better organized and coordinated than it actually was. Roatta and Dalmazzo
conducted high-level talks intended to establish collaboration between Italian and Četnik
forces throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.444 In March, with the knowledge of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italian agents entered negotiations with Milan Nedić, the
quisling leader of German-occupied Serbia who offered Četnik support in Montenegro
and Bosnia in return for Italian backing of a resurgent Serbian state. These discussions
fell apart in June because the Italians realized that Nedić exercised little control over
Četnik formations outside of Serbia, but they reflected the increasing formalization and
centralization of the army’s policy towards the Četniks through the spring of 1942.445
Roatta believed that Bader — who had tolerated Nedić’s contacts with Četniks and had
himself conducted negotiations with the Bosnian Četnik leader Jezdimir Dangić —
agreed with his strategy in principle. Moreover, the Italian general was encouraged by the
fact that Croatian authorities had opened negotiations with Četnik leaders in
Herzegovina; he used this as a pretext to do the same in Bosnia. At the end of the month,
Roatta proposed talks with Bosnian Četniks to achieve their allegiance or neutrality — to
“at least chloroform the Četniks” — during Operation Trio.446
Bader’s final operational directives for Trio seemed an Italian success. Italian and
German military divisions would have control over civil affairs and non-resisting Četniks
would not be considered rebels.447 However, as the operation’s start date of 15 April
approached, Italian military and political plans began to unravel. Negotiations with the
Četniks and the logistical difficulties involved with transferring three Italian divisions to
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their starting points beyond the demarcation line forced Roatta to postpone the
commencement of operations, first to the 20th, then to the 25th. Bader complained that
these delays would enable Tito’s forces to escape.448 German political authorities, already
alarmed by Roatta’s “surprising turn” regarding the Četnik question, considered the
Italian delays duplicitous. The postponement of operations seemed to confirm that the
Italian army had no interest in actual military operations, but that “a political aim, the
occupation of Sarajevo and East Bosnia, was probably the motive of their tactics.”449
Regardless of the reasons behind Second Army’s delays, the Germans and Croats
more or less correctly deduced Italian plans for eastern Bosnia. They now sought to avoid
Italian penetration into Bosnia altogether. When on 9 April, an Ustaša unit disregarded
Roatta and Bader’s orders and suddenly advanced against rebel forces around Srebrenica,
Kuntze decided to exploit the manoeuvre to “clear up the situation in East Bosnia north
of the demarcation line before the beginning of the joint operation.”450 On 20 April,
German and Croatian units began a methodical advance along the Drina River.
Effectively, they launched the opening phase of Operation Trio early, before the Italian
divisions were in position. Now, it was the turn of Italian generals to blame their allies for
“political interference.”451 Umberto Fabbri, the chief liaison officer attached to Bader’s
command, noted that the German and Croatian advance followed “the sudden arrival” in
Sarajevo of the Croatian foreign minister, Lorković, and secret police chief Dido
Kvaternik, as well as the Croatophile Austrian General Glaise-Horstenau. He concluded
that the “Germans and Croats, adhering to a clear cut political manoeuvre, advanced the
start date of operations, managing to avoid an Italian contribution in Bosnian territory.”452
Indeed, on 21 April, Bader announced that the situation in Bosnia was so greatly
improved that a large-scale operation was no longer necessary. The Italian command did
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not accept Bader’s explanation, which “compromised [Italian] political intentions of
putting a solid foot in Bosnia.” Roatta responded that without word from Rome and
Berlin, Operation Trio must go ahead as planned. He accelerated orders for Italian
divisions to cross the demarcation line and he instructed Dalmazzo to visit Sarajevo
personally, taking with him a large escort of motorcyclists and armoured cars displaying
large Italian flags.453
In the face of Italian complaints, Keitel ordered Kuntze to continue operations “in
accord with the command of the Italian Second Army.”454 However, by this point, the
bulk of the Partisan forces had relocated south of the demarcation line around Foča,
where the remainder of Operation Trio would play itself out in the first half of May. Tito
once again escaped the Axis noose, and Roatta was left consoling himself that at least his
divisions had proven more adept at mountain warfare than those deployed by the
Germans.455 On 15 May, Roatta announced that Operation Trio was over. During its
course, only the Taurinense Division had established any sort of permanence north of the
demarcation line. Most of its units reached Sarajevo by train at the end of April, where
they found Ustaša officials intent on making their stay “as comfortless as possible.” Now,
the Taurinense Division was ordered back to the Italian side of the demarcation line,
surrendering its northern garrisons to German and Croatian forces.456
Operation Trio ended in failure for the Italian Second Army. Militarily, Tito’s
Partisan formations had suffered a significant blow and were driven out of their bases,
but their command and elite core remained intact.457 Politically, Second Army’s attempt
to extend its influence into eastern Bosnia was completely thwarted by circumstances and
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by German and Croatian countermeasures. The operation thus epitomized the
dysfunctional nature of the Axis coalition in occupied Yugoslavia: political rivalry and
mistrust between the three partners contributed to their military ineffectiveness. During
Trio’s planning phase, Ambrosio and Roatta sacrificed the operation’s military potential
in favour of pursuing their expansionist agenda. Their desire to have thousands of Italian
troops criss-cross eastern Bosnia in order to impose an Italian presence in the region
caused inevitable delays that eliminated any chance of surprise against the Partisans.
Their poorly concealed political schemes raised suspicions among their allies, ensuring
that communications between the participating commands were neither frank nor timely.
Italian generals were indignant that their allies dared oppose their intentions in an area
that they considered to belong within Rome’s orbit. As in 1941, the Croatian government
and Croatophile “Austrians” drew most of their ire as the main obstacles to success.
The Četnik Controversy
Operation Trio marked the height of Second Army’s power in Yugoslavia. Italian
generals never again found themselves in such a favourable position in relation to their
allies. Reinforcements from Italy dried up and Italian forces found it increasingly difficult
to contain the Partisan movement. Immediately following the conclusion of Trio, the
Comando Supremo informed Second Army that it would have to give up two infantry
divisions before the end of the year. Needs on other fronts and imminent operations in
Slovenia demanded the withdrawal of troops and garrisons from Croatia.458 Thus,
Dalmazzo turned over the hard-won garrisons of Foča, Kalinovik, and Jelec in Zone III to
the Croats as VI Corps concentrated further south in Herzegovina.459 On 19 June 1942,
Roatta and Pavelić signed an accord in Zagreb that called for the withdrawal of all Italian
troops from Zone III and the return of civil powers to Croatian authorities in Zone II.
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Second Army would focus on defending the annexed territories and securing major
communications lines along the Adriatic coast.460
The middle of 1942 has thus been depicted as a dividing line for Italian policy in
the Balkans: up to that point, the Italians sought to expand their territorial control in the
region; afterwards, the Italian army was in retreat.461 With their shift to the defensive
after Operation Trio, military necessity played a larger role in the decision making of
Italian generals, but this did not mean that they had divested themselves of their longterm political aims in Yugoslavia, or that they had resigned themselves to German and
Croatian predominance in the region. They jealously defended their jurisdiction and
status from the Ustaše, while continuing their policy of attraction towards Serbs through
increasingly formal relationships with Četnik bands. Indeed, the Italian army’s
relationship with the Četniks became most controversial in 1942 and 1943. As Trio had
demonstrated, the Italian and German leaderships were fundamentally at odds over
military collaboration with nationalist Serb bands. Moreover, with Trio, the Germans
accepted a more active and permanent role in Croatia. During the remainder of the
occupation, the Italian army’s most serious disputes with German and Croatian
authorities arose over the Četnik question.462
The army’s motives for its alliance with the Četniks in 1942 were essentially the
same as its reasons for attracting Serbs in 1941; only the relative weight of those motives
changed in relation to new realities. Pragmatic military considerations played a larger
role in Roatta’s policies than they had for his predecessor, Ambrosio. During the buildup
to Operation Trio, Roatta had emphasized the military common sense behind negotiations
with Četnik leaders, arguing that “it is hardly worthwhile to double needlessly the
number of our adversaries.” Roatta considered the Serbs experts in the guerrilla-style
warfare that the Communist Partisans had forced upon Second Army.463 Rather than “to
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drive these accidental allies into the enemy’s ranks,” Roatta wanted to “give support to
the Chetniks, in order to make them fight against the communists” or, as he cynically put
it, to have the two rebel groups “slit each others’ throats.”464
Both the efficacy and necessity of this strategy seemed borne out by the results of
Operation Trio. Thanks to competition between the Četnik and Communist leaderships,
the Partisan “state” in eastern Bosnia already was weakened from within by the time of
the Axis offensive. Partisan units and commanders deserted to the Četniks and Tito was
forced to abandon the region and undertake his “long march” westward to Bosanska
Krajina.465 This brought the Partisans onto the edge of the sector occupied by Armellini’s
XVIII Corps, where the Italians already faced a strong Communist-led local resistance
movement. Aware of Second Army’s dwindling manpower situation and imminent
withdrawals to the coast, Armellini considered Četnik formations “extremely useful in
the struggle against communism.”466 General Paolo Berardi, who replaced Monticelli as
commander of the Sassari Division in May 1942, envisioned exchanging Italian
occupation in Zone III with a Četnik “buffer zone” [fascia di sicurezza] to keep pressure
off of Italian coastal garrisons and the Dalmatian provinces.467 Military and utilitarian
objectives thus were paramount in the formalization of Italo-Četnik cooperation by the
middle of 1942. Eric Gobetti rightly cautions against interpreting Roatta’s cynicism as
evidence of a coherent “divide and conquer” strategy that intentionally pitted Serbs and
Croats against one another, fuelling genocide. Ideally, Roatta wanted to unite the Ustaše
and Četniks in a common front against the Partisans. The Italian army’s actions, Gobetti
notes, remained the incoherent product of compromises made by individual commanders
in response to immediate circumstances.468
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Nonetheless, even during this period of retreat, political motives remained
significant among Italian commanders at all levels. Although their push into eastern
Bosnia had failed, Italian generals stubbornly guarded their influence south of the
demarcation line from German and Croatian encroachment. On the face of it, the Zagreb
Accord of 19 June seemed to reverse Italian gains from the previous autumn by returning
sovereignty to Croatian authorities. However, the terms of the agreement — developed
initially by the Comando Supremo and the Italian Foreign Ministry, then finalized in
Roatta’s meeting with Pavelić — included a number of conditions and stipulations that
sought to maintain Supersloda’s status as final arbiter in its half of Croatia. The Italians
retained the right to station troops and conduct operations anywhere in Zones II and III.
They kept police powers along the coast, in areas of operations, and wherever they had
garrisons. Croatian forces on the Italian side of the demarcation line were prohibited from
operating under German control. Moreover, Italian commands retained veto power over
Croatian civil authorities in the interest of public order. Finally, Croatian officials agreed
to honour commitments made by Italian authorities. This included collaboration with
Serb guerrilla formations, which were to be codified as “anti-communist bands.” The
Italians could continue to organize such bands for local protection so long as their
members recognized Croatian sovereignty.469
The subsequent establishment of the Milizia Volontaria Anticomunista [MVAC]
in summer 1942 was intended to fill Supersloda’s need for manpower against the Partisan
movement while providing legal cover for continued cooperation between the Italian
army and nationalist Serb leaders. The MVAC formations theoretically were to include
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. In practice, Italian commands merely formalized the
alliances that they had already made with local Četnik groups, many of which maintained
contacts with Mihailović and the Četnik organization.470 For example, Momčilo Đujić’s
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Četnik band, which had operated alongside the Sassari Division since early 1942, was
simply transformed into an MVAC unit.471
The Zagreb Accord and the planned withdrawal of Italian troops that followed it
demanded increased collaboration with Croatian authorities and personnel as well. Roatta
may well have genuinely desired a rapprochement with Zagreb on military grounds, in
order to concentrate forces against the ever growing Partisan threat.472 However, his
subordinates — and eventually Roatta himself — placed little faith in the Croats and
preferred to rely on Serbs and Četniks as more politically reliable allies. Italian generals
were convinced that military cooperation with Croatian forces only served to fuel some
sort of German-Ustaša plot.
Dalmazzo accused the Ustaše of using joint operations with his forces in
Herzegovina to regain influence in the important city of Mostar. Although the Italians
had requested a single company of Croatian militia for an anti-partisan operation 60 km
outside the city, an entire Ustaša battalion arrived, accompanied by secret police and a
German liaison officer who intended to remain in Mostar. The battalion was led by Jure
Francetić, who had conducted the sudden advance on Srebrenica that upset Roatta’s plans
during Operation Trio and whose “cleansing” operations in eastern Bosnia had claimed
thousands of lives. Predictably, Dalmazzo found Francetić unwilling to recognize Italian
authority in the city. Only after Dalmazzo personally detained Francetić at Mostar’s
airport and ordered Italian troops to escort the police and German officer back to
Sarajevo was the crisis resolved.473 During the operations that followed, Italian troops
reportedly fired “with great joy” on Ustaša militia.474 In order to prove that Francetić’s
attitude was emblematic of “the mentality of the leadership of the Croatian state,”
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Dalmazzo later forwarded Roatta intercepted communications between Zagreb and Berlin
calling for closer commercial relations between Germany and Croatia at Italy’s
expense.475
Charges of Ustaša sabotage, intrigue, and military incompetence or unreliability
continued to pour in from Spigo’s XVIII Corps as well.476 Such reports convinced Roatta
that the Croatian high command was “incapable of any respectable undertaking.”477 He
lamented that correspondence from the Croatian General Staff carried “a tone that is
inappropriate to relations with a high military command of a great allied power.”478
Moreover, Zagreb’s inability to properly garrison towns abandoned by Second Army led
Roatta to conclude that the Croatian government — which for so long had lobbied for the
withdrawal of Italian forces — had acted in bad faith. He complained that the Croats
distributed their forces unequally, keeping most of their troops on the German side of the
demarcation line.479 Roatta failed to mention that Croatian security forces had largely
been pushed behind the demarcation line at the behest of Second Army in 1941.
By the end of 1942, Roatta’s hopes for a rapprochement between Italians, Croats,
and Serbs were dashed. Despite the moderation of the genocidal policies of the Ustaše,
on-and-off talks between Croatian and Četnik emissaries, and a major cabinet shuffle in
Zagreb — which included the removal and exile of Slavko and Dido Kvaternik — the
political situation seemed worse than before for the same reasons as before: the Croatian
armed forces were ineffective; Ustaša functionaries were incompetent; and, the
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government was unable to feed its population.480 In December, Roatta drew up plans for
the “occupation of Zagreb in case of seditious or sinister attempts [tentativi sediziosi o
torbidi] in Croatia.” Project “Z” envisioned units from XI Corps making a blitz from
Slovenia to the Croatian capital.481 These plans were justified as a contingency against a
Communist threat to Zagreb, but their vaguely defined purpose allowed for other
scenarios that could well have included action against the Ustaša regime.482 At the very
least, the existence of Project “Z” at the end of 1942 demonstrates that Roatta had not
given up on protecting and expanding Italy’s spazio vitale in Croatia.
Given their suspicions of German-Croatian intrigue and their scant regard for
Croatian military capabilities, Italian generals never were fully committed to a
rapprochement with Pavelić and his functionaries. Certainly, they were not willing to
jettison their Serb allies as the cost for improved relations with Zagreb. Italian commands
remained convinced that, if they had to choose between working with the Ustaše or the
Četniks, the latter were more reliable, militarily and politically. Initially lukewarm
towards collaboration with nationalist Serb bands, the command of the Cacciatori delle
Alpi Division was impressed by the behaviour of Četnik formations who during
Operation Trio offered their services against the Communist Partisans. Allowing that
opportunism had played an important role in these defections, the division’s propaganda
officers felt that Serb sympathies could be won over permanently with a clear declaration
of support from Rome.483
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Under its new commander, Berardi, the Sassari Division remained enthusiastic
about pursuing an alliance with the Četniks. Even as its units abandoned and laid waste to
territory in Lika and Bosanska Krajina in summer 1942, the division optimistically
reported that Serbs near the Dalmatian border favoured incorporation “either with Serbia
or with Italy.”484 Despite Italian withdrawals, the command of the Sassari Division
continued to adhere to Mussolini’s postwar aims of expanding the boundaries of Italian
Dalmatia. At the same time, Berardi and his chief of staff, Gazzini, grew frustrated at the
inability of Croatian and Četnik formations to coordinate against the Partisans. Although
the Četniks openly flouted the Zagreb Accord by flying the Serbian flag during joint
operations, Gazzini placed the blame solely at the feet of Croatian authorities whose
touchiness, he concluded, derived from “the quibbling mentality of certain people that
come up from nothing believing themselves great men.”485
By September, Berardi was willing to renounce any form of collaboration with
Croatian authorities and populations in favour of closer ties with the Četniks. In a private
letter to Spigo, he warned that “the constitution and armament of Croatian formations
(the army included) and in particular of the Ustaše is in brief dangerous for us because
the Croats are our enemies […] even if their leader follows a policy of loyalty towards
us.” He accused Croatian authorities of actively supporting the Partisan movement for
anti-Italian motives, whereas “the only ones that are loyal to us […] are the Orthodox
Serbs.” Responding to Spigo’s call to make more use of Croatian forces, Berardi
countered that arming Croats “threatened to neutralize the advantage that we have begun
to obtain by arming the Četniks.”486
Having transferred from Greece only in May 1942, Berardi was not driven by the
same humanitarian concerns that had contributed to Monticelli’s pro-Serb bearing. He
484

“Notiziario giornaliero informativo,” 3 August 1942, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 999, DS 12th “Sassari”
Division, July–August 1942, allegati.
485

Sassari Division Command war diary, 22 and 25 June 1942, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 999, DS 12th
“Sassari” Division, May–June 1942. The results of the first operation which units of the Sassari Division
conducted alongside Croatian troops and Četnik irregulars were not encouraging. Before the operation was
complete, the Croats and Četniks each returned to their respective camps, exposing the Italians’ flanks.
486

The contents of the letter were copied verbatim in the hand-written Sassari Division Command war
diary, 15 September 1942, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 1004, DS 12th “Sassari” Division, September–October
1942.

337

inherited a command staff with deeply entrenched anti-Croatian sentiments, and his own
military and political calculations led him to build upon the policies of his predecessor.487
Berardi flaunted his alliance with Đujić’s Četniks before Croatian authorities in Knin.
While he prudently turned away a band of Četniks that showed up to a public funeral
waving the Serbian flag, the same day Berardi hosted a luncheon for Serb MVAC
officers. Speaking on their behalf, Đujić affirmed his desire to liberate Serbia from “the
Croats” through “Italo-Serb friendship.” In his own speech, Berardi insinuated that the
political objectives of the Četniks could only be achieved through collaboration with Italy
against the Communist Partisans.488 When Croatian authorities accused the Italian army
of supporting the Četnik project to restore the old Yugoslavian state, Berardi
disingenuously feigned ignorance as to who the Četniks were, since the Italians permitted
only the existence of MVAC formations open to any creed.489 Officially, Roatta chastised
his subordinates for their continued philo-Serbism and their hostility towards the
Croats.490 But, he too was convinced that the Orthodox Serbs were more loyal to Italy
than were the Croats.491
As in 1941, Italian generals overestimated the degree and extent of support they
enjoyed from Serb populations and nationalist Četnik leaders. However, they did not
embark on a policy of collaboration with the Četniks out of naïveté. From their
negotiations with Četnik emissaries, Italian generals understood that Great Serb
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nationalism threatened their own interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and
Dalmatia. However, they calculated that this would only pose a danger after the war in
the event of an Axis defeat. Through most of 1942, despite their own local troubles,
Italian generals anticipated that the Axis would win the war.492 In the case of an Axis
victory, it was unlikely that Serb lobbying would threaten Italian interests, given Hitler’s
hostility towards the Serbs. Thus, while Roatta knew that his “Četnik” MVAC leaders
were in contact with the more anti-Axis and pro-British General Mihailović, and that
their long-term political goals were incompatible with Italy’s expansionist aims, he did
not believe that the time had come to “throw them out the window.”493
While they entailed significant risk, these calculations proved more or less
correct, mainly because the Allies did not attempt a landing in the Balkans during 1942 or
1943. Second Army’s reliance on Četnik auxiliaries had militarily negative repercussions
in the form of excesses committed against Croat and Muslim populations, and it ensured
that cooperation with the German and Croatian allies would not improve. Nevertheless,
the alternate loyalties of the Četnik leadership did not manifest themselves in practical
form during the Italian occupation of Yugoslavia. Četnik leaders continued to cooperate
in Italian operations aimed against the Partisans, and they would go on to do so with the
Germans after Italy’s departure from the theater in 1943.494
While agreeing that Second Army’s motivations in its dealings with the Četniks
were the result of cynical Realpolitik, some historians have argued that Italian generals
were guilty of “defying Mussolini’s orders” by supporting the Četnik movement. This
argument is based in part on the assumption that Mussolini fully backed Pavelić’s regime.
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As we have seen, this was not the impression that Italian generals had of the Duce’s
policy. It is also based on contradictory directives from Rome that have been interpreted
as criticism of the latter’s pro-Četnik demeanour.495 Certainly, functionaries of the
Foreign Ministry continued to oppose the army’s policy. Luca Pietromarchi was still
wedded to the Croatian alliance and, by summer 1942, he was convinced that the Četniks
had become uncontrollable.496 But, the Comando Supremo ordered Roatta to intensify the
constitution of MVAC forces in August.497 The following month, Mussolini warned
Roatta to use caution in collaborating with Četnik forces. Already having to deal with
Croatian irredentism, he was concerned about opening the door to Serb claims. Even so,
he ultimately approved Roatta’s negotiations with Četnik leaders.498 This hardly
amounted to a prohibition against support for the Četniks, nor was it a ringing
endorsement of the alternative Croatian alliance. By the end of 1942, policy in the
Balkans was no longer a priority for Mussolini. His war plans for 1943 neglected the
theatre altogether, and in November Second Army was forced to offer up another division
for the defence of Italy.499
Pressure from Berlin proved a more crucial obstacle to Supersloda’s policies than
did pressure from Rome. Through 1942, German military authorities complained about
the activity of irregular Serb formations, including MVAC units.500 By the end of the
year, the Germans enjoyed much more leverage in Croatia than they had twelve months
earlier. As Italian strength dwindled, the Wehrmacht re-equipped its occupation forces
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already in the theatre and reinforced them with three new divisions.501 The new
commander of German forces in southeastern Europe, the Austrian General Alexander
Löhr, declared the entire region a “unitary theatre of operations” under his direction. He
unilaterally announced that the demarcation line would no longer apply during largescale anti-partisan operations.502 Following their defeats in North Africa, the Germans
were urgent to destroy all guerrilla forces in Croatia before the Allies could launch an
amphibious landing in the Balkans. They asked the Italians to participate in a new joint
operation, Weiss, under German command.503
As part of the operation, Hitler demanded “brutal action” against Serb nationalists
and Četniks. On this point, Cavallero was from the beginning noncommittal. He feared
that, despite their assurances, the Germans intended to “intrude politically” into Italy’s
sphere of influence.504 Roatta, Pirzio Biroli, and Dalmazzo, now commanding the Italian
Ninth Army in Albania, all defended the Četnik alliance. Mussolini and Cavallero agreed
that the Germans merely refused to negotiate with the Četniks for their own political
reasons and that Serb bands had thus far collaborated effectively with Italian forces
against Communist Partisans. They were not willing to renounce collaboration altogether,
but they felt that they had to throw a bone to Hitler. Cavallero returned to the Germans
with a compromise: he pledged to stop delivering arms to anti-communist formations and
he announced that General Roatta, whose relationship with the Germans had been very
rocky since Operation Trio, would be transferred out of the Balkans.505 After Operation
Weiss began on 20 January 1943, Cavallero continued to permit the “temporary use” of
“volunteer units” and he looked the other way as Supersloda continued to supply MVAC
forces with arms. When Cavallero was himself removed from command in early
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February, his replacement, Ambrosio, proved even more reluctant to carry out anti-Četnik
activity at Germany’s behest.506
Exasperated by the Italian army’s vacillation, at the end of February Ribbentrop
and Hitler demanded that Supersloda disband its Četnik MVAC units. Mussolini
defended the army’s policy, arguing that it was first necessary to pacify the region before
disarming the anti-communist formations, but in the end he gave into German pressure.
Luciano Monzali has described Mussolini’s defence of the army’s position as “hesitant
and weak.”507 But, given Mussolini’s by now total reliance on Germany to obtain any of
his objectives, it is significant that he offered any opposition at all. Hitler’s personal
intervention and insistence on the matter carried decisive weight. In this context, it is
unlikely that Italian generals in the field afterwards felt that they were trying to “boycott”
Mussolini’s directives to disband the anti-communist militia.508 Supersloda’s new
commander, Robotti, immediately informed the Comando Supremo that he planned to
disarm the MVAC units gradually to avoid a violent reaction.509 After the Germans
announced their intention to extend Operation Weiss by occupying Mostar, well within
Second Army’s jurisdiction, Robotti conferred with Ambrosio and Mussolini. They
agreed not to pull MVAC units out of the area as the Germans had requested.510 In the
eyes of Supersloda and Rome, the Četniks remained tools in the struggle to avoid
German hegemony in the Adriatic.
Operation Weiss marked the peak of Italo-Četnik collaboration and the high tide
of the Četnik movement, coinciding with Mihailović’s planned offensive against the
Partisans in Bosnia. However, as Tito’s forces sought to escape the Axis trap, they dealt a
serious blow to Četnik detachments on the Neretva River. At the end of March the
Partisans escaped to southeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, where they
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stepped up their attacks on the Četniks. Meanwhile, the Germans began disarming Četnik
forces in Serbia. This effectively marked the end of Četnik prospects in Yugoslavia.
Although many bands remained intact, their leadership had been discredited and shattered
by failure.511 In mid-May, the Germans launched a follow-up operation, named Schwarz,
intending to finish off the Četnik movement while again targeting Tito’s command.
Although most of the operation would take place in Montenegro, the Germans concealed
their plans from the Italians until the last moment.512
Confronted with a fait accompli, Mussolini ordered the army to cooperate with
the Germans and disarm “Četnik and nationalist formations loyal to the Mihailović
movement.” Even at this stage, Rome was unwilling to completely renounce
collaboration with nationalist Serb forces. Mussolini, Ambrosio, Robotti, and Pirzio
Biroli did not believe that all Četnik bands were loyal to Mihailović, and they resisted
German pressure to disarm Orthodox MVAC formations in general. During meetings on
the topic in June, Löhr insisted on total disarmament, but allowed that the Italians could
proceed gradually over two months.513
At no point did Mussolini display particular anxiousness to repudiate Second
Army’s policy towards Serbs and Četniks in Yugoslavia. Italian generals in the theatre
interpreted Mussolini’s ambiguous actions and statements as a green light to continue
their activities without bowing to German demands. It has been argued that the army’s
continued support of the Četniks in 1943 was due to its recognition that the Axis was
doomed and that, by cultivating relations with pro-Allied Četniks, Italian generals hoped
to facilitate Italy’s exit from the war.514 While Mussolini irrationally continued to
envision postwar territorial expansion in Croatia, leading Fascists, diplomats, and
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military men lost faith in his “growing lack of political realism.”515 But, it is remarkable
how wedded Italian generals were to the same objectives of imperialist expansion and
prestige, even after Mussolini’s fall on 25 July.
During the period between July and September 1943, Italian generals in
Yugoslavia demonstrated a considerable degree of continuity with their attitudes and
policies from 1941 and 1942. Robotti remained keen to demonstrate to the Germans and
Croats that “Italy has by no means renounced, nor intends to renounce, its influence in
the Balkans.”516 He complained of German intrusions in his area of jurisdiction, warned
of excessive German influence in Zagreb, reported German agents in Dalmatia, and
resisted German efforts to establish posts in Italian-held territory.517 Likewise, relations
with Croatian authorities were plagued by the same issues as before. Robotti remained
touchy when bulletins or government speeches in Croatia failed to mention Italy’s
contribution to its independence and war effort.518 He accused Croatian authorities of
intentionally preventing foodstuffs from reaching Italian Dalmatia and Carnaro, and he
threatened to make requisitions directly from Croatian territory.519 Italian officers
complained of Ustaše singing irredentist songs, and they sequestered firearms from
Croatian militia.520
After spring 1943, the Italians received more evidence that Četnik commanders
planned to attack their units as soon as the Allies landed on the Adriatic coast, and the
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Italian army attempted to disarm certain Četnik groups in Montenegro and
Herzegovina.521 Nonetheless, Italian intelligence officers calculated that the lack of
leadership or unity within the Četnik movement following Operations Weiss and Schwarz
mitigated its danger and was ultimately “good for us.”522 Italian commanders remained
convinced that the Četnik movement was a bastion against communism. Mihailović’s
refusal to align himself with Tito, Robotti argued, had thwarted British efforts to unite the
Partisans and Četniks against the Axis.523 While the V Corps voiced concern that local
Četniks appeared satisfied with the prospects of an Allied victory, it also noted that they
continued to participate loyally in Italian-led anti-partisan operations.524 The VI Corps
was even hopeful that the Germans might finally be coming to understand that the
Četniks were “the only truly anti-communist combatants” in the region.525
The army, on the whole, maintained its philo-Serb outlook due to its military
reliance on Četnik manpower and its conviction that the Četniks were more politically
reliable than any other potential allies in Yugoslavia. In its view, “a Greater Croatia
favourable or friendly towards Italy is impossible.” For its part, too, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs maintained its pro-Croatian stance after Mussolini’s fall. This further
suggests that disagreements over policy towards the Ustaše and Četniks were not based
on conflicting interpretations of the Duce’s will nor upon ideological considerations, but
on differing strategic opinions between state institutions.526
Although their policies towards Croats and Serbs were in large part ad hoc
responses to complex and difficult local circumstances, Italian generals displayed a great
deal of consistency in the pursuit of political aims in Yugoslavia between 1941 and 1943.
They shared Rome’s fear of Nazi dominance in the Adriatic and sought to keep German
521
522

Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 262–63.
“Esame dei documenti catturati al maggiore (cetnico) Stude,” 23 June 1943, NARA T-821/288/0259–

61.
523

“Situazione politico-militare (relazione),” 31 July 1943, NARA T-821/31/0246–56.

524

“Relazione mensile,” 28 August 1943, NARA T-821/287/0381–85.

525

“Informazioni,” 16 August 1943, NARA T-821/288/0308.

526

The opinions of both sides are summarized well in “Colooquio tra le Eccellenza Robotti e Petrucci
avvenuto a Ronchi,” 11 August 1943, NARA T-821/31/0268–71. Emphasis in original.

345

boots out of Italy’s declared sphere of influence. Within months, they concluded that the
puppet state established in Zagreb would serve neither to defend nor extend Italian
interests in the region. Considering the Independent State of Croatia an enemy to Italian
expansion, they searched for allies elsewhere and pursued policies that sought to claw
away at territory and influence held by Ustaša authorities. Cooperation with Serb
nationalist leaders began primarily for these political purposes and later crystallized into a
quasi-official alliance with the Četniks, who Supersloda wanted to use militarily against
the Partisans and politically against the Germans and Croats. These developments
certainly conflicted with Rome’s initial decision to cultivate its relationship with the
Ustaše, but Italian generals believed that they enjoyed Mussolini’s consent and approval
in making this departure. Their greatest conflicts came firstly with Croatian authorities
and secondly with the Germans, who disagreed with Second Army’s military strategy but
also correctly ascertained its political intentions.

The Treatment of Jews
If the Italian army’s policies towards the Serbs and Četniks produced an insuperable rift
with its German and Croatian allies, its treatment of Yugoslavian Jews widened the
chasm even further. While the Nazis and Ustaše actively persecuted Jews, the Italian
military appeared to protect them. Since the 1950s a number of scholars have examined
and attempted to explain Second Army’s confusing policy towards Jewish refugees in
occupied Yugoslavia.527 There is general agreement that several thousand foreign Jews
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survived the Holocaust at least in part because of the attitude and behaviour of the Italian
army in its zones of occupation.528 Historians agree on the narrative and timeline of
Italian policies towards Jews in Yugoslavia, which were developed after mid-1942 by the
command of Supersloda in conjunction with officials from the Italian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, largely in response to German and Croatian pressure to hand over Jewish
refugees for deportation. Most scholars also agree that Italian policy was motivated by
multiple factors: military, political, diplomatic, ideological, ethical, and local. However,
there is less agreement on the relative importance of each of these factors on the Italian
army’s decision making — particularly, whether humanitarian concerns trumped
pragmatic calculations or vice versa. There is also disagreement over the extent to which
Italian officers and diplomats in Yugoslavia truly represented a coherent, coordinated,
and consistent “rescue effort.” Finally, historians disagree over the “conspiratorial”
nature of the army’s policy, concerning the degree to which it consciously undermined
Mussolini’s central directives and Fascism’s officially anti-Semitic stance, as enshrined
in the Italian racial laws of 1938.
Certainly, the Italian army’s treatment of Jews in Yugoslavia differed
significantly from that of its German and Croatian allies. In Serbia, the German army was
complicit in the Holocaust from the beginning of the occupation. The Military
Commander in Serbia oversaw the “Aryanization” of Serbian businesses and the
segregation of Jews, Sinti, and Roma in the country. 529 The Wehrmacht also targeted
Jews in reprisal actions intended to dissuade the broader Serb population from supporting
the communist-led insurgency in Serbia during the summer and autumn of 1941.
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Equating Jews with communists, German authorities forced the Jewish community to
provide hostages on a daily basis. While the German army came to regard the arbitrary
arrest and execution of innocent Serbs as a counterproductive security measure, it
continued to shoot male Jews as communists until December 1941, when it ran out of
victims.530 The remaining Jews in Serbia, comprising 7,500 women and children, were
interned at the Semlin [Zemun] concentration camp near Belgrade. At the end of 1941,
the SS took control of the camp and proceeded to liquidate these Jews with the use of a
single gas van. By May 1942, Serbia could be declared “free of Jews” [judenfrei].531
In the Independent State of Croatia, mass violence against Jews originated
without German prodding. Anti-Semitism played a relatively minor role in Croatian
history and Ustaša ideology, which focused its hatred on Serbs as the inferior yet
threatening “other.” Nonetheless, the Ustaša leadership quickly targeted Jews as agents of
the Serbs who threatened the racial purity of Croatia.532 In an attempt to please Hitler, the
Pavelić regime introduced anti-Jewish measures — including curfews, marriage
restrictions, the registration of property, the Aryanization of the bureaucracy and Jewish
capital, and the obligatory donning of yellow badges — in May and June 1941. Mass
roundups followed and, by summer, Ustaša guards were murdering Jews and Serbs in
death camps such as Jadovno and Jasenovac.533 The Nazis did not interfere in Croatia’s
Jewish question until mid-1942, when they arranged to deport the country’s remaining
Jews to their newly built extermination camps in eastern Europe. Out of a prewar
population of 35,000 Croatian and Bosnian Jews, between 20,000 and 25,000 died in
Ustaša camps, and over 7,000 perished in Nazi gas chambers. Others were killed in
Ustaša and Četnik raids or fighting as Partisans.534
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Italian authorities were aware of these developments. Diplomatic representatives
reported the arrest and internment of all Jews by German authorities in Serbia.535 In a
meeting with Ciano at the end of 1941, Croatian secret police chief Dido Kvaternik
implicitly admitted to the murder of 20,000 Jews, explaining to the Italian foreign
minister that the reduction of Croatia’s Jewish population from 35,000 to 12,000 was the
result of “emigration.” Given the wry smile on Kvaternik’s face, Ciano concluded that
the word was a euphemism.536 Military intelligence reports related accusations from
Jewish refugees of “abuse, violence and all sorts of crimes” at the hands of German and
Croatian authorities.537 Second Army tracked the formalization of Ustaša persecution,
keeping records of Croatian anti-Semitic legislation. At the end of July 1942, the army
reported the existence of an agreement between the German and Croatian governments to
deport Croatian Jews to the German-occupied eastern territories.538
It was not until this revelation in summer 1942 that Supersloda deemed it
necessary to devise a formal policy towards Jews and Jewish refugees residing in
territories occupied and administered by its units. During the crucial first year of
occupation, when most Croatian Jews were driven from their homes, there is scant
evidence of a concerted rescue effort by the Italian military leadership in the region. In
one of the earliest studies on the topic, Jacques Sabille argued that Italian officers and
troops who protected Jews in 1941 did so spontaneously and illegally, and therefore left
no documentary evidence of their “rescue work.”539 But, as we have seen, the war logs of
the Sassari Division made no effort to disguise — and instead proudly recorded — its
protection of Orthodox Serbs from Ustaša persecution. That the same records make no
mention of Jews was more likely due to the small Jewish population within the Sassari
Division’s zone of occupation, whose inland location did not make it a primary
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destination for Jewish refugees seeking asylum in Dalmatia or Italy, and because of the
division commander’s preoccupation with the much larger Serb population that bore the
brunt of Ustaša persecution which most directly threatened stability in the region.
Undoubtedly, many Jews benefitted from the Italian army’s anti-Ustaša bearing in the
spring and summer of 1941. However, alongside recollections of assistance received
from individual Italian soldiers, the testimonies of survivors relate instances during this
early period in which Jewish refugees managed to flee to Italian zones, only to be
apprehended by Italian police and remanded to Croatian authorities.540
More recent scholarship has demonstrated that Fascist policies towards Jews in
the annexed provinces of Dalmatia and Carnaro in 1941 had few characteristics of a
“humanitarian rescue operation.” Bastianini’s Italianization project envisioned the
expulsion of foreign and eventually Dalmatian Jews from the Adriatic coast. Italian
police turned away or expelled hundreds of Croatian Jews that sought refuge in Fiume,
Zara, Kotor, or Split, while interning Jews that were considered dangerous.541 The war
logs of the VI Corps and the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division, based out of Split between
September and December 1941, reveal that military authorities on the spot approved of
the government’s anti-Jewish policies.
The coastal city of Split was a key destination for Jews fleeing Ustaša and Nazi
persecution in 1941 and 1942. There was plenty of accommodation available to rent and
it was an important rail hub, allowing refugees from as far away as Zagreb and Belgrade
to enter the city clandestinely. From Split, many fugitives hoped to reach the Italian
peninsula by boat.542 Split was also reasonably close to Sarajevo and its community of
10,000 Jews, of whom 2,500 to 3,000 survived the Holocaust by fleeing the city.543 It is
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clear that, long before Italian authorities devised a policy for the treatment of Jewish
refugees, many Yugoslavian Jews adopted survival strategies that took them to or
through Italian-held territories, where they assumed they would be treated more
leniently.544 This reinforces Alexander Korb’s observation that even victims of mass
violence can exercise a degree of agency, thereby influencing broader policies.545 But
Italian military authorities in Dalmatia saw these Jews and other refugees as a threat. The
commander of the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division, General Pivano, criticized the local
civil administration for giving
refuge to so many Serbs, Bosniaks, Herzegovinians, Croats and Jews from the
former Yugoslavian state. Among these refugees who are generally hostile to us,
Russian-English propaganda would have an easy task organizing attacks or acts of
sabotage against us.546
Pivano also suspected the loyalties of local Jews, fearing that the Jewish owner and
employees of a cement factory outside Split were “not in favour of the Axis.”547
Following a series of urban guerrilla attacks in Split during October and
November 1941, authorities there arrested and deported hundreds of non-native Jews,
along with some Croats, for internment in isolated Dalmatian islands, Albania, or
different parts of Italy.548 By the end of December, 1,096 Jews had been deported.
Commanding the VI Corps, Renzo Dalmazzo praised the arrests and deportations as part
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of effective security measures taken by Dalmatian authorities.549 Armellini’s vehement
condemnation of squadrist violence against Jews in Split six months later did not
necessarily indicate a more positive view of the Jewish community on behalf of XVIII
Corps.550 His complaints of arbitrary vandalism and brutality committed by Bastianini’s
militia were intended primarily to undermine the Fascist governor’s position in Dalmatia.
Beyond the episode of 12 June 1942, Armellini’s extensive body of correspondence with
Bastianini did not comment on Jewish policy.
For Italian military authorities in the first year of occupation, the Jewish question
remained subordinate to other more pressing concerns. Davide Rodogno correctly points
out that the army’s attitude towards Jews cannot be separated from its general policy
towards refugees as a whole. This typically involved the closing of borders, including the
Italo-Croatian demarcation line, in order to avoid the economic and public health
concerns that came with an influx of refugees.551 In Split, military authorities supported
Bastianini’s decision to expel or intern Jewish refugees, not for their protection but as
part of counterinsurgency strategy. In Italian-occupied Croatian territory, political
considerations justified harbouring Jewish refugees, just as the Italians harboured Serb
refugees that requested protection from the Ustaše.552
Military authorities wielded Italian “protection” of refugees as a political weapon
to consolidate and expand Italy’s sphere of influence in the Balkans. Intending to
differentiate Italian occupation from Ustaša rule and to normalize the newly occupied
Zones II and III as quickly as possible, Ambrosio’s 7 September 1941 decree announced
freedom of religion and equal treatment for all ethnic groups. As a result, one of
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Ambrosio’s priorities involved ensuring that Italian promises of protection could be
kept.553 While primarily aimed at winning over Serbs, Second Army’s policy implicitly
extended to Jews as well. Thus, Dalmazzo’s VI Corps intervened in favour of Jewish
refugees in Mostar, obliging Croatian civil authorities to issue them ration books.554
Continued Ustaša persecution of these Jews directly threatened Ambrosio’s policy as
well as Italian suzerainty over Croatian authorities in occupied territory, prompting the
commander of Second Army to intervene personally at the end of the year. Ambrosio
guaranteed Jews in Mostar the same living conditions as other groups and promised that
they would not be “harassed” so long as they did not disturb public order.555 Staff of VI
Corps’s Civil Affairs Office later came to regard Jewish refugee policy as a means to
undermine Croatian sovereignty and to bolster Italy’s irredentist claims on Dubrovnik as
well. Noting that the 350 Jews in the city were Ladino-speaking Sephardic Jews —
ostensibly “Latinized” rather than “Slavicized Jews” — Italian military and diplomatic
officials in the city suggested that they could make the difference in a future plebiscite for
annexation.556
However, other Italian commands saw Jewish refugees as an unwanted burden.
After Pivano’s Cacciatori delle Alpi Division was transferred from Split to Mostar in
December, the general and his staff bore the brunt of complaints from Croatian and
German authorities that such “undesirable elements” exacerbated the food crisis in the
city and provided intelligence to insurgents.557 Pivano’s intelligence reports largely
agreed with this analysis, adding that “the population does not at all view favourably the
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presence of Jews in the city who have come in large numbers from Sarajevo to put
themselves, so they say, under the protection of Italian troops.”558 Pivano considered the
Jews to be “against us” [a noi contrario] and prohibited his troops from having any
contact with them.559 There is no indication that the attitude of Pivano and his staff was
informed by anti-Semitism. The command of the Cacciatori Division considered every
group in Herzegovina, including Croats, Serbs, and Muslims, to be hostile to Italy, and
the Jews were no exception. Nor does the division’s staff appear to have considered
handing Jewish refugees over to the Croats or Germans as a way to rid itself of the
logistical dilemmas they posed. This suggests that Pivano, too, accepted the care and tacit
protection of Jewish refugees as a necessary component of Second Army’s pacification
policy, if not for compassionate grounds.
By June 1942, the Cacciatori Division had been replaced in Mostar by the Murge
Division. Its commander, Paride Negri, was more sympathetic to the Jews and
maintained a closer relationship with the leadership of Mostar’s Jewish community.560 In
an oft-cited “turning point” for Italian rescue efforts in Yugoslavia, Negri alarmingly
reported news of German and Croatian plans to deport all Croatian Jews, including those
in Herzegovina, to the east. Informed by a German official of these intentions, Negri
replied: “Oh, no, that is totally impossible, because the deportation of Jews goes against
the honor of the Italian army.” Negri’s reference to honour indicates that his response
was conditioned either by humanitarian principles or by the political need to protect
Italian sovereignty in its area of jurisdiction, or both.561
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A number of circumstances converged in summer 1942 that prompted Supersloda
and the Foreign Ministry to begin coordinating policy towards Croatian Jews. By this
point, the remaining Jews in the NDH recognized the nature of the Ustaša camp system
and saw flight as the only viable option left to them.562 News of Italian plans for
withdrawals in the aftermath of Operation Trio fuelled a further exodus to the west. In
response, Bastianini renewed his calls upon military authorities to prevent this flood of
refugees from entering Dalmatia. Now, by planning the total deportation of Croatian
Jews, German and Croatian authorities threatened to undermine Italian independence in
parts of Croatia controlled by Second Army.563 On 17 August, the German Foreign
Ministry formally requested the Italian army’s cooperation in the deportation of
Yugoslavian Jews to eastern Europe.564
Mussolini immediately complicated the issue by giving his “nulla osta” [no
objection] to the German request. Some historians have considered these two words —
scrawled in the Duce’s handwriting across a Foreign Ministry memorandum — as a
“short and decisive” central directive or “explicit command,” which Italian functionaries
immediately set about “sabotaging.”565 However, according to Italian bureaucratic usage,
a nulla osta did no more than leave the final decision up to the competent authorities on
the spot.566 Subsequent events suggest that Mussolini, was not fully wedded either to a
policy of protecting or persecuting Jews in Italian-occupied territories. He showed little
concern for the fate of Yugoslavian Jews and was willing to turn them over to the
Germans in order to avoid a crisis with Hitler.567 But Supersloda and the Foreign
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Ministry quickly convinced him that Italian military and foreign policy had more to gain
by refusing to hand over Jewish refugees. Mussolini’s position towards the Jewish
problem in Yugoslavia was nearly identical to his stance towards the Četnik alliance —
he provided few clear instructions and tended to accept and support the line adopted by
his generals.
Roatta’s justifications for declining to hand over Jewish refugees also bore
similarities to the Četnik issue. Indeed, the two policies, in Roatta’s mind, were directly
linked. In a series of telegrams to Cavallero and Mussolini, Roatta opined that Ustaša
meddling was behind the German request. He believed that turning over Jews to Croatian
or German authorities “will inflict a serious blow to the prestige of the Italian army in all
of Croatia and the Balkans.” In other words, relinquishing the Jews would threaten both
Italy’s sovereignty from Germany and its hegemony over Croatia. Echoing Ambrosio’s
concerns from the end of 1941, Roatta added that the extradition of Jews would expose
Italian guarantees against racial or religious discrimination as meaningless, and would
jeopardize the army’s relations with the Orthodox Serb populations that placed their trust
in Italian promises. Roatta feared that their “Balkan mentality” would lead Serbs and
Četniks to believe that the Italians would abandon them next.568 Thus, Roatta connected
the Jewish question not only to concerns of sovereignty and to the army’s and
Mussolini’s shared obsession with prestige, but to his counterinsurgency strategy that
increasingly depended on Četnik auxiliary formations and to his designs for future Italian
expansionism in the Balkan region based on popular Serb support.
The anti-Croatian motivation behind the army’s policy cannot be underestimated.
When, on 31 August, Ustaša officials asked Roatta to hand over the Jewish refugees
currently residing in Italian zones, the general replied
that the matter is not my business, but rather the jurisdiction of central authorities.
I added that — until given orders to the contrary — I would not turn over people
that — apart from any declaration by us on the subject — find themselves
potentially under our protection.569
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As Luciano Monzali argues, such a refusal served the purpose of demonstrating to the
occupied population Zagreb’s weakness, while presenting the Italian army as the true
arbiter in the Independent State of Croatia.570 Absent from the army’s official rationale
were humanitarian concerns. An internal memorandum later justified the decision not to
hand over Jews to the Croats on “moral” grounds, but it is clear that these were primarily
connected to the political fallout of appearing to abandon Ambrosio’s guarantees.571
Within the armed forces, the impetus for a more formal policy towards Jewish
refugees in Yugoslavia came from Roatta. At the corps level, commanders and staff
officers received the policy with less enthusiasm; indeed, some of their comments
suggest the presence of a lurking anti-Semitism within the officer corps. Like Pivano the
previous year, Italian corps commanders considered Jews to be a security threat and
logistical burden. When Roatta agreed to relieve Bastianini of the 1,500 foreign Jews
taking refuge in Dalmatian territory by transferring them to locales under Italian military
jurisdiction, the response from V Corps commander Renato Coturri was hardly
favourable. He complained that his sector was already “full of Jews and other political
refugees that hoped to place themselves under the protection of our Armed Forces.”
These refugees already posed an extra burden on local economies and resources in
coastal towns, threatening the Italian occupation by draining scant local food stocks and
causing prices to rise in markets.572 Dalmazzo envisioned similar problems in VI Corps’s
zone of occupation. Moreover, he opposed the idea of leaving Jews free to roam within
island communities, citing economic concerns but also fears that they would support the
local Partisan movement: “It is known that some Jews are ready to side with communism
should they be drawn by local circumstances or personal advantage or even hunger.”573
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Distrust of Jews based on racist stereotypes prompted Coturri’s top carabiniere to
complain that, while Jews generally behaved themselves, they were overly alarmist and
had “a marked tendency to spread any news of a political nature, even if groundless or
distorted [alterato], that could in some way effect the racial question.” He added that
the distinctive interfering disposition, excessive profiteering [affaristico], and
generally unscrupulous behaviour, natural qualities of the race, have not failed to
characterize the Jewish refugees in the major centres. This, in response, has
provoked the unanimous hatred of the population and of the Croatian authorities
towards the refugees as well as unfavourable comments about the Italian military
authorities.
The carabiniere suspected, but could not prove, that some Jews were in contact with the
Partisans. He warned that, if Jews appeared loyal and grateful to Italy, “there is no doubt
that, deep down, they nurture hatred for the Axis and hope for its military defeat.”574
The anti-Semitic attitudes apparent within mid-level commands found echoes
among Roatta’s own command staff as well. When in September the Jewish refugee
community in Crikvenica petitioned V Corps to improve their living conditions — by
reducing the tourist taxes and rental rates they were forced to pay, by extending their
freedom of movement, and by allowing them to purchase food and firewood from
military stores — Coturri rejected all their requests.575 Roatta’s chief of staff, Ettore de
Blasio, approved Coturri’s decisions and, in a memorandum distributed to the V, VI, and
XVIII Corps, he complained that “the Jews living here have forgotten their status as
‘undesirable’ guests and that, with the intrusive spirit characteristic of their race, they
want to profit from the measures adopted by us out of a sense of humanity to give
themselves a privileged status.”576 Months later, Supersloda’s chief of civil affairs,
Michele Rolla, dismissed a similar petition from Jews at Kraljevica [Porto Re] as the
result of their “age-old ... nature.”577 While not necessarily refuting humanitarianism as a
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motive, such statements and attitudes challenge Jonathan Steinberg’s claims that Italian
policies towards Yugoslavian Jews stemmed in part from the army’s tradition as a “philosemitic” institution.578
At least through October 1942, these ambiguous attitudes towards Jews were
paralleled by the incoherent and inconsistent application of policy towards Jewish
refugees in Italian occupation zones. On one hand, there is the case of Imre Rochlitz, a
young Austrian Jew who fled with his aunt and uncle to Split in spring 1942. In August,
following Roatta’s agreement with Bastianini to transfer Jewish refugees out of Dalmatia,
Italian authorities in Split offered an amnesty to illegal refugees; Rochlitz and his family
presented themselves and were sent to confino libero — whereby internees could move
freely within a community but not beyond it — in Novi Vinodolski, a small resort town
on the Croatian coast occupied by V Corps. Although his family “had practically no
contact” with the small Italian garrison in Novi, Rochlitz recalled “small acts of
kindness” from ordinary Italian soldiers.579
On the other hand, there is the case of Bela Kraus and Blanka Soten, Jewish
siblings from Osijek — well beyond the Italo-German demarcation line — who managed
to reach Novi by their own means around the same time that Rochlitz arrived in the town.
Kraus and Soten reported to the Italian garrison and requested asylum. Despite having
relatives in Novi who offered to provide for their upkeep, their request was denied. Italian
authorities ordered the two sent back to Croatian-administered territory by train, but they
managed to escape during the night.580 Their story highlights the fact that, despite
Roatta’s references to “protection” of Jewish refugees, local Italian military authorities
did not welcome new arrivals from outside their zone of occupation. Indeed, earlier that
summer, Coturri had ordered that refugees attempting to enter V Corps’s sector illegally
should be turned back. This attitude did not differ greatly from that of Italian civil
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authorities in the annexed territories, who expelled hundreds of illegal Jewish refugees
during 1941 and 1942.581
Ambiguity and inconsistency between Italian military commands and offices
likely contributed to the delayed process of concentrating and identifying Jews in the
summer of 1942, often considered the result of intentional dithering as part of an Italian
conspiracy to undermine the Holocaust.582 Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and
logistical challenges further contributed to delays.583 The XVIII and VI Corps reported
difficulties relocating Jews from Split to several Croatian islands because of insufficient
local resources, the poverty of many of the refugees, and the hostility of local Croatian
authorities. Demonstrating greater moral misgivings than his predecessor Dalmazzo, the
VI Corps’s new commander, Ugo Santovito, warned Roatta that “it is not humanely
permissible to send Jews to the islands and leave them there without provisions.”584
Roatta wanted to wash his hands of the problem completely by interning Croatian Jews in
Italy, but the Ministry of the Interior vetoed this option since Fascist racist legislation
prohibited the immigration of foreign Jews.585
At the end of October, in response to renewed German diplomatic pressure
concerning the deportation of Croatian Jews, the Comando Supremo finally provided
Supersloda with an explicit order to intern “all Jews” within its jurisdiction. Once the
Jews were settled in concentration camps or quartered in hotels under Italian surveillance,
the military would perform background checks to determine who were to be considered
“Croatian Jews.” No Jews would be handed over to Croatian or German authorities
without further instructions from Rome. By mid-November, the three Italian army corps
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in Croatia had rounded up some 3,000 Jews.586 The roundup operations did not go
smoothly. A Carabinieri report noted that some Jews — convinced that the Italians were
about to turn them over to the Germans — fled or committed suicide. Moreover, the
report concluded that the operations had “seriously damaged Italian prestige” by
undermining Italians claims of justice: arrests and internment appeared arbitrary and
harsh. The Ustaše even tried to exploit the move to make them appear more lenient and
fair than the Italians. Additionally, local merchants and hoteliers complained of the
exodus of Jewish money from their markets.587
Such reports confirmed Roatta’s conviction that the Jewish question had broader
ramifications on Italian occupation policy. In discussions with the Duce during
November and December 1942, Roatta thus advised Mussolini once again not to hand
over the interned Croatian Jews to the Ustaše or Nazis, given the probable “military and
political repercussions” that would follow. Mussolini agreed that no Jews would be
deported during the foreseeable future, so Roatta ordered the construction of more
permanent camps for Supersloda’s population of Jewish internees.588 In February and
March 1943, the Germans once again pressured Rome to comply with the extradition of
Croatian Jews. Mussolini reluctantly assented to their proposal to transfer Jewish
internees by sea to Trieste, where they would board German trains. Supersloda’s new
commander, Robotti, adopted his predecessor’s point of view and rationale to oppose any
transfers of Jews. Mussolini, once again, agreed and told Robotti to make up excuses to
prevent their extradition.589
Confronted by German diplomatic pressure and with military circumstances that
necessitated withdrawals throughout the Balkans, the Italian army decided to transfer its
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interned Croatian Jews to new quarters on the annexed island of Rab [Arbe].590 However,
preparations for the transfer required months, so Italian corps commands remained in
charge of caring for the interned Jewish refugees. By February 1943, the XVIII Corps
held 615 Jews on the Croatian islands of Hvar [Lesina] and Brač [Brazza]. In the VI
Corps’s sector, 874 were expensively lodged in hotels and residences in villages
surrounding Dubrovnik or on the island of Lopud [Mezzo], also in Croatian territory. The
V Corps presided over 1,172 Jews at Kraljevica, across the border from the Italian
province of Carnaro.591 Housed in old overcrowded Yugoslavian army barracks and
cavalry stables, conditions at Kraljevica most closely resembled those of a concentration
camp, although its population too received rations equivalent to civilians under
“protective custody,” amounting to 1,234 calories per day.592 Only between May and July
1943 were the internees transferred to Supersloda’s new camp on Rab. Still considered to
be in “protective” custody, the Jews at Rab enjoyed better conditions than the Slovenes
that had been held there as hostages, although overcrowding remained an issue. Jewish
internees could purchase food from outside the camp, bathe in the sea, and organize their
own schools, libraries, and entertainment.593 Most of the Jews at Rab managed to escape
to Partisan-held territory or to Southern Italy after the armistice of 8 September.594
Not included at Rab were some five hundred Dalmatian Jews that Italian civil
authorities had interned on the island of Korčula [Curzola]. Their plight in 1943 reveals
the limited nature of the army’s “rescue operation” in Yugoslavia and the motives behind
its policies. As we have seen, civil authorities in Dalmatia had targeted Jews as
undesirable elements that threatened security, and military representatives largely agreed
with or accepted this interpretation. In early 1943, staff officers of the VI Corps criticized
the Governorate for treating its Jewish confinati politici on Korčula too leniently.
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Military authorities claimed that Jews, allowed to roam the island freely, maintained
frequent contact with Partisans and actively spread communist propaganda. They asked
the Governorate either to construct a proper concentration camp for the Jews or to
transfer them elsewhere.595 When it became clear that civil authorities could meet neither
condition, the VI Corps petitioned Supersloda to intern the Jews of Korčula at Rab.
However, Supersloda refused to assume responsibility for the Governorate’s Jews who, it
was argued, remained outside the army’s jurisdiction. The army did not consider
Dalmatian Jews to be under its protection — or in need of it — but rather saw them as a
security threat.596
Circumstances changed in August, when military authorities assumed full powers
in Dalmatia. The VI Corps immediately began preparing a concentration camp on
Korčula “for the internment, as internati civili, of those deemed unruly and harmful to the
pacification of the island.”597 Only at this point, considering the new jurisdictional
arrangement as well as the “precarious and tragic” fate of the Jews if Italian forces
abandoned Korčula, did Supersloda’s Civil Affairs Office decide to transfer the Jews to
Rab.598 It does not appear that the transfers were completed.599 The documentation on the
Jews of Korčula reinforces the observation that, at the middle level, staff officers and
commands did not always sympathize with Jewish refugees — as late as August 1943,
the VI Corps continued to view Jews in its territory as potential enemies that required
surveillance. At a higher level, the army command was spurred into action partly by
humanitarian concern and partly by the changing political situation caused by the fall of
Mussolini and Allied landings in Italy. As argued elsewhere, once defeat seemed
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inevitable, humanitarian instincts merged with the political utility of using Jews as
diplomatic “pawns” in negotiations with the Allies.600
Between 1941 and 1943, multiple motives informed the policies of Italian military
commands and staffs in Yugoslavia towards Jewish populations and refugees. While
acknowledging all these motives, several scholars — among them Holocaust survivors
who credited the Italians for their escape — have argued that humanitarian interests
trumped all others.601 However, this examination of official documentation from the
army, corps, and division levels highlights the primacy of politics in the decisions and
attitudes of Italian military authorities. Although evidence of humanitarian or moral
concern towards Yugoslavian Jews is not lacking, the influence of strategic, diplomatic,
and imperial calculations surfaces more consistently and in more tangible form.
Local military authorities in Dalmatia and Croatia tended to see Jewish refugees
as a drain on resources and a potential security threat, but they accepted Second Army’s
rationale that — given the impossibility of interning the refugees in Italy — handing the
Jews over to the Croats or Germans would be even more damaging to their pacification
strategy. As this strategy was based in part on attracting the sizeable Serb minority in
their zone of occupation and on differentiating Rome’s rule from that of Zagreb or Berlin,
the Jews became a valuable political symbol for the Italian army. By refusing the
extradition of Croatian Jews, the army demonstrated to the persecuted and turbulent Serb
population its ability to protect minority groups, it bolstered its prestige by withstanding
pressure from its stronger German ally, and it undermined Croatian sovereignty in order
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to strengthen Italian influence within its sphere of interest and potentially pave the way
for further expansion in the region.
By summer 1943, Supersloda had adopted a relatively firm policy in response to
German and Croatian requests for the extradition of Croatian Jews who, one report
commented, “were not and will not be handed over for well-known reasons.”602
However, between 1941 and 1943, it is clear that individual commands and staff officers
held different opinions, priorities, and attitudes towards the Jewish populations in their
jurisdictions. Therefore, their policies cannot be considered part of a coordinated and
consistent “rescue operation.”603 Military authorities in the annexed provinces largely
supported the anti-Jewish and anti-refugee measures adopted by Fascist civil authorities.
This included turning back new arrivals, a practice that was followed in Italian-occupied
parts of Croatia as well. In Croatia, where a policy of protection was most evident after
summer 1942, attitudes varied widely. Staff officers at Supersloda were most involved
and most insistent on the policy, while corps and division commands showed less
enthusiasm since they bore responsibility for organizing, supervising, and supplying the
refugees. Other units did not even mention the presence of Jews in their sectors; for them,
Jewish policy was irrelevant. Correspondence at all levels reveals the presence of antiSemitism within the Italian officer corps.
That several thousand Yugoslavian Jews survived the war was less the result of a
rescue effort devised by the Italian army than of the convergence of circumstances that
favoured the survival strategies adopted by some Jews.604 Long before Second Army
developed any concrete policy towards Jewish refugees, many Jews decided that their
best chance of survival lay in the Italian-occupied zones. Their ability to enter Italian
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territory clandestinely and evade detection depended on their own wherewithal and
assistance from Croatian officials, common Croats, or ordinary Italian soldiers, offered
out of kindness, greed, or laziness. Their ability to remain in Italian territory thereafter
hinged on local Italian pacification strategy and logistical circumstances, Italian reactions
to Croatian and German pressure, the intervention of religious leaders, and the presence
of national and international humanitarian relief organizations.605
Hannah Arendt once argued that Italian policy effectively amounted to a
“sabotage of the Final Solution.”606 The SS and German Foreign Ministry certainly saw
it as such, complaining that “the Italians are creating endless difficulties concerning the
handing over of the Croatian Jews.” Even lower-ranking German observers in the field
criticized the army’s lenient treatment of Jewish refugees.607 That the Italian army and
government protected foreign Jews from the Nazis was somewhat unique. Throughout
Europe, German anti-Semitic policies found a great deal of support from collaborators
and allies.608 But even in the minor Axis nations, Jewish policy had more to do with local
interests than German wishes. Hitler’s allies demonstrated their sovereignty by protecting
certain Jews while deporting others.609 Italian generals were aware that lesser Axis
partners like Hungary and Bulgaria did not adhere fully to Nazi anti-Jewish policy. Since
Italian generals considered Italy to be an equal partner of Nazi Germany within the New
European Order, this became part of their rationale not to hand over Jews.610
If Italian military authorities sought to undermine German objectives, it is more
doubtful whether their approach to the Jewish question revealed anti-Fascist tendencies
on their part. Italian staff officers familiarized themselves with Fascist racial
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legislation.611 While these laws defined Jews in biological terms and were hardly benign,
they did not provide any indication that the extermination of Jews was an objective of
Italian Fascism.612 Mussolini’s own commitment to anti-Semitism has long been debated
among historians.613 In the case of the Yugoslavian Jews, the Duce offered little precise
direction. When confronted in Rome by German diplomatic pressure, he appeared willing
to abandon the Yugoslavian Jews; but Roatta and Robotti had little difficulty convincing
Mussolini of the military and political benefits of their internment policy. They did not
need to hide their policies from the Duce. Militarily, politically, and ideologically, the
Italian army and government had little reason to accommodate German requests.
Supersloda’s policies towards Jewish refugees in Croatia represented neither a conspiracy
nor the manifestation of an innately humane Italian national character; rather, they were
consistent with the army’s military and political strategy in Yugoslavia.614
Between 1941 and 1943, the Italian army appeared to depart from Rome’s official line in
several key areas of policy in Yugoslavia. Some generals questioned Mussolini’s decision
to annex territory in Dalmatia and Slovenia. In the new provinces, their relations with
Fascist civil authorities, appointed directly by the Duce, often were dismal. The same can
be said of their attitudes towards the alliances with Nazi Germany and the Croatian
Ustaše, both of which had been central to Mussolini’s foreign policy leading up to the
war. While working against their ideologically kindred Axis partners, Italian generals
effectively favoured ideological enemies of the regime, including nationalist Serbs, proAllied Četniks, and foreign Jews. These policies in particular, and the army’s autonomy
in formulating them, have formed the basis of counterarguments against the thesis that
Italian commanders “worked toward the Duce.” Burgwyn argues that, more frequently,
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“Mussolini worked toward his generals.”615 Nonetheless, examining the context and
motivations behind the army’s approach to each of these issues reveals that Italian
generals never considered their conduct to be a manifestation of anti-Fascist values,
resistance, or disobedience. On the contrary, their policies were compatible with what
they interpreted as Rome’s long-term aims and wishes.
The army’s opposition to Fascist civil authorities in the annexed provinces never
was absolute. While Armellini blamed Bastianini’s process of Italianization for many of
his problems in Dalmatia, generals like Pivano and Dalmazzo praised the governor’s
harsh policies towards Slavs and Jews. In Slovenia, military authorities accelerated the
pace of Italianization. Conflict between civil and military authorities in the provinces was
fundamentally administrative in nature. Jurisdictional disputes were the inevitable result
of a hastily conceived occupation apparatus and the rise of guerrilla resistance that
required a military response. General Armellini’s dispute with Bastianini was not
politically anti-Fascist in nature, despite evidence elsewhere of his aversion to the regime.
Military strategies, jurisdictional jealousies, and incompatible personalities were at the
heart of his issues with the governor.
This does not mean that the Italian army in occupied Yugoslavia was an apolitical
entity, solely concerned with military affairs and washing its hands of political matters.
Circumstances prompted Italian generals to think and act politically, especially outside
the annexed territories where Rome’s interests faced external threats posed by partisan
movements and, equally important, their own allies. Besides the ever present fear of
German domination, fully shared in Rome, military authorities on the spot quickly
concluded that the Independent State of Croatia would never function as a Fascist puppet.
In order to consolidate Italy’s political influence in the Adriatic, Mussolini’s generals
eschewed collaboration with German and Croatian authorities, even at the expense of the
Axis coalition’s military effectiveness. From a position of strength based on their local
numerical superiority, they tried to extend the territory under Italian dominion through
military operations and by attracting Serb populations that had been persecuted by the
Ustaše. In the final year of the occupation, from a position of weakness, Italian generals
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tried to hold on to their gains through cynical alliances with anti-communist groups,
including the pro-Allied and anti-Croatian Četnik movement. They hoped to bolster their
flagging prestige and trust among their new allies by refusing to hand over persecuted
Jewish refugees to the Nazis and Ustaše.
Of course, the army’s rationale and policies were never so clearly laid out or
consistent. Behaviour and attitudes varied between division, corps, and army commands
as each responded to local circumstances. The personalities of individual commanders
differed too — while both Ambrosio and Roatta came from Piedmontese stock, the
former was a traditionalist rooted in common sense whereas the latter was intelligent,
“modern,” and “unscrupulous.”616 For some, humanitarian considerations made a real
contribution to their pro-Serb or, less frequently, pro-Jewish stance. Faced with complex
situations, Italian generals often improvised. It is difficult to say precisely what sort of
political settlement Second Army’s senior officer corps envisioned for the Balkans after
the war. Their main political objectives were for the short and medium terms, aiming to
ease the military occupation of territory while providing Rome with the strongest possible
bargaining position at the end of the war. Based on patterns in their correspondence and
behaviour, Italian generals as a group came to favour some extent of direct annexation
along Italy’s northeastern frontier and the Adriatic coast, bordered by a series of semiautonomous Italian protectorates in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and
Albania.617 This vision was fully compatible with the equally hazy Fascist concept of an
Imperial Community in Mediterranean Europe. In its pursuit — taking into consideration
the limitations imposed by German domination and by the overall war effort — the
generals of Second Army proved remarkably consistent, if not successful.
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5

Military Propaganda for Empire in the Balkans

The complex political framework of occupation in the Balkans coloured the way in which
the regime and army presented Italy’s mission in the region. Propaganda for Italian troops
had to reconcile imperialist concepts of spazio vitale with Italy’s formal support for the
Independent State of Croatia and the limitations posed by German hegemony in the
region and within the Axis. Propaganda also had to maintain morale and fighting spirit
among personnel on occupation duty, largely neglected by the Italian press and forgotten
by the public, during a war in which unqualified Italian successes were rare and where
expectations of a swift Axis victory eventually gave way to uncertainty. These challenges
limited the cohesiveness, consistency, and effectiveness of Italian military propaganda
during the Second World War.
Nonetheless, the themes employed in propaganda directed to the troops remained
primarily ideological in nature. As in Ethiopia half a decade earlier, war and occupation
in Yugoslavia were presented in imperial terms, as providing Italians once again with an
opportunity to rekindle the greatness of ancient Rome. Those who resisted Italian
domination were denigrated as enemies of civilization, as barbarians, and now as godless
communists. Once again, propaganda exalted the use of violence on one hand while
lauding the innate humanity of Italians on the other. This time, however, it was the
military leadership and its own propaganda organs that promoted the regime’s new war
for empire. The logistical scale and complexity of global war compelled Rome to
delegate propaganda activity to military authorities, partly reversing the trend towards
centralization that had accompanied the Ethiopian campaign. Despite this renewed
autonomy, military propagandists continued to toe the Fascist line in important aspects.

The Army’s New Role in Propaganda
By the time Italy entered the Second World War, the Fascist regime had centralized
control over most aspects of propaganda through the Ministry of Popular Culture, now
under Alessandro Pavolini. However, experience in Ethiopia had revealed the need for
the regime to involve the armed forces more closely in the production and dissemination

370

of propaganda. Although officials at Minculpop were never willing to give up control
over policy, they issued guidelines for inter-ministerial collaboration and established new
liaisons with the branches of the military.1 Agreements between Pavolini and Cavallero
on the coordination of propaganda in wartime had the effect of transferring many powers
to the army. Along with controlling the flow of military news to the Italian public, the
Comando Supremo collaborated directly with the General Directorate for the Italian Press
[DGSI] to create and supply propaganda material to its soldiers in the field.2 As a result,
while Minculpop always remained the final arbiter, the army enjoyed a more active role
in the field of propaganda during the Second World War than it had in Ethiopia.
Propaganda offices were attached to various levels of command to monitor and
maintain the morale of Italian soldiers and of the populations in contact with them, to
counter enemy propaganda, and to foment revolt among the enemy. The Comando
Supremo and the SMRE each had a propaganda office [Ufficio Propaganda] in direct
communication with Minculpop. These high commands issued directives relating to
assistance for the troops — including policies on rations, welfare programmes, and
military leave — and provided war bulletins and other propaganda material for
subordinate units to disseminate. This was conducted by propaganda sections and
subsections [Sezioni/Sottosezioni P] attached to army, corps, and division commands, and
by individual propaganda officers [Ufficiali P] assigned to regiments.3
The propaganda officers of the Second Army originated from multiple branches
of the armed forces and from a variety of backgrounds: a few were veterans of the First
World War; many came straight out of university from professional fields such as
accounting, law, and medicine; some had worked in the publishing industry or with
Fascist agencies like the OND; many came with recommendations from the Fascist
Party.4 In 1942, the SMRE tried to centralize and professionalize the army’s propaganda
1
2

Della Volpe, Esercito e propaganda fra le due guerre, 53–54.
Cannistraro, La fabbrica del consenso, 220–21.

3
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seconda guerra mondiale, 30–31.
4
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services through a series of regulations. Propaganda officers now had to hail from combat
arms, they needed to have participated in at least one military operation, and they were
supposed to have civilian experience in communications. Most importantly, in order to
address “political” deficiencies among section personnel, Fascist Party membership now
became a prerequisite for any propaganda officer.5
The impetus for this transformation came from within the leadership of the armed
forces. It appears to have been connected to Cavallero’s efforts to limit the potentially
pacifistic role of chaplains in the moral education of Italian soldiers.6 While the
Fascistization of propaganda officers helped ensure that their work was suitably
militaristic and in compliance with Fascist directives, it also caused some military
personnel to mistrust them as a sort of political commissar spying for the regime.7
However, with the noteworthy exception of the Marche Division — whose commander
Ambrosio chastised for preventing propaganda officers from carrying out their work —
Italian command staffs appear to have accepted “P” officers as colleagues. 8 Despite their
at least nominal Fascistization, propaganda officers were expected to serve as “devoted
functionaries” [devoti fiduciari] of military commanders.9
Propaganda sections faced a number of obstacles in occupied Yugoslavia. As had
been the case in East Africa, logistical difficulties impeded the effective use of film
propaganda. While troops stationed in cities like Ljubljana had access to various forms of
entertainment and information, many units found themselves in zones without electricity,

5
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9
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which limited their access to cinemas as well as radios.10 In 1941, the VI Corps set up
mobile cinemas for its troops, but the vehicles were not properly outfitted for longdistance travel on poor roads, restricting their range to accessible areas around Split and
Zara.11 A shortage of film material was only partially overcome at the end of 1941 with
additional shipments from the Ente Nazionale Industrie Cinematografiche [ENIC] and
LUCE, but even then most films available to the propaganda sections were old American
ones without a useful political purpose.12 Units in Second Army continued to report
deficiencies in the quantity and quality of autocinemas and radios throughout the
occupation.13 With film and radios in short supply — and with many inexperienced junior
officers displaying “poor command effectiveness” — propaganda officers took it upon
themselves to conduct “propaganda tours” [giri di propaganda] and to hold
“conversations” with the troops, which amounted to little more than reading off war
bulletins provided by high command or the Agenzia Stefani.14
10
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11
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Given these limitations, written propaganda once again proved the most important
means of reaching the troops.15 Initially, most propaganda sections focused on sourcing
publications from Italy rather than producing material of their own. The War Ministry,
the SMRE, Minculpop, and the Fascist leisure organization, the Opera Nazionale
Dopolavoro [OND], sent newspapers, magazines, leaflets, postcards, and other printed
material to Yugoslavia. The OND also established libraries for troops in some of the
larger urban centres.16 However, propaganda officers complained that material sent by
central agencies did not reach all units equally.17 Moreover, the daily newspapers usually
arrived late — especially for units stationed in Croatia — and there were too few satirical
papers and magazines. The troops wanted more “appealing” types of literature as “a
spiritual tonic and a means of distraction.” One of the more widely distributed illustrated
magazines in VI Corps’s zone of occupation was the OND’s Gente Nostra.18 Other
periodicals directed towards soldiers that arrived from Rome included Fronte: Giornale
del Soldato and Forze Armate, published by Minculpop and the War Ministry,
respectively.19

il periodo dal 15 marzo al 15 aprile 1942,” 27 April 1942, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 1265, DS VI Corps, April
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Complaints over the quality of newspapers available to soldiers in Yugoslavia
prompted corps and army commands to become more involved in the production of
written propaganda tailored to their troops. In theory, all military publications needed to
be approved by the SMRE, in consultation with Minculpop, but in practice during the
first two years of the war military commands on all fronts created their own material with
varying degrees of censorship.20 In Slovenia, the XI Corps continued to print its own field
newspaper, Picchiasodo, which had been published on a monthly basis since 1940. In
July 1942, it added a supplementary one-page daily that included bulletins as well as
political and tactical instructions from corps commander Mario Robotti.21
In Dalmatia, the VI Corps initially distributed copies of the San Marco — a daily
newspaper established by civil authorities in Split using an old Yugoslavian printing
press — at a reduced rate to military units.22 Such collaboration became more involved in
December 1941, when the San Marco was replaced by Il Popolo di Spalato, whose
editors proudly declared to their readers that “our programme is that of Fascism.”23
Propaganda officers from the VI Corps arranged to edit and print a half-page section —
later expanded to a full page — in every issue of Il Popolo di Spalato, entitled “Per voi,
soldati.” Rather than news bulletins, “Per voi, soldati” included a varied array of satire,
political propaganda, trivia, quotes by famous Italians, model letters home, and articles or
poetry submitted by military personnel in hopes of recouping the fifty-lire prize offered
each month for the two best pieces of writing. The VI Corps continued to subsidize sales
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of the newspaper to its troops and provided copies to units stationed far from Split.24 The
special section remained in print after XVIII Corps took over control of the zone, with an
estimated readership of 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers. The VI Corps launched its own daily,
La Sentinella, out of Dubrovnik in September 1942.25
Not until June 1942 did the Second Army establish a field newspaper intended for
all of its troops in the Balkans, entitled La Tradotta del Fronte Giulio. With the approval
of the SMRE and Minculpop, Supersloda’s propaganda office modelled its weekly
offering after the famous trench newspaper of the First World War, La Tradotta, which
following the disastrous defeat at Caporetto in 1917 had sought to improve relations
between Italian military elites and the masses through persuasion.26 Similarly, the Second
Army developed its paper at a time when war bulletins no longer sufficed to maintain
troop morale, since an Axis victory no longer seemed imminent. Comprising four pages
in 1942 and eight pages in 1943, La Tradotta included cartoons and literature, mostly
submitted by military personnel.
Since the paper was intended to entertain as well as to educate, not all of the
material was overtly political in nature; much of it was humoristic or artistic, focusing on
themes of daily military life or nostalgia for home. A typical example of the style of
humour employed by the newspaper was a series of cartoons depicting the chaos that
ensued when an army typist made a mistake. In one case, gomme [tires] was inadvertently
changed to gonne [skirts], resulting in an order to the effect that “every driver must
inspect the skirts and repair any tears.” The cartoonist drew a group of Italian transport
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personnel lifting the skirts of all the local women they came across.27 [Appendix D]
Indeed, the blasphemous or indecent nature of some of the articles in La Tradotta raised
the ire of the Italian army’s top chaplain, Archbishop Angelo Bartolomasi.28 The
propaganda office printed 25,000 copies of La Tradotta each week, an impressive figure,
especially considering wartime paper shortages in Italy. Corps and unit commands
purchased them and distributed them to their men.29

A Multifaceted War
In terms of the actual production of propaganda material, the Italian army and its units
enjoyed more autonomy and shared greater responsibility in occupied Yugoslavia than
they had in Ethiopia. To accompany the “orders of the day” of unit commanders and the
literature from civilian and Fascist agencies, by mid-1942 Supersloda and its subordinate
commands had established printing presses and editorial boards of their own.30 The field
newspapers they produced provide an indication of how the military leadership portrayed
the war in Yugoslavia. However, it took Second Army more than a year to develop a
centralized propaganda organ for all of its units in the form of La Tradotta. Thus,
domestic Italian media remained important sources of military propaganda, especially in
the early stages of the occupation. In April and May 1941, the Fascist regime carefully
controlled propaganda justifying the largely unexpected war, through Minculpop’s
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“dispositions” to the domestic Italian press.31 Through newspapers like the Corriere della
Sera and Il Popolo d’Italia, the regime established its war aims and thereby provided the
first muddled explanation to the Italian invading and occupying forces on the importance
of their mission in Yugoslavia. Fascist propaganda presented the campaign as both a
defensive and expansionistic imperial war.
Because it had not anticipated the timing of the war with Yugoslavia, the Fascist
regime had little time to launch a preparatory propaganda campaign to justify Italy’s
presence in the region.32 As a result, not only the reporting of news but of broad themes
and war aims developed in stages, responding to the changing political and military
situation. As late as 25 March 1941, Italian newspapers spoke of “Italo-Yugoslavian
friendship,” applauding Yugoslavia for remaining faithful to its pact of friendship with
Italy by standing up to British pressure and agreeing to join the Tripartite.33 Even after
the coup that placed Peter II in power, Stefani reports voiced confidence that Yugoslavia
would nevertheless honour its agreement with the Axis.34 The Italian newspaper press
only began to print preparatory propaganda for war against Yugoslavia at the beginning
of April, emphasizing Serbian militarism and oppression of minorities while blaming
British intrigue for the deteriorating situation.35
With the Axis invasion on 6 April came a flurry of reports on British and Serbian
machinations in the country, which had — it was now claimed — maintained an anti31
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Italian and pro-Anglo-French stance ever since the 1937 pact of friendship. The regime
had to reconcile its aggression against Yugoslavia with previous talk of friendship with
the country. The official explanation of the government was that, although the Axis had
sought to include Yugoslavia as part of a reconstructed Europe by offering it the Greek
port of Salonika, the coup of 27 March forced Italy to take pre-emptive action before
Yugoslavia could become a British base of operations.36 The regime hurriedly published
new editions of older anti-Yugoslavian propaganda, emphasizing the defensive nature of
the campaign. One such work by the infamous Fascist mouthpiece Virginio Gayda —
initially published in 1933 but reprinted with a new preface in April 1941 — claimed that
with British help the Serbs intended to dominate central Europe, concluding that “the new
war with Yugoslavia that the Axis Powers were forced to confront on 6 April 1941 is
truly a war of national and international defence against an aggressor given to the most
lunatic imperialist plan.”37
Although it now portrayed the conflict as having been inevitable, the regime
presented no substantial war aims upon its declaration of war. Primarily, this early
propaganda connected the new Balkan conflict to the broader ongoing war against
Britain, with the secondary objective of liberating Croatia from the Serbian yoke.38
Certainly, the liberation of ethnic groups served the revisionist propaganda and ideologies
of the Axis powers and could be portrayed as part of the “reconstruction of Europe” and
establishment of a new order to replace that imposed by Versailles.39 Alongside the
36
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notion of a defensive war, then, the concept that the invasion fulfilled a liberating mission
comprised the first justifications for the campaign in Yugoslavia. Themes of Italian
irredentism and conquest only grew prominent towards the end of operations, when it
became clear that Italy would occupy large tracts of territory in the region. This too was
justified by referring to the “bad peace of 1919,” which had failed to grant Italy all the
land promised to it along the Adriatic. More so than the liberation of Hungarian, Croat,
and Montenegrin minorities, “for us Italians, naturally, the greatest and loudest
[achievement] of all rings the name of Dalmatia reconquered!”40 With victory and
annexations, the concept of spazio vitale entered official discourse.41 Like the Ethiopian
campaign, this too had become a war for empire.
Fascist propaganda from the outset, while remarkably nimble, was multifaceted
and fraught with contradictions. On one hand, the war was fought to defend Italy and its
neighbours from Serbian and British aggression, and for the self-determination of
minorities persecuted by the Yugoslavian state. On the other hand, the war was presented
as an opportunity to claim unredeemed national territory and to establish Italian imperial
domination over the Balkans. The Italian Second Army inherited these themes from the
political leadership in Rome. During the course of the occupation, the message of the
army’s propaganda became even more complex, reflecting the tangled politics and the
worsening military situation in the Balkans. The army’s dismal relationship with its
Croatian allies flew in the face of propaganda on its liberating role. An anti-Slavic
element increasingly crept into Italian propaganda and the army fell back upon the
imperialistic messages that had predominated years earlier in East Africa. Once again,
Italian soldiers were told that they were modern legionaries, bearers of a superior
civilization capable of both severity and generosity. Finally, with the Soviet Union’s
entry into the war, and as Yugoslavian partisan resistance spread, Italian military
propaganda became dominated by anti-communist sentiments and an obsession with
guerrilla warfare that contributed to the brutalization of the soldiers of the Second Army.
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All of these themes overlapped, intermingled with, and often contradicted one another in
the army’s propaganda throughout the period of occupation, informing the way officers
and men perceived the local populations and how they behaved towards them.

The Liberating Mission and the Croatian Alliance
One of the most problematic areas for Italian propaganda in Yugoslavia was its depiction
of Croats and of the Independent State of Croatia. The troubled relationship between
Italian and Croatian authorities and the rise of resistance movements in Croatian territory
conflicted with early claims that the Croats were worthy allies beholden to Italy for their
liberation. Indeed, in the first month of occupation, the Italian press claimed that Croats
welcomed them as liberators from the tyrannical oppression of Belgrade. Still writing for
the Corriere della Sera, Ciro Poggiali defended early Croatian “reprisals” against
“Četniks” as having been justified by “twenty years of Serbian high-handedness”
[prepotenze].42 The same paper lauded the Ustaša terrorists of the 1930s as freedom
fighters, whose gratitude for Italy’s patronage was exemplified by the offer of the
Croatian crown to a member of the House of Savoy.43 Likewise, the Treaty of Rome
signified Italo-Croatian harmony as well as Italian paternalism. Portraying the liberation
of Croatia and the incorporation of the new state into the Tripartite as one of Italy’s
greatest achievements of the war, headlines read how “in the light of Rome a people have
regained their freedom.”44
Italian propagandists even tried to instil the notion that Italians and Croats shared
a common historical and cultural identity. They emphasized the historical links between
Italy and Croatia, favourably comparing the present Croatian situation to that of Italy
during the Risorgimento; both nations had undergone centuries without political
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sovereignty.45 A series of articles by Eugenio Coselschi recounted how irredentists of
both nationalities collaborated against the Austrians in the 1850s and how the Croat
independence movement of the nineteenth century drew inspiration from Italian
unification, just as the Ustaša party had modeled itself after Italian Fascism.46 Mussolini
spoke of the natural “solidarity” between Croatia and Italy, based on shared national
borders, shared values, ideals, and political institutions, as well as complementary
interests; their collaboration and friendship, he prophesied, would provide an example of
“Roman strength.”47 Another article spoke of Croatia’s historical Latin character,
claiming that Croats had for centuries been oriented “towards the West and especially
towards Rome.”48 This inclination to present Italians and their Croatian allies as bearers
of a shared Western, even Latin, civilization remained Rome’s official policy for the rest
of the war.49
Officially, the Italian army’s own propaganda for its troops also spoke of
“camaraderie” with the Croatian armed forces and of gratitude for Italy’s role in the
“rebirth of Croatia.”50 Propaganda directed towards troops of the VI Corps, stationed in
annexed Dalmatian and occupied Croatian territory, portrayed the Croatian populations
as loyal allies who respected Italians as representatives of a great civilization that offered
freedom and protection “against any sort of disorder.”
After so many months in Croatia, we have learned a few words of this difficult
language, so different from our own; and we manage to make ourselves
understood to the local people. They see us in a good light and willingly approach
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us, during breaks. A few old peasants tell us how they had been prisoners [of war]
in Italy, and they tell us where and when. They all keep fond memories of our
country. And they try to return however they can the kindness they received
twenty years ago.
But the most touching thing is when the children run in flocks along the streets
[...] They all raise their arms and repeat a thousand times: ‘ZIVIO DUCE’, with
silvery voices and playful and happy eyes. […] ‘ZIVIO DUCE’ means long live
all of us, because the Duce too was a corporal like me, in the other war. It means:
Long live Italy, who we represent here. […] Here everyone likes us because we
represent civilization and because we are kind even to the humble; and also
because we like kids.
They know that we are allies and they do not consider us troops of occupation.
None of us are bullies. We respect the harvest, because we are peasants too, and
we pay for everything that we need. When a battalion leaves a place, everyone is
sad and many cry.51
Such propaganda was unique in emphasizing the peasant identity that many Italian
soldiers shared with Croat villagers. It also stood in contrast to VI Corps’s own reports on
the morale of its men, which reveal that by December 1941 Italian soldiers held an
“aversion” towards their Croatian allies and were generally “distrustful” of the occupied
Croatian populations.52 While Italian soldiers admired the German soldier for his valour,
they considered the Croatian army to be “militarily inept, disorganized and composed in
general of brutal and bloodthirsty soldiers,” and they believed the regime had made a
mistake by binding itself to the “criminal and assassin” [delinquent e regicida] Ante
Pavelić.53
Although Italian commanders largely shared the sentiments of their men
regarding the Croats, political and military imperatives prevented them from condoning
it. As a result, from time to time army propagandists reminded the troops of their
liberating mission in Croatia. Intended for troops stationed almost entirely on Croatian
territory, the bulletin of the V Corps recounted how Italian troops had freed Croatia from
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an eight-hundred-year “period of slavery” under Hungarian, Ottoman, Austrian, and
finally Serbian rule. It tried to convince Italian soldiers that they shared a common
Roman identity with Croats: “Between the darkness of prehistory and the shadows of the
past [Croatia saw] a single bright light: the light of Romanità, that has always shone,
since the earliest beginnings, upon the history of the Croat people.”54 The use of the term
romanità [Romanness] may simply have been an opportunistic use of rhetoric — it was a
typical Fascist catchword — but it carried a subtle yet unmistakable message. It held up
the populations of the Independent State of Croatia as civilized equals while couching the
Italian presence in Croatia in imperialistic, and historically justified, terms.55 It left no
doubt of Rome’s dominant status in its relationship with Zagreb.
La Tradotta del Fronte Giulio promoted similarly contradictory messages
regarding Italo-Croatian relations and the army’s purpose in Croatia. For example, one
article provided the positive story of an Italian soldier’s travels to Metković, in the
Independent State of Croatia, where he met a peasant woman named Milka who turned
out to be of Venetian stock.
It was destiny — she tells me — that after Turkish, Austrian, and Serbian rule, the
last of which was brutal without peer — Latin civilization would again come to
our shores. So many degradations for us Croats in so many years of slavery! And
why? Because we were Catholics and hard workers. Can such brutality be
explained by the fact that we prayed in Latin like our fathers? […] I feel that in
this land of slaves, martyrs and heroes, the Italian cause has dug a deep furrow
with the sharp plough of history marching to the step of the new legions. Now
more than ever I see the sublime light of a universal mission shine upon my dusty
uniform.56
Thus, as late as October 1942, Italian military propaganda continued to emphasize pride
in the liberation of an oppressed and kindred Croat people, albeit within the framework of
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an imperial system dominated by Italy. However, as guerrilla resistance continued to
spread, even the army’s propaganda began to equate the adjective “Croatian” with
treachery. Another story in La Tradotta told of a unit whose men returned from a
rastrellamento with their jackets “full of Croatian rain, that is a treacherous [traditrice]
rain that you do not see but that you feel in your bones.”57
The pages of La Tradotta did not tend to differentiate between Slavic groups.
Croats were often lumped together with Slavs in general, referred to derogatively as
crucchi, a term derived from the Serbo-Croatian word for bread, kruh. In articles and
cartoons, the term was most frequently used to refer to Communist Partisans, but it could
also represent Slavic populations or territory more broadly.58 Typically, “crucca scum”
were described as untrustworthy.59 One cartoonist drew a couple soldiers about to snatch
a “crucca” hen; however, the chicken pleaded, “I swear! I have anti-communist
sentiments!”60 The fictitious letters in the series “Le lettere del fante Bonaventura” were
addressed from “Zona Crucca,” “Zona dei crucchi,” “Crucchilandia,” and “Cruccherìa.”61
Similarly, rather than writing specifically of Croatia or other regions occupied by
the Second Army, articles in La Tradotta most frequently referred to occupied territory as
“the Balkans” [in Balcania, di Balcania]. The army called upon its personnel to view
themselves as “comrades-in-arms of the Balkans.”62 As guerrilla warfare increased, the
term more often became preceded by negative modifiers, such as the “treacherous land of
the Balkans.”63 The army’s policy of treating all guerrilla bands as part of a “single
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front,” the need for army propagandists to appeal to soldiers in diverse parts of
Yugoslavia, a desire to simplify the political and ethnic complexities of the region, and
security-intelligence concerns likely contributed to this trend towards generalization.64
Ultimately, efforts to establish feelings of camaraderie and equality with the Croatian ally
in Italian propaganda gave way to racist stereotypes as Italian forces grew frustrated with
their inability to eliminate the Partisan threat.

Irredentism and the Imperial Civilizing Mission
Italo-Croatian relations were also plagued by competing irredentist claims over the
coastal territory of Dalmatia. Incompatibilities between Italian and Croatian interests
were made apparent at the beginning of the occupation when a single headline in the
Corriere della Sera tried vainly to combine both themes of liberation and irredentist
expansionism: “The intimate communion between Italy and the revived kingdom. Moved
exultation of the Italian people for the return of Dalmatian territory under the sign of
Rome.”65 This confusing message had its roots in the cautious attitude that Minculpop
adopted towards the Balkan situation in May 1941. Convinced that propaganda had
ramifications on foreign policy, and unwilling to raise expectations in Italy given the
uncertainty whether Hitler would grant his ally any territorial bounty at all, Pavolini
ensured that irredentist propaganda remained limited at this stage. At the end of April, he
warned Italian journalists “not to anticipate anything on what could be the Balkan
settlement as a rule. In particular in dealing with questions about Dalmatia, totally avoid
any tone that can seem anti-Croatian or anti-Slavic.” Instead, he promoted his concept of
an “Italian Imperial Community,” over which Italy would exert indirect influence. 66
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Themes of imperialist expansionism in this respect made their way into the
army’s propaganda.67 Soldiers of the VI and XVIII Corps were told that the war against
Britain and the Soviet Union was being fought to reorganize the world into living spaces
[spazi vitali]. Europe would be divided between a Nordic living space, under German
hegemony, and a Mediterranean one, under Italian tutelage. Such an arrangement was
justified on historical, biological, and geographical grounds: centuries of experience
revealed that Germanic ways of life could not persist in the Mediterranean, while Latin
ways were unsuited to northern climes.68 Like Germany, Italy was fighting a just war of
expansion for national survival by ensuring the “fair distribution of the raw materials
existing in the world.”69 In addition, Italian generals helped promote more traditional
concepts of empire through speeches and decrees to their men. On the anniversary of the
declaration of empire, Armellini tried to instil in his troops a belief in Italy’s imperial
mission. Despite the loss of East Africa, he pledged that “the Army, which was the
champion [propugnatore], conqueror and defender of the empire, reaffirms with arms in
hand the certainty that Italy is, [and] will be an empire.”70
Italian imperialism in the Balkans therefore found justification in terms of Italy’s
cultural hegemony in Europe, its right as an economically dependent and disenfranchised
“proletarian nation” to expand, and in the patriotic desire to secure national greatness.71
Despite Pavolini’s initial concerns, irredentism formed another pillar that justified the
Italian presence in the region. The Corriere della Sera praised the soldiers of the Second
Army for turning “the empty dream of generations of patriots” into reality. 72 Although
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few of those Dalmatians who considered themselves irredentists shared Rome’s vision of
a centralized national Italian state, propaganda claimed that the local populations had
welcomed Italian liberation with open arms, even rising in revolt against the Yugoslavian
oppressors.73 The inhabitants of Dalmatia supposedly all spoke an Italian dialect rooted in
ancient Latin and had retained their sense of “Italian community” despite Yugoslavian
oppression.74 In the Adriatic, Italy’s imperial mission looked for inspiration not only from
Rome but from the more recent Venetian empire, conjuring the spirit of Enrico Dandolo,
who founded the “Latin Empire” in Constantinople after sacking that city, and Pietro
Orseolo, the doge who conquered Dalmatia in the eleventh century.75
Irredentist propaganda, by association, implied Italian racial or cultural
superiority over Slavs. Anti-Slavism had been an important component of Italian
ultranationalist ideology since before the First World War.76 Despite the regime’s official
adoption of biological “Nordic” racism with the race laws of 1938, most Fascist
ideologues continued to promote spiritual “Mediterraneanist” racism as a way to
differentiate themselves from Nazi theorists and to appeal more broadly to Italian
Catholics.77 The army’s propaganda reflected this tendency. One author scorned the
notion of racial “purity,” arguing that it was impossible to reverse centuries of racial
mixing in Europe. Cultural and social organization was more important than bloodlines.78
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Racist characterizations in the regime and army’s propaganda focused primarily
on cultural themes that nonetheless emphasized the inferior otherness of the occupied
populations. Authors used art and architecture to legitimize Italy’s claims across the
Adriatic as well as to denigrate the civilization of South Slavs. They publicized “the
Roman solemnity” of the city of Split and “the Venetian graces” of nearby Trogir, which
they deemed worthy of preservation and restoration.79 “In Split,” La Sentinella
exclaimed, “that which is not Roman is Venetian, in happy continuity.” The article
dismissed “Slavic” examples of art and architecture as profanities. It portrayed Ivan
Meštrović’s statue of the tenth-century Bishop Gregory of Nin — who defended the use
of Slavic language in Catholic liturgy — as a physical and symbolic eyesore compared to
the Roman motifs of the Palace of Diocletian: “It took the Italian redemption [of
Dalmatia] to remove — even if the monument was most valuable, a true work of art —
that not only architectural, but even religious, indecency [sconcio].”80 In terms of ItaloCroatian relations, such propaganda was all the more provocative because it was
published for troops of the VI Corps stationed in Dubrovnik, which remained part of the
Independent State of Croatia. Though not always a central component of Italian
propaganda, such themes remained present into 1943, with La Tradotta still celebrating
“the return of Rome and Venice to the old sea where Italic law [diritto italico] never was
suffocated by arrogant Slavic audacity.”81
Language, too, was a simple but effective tool to highlight differences between
the two peoples. One article voiced particular disgust for the Slavic names given to
“Italian” cities in Yugoslavia: “Split! Siebnik! [sic] Dubrovnik! These barbaric sounding
names lived for twenty-two years, and no more.”82 Another author agreed that the Italian
language was far more beautiful than the Serbo-Croatian tongue. Army censors, the
author claimed, prevented him from printing any place names, “but if you take a few Ks
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and mix them together, then add a final ‘ić’ you will have the name because in this
cacophonous language all the towns resemble each other and pronouncing one of them is
enough to put you in bed for a week with inflammation of the larynx.”83 Such
pronouncements, however humorous, served to establish a sense of alterity between
Italians and their Balkan neighbours. Thus, irredentist-inspired racism undermined the
regime’s early pro-Croatian propaganda and provided further justification for Italy’s
presence in Dalmatia and its hinterland. The Second Army had to protect its coastal jewel
of civilization from the “hard-hearted primitive people” [popolo primitivo dal cuore
inasprito] that lived further inland.84
Italian propagandists applied somewhat different themes to justify the occupation
and annexation of Slovenia. Compared to Dalmatia, the new province’s territorial and
racial ties to Italy were less apparent; official motivations for annexation drew feebly
upon the history of Roman colonization in Slovenia and the inclusion of some of its
territory in the medieval Patriarchate of Aquileia.85 However, at least initially, Italian
propaganda relied less upon irredentist claims and more upon the ostensibly more modern
and Fascist concept of an Italian imperial community to explain the incorporation of so
many Slovenes into the realm. Just as ancient Romans had won over diverse cultures with
their laws and civilization, it was claimed that, as an educated Western people with no
history of nationhood, Slovenes naturally desired to enter “the order of imperial Rome.”
The population purportedly appreciated “good Roman justice that renders unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar’s, unto God the things that are God’s, and unto the Slovenes of
these lands the things that are Slovenian, its language, its culture, its traditions and its
generous autonomy.”86 “Today,” exclaimed an article in the Corriere della Sera, “the
tricolour flutters over the terraces [spalti] of the Slovenian city that has become a member
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of the imperial community of Rome, almost to consecrate that yearning that always
leaned towards Latin and Catholic civilization.”87 Such propaganda adhered to
Minculpop directives to “treat Ljubljana as an exclusively Slovenian city” in order to
appeal to the Slovene population.88
According to this propaganda, Roman imperialism permitted moderation towards
those who proved themselves civilized. Similarly, newspapers credited “Fascism’s high
sense of justice” for granting a degree of autonomy to the Province of Ljubljana.89 At the
outset of the occupation, the Italian press praised Slovenian culture for its elegant
literature, high level of literacy, and excellent university.90 These same characteristics
later made generals like Robotti consider the urban population of Ljubljana and the
Slovene intelligentsia to be untrustworthy and dangerous. However, for the time being,
propaganda organs sought to demonstrate “the solubility (in scientific terms) of the
Slovenian spirit with that of the Italians, and that certain ‘Italian air’ that transpires in
every cultural manifestation.”91
The notion that Slovenes could be absorbed into Italian culture ran counter to
trends in Fascist policy since the racist turn of 1938, when previously assimilable Slavs
became viewed as “alien” and inferior.92 However, it dovetailed with Fascist claims that
their particular brand of imperialism, unlike the selfish and exploitative versions of their
enemies, had a universal character that would benefit everyone.93 For the troops of the
Second Army, these early depictions of Slovenia had several ramifications. The
propaganda seemed to promote moderate behaviour and even a level of fraternization
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towards the occupied populations. It also contributed to a tendency — which persisted
among those serving in Croatian territory — to view the Province of Ljubljana as a
“promised land,” inhabited by friendly and civilized people.94 Given these expectations,
guerrilla resistance came as all the greater a shock to the Italian occupiers and may have
contributed to the harsh Italian reaction to signs of rebellion in Slovenia.
Concepts of nationalist irredentism and universalist imperialism overlapped and
intertwined in ways that sometimes bolstered and other times contradicted one another.
Balkan Slavs could be treated as a monolithic whole or as variegated groups; they could
be seen as civilized allies or barbaric enemies. The aspect that remained constant was the
conviction in the cultural superiority of Italians over the races of occupied Yugoslavia.
The common narrative between irredentist and imperialist propaganda involved that of
Latin civilization in the Balkans assailed by Slavic barbarism. In this way, the myth of
Rome and its “civilizing mission” was central to the army’s propaganda in Yugoslavia.
The war, it was promised, would establish a new order in which “Rome returns as a
beacon of civilization and justice among the peoples of the entire world.” Referring to the
Fascist ventennio, the editors of La Tradotta explained this as the “logical inevitable
development of the history of these past twenty years.”95 [Appendix E] It was around the
theme of romanità that the army most enthusiastically identified itself with the regime.
Reflecting the regime’s discourse on the fundamental unity of Italian history, a
serial column in Il Popolo di Spalato declared that the history of Italy was “the same
thing as the history of Rome.”96 An article on “Great Italians” explained how the legions
of Caesar and Augustus “brought civilization to the darkest corners of Europe.”97 Army
propagandists and commanding officers followed the regime’s lead by attempting to fit
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concepts of romanità, Italic antiquity, and Christianity into a monolithic model of Italian
civilization.98 While Dalmazzo reminded his men that the lands they occupied “once saw
the passage of Roman legionaries,” Armellini lauded the “heroism of the Italic stock
[stripe italica]” in conducting its “civilizing work.”99 The civilizing mission originated
not only from Rome’s legacy as centre of the ancient empire, but also as the centre of
Christianity.100 Whether through empire or religion, it had been Italy’s historic destiny to
bring “the light of its universal genius to others, in morality and in law, in the entire
structure of life.”101 An article on “the five parts of the world” explained:
It is Europe that has brought civilization to other parts of the world, but since it
was Rome and Italy that civilized Europe, one can, without exaggeration, confirm
that world civilization is Roman and Italian civilization. Every time that peoples
of the world have tried to pull away from our model of civilization and come up
with something new, they have failed.
As in Ethiopia, the sense of a civilizing mission could not be separated from a
chauvinistic sense of superiority over others, especially over those who chose not to live
“under the shadow of a just and strong government.”102
Although always coloured with paternalism, and often tainted with racism, the
army’s sense of a civilizing mission was closely connected to calls for humanitarianism
in order to conduct a hearts-and-minds policy in Yugoslavia. Propaganda for the troops at
times could be sympathetic towards the occupied populations and would praise the
kindness and generosity of Italian soldiers towards them. After describing the filth,
negligence, and poor education of the locals in the village his unit garrisoned, one
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contributor to La Tradotta told of how Italian soldiers took in an orphaned boy. After
being cleaned up, fed, and clothed for winter by the Italians, the boy became a loyal
follower, greeting the officers of the garrison with the Roman salute. The story, the
author claimed, was “an infinitesimal part of the humane generosity that the Italian
soldier offers up every day.” He therefore asked his comrades in the Second Army to
donate “out of use” garments to win more children over as “neo-Balilla”: “This is the
objective. Will it succeed? Yes, even here!”103 The following week, the front page of La
Tradotta included a drawing of a strong battle-hardened Italian soldier handing bread to a
scrawny child, revealing how by the end of 1942 Italian military authorities officially
promoted the image of the humane Italian soldier.104 [Appendix F]
Thus, elements of the italiani brava gente myth — largely fostered by postwar
governments as a means to establish an anti-fascist national identity and to mitigate the
harshness of Allied peace terms — already enjoyed currency during the Second World
War itself.105 The prevalence of these themes in Italian propaganda towards the end of the
occupation suggests that they came, in part, as a response to Italy’s failed war effort. The
heightened possibility of defeat prompted the Italians to distance themselves from the
policies and methods of their German allies. But references to the inherent goodness of
the Italian soldier were compatible with Fascist notions of an imperial civilizing mission.
The army exalted the humane traits of the Italian soldier as evidence of his superior
civilization, rooted in Roman concepts of justice and Catholic morality. Humanity went
hand-in-hand with superior Latin civilization.106 As one caption read, doling out food to
locals demonstrated the “Christian brotherhood of the Julian infantry in the Balkans!”107
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Such “generous charity,” it was hoped, would convince the local populations that Italian
“soldiers are good.”108
Italian propaganda therefore sought to convince the troops that they brought
civilization, charity, and protection to the people of the Balkans. This entailed a degree of
sympathy for local civilians, especially children, who suffered from the hardship of
guerrilla war. But, it also contributed to the dehumanization of Italy’s enemies. An article
entitled “Hunger” described the distressing sight of starving children in the Balkans and
blamed their plight on the policies of the Communist Partisans and the Allied powers.
They are the children in any Balkan station, on any Balkan railway: come from
the village, hungry, at the sound of an Italian train. Partisans have passed through
the village, they were here until yesterday, they stole everything, they destroyed
homes, they condemned the inhabitants to tormenting hunger, they killed the
weak, these children survived: a horrible picture of the desolation into which the
policy of Anglo-Russo-American selfishness has thrust a land that had already
accepted the peaceful protection of Rome. Betrayed by the lies of London and
Moscow, by fantastic American promises, this unfortunate race has stiffened itself
in a reaction as futile as it is tragic: innocent victims, these kids that crowd around
the Italian train, these children whose faces carry signs of terror, symbols of an
infamy without human precedent, pitiful remains of a people that has decreed its
own extermination.
Humble and anonymous, the hand of the Italian soldier extends itself to these
children, in an admirable gesture that transcends the strict boundaries of war, and
that proves more infamous the cruelty of those who consciously desired the
misfortune of the Balkan people.109
In 1943, with large swaths of territory in the hands of the Partisans, Italian propaganda
portrayed the civilian populations as “innocent victims of Balkan communism [that] find
salvation in the Italian soldier.”110 So, the notion of a liberating mission in the Balkans
continued up to the fall of Mussolini, except that by this point Italian propaganda claimed
to be fighting to liberate the oppressed and terrorized populations from communist
occupation.111
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Positive propaganda based on themes of liberation and charity imposed limits on
the nature of Italian repression in the Balkans. It demonstrated that Fascist concepts of
spazio vitale did not require the extermination of other races; it helped prevent Italy’s war
in the Balkans from transforming into a Vernichtungskrieg. However, the emphasis on
humanitarianism was itself limited by the expansionist, racist, and anti-communist
messages that always accompanied and usually overwhelmed it. The contradictory
interplay between these themes was made evident in an article for La Tradotta entitled
“The Little Serb.” The article told the story of an Italian unit that had just encountered
and defeated — quite bloodily — a group of Partisans in a village. Inside the village, the
Italian soldiers came across a scrawny boy in bare feet, poorly clad, and with a shaven
head, typical of the way Balkan children were depicted in the army’s propaganda. The
author argued that the pitiful sight of the boy and his village was a glimpse of “the
infernal vision of the Soviet paradise.” In Italy, he commented, children like this would
be sent to idyllic colonies by the sea, where the state would care for their moral and
physical development, thereby strengthening the fabric of the nation. But, in the Balkans,
instead there is nothing but mountain banditry and incursions by raiders; here
social chaos finds its most typical manifestation. The villages are dirty, the hovels
are filthy, education is backwards or else absent. The incurable desire for the
ghastly is the prevailing and absolute law that is sown among these sterile
mountains and barren plateaus of agony and anguished moans.
While the author treated the Serb child sympathetically as an innocent victim —
unfortunate enough to belong to a backwards and barbaric society — and while the
Italian soldiers in the article demonstrated their innate generosity and civilized kindness
by offering the boy some bread, such sympathy did not prevent the Italians from burning
the boy’s village and leaving him behind to fend for himself after “the dreadful disaster
provoked by his father.”112 In this case, although mercy and charity towards defenceless
children were portrayed as characteristics of the good Italian soldier, the author had no
doubt that the boy’s father was a Communist Partisan and that the village as a collective
unit was rebellious and deserving of its fate.
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The limits of Italian sympathy for the local populations were made further evident
in the 6 June 1943 issue of La Tradotta. On the same page as articles that highlighted the
hunger of the populations and Italian efforts to win them over by offering food was a
notice about the “sound measure” of “suspending rations to populations that support the
partisans.” The author added that “this measure has proven to have effect. The belly,
when it rumbles, gets rid of cheerfulness [toglie l’allegria].”113 The following month, and
just a week before Mussolini’s fall from power, another notice proclaimed that “The bono
italiano is a myth to explode, he who fears the violence of your just reaction will tell you
himself.”114 Italian commands, which had to balance concerns for the morale, discipline,
and fighting power of their men, were never completely willing to adopt a “soft”
approach in their counterinsurgency policies or in propaganda for their men. This was yet
another factor behind the plurality of contradictions regarding Italy’s mission in
Yugoslavia. Italian propagandists were aware of these contradictions, but they insisted
that Italian soldiers were “sufficiently great and civilized and strong in arms to feed an
innocent child, and to destroy without mercy and to the last man those who prove
themselves enemies of Rome.”115

The Enemy
By 1942, obsession with the guerrilla enemy outweighed any other single theme in the
Italian army’s propaganda for its troops. As Teodoro Sala has demonstrated, Italian
propaganda in Yugoslavia had to respond and adjust to the changing conditions and
characteristics of guerrilla warfare.116 Indeed, for the thousands of soldiers that reached
the theatre as replacements or reinforcements after the summer of 1941, the state of
warfare in the Balkans came as a tremendous shock, rendering obsolete much of the
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preparatory propaganda they had received in Italy.117 After May 1941, news in Italy
about the occupying forces in the Balkans was virtually non-existent.118 With the
outbreak of war against the Soviet Union in June, any form of news from the Balkans
became increasingly less regular and usually presented an image of normalcy in the
region.119 Only later in 1943, when it could no longer be ignored, did newspapers on the
home front begin to acknowledge the existence of Tito’s Partisan movement and Italian
counterinsurgency operations against it.120

The Guerrilla in Italian Propaganda
Despite the lack of recognition in the domestic press and the fact that prior to 1942 troops
stationed in Dalmatia and Croatia were not awarded the extra pay granted to soldiers in
areas of operations, Italian commands tried to convince their men that they were in a true
war zone.121 This was intended to overcome morale and discipline problems — a
common issue for frontline troops relegated to occupation duty — that plagued the
Second Army. After the difficult winter of 1941–42, Ambrosio lamented the lack of
fighting spirit among his men. On more than one occasion, entire units had surrendered
without a fight after being ambushed. He blamed poor morale on fatigue but also on the
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very nature of guerrilla warfare and asked his officers to instil in their men “the
invincible will to annihilate the enemy.”122 In his 3C circular, Roatta made a similar
appeal that “operations against rebels are true and proper operations of war,” which “one
must fight to the end and with fierceness.”123
Moreover, the army’s propaganda insisted that fighting Partisans in the Balkans
was equivalent to combat on other fronts.124 Even after the defeats at El Alamein and
Stalingrad, Italian soldiers were told that “fighting here on the stony ground of the
Balkans you keep the war far from your family, from your home, from your fields.”125 In
terms of the nature of operations and combat, too, army propaganda insisted that
experience in the Balkans matched that of the North African or Russian fronts.
In fact we have, here, the Russia of winter and the Africa of summer; that would
be to say mud and rocks, cold and dust in turns; and an enemy as cowardly as the
English, as cruel as the Russians, as treacherous as the French, as quick as the
Americans and as barbaric as the Australians.126
As on other fronts, Italian commanders awarded medals in the field for bravery, even if it
was against “communist rebels,” and publicly praised their units.127 After operations,
Roatta lauded his divisions for overcoming “the fierce resistance of a seasoned and wellarmed enemy, [and] the great difficulties of an impracticable terrain.”128
At the same time, however, Italian commanders and propagandists depicted the
guerrilla enemy as illegitimate. One article commented that it was ridiculous for
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“partisans” to refer to themselves as part of an “army” [esercito].129 The “partisan bands”
lacked the discipline to be considered true military formations.130 As in Ethiopia, the
army employed language that delegitimized their enemies. A single article in La Tradotta
included most of the terms used to refer to insurgents in the Balkans: “communist
brigands;” “partisan bands;” “velocissimi crucchi;” “rebels;” “partisan bandits;” and,
“battalions of bandits.”131
In the minds of Italian commanders, the illegitimacy of the Partisans sprang
largely from the nefarious tactics and techniques they employed. During his major
operation in Slovenia in the summer of 1942, Mario Robotti affirmed to his men that their
campaign against
communist banditry, which still infests what is now our land, [requires…] action
that is ever more firm, decisive, inflexible!
Action that constitutes a need and a duty against an enemy that is underhanded
and cowardly, but, at the same time, clever and fierce. An enemy that, as a rule,
doesn’t want, because it doesn’t dare, to confront us openly, and, having set traps,
tries to exploit them without mercy, with cold ferocity, not worrying about the sad
consequences of their work that fatally fall upon the populations, too often,
however, with true recklessness, more or less fully conniving with these criminal
bands. An enemy that doesn’t even care for the Slovenes themselves assassinating
entire families, including women and children and honest priests.
The troops should know that their efforts and sacrifices, even if today they should
have [...] less resonance compared to their comrades that fight on other fronts, are
no less useful and advantageous towards the certain triumph of the nation.132
Robotti’s comments exemplify the efforts of Italian commanders to portray the Balkan
theatre as a genuine war front while at the same time delegitimizing enemy combatants
that refused to engage in conventional warfare. They also reveal how sympathy for the
civilian populations that became victims of the Partisans was limited by mistrust for the
occupied populations as a whole.
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The ability of guerrilla forces to exploit terrain to launch hit-and-run attacks and
to camouflage themselves among the civilian population resulted in frustration that
manifested itself not only in the field but in the army’s propaganda as well. As one article
vividly explained, the perfidious techniques of the Partisans made the rastrellamento a
particularly nerve-wracking experience.
The unit sets out on a combing action, through the morning mist. They advance
cautiously, ears perked to catch the most imperceptible sound that manages to
pierce the thick layer of padding that stretches above and between us, eyes that
hurt from the strong effort of trying to see. And hands lightly caressing the butts
of their rifles. Because here the enemy is everywhere. Lying flat behind that
boulder, hidden in that bush, huddled up in that ditch. Ahead, beside, behind. Is
this war? Or is it more of a hunt, man against man, which needs to be played with
cunning and caution so as not to succumb? Involuntarily, dream-like visions rise
ahead of infantry that rush to the attack, magnificent in force and daring. Furious
scuffles, the piercing bangs of shots, cries of victory, enemies in retreat…
But here it is another thing. Here the trap and the ambush reign. A brief pattering
of automatic fire, coming from who knows where, from that hut, from that thick
of shrubbery, from the edge of the road. Then nothing more. Silence. And it
leaves in your heart a bitter dissatisfaction of not being able to come to blows, of
not being able to spit in the faces of these forest brigands, armed with fear and
ferocity, who shoot by surprise and flee. Caution and cunning. Searching every
spot, reconnoitering every ditch, taking in every stone. Traps are everywhere.133
Fear of the ambush dominated much of the literature in La Tradotta. A poem written by a
cavalry lieutenant noted how, during night in the forest, “Death is always ready / To raise
his bony hand / With the ghastly sneer of every partisan.”134 Propagandists consciously
exploited soldiers’ frustration with guerrilla warfare to inspire hatred for the enemy.
Hate, a terrible word: it is necessary that the solider, the good Italian soldier learns
to hate! [...] We Italians do not know the cowardly ways of betrayal and disgrace,
we have always fought openly and fairly [a viso aperto] [...] against the cursed
enemy. No longer: Italian soldiers, we have learned how to hate them, these
murderers of women, this enemy that dares compare itself to Rome and its
civilization, and stoops to machine gunning a child!135
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The Italian military leadership officially sanctioned hatred as a positive value to be
promoted among all Italian soldiers. According to directives from the Comando Supremo,
it was the duty of all commanders and propaganda officers “to exalt aggressive spirit,
love for combat and hatred against the enemy” in order to secure fighting efficiency and
unit cohesion.136
In addition to inspiring hatred by highlighting the underhanded tactics and
ruthlessness of guerrilla fighters in the Balkans, Italian commands exaggerated the
tendency of Partisans to shoot any prisoners they took. This served to justify harsh
reprisals and to discourage Italian soldiers from surrendering.137 Prewar propaganda had
already assumed that guerrillas in the Balkans — at this point referring to irregular Četnik
bands in the service of the Yugoslavian government — would take no prisoners.138
During the occupation, when Partisans took prisoners, Italian commanders spread word
that all of them had been shot.139 Some army chaplains, conditioned by their experience
of guerrilla warfare, helped promulgate such messages. In August 1942, Ivo Bottacci, the
top-ranking cleric attached to Second Army, distributed a circular informing clergy that a
fellow chaplain had been killed in an ambush by a “horde of rebels” bearing “Bolshevik
insignia.” Bottacci claimed that the chaplain “was wounded by gunfire and probably
finished off at close quarters,” since “several stab wounds were noted on his body.”140
Italian officers and non-commissioned officers, claimed an article in La Tradotta,
were shot by Partisans out of hand. Enlisted men were forced to assist in the executions
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and then had to perform heavy labour if they were not themselves shot.141 In 1943,
Second Army’s commander Mario Robotti personally spread propaganda of Partisan
atrocities against Italian prisoners, eulogizing the case of Captain Umberto Nazazzi.
Captured by the Partisans and interrogated in a village, Nazazzi proclaimed his hatred for
Bolshevism and his faith in the triumph of Fascism before being executed.142 Even if
soldiers did not buy into the regime’s justifications for their presence in the Balkans, the
conviction of the enemy’s cruelty helped them accept executions and harsh reprisals as
legitimate. Referring to such measures, Casanuova recalled that “all this was horrible, but
it came down to personal defence, in that merciless and fitful [frazionata] war that they
had sent us to fight against our will.”143
Thus, alongside imagery of bringing aid and succor to the destitute, Italian
propaganda told stories of tremendous violence and brutality towards insurgents.
Resembling the fetishization of military violence in Ethiopia by Fascist authors, such
tales were almost pornographic in nature, depicting episodes of success against an enemy
that in reality all too frequently slipped away.144 Articles described the pleasure of
thwarting rebel ambushes, gunning down fleeing brigands, chasing Partisans into the
mountains to starve, and torching their hideouts with flamethrowers.145 A cartoon in the
field newspaper of the V Corps depicted an Italian soldier literally sweeping away a
horde of uniformed Communist Partisans with a large broom. Perhaps with Freudian
connotations — which certainly had currency in the 1940s — the caption read, “like a
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repressed dream… the ‘broom’ service” [Come il sogno sublima... il servizio di
‘ramazza’].146 The army’s propaganda thus encouraged an obsession among Italian
soldiers for killing the hated partisan, whether in combat or by firing squad. An article on
a victorious night action conducted by men of the Granatieri di Sardegna Division in
revenge for the ambush of three “massacred” Italian officers left no doubt that captured
partisans ought to be shot: “The survivors that surrender understand, more than our
limited Slavic vocabulary, that much more eloquent [language] of our rifles.”147
In 1943, La Tradotta’s series of “Letters from Private Bonaventura” continued the
obsession with exterminating Partisans. In January, the fictitious Bonaventura spoke of
flamethrowers “roasting the forests with attached — pardon the language — rebel
partisans.”148 This was followed in February with imagery of “crucchi rebels […]
roasting in Hell.”149 Bonaventura wrote that he had “developed such a craving to put an
end to these scoundrels of cowardly rotters of assassins of — with all due respect —
bloody [porci] rebels, that I am so hot-headed with heroism and war-like fury that it gave
me a rather formidable cold.”150 Coming at the end of the first stage of the joint
Operation Weiss, Bonaventura’s remarks were consistent with other propaganda, which
exalted that “the crucco bandit is covered with blood, but this time it is his blood!”151
Propaganda treating the Balkans as a war zone while aiming to inspire hatred of
the Partisans and the desire to annihilate them had an indirect impact on the way the
occupied populations were presented to the troops. Despite claims that the Italian soldier
could find a balance between compassion for local populations and loathing for rebels,
the very nature of guerrilla warfare made such distinctions impossible to maintain. The
146
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characteristics that made the Partisan so despicable in Italian eyes — their ability to avoid
combat or capture by hiding among the rural population, their reliance on locals for
supplies and information — also brought into question the loyalties of the civilian
population. Although the Italians always maintained that they were liberating the people
of the Balkans, first from Yugoslavian tyranny and later from communist terror, military
leaders at the same time emphasized that the local populations could not be trusted.
In fact, from the early stages of the occupation, Italian generals sought to limit
contacts between their troops and the civilian populations, largely to maintain military
discipline and the health of their men. Ambrosio expected “correct behaviour, serious and
reserved,” from the personnel of Second Army towards the local populations.152 To
prevent more intimate forms of fraternization, propaganda sections published leaflets
alerting their men to the widespread presence of venereal disease in their zone of
occupation and they established military brothels [case di tolleranza] in order to monitor
and control sexual relations between Italian troops and local women.153 Increased
Partisan activity in the winter of 1941–42 prompted Italian commanders to issue
additional decrees against fraternization, now in order to avoid ambushes or subterfuge.
Ambrosio warned that those who today claimed to be friends could tomorrow become
Italy’s enemies.154
Roatta later codified such sentiments in his 3C circular. For reasons of military
discipline, cohesion, and secrecy in a combat zone, Roatta told his men “not to trust
anyone and — until irrefutably proven otherwise — especially those who seem
exuberantly favourable and try to win our friendship.”155 In adherence with the principles
of Roatta’s circular, Armellini established a segregated village for soldiers in Split and he
encouraged his men to take an aggressive stance against civilians acting suspiciously,
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publicly praising one soldier for his prompt action and initiative.156 Like Roatta, he
warned his men to “use the utmost prudence and caution in relations with civilians [...]
who rely too much on our congenital good nature.”157 Calls for discipline and a certain
detachment from the local population dovetailed with the Fascist image of the ideal
imperial conqueror, modelled on the ancient Roman legionary with his “firmness” and
“warrior spirit.”158
Of course, it was impossible to completely avoid instances of intimate
fraternization, especially in the opening months of the occupation. Official Italian reports
hinted at the existence of such relations. For example, in a report intended to emphasize
the anti-Italian bearing of Ustaše in Drniš, the Sassari Division related how Croatian
authorities had levied fines upon five local girls for their dalliances with Italian soldiers.
Out of a “misguided sense of chivalry,” the soldiers who “frequented” the girls
reimbursed them from their own funds. An Italian battalion commander also intervened
to stop the Ustaše from shaving the girls’ heads.159 A VI Corps circular complained of the
frequency with which Italian officers could be found circulating with women after curfew
in Dalmatian cities.160 However, Italian commanders generally considered levels of
fraternization to be minimal. By the end of 1941, the VI Corps reported that relations
with local populations were “limited to the bare necessities of life. The troops, given their
long stay in the area, by now know the populations well and they know that they need to
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act with caution and reserve towards them.”161 By May 1942, following anti-partisan
operations, relations reportedly were “always limited and imbued with distrust.”162
Propaganda through 1942 told soldiers to always be suspicious and prepared for
combat. In one cartoon, a rifle lectured a soldier for not taking good care of it: “But, my
friend, you should understand that I am your most loyal companion: I who, in the dark
nights, keep you company in the long hours of patrol; I who saved your life in the
ambush the other day, when I had to cut a caper [fare una capriola] on that partisan who
wanted to send you to another world.”163 A December 1942 article touched on the
untrustworthy nature of the local populations. On the march, it explained, Italian soldiers
“encounter shepherds, peasants, ugly terrified mugs [brutti ceffi spauriti], that, when
questioned, reply: ‘Ne razumi, ne razumi’, that is: ‘I don’t understand’ (but they know
and understand many things).”164 Similarly, another writer bemoaned the inability to trust
the populations of the Balkans:
They say ‘Bono Tagliansco’ and then ‘tac’ at the first street corner they shoot you
from behind and that’s that and you never manage to find out who is the assassin;
but I never trust anyone [...] they are all treacherous and even when they smile
and bow to you inside they harbour the poison distilled in Moscow, and they are
all like Boris Karloff [Bori Scarloff — sic] when he walks sinisterly at night.
They are cowards, they are.165
As these passages demonstrate, the very presence of guerrilla resistance throughout
Second Army’s zone of occupation inspired propaganda that treated Partisans and
populations alike with disdain.
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Accounting for Resistance
Army propagandists had to explain to their men why the Italian liberating and civilizing
mission faced such determined resistance in occupied Yugoslavia. Largely, they resorted
to ideological and racist interpretations of the origins of Partisan movements in the
Balkans. To varying degrees, the army employed anti-communist, anti-Semitic, and antiSlavic themes to account for guerrilla warfare and to further bolster the notion that the
troops of Second Army were participants in a broader struggle in defence of humanity.
The invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, just two months after the
collapse of Yugoslavia, introduced a new impetus to Italian propaganda at home and on
all fronts. It allowed the regime to reuse rhetoric and imagery from earlier campaigns
against its most consistent history enemy: communism.166 Anti-Bolshevism now flanked
anti-plutocratic themes as the pillars of the regime’s propaganda, with the common
denominator — according to Pavolini — being world Jewry.167 The war could now be
presented as an anti-Bolshevik crusade in defence of Western civilization.168 By 1942, the
common enemy had become the “Judeo-Masonic-Communist clique,” where Western
democracy played the role of the “Trojan horse of Bolshevism.” The Germans and
Italians, on the other hand, were anointed “new crusaders” against “Bolshevism.”169
Army commanders in Yugoslavia sought to take advantage of these new motifs in
their own propaganda. Immediately after the Germans launched Operation Barbarossa,
VI Corps commander Renzo Dalmazzo asked his officers to say a few words to their men
to counter communist and defeatist propaganda, as “a way to contribute to the struggle
against Bolshevism that our allies and our troops fight on the eastern front.”170 Unit
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commanders, in “conversations” with their men, emphasized the transformation of the
war to a popular struggle against Bolshevism. Also in Yugoslavia, they claimed, Italian
soldiers stood “for the triumph of such insuppressible ideals as the nation, family,
religion, justice.” Propaganda sections reported that “this feeling is enshrined in the
minds of even the less educated and has made the war more popular on the whole and
especially that against communism.”171
Anti-communism became a focus of propaganda for both troops and civilian
populations in Dalmatia, fusing with anti-democratic and anti-Semitic propaganda.172 An
article written in Il Popolo di Spalato by a second lieutenant presented the broader war
effort as a “holy war” of salvation and justified expansion:
In fact, we have never been afraid to say that we fight, not only for the salvation
of Roman-Imperial Catholic civilization and for the destruction of the demomasonic-liberal world and its Bolshevik brother, younger by birth but more
dangerous in its intentions, [but] also to conquer our place under the sun, to give
the wealth of the world, now held by a few, that logical and humane distribution
that is the expression of economic justice and that will provide the entire world
with a more harmonious growth and [will provide] men with that wellbeing that
until now they have searched for in vain.173
Concepts of a just and holy war against communism and materialism merged with the
religious aspect of Italy’s civilizing mission. Italian soldiers not only emulated Roman
legionaries; they were also “soldiers of Christ, like past crusaders.”174 As Marla Stone
argues, the need to emphasize traditional Christian values and conservative fears of
communism signalled the failure of Fascism’s project to transform Italians.175 Regardless,
what is significant here is that military propagandists consistently followed the regime’s
line in employing anti-communist rhetoric. Moreover, like the German army’s
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propaganda in the east, these defensive or “positive” themes coexisted with and
complemented racialized imagery of the subhuman enemy.176
Along with generic messages on the ideological importance of the broader war,
the pages of La Tradotta sought to connect the anti-partisan struggle in Yugoslavia
directly to the anti-Bolshevik crusade being waged on the eastern front. Despite the
complex and heterogeneous nature of resistance in the Balkans, Italian military
propaganda tended to label all insurgents as communists. Sometimes, authors referred to
Balkan Partisans as “Bolsheviks.”177 The Fascist regime had used such labels in the past
to denote any leftist opposition, but here the connections to Soviet Communism were
more specific.178 Italian troops were told that their enemies were directed by Moscow. A
drawing, entitled “For whom they fight,” depicted an Italian soldier with rifle and
bayonet protecting a mother and two children from a dagger-wielding Partisan flanked by
Stalin.179 [Appendix G] The message could not have been clearer: while Partisans fought
for Stalin and communism, Italians fought in defence of the family and civilization.
Connecting counterinsurgency in Yugoslavia to the operations against the Soviet
Union served three main purposes. First, it supported the army’s contention that service
in the Balkans was equivalent to that on other fronts. Second, it provided an opportunity
to portray the occupation of the Balkans as part of a defensive campaign to protect
positive values, despite the fact that the Axis had invaded both Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union. Third, building upon two decades of anti-communist propaganda disseminated by
the Fascist regime, it further delegitimized the guerrilla enemy and justified harsh
countermeasures.180 It permitted the army and regime to portray Yugoslavian Partisans as
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historic enemies while presenting Italians as victims, establishing a dangerous framework
of discourse and metaphors common to modern genocides and mass violence.181
A full-page article in La Tradotta, complete with photographic evidence of the
ideological sentiments of the Partisans, employed all three interpretations.
He who says ‘partisan’ in the Balkans, let us be clear, means ‘communist.’ […]
Here, in the Balkans, we don't just fight against an underhanded enemy that waits
in hiding to claim victims for its ranks: here we fight an idea, devoid of human
thought, that would like to bathe the world in a lake of blood and desolation.
You don't need to go to Russia to see desecrated churches and the destruction of
religious ornaments.
Just come to the Balkans. […]
But this perfidy will not prevail.
Entrusted to the strong hands of the Italian soldier, to the power of his arms, to the
might of his civilization, the defence will be steadfast, invincible.
Communism will be stopped, it must be stopped.
For the peace of mind of our hard-working families, for the sweetness that comes
from our homes and our churches.
Remember this soldier of the Balkans.
We must fight the enemy by force of arms and prepare for the quiet work of
tomorrow’s peace, when the scourge of this war, this crusade, has passed.182
In this way, the fight against insurgency in Yugoslavia became part of a defensive war
against Oriental communism. Military propaganda described the Balkans as a buffer
zone, separating Europe from the east, in which the Second Army fought its own battle
against “Balkan communism” and “Asiatic barbarity.”183
Italian propagandists frequently stressed the foreign ungodliness of communism
and the Partisan enemy.
Every day we gather proof of the sinister influence that Russia exerts from afar
over the Slavic peoples, in the anti-European attempt to cast them into the arms of
communism. […] The rubble of the ruined church [in a Slovenian town] gives
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evidence against whom the battalions of bandits truly fight: against freedom of
mind, against all that is most sacred in earthly life, against God.184
In particular, the existence of female Partisans symbolized how communist ideology
countered Christian and Fascist concepts of motherhood and the family.185 Italian
propaganda did not portray these women as innocents; rather, they were seen as
especially fanatical and brutal. While some writers claimed that “the Komesarica is a
whore invested with the office of political commissar” that “plays the part of the bitch in
the Bolshevik kennel,” others accused female Partisans of committing the worst forms of
torture upon Italian prisoners of war.186 The “inhuman insensitivity, coldness,” cruelty,
and brutality displayed by female Partisans contrasted with Italian notions of “the fairer
sex,” and could only be explained by their infection with “Asiatic philosophies.”187
Special hatred, therefore, was reserved for female Partisans, who became the subject of
much rumour throughout the ranks.188 One author dreamed of plucking the belly and nose
hair of a “beautiful Krucca, […] or ‘Komesarica’,” one by one.189 Although Italian policy
generally spared women from execution, units occasionally recorded shooting female
Partisans caught in flagrante.190
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As has been shown, Minculpop directives emphasized the purportedly Jewish
essence of communism.191 In Russia and Ukraine, anti-Semitism was an important theme
in the Italian army’s propaganda.192 Likewise, in Dalmatia, VI Corps’s propaganda
section included a series of overtly anti-Semitic articles in its supplement to Il Popolo di
Spalato. The half-page section occasionally included quotations from the Protocols of the
Elders of Zion.193 An article written by Giovanni Preziosi — the regime’s most fanatical
anti-Semitic rhetorician — cited the Protocols, Adolf Hitler, and his own journal, La Vita
Italiana, in an attempt to blame the war on a Jewish plot for world domination.194
Another presented Jews as particularly clever, racially conscious, and coordinated foes.
They are and remain Jews first and foremost and they feel deeply Jewish, that is,
not only of a different religion from ours (and that would be nothing bad, since
religion is a private matter that concerns only one's conscience), but also a
different race superior to all others, a privileged race for which anything is
permitted, even playing dirty tricks [far canagliate].195
Propaganda like this presented the war as a struggle for “Aryan” survival, in which Rome
represented the “pure and creative forces against worldwide subversion.”196
On the other hand, while anti-Semitic propaganda was present in Yugoslavia, it
tended to be generic in nature and did not become a central aspect of the army’s
propaganda in the Balkans. The articles in Il Popolo di Spalato covered all the typical
themes of traditional and racial anti-Semitism, but did not deal specifically with Balkan
Jews; there was no direct effort to link guerrilla resistance to Judeo-Bolshevism. In fact,
despite occasional references to Jews, La Tradotta largely refrained from addressing
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them at all.197 This was perhaps because of Second Army’s own ambiguous policy
towards Jewish refugees — the similarly ambivalent Četnik alliance was also notably
absent from Italian propaganda. It also suggests that the ideological inclinations of
individual propaganda officers could influence the selection of material for field
newspapers like La Tradotta or supplements like “Per voi, soldati.” Reflecting the
variation in racial thinking espoused by Fascist ideologues, propaganda officers in VI
Corps were more inclined to present anti-Semitic propaganda to their men than were their
colleagues attached to Second Army command.
More so than anti-Semitism, anti-Slavism emerged as a primary theme in
propaganda depicting Yugoslavian Partisans. In this way, the guerrilla enemy took on
racial as well as ideological attributes. The war against the Soviet Union brought with it
the notion of links between Bolshevism and the “Slavic” race.198 In Yugoslavia, too,
ideology and race became inseparable, as the tendency to equate Communist Partisans
with crucchi — a term which, as has been discussed, had mainly ethnic or linguistic
origins — attests. In the context of guerrilla warfare, the equation that partisans equaled
communists easily extended itself to become Slav equaled partisan equaled communist. A
cartoon, entitled “Ribelli crucchi,” combined ideological and racial motifs. The artist left
no doubt that the “rebels” were communists: their hideout was adorned with imagery of
Stalin; the Partisan commander wore the red star on his cap; even the bedpan sported the
hammer and sickle. But the cartoonist also defined these communists as crucchi and the
way they were depicted — poorly dressed, unshaven, and stinking — was typical of how
Italian propagandists presented rural populations of the Balkans in general.199 Another
cartoon, entitled “Quando la ‘colonnella’ è ‘dobra’” [When the ‘colonel’ is ‘good’
(looking)], portrayed crucchi — this time, Slavic peasants being recruited into the ranks
of the Partisans — in a similarly grotesque fashion. In the cartoon’s raunchy caption, one
of the recruits offered his services to the female Partisan leader: “Comrade Colonel, I’d
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like to enter your Corps [the word corpo also means “body” in Italian]... The Colonel: No
can do kid; you’re not big enough.”200 [Appendix H]
Already before the occupation, Fascist propagandists had presented the terrorist
methods of guerrilla fighters as endemic to the region. Initially, their vitriol fell upon the
Serbs in particular. Virginio Gayda declared that “bloody violence at the service of
politics is of ancient custom in Serbia.”201 During the Axis invasion, Curzio Malaparte
warned that Italians could not expect an honourable conventional war in Yugoslavia —
“this country of ‘sons of a gun’” — but instead must be prepared for “the traditional war
of the old Serbs: massacre, plague [peste], burning, hunger.”202 By 1942, the spread of
guerrilla resistance prompted the army to reapply such concepts with a broader brush,
speaking of South Slavs and the Balkans as a whole. According to one author, Partisans
belonged to “a race of scoundrels.”203 Their violent techniques supposedly came naturally
to the savage peoples of the Balkans:
For partisans putting a prisoner against the wall and shooting him is nothing.
Shoot him [fucilazio], they say, shoot him [fucilazio]. Just like we would say:
‘Let's go to the cinema.’ Human flesh has as much value as tree bark. […] The
execution [fucilazio] is for partisans a ritual associated with the primordial savage
massacres customary to these barbarous and primitive people. The partisan,
killing, enjoys feeling the old bloody instincts rise again.204
Nothing was particularly unique or surprising about Italian views of Balkan
peoples as rebellious, violent, and savage. Europeans had adopted the term
“balkanization” at the beginning of the twentieth century to denote political
fragmentation and “a reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the
barbarian.”205 The “cowardly” techniques employed by Partisans “in this sad and
murderous Balkan war” were given racial connotations by contrasting the “brigandage of
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the Slavic partisan against the heroic chivalry of the Latin soldier.”206 In this light,
Balkan savagery explained guerrilla resistance and justified a harsh Italian response:
“Hate, a Balkan word: this is the first unit of measurement of ‘partisan civilization.’ [...]
We [Italians] believe in fear, we believe in hate, yes: the fear and hate of the wild animal
towards the man that is forced to strike it so as not to be devoured.”207
It is clear that understanding resistance in this way had a negative effect as well
on how civilians were presented, further contradicting propaganda that called for
sympathy and charity towards the occupied populations. As evidence of Italy’s superior
civilization, a chaplain described the Balkans as “beautiful, but sprinkled with blood,
with our blood; [...] lands so beautiful and yet the lair of assassins. Lands far from the
pure soul of Rome and therefore so different from ours.”208 Similarly, a noncommissioned officer referred to the Balkans as a “land that we cannot love,” inhabited
by “people that have nothing in common with us, filthy drunks, scoundrels, traitors that
neither feel physical pain nor share the refinement of our race.”209
Thus, while soliciting compassion for hungry children, Italian propaganda
presented adult Slavic populations as devoid of human sentiment. The theme of the
unfeeling Balkan Slav merged with that of the soulless Bolshevik in a story about a
“communist mother” and her young daughter, encountered by Italian troops conducting
house-by-house searches during a rastrellamento. Instead of showing natural motherly
concern and comforting her crying child, the woman flung a grenade at the Italians. The
grenade rattled around and only succeeded in killing the girl. “One soldier,” the author
commented, “has moist eyes. That big strapping lad cannot understand the terrible deed.
He only understood one thing: a crucca woman (she is no longer a mother) killed her
little girl.”210
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The response of Italian propaganda to guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia was in
many respects similar to its response to armed resistance in Ethiopia. Effectively, Italian
propaganda and directives like the 3C circular equated the struggle in the Balkans with
colonial warfare in which conventional concepts of honour did not apply.211 Italian
military authorities sought to delegitimize enemy combatants by emphasizing their
brutality and immorality, which they explained in ideological and racial terms. Hatred for
Slavic communism was intended to provide a unifying force for Italian soldiers and to
buttress their waning fighting spirit and cohesion. The insurgency itself came to dominate
Italian propaganda in the Balkans, and this tended to taint depictions of the region and its
inhabitants as a whole.
There were genuine efforts to moderate the behavior of occupying troops towards
local populations: Italian propaganda presented spazio vitale as an inclusive and
liberating concept; it elevated the Christian morality of the Italian soldier; and, it tried to
draw a line between enemy combatants and innocent civilians. But in the face of one of
the more effective resistance movements in occupied Europe, this line became
irrevocably blurred, both implicitly and explicitly, in the army’s propaganda. Ultimately,
commanders like Roatta wanted to repudiate “the negative qualities summed up in the
phrase ‘bono italiano’,” that is, the carefree, gregarious, and gullible Italian soldier.212
While concepts of chivalry had their uses, the leadership of the Italian Second Army most
of all wanted to fashion soldiers that were capable of crushing resistance with brutal and
uncompromising force.

The degree to which Italian troops conformed to the mould set out by their commanders
and by Fascist and army propaganda organs is debatable. Given his ongoing dispute with
military authorities in Dalmatia, it is not surprising that Bastianini complained that “our
armed forces — except the militia — are deplorable: no energy, no spirit, just a general,
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widespread antifascism.”213 The ever-pessimistic Bastianini exaggerated — evidence of
conscious antifascism on the part of Italian soldiers or officers was rare and desertions
remained few in number, suggesting that the army did not undergo a complete moral
collapse — but there is no doubt that the troops suffered from a growing sense of
disillusion in 1942 and 1943.214 Soldiers in Yugoslavia were well aware of the Fascist
regime’s faltering war effort. Following the Axis defeat at El Alamein, Second Army
reported that “the morale of the troops in general and that of the officers in particular is
very much in decline.”215 Failures in North Africa and Russia and the frustrations of
guerrilla warfare aside, shortages of food and other materials — from soap to tobacco to
coffee — proved a constant drain on morale. Soldiers were able to find little in the local
markets and in September 1942 the army was forced to shut down its cooperative shops
in order to ease the burden on the “national economy.”216 News of similar shortages on
the home front did not comfort the men, instead contributing to their demoralization and
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defeatism.217 It was difficult to convince soldiers of the inevitability of victory and of
their own superiority when they lacked basic necessities themselves.218
Pessimism regarding Italy’s chances in a war against so many well-equipped
enemies added its weight to a number of underlying obstacles facing the effective
indoctrination of Italian soldiers during the Second World War. Although Italian
propaganda sections encouraged officers to converse with their men, the quality of the
junior officer corps had not improved since the Ethiopian campaign. By March 1942,
reservists made up 90 percent of subalterns and 66 percent of captains in the Italian
army.219 Despite efforts in the field to have company commanders and subalterns “live
the life of their units” and engage with their men in familiar conversation, the Italian
army placed little emphasis on the officer’s role in providing “spiritual-political
guidance” to the troops, especially compared to its German ally.220 The ideal Italian
officer was a paternalistic figure that did not fraternize with his troops — what Davide
Rodogno has referred to as a nineteenth-century type of officer.221
The army relied on written propaganda which, as this chapter has shown, adhered
rather strictly to the official Fascist line, as vague and convoluted as it often was. But the
five years since the conquest of Ethiopia had seen little improvement in literacy rates
among Italians, as much as one-third of whom remained illiterate or semi-literate.222 In
military units, this shortcoming could partly be negated through communal reading. In
addition, Italian propagandists tried to reach a broader audience by including “popular”
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language or even dialect and by soliciting the participation of military personnel in the
production of propaganda.223 Italian propaganda officers were aware of the obstacles that
faced them and they took steps to overcome those obstacles, but adjustments to content
could only make limited headway in the face of structural challenges.
Although its impact is difficult to measure, another factor that impeded the
indoctrinatory efforts of the regime and army was the peasant origin of many Italian
conscripts. It is possible that soldiers from poor rural backgrounds sympathized and
identified with Croat or Slovene peasants; as has been shown, such notions were not
completely absent even from Italian propaganda.224 More important perhaps than the
socio-economic status of the peasant soldier was his firm rooting in Catholic tradition.
Mimmo Franzinelli has argued that, given the regime’s inability to establish unifying
objectives for a war based on vague imperial myths, many Italian soldiers turned to
religion as a way to make sense of the war and the sacrifices it demanded. In this respect,
army chaplains took on a key role in the maintenance of morale and cohesion in Italian
combat units. There existed a broad ideological consensus between the Fascist regime
and the leadership of the Ordinariato Militare, the military clergy. However, while their
ranks included a vocal ultra-Fascist minority that portrayed the war in Mussolinian terms,
most chaplains relied on more traditional patriotic or spiritual themes in their preaching
and, unlike the army’s propaganda officers, they rarely inspired hatred for the enemy.225
According to the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division’s “P” unit, chaplains were well-received
by the troops, especially during religious holidays such as Easter.226 Italian propagandists
tried to link ideological and religious messages wherever possible — most notably by
presenting the war as an anti-Bolshevik crusade and civilizing mission — but they also
223
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printed non-political religious material, such as a “prayer for the infantry” and the story
of a machine-gunner who credited his survival to the presence of a crucifix near his
post.227 These examples attest to the strength of spiritual faith within the Italian army, not
necessarily in harmony with the military leadership’s image of the ideal soldier.
Despite the underlying obstacles posed by the conditions of war, an archaic
military culture, peasant society, and religion, there is evidence that the army’s
propaganda had some resonance among soldiers that served in the Balkans. Postwar
memoirs, often written in defence against charges of war crimes and in the context of
Italo-Yugoslavian political disputes, reflected many of the themes of Italian propaganda,
especially in relation to the Partisan enemy.228 Mario Roatta’s apologetic account of the
war emphasized the barbaric techniques of the Communist Partisans in order to justify his
conduct in Yugoslavia.229 Roatta’s aid, Giacomo Zanussi, lambasted the Fascist regime
for the harm it brought to the army and for its inflated ambition, but likewise portrayed
Second Army’s mission in defensive terms. He attributed the strength and character of
the Partisans to the problem that “in a Balkan state [...] the use of firearms is as common
as tea is among the Anglo-Saxons.”230 The memoirs of Mario Casanuova, a military
doctor, argued that Italian soldiers neither desired nor understood the war in the Balkans:
with the exception of some radical officers the troops did not buy into Fascist
propaganda.231 Yet, his own experience seemed to confirm the irredentist claims of the
regime as well as the backward nature of the non-Italian population. Casanuova found
that the architecture and dialect of the cities of Split and Dubrovnik truly did remind him
of Venice, while the traditionally garbed Muslims of Herzegovina appeared completely
foreign, eastern, and exotic.232
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The censored correspondence of soldiers writing home confirms that Italian
troops in the Balkans generally lacked enthusiasm for their war, but that their views of
the enemy largely reflected Fascist propaganda. As Giorgia Manca has shown, while
soldiers rarely referred in their letters to the annexation, Fascistization, or Italianization of
the occupied territories, they portrayed the conflict in Yugoslavia as a defensive struggle
against a savage enemy. Anti-communism was the only recurring political theme
prevalent in the writing of Italian soldiers.233 The VI Corps’s own censors reported that
“the operations undertaken against Russia arouse particular interest because we are
talking about a war felt by the masses [trattasi di guerra sentita dalla massa].”234
Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi has argued that anti-communism was the most successful
theme of the army’s propaganda because it gave logic to the Balkan campaign and
reflected a genuine “phobia” among Italy’s military leadership; the officers truly bought
into it.235 The internal reports and correspondence of military authorities in Croatia and
Slovenia confirm this depiction. Dalmazzo was horrified by the chaos that reigned in
Drvar after his units conquered it from the Partisans. He credited this not to wartime
circumstances, but to the ideological nature of the communist occupation. Dalmazzo
sensationally described to Ambrosio the workings of the so-called “people’s court”
[tribunale del popolo], the elimination of priests, and the communists’ disregard for
functioning public services or industry.236 In Slovenia, Robotti explained the main tasks
of the XI Corps to his subordinates by quoting Mussolini, who in a meeting had spoke of
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the need to purge the province of the “communist bubo” [bubbone comunista].237 This
was one of the few instances in which an Italian general directly defined his mission in
terms of “working towards the Duce.”
In addition to anti-communism, the chauvinistic racism so prevalent in Ethiopia
pervaded Italian troops in the Balkans as well. In the face of resistance, the traditional
cultural racism that dominated military propaganda could have a brutalizing effect on
officers and men. As an army chaplain, Pietro Brignoli complained of the constant need
to curtail the racist sentiments of the officers and men. One particularly bullish officer, he
recalled, had opined that the whole territory of Croatia should be gassed [ipritare] “for
the good of humanity.”238 Whether for racist or political reasons, by the end of 1941
Italian military intelligence [SIM] reported that the soldiers of Second Army considered
the populations of the Balkans in general to be hostile.239 As Manca concludes, the
brutalization of the guerrilla enemy was not directly related to Fascist ideology, but it
nevertheless contributed to the violent instincts of Italian soldiers in the Balkans.240
Regardless of the effectiveness of the army’s propaganda, the degree to which the
military leadership assimilated the key messages of the Fascist regime in justifying its
occupation of the Balkans is striking. It is true that military propaganda tended to exalt
the army as an institution more than it did the regime. Overt praise of Mussolini and
Italian Fascism, or even the use of the adjective “fascist,” was less pronounced in the
pages of La Tradotta than they were, for example, in the War Ministry’s magazine,
Fronte.241 Italian generals did not adopt overtly Fascist rhetoric when addressing
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Blackshirt units either.242 However, even if the tone of its propaganda did not affirm the
army’s complete Fascistization, the main themes that it employed reveal the extent to
which army and regime shared “an affinity between mentalities,” based on traditional
nationalism, self-sacrifice, and the centrality of the state.243
This fundamental compatibility is evident in a June 1942 circular on troop morale
distributed by the Sassari Division’s interim commander, Ettore Giannuzzi. The general
urged his units to inculcate in their men a “state of mind that is the profession of Italic
faith” by fostering “moral values that characterize our warlike youth: absolute devotion to
the Nation [Patria], pride in our history, love of battle, the habit of danger, bravery and
the duty to truth.” While the absence of direct references to Fascism in his list is
noteworthy, the values that Giannuzzi highlighted corresponded perfectly with those of
the ideal Fascist “new man.” Giannuzzi blended together the Futurist exaltation of youth,
violence, and danger with myths of a deep-rooted Italic antiquity and an understanding of
the nation as the focal point of a political religion in much the same way that Fascist
ideology did. Likewise, his aim was to transform the Italian conscript into an imperial
conqueror. According to Giannuzzi, these values were especially important in occupied
territory, because they demonstrated to the populations the “civilizing mission” of the
troops. He therefore encouraged unit commanders to have their men “sing the hymns of
the Nation and Regime [this was a direct reference to Fascism] in the most enthusiastic
way possible,” for the spiritual benefit of both the troops and the occupied populations.244
Cannistraro has noted that Fascist propaganda as a whole was largely the
reformulation of nationalist thought; this seems particularly true of its portrayal of the
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war in the Balkans.245 Thus, it is not surprising that, even with an expanded and more
autonomous role in the production and dissemination of propaganda, the army largely
complied with the main themes espoused by Minculpop in Yugoslavia. Claims to a
liberating and civilizing mission, the concept of romanità, appeals to irredentist and
imperial aspirations, exhortations to hate the communist or Slavic enemy, all could be
found in field newspapers as well as in domestic dailies. If, as Burgwyn has argued, “of
all the Italian empire-builders in Yugoslavia, the military was the least enthusiastic,” this
was not evident in the army’s own propaganda, which clearly presented the Italian soldier
as an imperial conqueror.246
The contradictory nature of some themes — for example, pro-Croatian versus
anti-Slavic propaganda or notions of liberation versus imperial conquest — no doubt
limited their effectiveness, but such inconsistencies reflected Mussolini’s vague war aims
and the changing conditions of war more than a fundamental ideological rift between
army and regime. The Fascist concepts of spazio vitale and Imperial Community
permitted the existence of apparently contradictory interpretations of Italy’s war in the
Balkans. Although violence and control were the essence of Italian Fascism — and,
indeed, were at the heart of the army’s propaganda — material on the liberation of
minorities and the charity of the Italian soldier was also consistent with concepts of
romanità that justified the expansionist goals of the regime. Italian Fascism sought to
establish a third Rome whose universal cultural leadership was rooted in its Imperial and
Catholic legacy.247 The army’s emphasis on humanity and civiltà, then, was not merely
the knee-jerk reaction of Italian generals seeking to maintain self-esteem in a losing war,
as Jonathan Steinberg has suggested.248 It complied with Fascist perceptions of empire
and it reflected the army’s attempts to include elements of a hearts-and-minds policy in
its counterinsurgency strategy, however deficient those attempts proved to be. This did
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not necessarily make Italian propaganda benign. Although there was an increased
emphasis on humanitarian values in the latter stages of the occupation, this always came
alongside negative propaganda on the Balkan, Slavic, or communist enemy, and usually
with the corollary intention of establishing a sense of superiority over the Partisans and
occupied populations.
Military propaganda continued to insist upon Italy’s cultural and racial superiority
over Balkan Slavs up to the end of the Fascist occupation. In the middle of July 1943 —
one week after the Allied landings in Sicily and one week before Mussolini’s dismissal
and arrest — the army went so far as to proclaim victory over the Communist Partisans.
The partisans give up.
These enemies that have surrounded themselves with the most appalling
reputation of assassins fighting against soldiers that only came to bring them order
and peace, these abominable enemies give up. [...] They give up: they prefer the
just punishment of our arms to the continuous terror of life in the woods.
The army claimed that the Partisans surrendered because they now recognized the
superiority of Italian civilization over communist ideals: “The rebel people of the Balkans
[gente ribelle della Balcania] have always found in Italian arms the invincible strength of
a superior civilization, which has humbled and tamed them.”249 Thus, the army reiterated
its contempt and hatred for Partisans, as well as the racial dimensions of the struggle
against insurgency. That propaganda of this sort persisted for so long was largely due to
the fact that it exploited preconceptions of “the Balkans” whose accuracy appeared to be
proven by conditions in the field. Confused by the political, ethnic, religious, and social
complexity of the region and embroiled in guerrilla warfare, many Italian officers and
soldiers accepted that Yugoslavia simply was a “dysfunctional family” [famija rovinata]
or a “boiling cauldron.”250
The Second Army’s propaganda in occupied Yugoslavia echoed the conflicting
ideological, political, and military factors guiding Italian policy in the region. Ideological
factors included traditional anti-Slavic irredentism as well as Fascist imperialism based
on the myth of recreating the ancient Roman Empire. Politically, however, these
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expansionistic aims were at loggerheads with ever-growing German hegemony in the
region and the formation of an Independent State of Croatia as a nominal Axis partner
and, therefore, as an ally of Italy. And, militarily, the Italians found themselves embroiled
in a difficult counterinsurgency campaign against a largely Communist-led Partisan
movement; this brought the theme of anti-communism into the mix. The Italian army’s
perception of the occupied populations thus oscillated between seeing them as cultured
people that needed liberation, barbarians that needed civilization, innocents that needed
protection, and hardened communists that needed to be killed.
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6

Counterinsurgency in Yugoslavia

By 1942, guerrilla warfare dominated the Italian imagination in occupied Yugoslavia.
Second Army’s propaganda increasingly focused on themes related to the Communist-led
insurgency, and military circumstances imposed ever greater limitations on Fascism’s
programme of empire-building in the Adriatic. The persistent security threat throughout
Italy’s annexed and occupied territories ensured that the Italian military remained a key
player in the region until Italy’s capitulation in September 1943. The army usurped many
of the powers of Italian and Croatian civil authorities and effectively dictated
counterinsurgency policy in the areas where its troops were present. Although it differed
in some respects, the army’s strategy against insurgents in Yugoslavia shared
fundamental features with its colonial practices in Ethiopia. While Italian generals
continued to pay lip service to notions of attracting local populations through political
and social incentives, and while they sought to exploit Italy’s reputation of relative
humanity compared to their German and Croatian allies, their military methods against
guerrilla formations and suspect civilian populations relied on displays of overwhelming
strength and terror.
Although precise statistics are impossible to calculate due to the complex array of
circumstances in wartime Yugoslavia, there is no doubt that the Italian armed forces
made a significant contribution to the tragically high death rate among Yugoslavs under
Axis occupation. Out of a prewar population of sixteen million, slightly more than one
million Yugoslavs died or disappeared as a result of war and occupation between 1941
and 1945. In occupied Europe, only the Soviet territories and Poland suffered greater
human losses. The Italian army was directly or indirectly involved in the overlapping
genocides and the counterinsurgency operations and reprisals that accounted for the vast
majority of these casualties.1 Although the victims of Ustaša mass violence and German
counterinsurgency likely were much greater in number than those of the Italians, the
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Italian Second Army employed the same methods as the Germans while turning a blind
eye to Četnik mass violence against Croats and Muslims.

Guerrilla Resistance
The national uprising in occupied Yugoslavia has been described as “an insurgency as
violent and obdurate as any in World War II.”2 The size, composition, behaviour, and
tactics of guerrilla forces varied by region and time period, but no part of Second Army’s
zone of occupation was left unscathed by insurgency. Armed resistance developed in
different ways and took different forms in Slovenia, Dalmatia, Croatia, and BosniaHerzegovina, as well as in areas outside Second Army’s direct purview, including
Montenegro and Serbia. Nonetheless, it is possible to discern four general phases of
resistance throughout Italian-held Yugoslavia between 1941 and 1943. An initial phase of
relative calm following the shocking disintegration of the Yugoslavian state in April 1941
lasted into the summer. A second phase from July through the end of 1941 saw
spontaneous popular insurrections against the Ustaše and Germans in Croatia and Serbia,
and against the Italians in Montenegro, with a gradual escalation of attacks against troops
of Second Army. By the third phase in 1942, the main focus of insurrection — now under
greater coordination by competing Communist and Četnik leadership cadres — had
shifted into Italian-occupied Croatia. The fourth phase in 1943 saw the ascendancy of
Communist Partisan forces throughout Supersloda’s jurisdiction, as Italian forces vacated
much of the countryside. Although the development of resistance was not linear and
suffered numerous setbacks thanks to Axis countermeasures and errors committed by the
guerrillas themselves, in general terms Italian commanders confronted an insurgency that
steadily grew in numbers, efficiency, and influence.
During the first months of the occupation, direct attacks on the troops of Second
Army were rare. This was a period of confusion and uncertainty for local populations,
coming in the aftermath of the partition of Yugoslavia and the establishment of new
systems of administration throughout the region. The potential leaders of resistance
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adopted a wait-and-see attitude. While the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact remained in effect,
the Comintern ordered European Communist parties, including Tito’s Communist Party
of Yugoslavia [KPJ], not to fight the Axis.3 Nationalist Serb officers, including
Mihailović, made their way to the rump state of Serbia, where they aimed to lie low and
organize Četnik formations in coordination with the Yugoslavian government-in-exile.4
Most of the former soldiers of the Yugoslavian armed forces who had not been captured
during the Axis invasion in April went home or fled to the mountains, their weapons
largely unaccounted for.5 Italian patrols combed the occupied zones in search of arms,
ammunition, and former soldiers, but without success. House-to-house searches yielded
meagre results and commanders noted that “no materiel was turned in spontaneously by
the population.”6 As in Ethiopia, the inability of the Italian army to disarm the occupied
populations gave cause for concern.
Several factors converged in July 1941 to spark major revolts in Croatia, Serbia,
and Montenegro, ushering in the second, more active, phase of resistance throughout
Yugoslavia. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war at the end of June was critical. It
inspired confidence that Germany would ultimately be defeated and it brought the small
but well-organized KPJ into play. Tito, predicting that the Nazi-Soviet alliance could not
last, already had laid the groundwork for a campaign of sabotage and guerrilla resistance.
Whereas the Communists played an important role inciting the revolts in Serbia and
Montenegro, the uprising in Croatia — centred in Bosnia and Herzegovina — was largely
the spontaneous work of independent Orthodox Serb bands in response to Ustaša mass
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violence that threatened their existence. The KPJ used its superior organizational skills
and underground experience to take charge of all three uprisings, but the Communists
themselves — who counted only 8,000 members in spring 1941 — did not provide these
revolts with their mass character, nor were they fully in control of events. Patriotism,
traditions of resistance, and grievances against the occupying authorities were the most
significant factors feeding rebellion.7 For these reasons, ethnic Serbs made up the
majority of the Communist Partisan movement in 1941, despite its largely Croat
leadership. By the end of the year, with the defeat of revolt in Serbia and Montenegro,
Serbs from the Independent State of Croatia comprised 95 percent of all Partisans in
Yugoslavia.8
Communists also obtained leadership over resistance movements in the annexed
Italian territories of Dalmatia, Carnaro, and Slovenia, garrisoned by Second Army.
Although local populations recoiled against the sudden imposition of foreign institutions
and functionaries by their new overlords, resistance in the annexed territories developed
at a more gradual pace than in Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro. In Dalmatia, the most
active resistance took place in urban centres where the KPJ mobilized Croat workers and
students against Italian authorities. Between July and September, their activity included
public strikes and demonstrations, spreading propaganda through leaflets and graffiti, and
conducting sabotage against railroads and telephone lines. A change in tactics resulted in
a series of terrorist-style attacks on Italian trucks, police, and military personnel in Split
and Šibenik using bombs or hand grenades. A number of civilians also were killed or
maimed in these attacks, culminating on 9 November when insurgents threw three
grenades at the 51st Infantry Regiment’s musical band, wounding at least 17 civilians and
24 soldiers.9
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The Province of Carnaro remained relatively calm through July, but by the end of
the summer a number of small guerrilla detachments had formed in the eastern
countryside, along the border with Croatia. Although the Partisans of Carnaro continued
to increase in numbers, by March 1942 they numbered no more than 600.10 Following the
Italian and German occupation of Slovenia, a coalition of Communists, Christian
Socialists, and other leftist political and cultural groups immediately formed the Slovene
Liberation Front, which subordinated itself to Tito’s Yugoslavian Partisan movement. Its
guerrilla wing was small, numbering 1,500 by the end of the year, but it was wellorganized and efficient. Despite concerns from the anti-communist Catholic middle class,
the Liberation Front enjoyed a broad base of nationalistic support because the Axis
partition of the country had effectively threatened the national survival of Slovenes. By
October 1941, Robotti deemed the country “decidedly hostile” while Ambrosio reported
that the Slovene Partisan movement had assumed the characteristics of a classic guerrilla
insurgency: ambushing isolated Italian patrols; sabotaging railroads; spreading
propaganda; and, assassinating Slovene collaborators and gendarmes. The territorial
gains of the Liberation Front were limited by the harsh early winter of 1941–42, but the
movement compensated by stepping up its campaign of high-profile assassinations in the
city of Ljubljana itself.11
The Italian Second Army thus faced small-scale guerrilla warfare and urban
resistance in the annexed provinces that, while not posing a serious threat to Italian rule,
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gave real cause for concern by late summer and autumn 1941. At the same time, the
largely political decision to extend the army’s zone of occupation into the Independent
State of Croatia brought more Italian troops into contact with Partisan detachments and
independent Serb bands in that region as well. Through July and August, Italian
commands passively observed the emerging civil war in Croatia from the sidelines,
unwilling to shed Italian blood to assist their Ustaša allies and content that most Serb
bands opted not to engage Italian troops. As we have seen, Italian generals believed that
the reoccupation of territory up to the demarcation line in September and October would
end the revolt bloodlessly. However, many armed bands remained in the field after the
return of Italian troops, and they continued their guerrilla activity against Croatian
targets, assassinating local officials, raiding livestock, and kidnapping villagers.12 Of the
Serb fighters who did return to their homes, few trusted the Italians enough to turn in
their firearms.13 These were ominous signs for the tranquility of Second Army’s
occupation of Croatia.
By the middle of November, the overstretched VI Corps in Dalmatia, Lika,
Bosnia, and Herzegovina felt itself under serious pressure from numerous guerrilla
groups. The Cacciatori delle Alpi Division described its sector between Split and Šibenik
as “infected by communists,” although their numbers were small. In Lika and western
Bosnia, the Sassari Division reported the presence of two thus-far friendly “Četnik”
bands, three hostile Communist bands ranging from 150 to 1,000 men each, two
formations of “Četniks with Communist leanings” [cetnici ad orientamento comunista] of
200 and 2,000 men, and one group of rogue “Ustaša-rebels” that allegedly cooperated
with the Communists. Further south, the Bergamo Division faced 150 “Četniks” in
alliance with the Communists. In Herzegovina, the Marche Division was under pressure
12
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from several hundred Communist Partisans that had been pushed out of Montenegro by
Pirzio Biroli’s forces. Meanwhile, the corps reported the concentration of as many as
15,000 “Četniks” and 1,500 Communists north of the demarcation line acting in
conjunction to threaten Sarajevo.14
The “Četniks” referred to in Italian documents at this point had little or no
connection to Mihailović’s Četnik movement in Serbia proper. The term originated from
the small guerrilla detachments that had fought in Serbia’s struggle for independence
against the Ottomans in the nineteenth century and in the Serb uprising against Bulgarian
and Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1917. After the First World War, the term referred
to an ultranationalist and conservative veterans’ association based out of Belgrade.
Following the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia, the Četniks took the form of an “officer’s
movement” made up largely of Serb colonels and junior officers who had not gone into
exile or been captured at the end of the campaign. Draža Mihailović gradually emerged
as the leading Četnik officer in Serbia. The initial successes of the Partisan uprising in
Serbia prompted the Četniks temporarily to abandon their “wait-and-see strategy” and
join sides with Tito in September. But fear of provoking harsh German reprisals and
concerns over Communist political gains led Mihailović to turn against Tito at the end of
October, attacking the Partisan headquarters at Užice. The Germans refused to support
the Četniks and the attack failed, prompting Mihailović and his officers to go into hiding.
Despite this, the Yugoslavian émigré government proclaimed Mihailović the commander
of its Home Army on 7 December 1941.15 Serb bands in Bosnia identified themselves
early on as Četniks because the word was synonymous with freedom fighters, but an
organized and coordinated Četnik movement did not develop there until 1942, largely out
of conservative concern for the Communist presence in the revolt. Conflict between
Communist and Četnik leaders was slower to develop in Bosnia than in Serbia because
both groups agreed on the need for active resistance against the Ustaše. The arrival of the
Italians gave some Serb guerrillas the opportunity to return to their homes but, as the
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intelligence reports of the VI Corps reveal, many bands in autumn 1941 adopted
ambiguous attitudes between collaboration and resistance.16
Attacks on Italian trains and troops in Croatia increased through November and
December. One of Second Army’s first significant military setbacks in Croatia came at
the end of November, when an infantry company near the Montenegrin border was
attacked and wiped out by “rebels.”17 Guerrilla activity was most predominant in the
interior, near the demarcation line, where the Italian army had to abandon territory at the
end of the year. But insurgents scored successes even in sectors where the Italians were
strong. They interrupted roads near important coastal centres such as Dubrovnik. At the
end of December, a garrison of the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division lost 54 men in an
ambush that took place just 2 km from its base. The division lost another 84 men, mostly
prisoners, in a similar attack a month and a half later.18 Contrary to Axis expectations, the
onset of winter in Croatia seemed to embolden guerrilla forces, compelling them to leave
their mountain hideouts and operate in the lower valleys.19 Heavy snow and extreme cold
in the middle of January “paralysed” the VI Corps. Small mobile groups of Partisans
exploited the situation by cutting off access and supply to Italian garrisons in Croatian
towns, thereby threatening them with destruction.20 On 21 and 22 January, the Sassari
Division suffered its first serious losses of the occupation. After 21 soldiers from its
garrison at Bosanski Petrovac were taken captive while collecting firewood, the division
sent two companies of infantry to free them. This rescue party quickly found itself
16
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engaged by a “Communist band,” which outmanoeuvred the Italians in the snow-covered
terrain and forced them to retreat, leaving another ninety men and two artillery pieces
behind.21 The Sassari Division’s besieged garrisons at Drvar, Oštrelj, and Srb barely
escaped destruction from Partisan attacks or hunger. It took three weeks of heavy fighting
against insurgents, sleet, wind, and snow before Srb was relieved by an Italian column on
26 March. By then, the Blackshirt garrison had been reduced to an enclave of seven
buildings.22 During the winter of 1941–42, Dalmazzo noted that the Partisans steadily
improved their tactics. They acted behind effective screens, waiting for the Italian
vanguards to pass before opening fire from the side and rear. They took advantage of the
rocky terrain to remain hidden, adopting a spread-out deployment, and they were
excellent shots.23
By the beginning of 1942, Italian commanders were aware that the insurgency in
Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slovenia had entered a new phase. In 1941, the most serious
uprisings — and, in turn, the most serious anti-partisan operations — occurred outside or
on the fringes of the zone occupied by Second Army. Tito’s main objective in 1941 was
to seize Belgrade, the traditional seat of power in Yugoslavia. However, the Germans
crushed the uprising in Serbia at the end of the year; their harsh but calculated reprisals
persuaded the Serbian population of the wisdom of Mihailović’s lie-low approach to
resistance. German and Četnik control in Serbia forced Tito to relocate his command
westward to Bosnia after December. As a result, the Independent State of Croatia — and
especially Bosnia, where the Partisans found rugged terrain, fewer German troops, and
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greater popular support due to anti-Ustaša sentiment — became the focus of partisan
warfare in 1942. This placed greater pressure on Italian zones, whose territory generally
was more mountainous than that occupied by the Germans. Tito’s new base at Foča was
on the Italian side of the demarcation line.24
During 1942, the Communist Partisan and Četnik movements were in open
conflict with one another as each side sought to lay the foundations for the postwar
political order in Yugoslavia. Whereas Tito preached full-blown socialist revolution in a
pan-Slavic federalist state, Mihailović and the Četnik leadership worked towards a
conservative nationalistic Great Serbia comprising most of Yugoslavia. However, the
boundaries between the two sides were not hard and fast, especially in Bosnia. Rather
than picturing blocs of Partisan and Četnik units in alliance or conflict with one another,
it is more accurate to envision two leadership cadres — Partisan and Četnik, each with
their own internal squabbles — competing for the loyalty of a “floating” mass of largely
rural Serb fighters. Individual bands and guerrillas could change loyalties several times
during the course of the war, not only out of opportunism but because of genuine
confusion over which group best represented their interests.25
At any particular moment between 1942 and 1943, there likely were far more
Četniks than Partisans in the field. At the height of their power at the beginning of 1943,
the Četniks could call upon 150,000 followers compared to 50,000 Communist Partisans
throughout Yugoslavia.26 However, Mihailović wielded little control over the many small
locally oriented bands that nominally adhered to his movement. Many Četnik recruits,
who had enlisted to protect their families, refused to operate outside their home districts.
Outside of Serbia and Montenegro, where Mihailović based his headquarters during the
war, Četnik leaders and local warlords often proved unwilling to sacrifice their autonomy
and obey higher commands. Early on, Tito could not dictate policy to the various Partisan
groups spread throughout Yugoslavia either. But he could call upon an elite core of
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mobile units capable of acting far from home, which could be bolstered by local recruits,
including former Četniks. Moreover, whereas the Četniks only ever claimed to be a Serb
movement, the Partisans potentially catered to a larger population base. The federal
structure of the Partisan movement, with “general staffs” and committees for each
Yugoslavian province, allowed for a degree of coordination and standardization while
permitting local Partisan leaders to appeal to populations on regional lines. Thus, between
1941 and 1943, the Partisans drew upon mass support from Serbs in the Independent
State of Croatia, Croats in Italian Dalmatia, and Slovenes in the Province of Ljubljana,
focusing more on patriotic themes than on Communist ideals. Finally, while the Četniks
remained a rural military movement, the Partisans made headway in urban centres and
concerned themselves with civil administration. They established Partisan “states” in
liberated areas to maintain order and organize education, welfare, labour, recruitment,
and taxation, often employing local notables. While Partisan leaders were guilty of
committing a number of “left errors” against “class enemies,” Ustaša collaborators, and
Četnik sympathizers — which likely cost them a firm presence in Herzegovina after mid1942 — in general they displayed greater ideological tolerance and more determination to
avoid arbitrary violence or plunder than did their enemies.27
The strategies of the Partisans and Četniks also differed dramatically. The Četnik
leadership was less concerned with active resistance against the Axis than with working
towards a Great Serbian state in anticipation of liberation by the Western Allies.
Combined with a desire to avoid Axis reprisals, this frequently led to “tactical
collaboration” with the Germans and Italians in order to focus on combating the more
politically threatening Ustaše, Communists, and Muslims of Yugoslavian origin.
Conversely, after June 1941 the KPJ was consistently anti-Axis and anti-Italian, partly
because Moscow wanted it to divert Axis resources from the invasion of the Soviet Union
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and partly in order to assume the mantle of liberator against foreign occupation.28
Through 1941, Italian commands had noted that, while “Četnik” bands abstained from
attacking Italian troops, the much smaller Communist forces were consistently more
“extremist and intransigent,” even after being driven into the mountains.29
At the end of 1941, Partisan leaders in western Bosnia announced their intention
to execute captured Italian officers.30 There is some debate over the level and frequency
of atrocities committed by the Partisans against Italian prisoners. After the war, Italian
participants tended to justify their behaviour in the Balkans in light of “communist”
massacres of civilians and Italian soldiers.31 The execution of an entire Italian infantry
battalion during the epic battle of the Neretva in early 1943 is well documented.32
However, the conduct of Partisans towards Italian prisoners between 1941 and 1943 as a
general rule is not clear. Like most insurgent groups, the Yugoslavian Partisans were
unable or unwilling to meet standards on the treatment of prisoners of war as established
in the 1907 Hague Convention.33 Giacomo Scotti and Eric Gobetti have argued that
Partisans in Montenegro and Croatia usually set Italian prisoners free, although officers
and Fascist militia almost always were shot.34 In his study of partisan warfare in
Slovenia, Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi confirmed only a single documented incident of torture
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and execution of prisoners by Slovene Partisans.35 Italian interrogations of liberated
prisoners suggest that the behaviour of individual Partisan bands varied widely,
depending on circumstances. In Croatia, some formations held on to their prisoners —
including officers and Blackshirts — for several months, using them for manual labour
and hoping that Italian authorities would agree to an exchange. Soldiers deemed too
badly wounded to move often would be shot.36
Through 1942, Partisan bands in Italian-occupied zones proved adept at irregular
warfare. In Dalmatia, Italian authorities reported “the continuous exodus of hundreds and
hundreds of young men from the great [urban] centres and from villages,” concluding
that Partisan formations were “aided completely [totalitariamente] by the populations.”37
Still more serious was the resurgence that spring of the Slovene Liberation Front, which
threatened to “paralyse life” in the province by cutting communications lines. As in
Croatia the previous winter, the Partisans hemmed Italian forces into their garrisons,
dominating the countryside.38 By June, Italian authorities estimated that some 5,000
Slovene “rebels” had managed to gain control over ninety percent of the province.39 The
rebellion shut down virtually all commercial and industrial activity in Slovenia. Italian
firms sent to exploit Slovenia’s timber resources were unable to perform their work.40
Yet, Roatta lamented that, while the enemy seemed to be everywhere “in strength,”
Slovene Partisans stuck to true “guerrilla” tactics and refused to concentrate in large
formations that could be located and destroyed.41 An officer of the Cacciatori delle Alpi
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Division, who had already faced Communist Partisans in Croatia, considered their
Slovene counterparts “particularly intelligent and organized,” given the shrewdness that
was required to “flush them out of their lairs.”42 When confronted by major anti-partisan
operations, they split up into smaller groups of forty or fifty men to avoid capture.43 The
Slovene Partisans were well-endowed with machineguns and explosives, and they
employed a sophisticated communications system. At the end of the year, the XI Corps
discovered that nearly all its radio transmissions were being intercepted by the Liberation
Front.44
In Croatia, the Partisans could be equally wily. An Italian chaplain complained
that they “continually make idiots of us [ci minchionano] with their audacity and their
(certainly excellent) organization, thus demoralizing our soldier who finds himself forced
to fight an elusive enemy.”45 But the Partisans held and administered vast tracts of
territory in Croatia, and they increasingly fought in the open as large units.46 Even while
Tito’s main host remained in eastern Bosnia, Italian forces in the west encountered
sizeable Partisan bands willing to engage regular troops in combat. During May, the
Sassari Division estimated that 3,000 “communists” operated between Petrovac and
Klujč. A thousand of these managed to surround a CC.NN. battalion, wiping out a fiftyman platoon in the process. Later that month, Partisans successfully attacked two
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columns of the division, inflicting 104 casualties and capturing two howitzers and a
machinegun.47
Partisan activity in the Sassari Division’s sector only increased after Operation
Trio forced Tito to make his famous “long march” to northwestern Bosnia and Croatia,
where he eventually established another large Partisan “state” around Bihać in
November.48 At the end of October, Partisans launched a night attack on the Sassari
Division’s most advanced post at Bosansko Grahovo, defended by 700 Italian troops and
400 Serb irregulars. The Italians estimated that they faced between 3,000 and 5,000
Partisans, supported by well-directed artillery and mortar fire that reflected the improved
technical and tactical capabilities of Tito’s reorganized “Proletarian Brigades.” Fielding 6
brigades in June 1942, by November the Partisan movement counted 31 one of them: 4 in
Slovenia; 3 in Dalmatia; 11 in Croatia; 6 in western Bosnia; 1 in eastern Bosnia; 1 in
Herzegovina; 2 in Serbia; and, 3 in Montenegro.49 The garrison at Bosansko Grahovo
held out until a relief column arrived, but the division’s commander was concerned that,
with no further reinforcement in sight, his units would not be able to withstand further
pressure. Indeed, Partisan units quickly occupied the hills surrounding the divisional
headquarters at Knin and forced the Italians to evacuate Bosansko Grahovo and other
exposed garrisons.50 The plight of the Sassari Division was not unique. Further north, on
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the border between Croatia and Slovenia, a reinforced column from the V Corps barely
escaped destruction at the hands of an estimated 5,000 or 6,000 Partisans. Only a series of
costly charges by Italian cavalry kept the column’s escape route open. Italian casualties
amounted to 189 men, 188 horses, 8 trucks, 7 motorcycles, 4 heavy machineguns, 2
artillery pieces, and a light tank.51
The Communist Partisans were not completely successful in 1942. Tito’s forces
suffered heavy losses in Operation Trio, which also forced them to abandon eastern
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Četnik control. The Germans reinforced Croatia and dealt
Partisan forces in the west a heavy, if superficial, blow with their Kozara offensive that
summer. Overall, though, the Partisans had made gains. They entered 1943 operating to
an effective military standard and making use of an excellent communications network.52
During Operation Weiss, the Axis offensive against the Bihać Republic, the Sassari
Division partook in a pitched artillery duel with Partisan units while Tito’s Chief
Operational Group shattered the Murge Division on its way to the Neretva River. Here,
the Partisans also permanently broke Četnik influence and power, enabling them to
regain a foothold in eastern Yugoslavia.53 In Dalmatia and Slovenia too, larger Partisan
formations began to concentrate, making more frequent attacks against Italian units and
garrisons while continuing to spread propaganda and commit acts of sabotage and
“terrorism.” These attacks increased as news spread of Italian defeats on other fronts. 54
Thus, in the final phase of the insurgency against Second Army, Italian generals could
not be confident in their technical and tactical superiority over their enemies. On the eve
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of the armistice with the Allies, Italian maps painted a grim picture. Outside of
Herzegovina and the northern Dalmatian coastline, almost the entire zone entrusted to the
Italians was covered in red blobs denoting Partisan “detachments” [odredi], “brigades”
and “divisions.”55

Repression and Reprisals
As in Ethiopia, the generals of the Italian Second Army were not immediately confronted
with strong guerrilla movements in occupied Slovenia, Dalmatia, and Croatia. AntiItalian insurgency in these sectors developed gradually. Following a lull in May and June
1941, Second Army witnessed the growth of small-scale insurgency in the annexed
provinces; but the Italians were not the main targets of the popular Serb uprising in
Croatia in the summer, and they only faced significant attacks after autumn. By spring
1942, the Italian army confronted large-scale insurrection in Croatia and Slovenia. By
1943, it sometimes faced well-armed and well-organized Partisan formations capable of
sustaining semi-conventional combat against entrenched Italian units. Italian policy
responded in part to these circumstances, but it did so disproportionately. Violence
escalated as resistance increased in 1941 and 1942, but policy tended to anticipate
resistance — the reaction usually proved more violent than the initial action that justified
it. While generally not reaching the same extremes as German mass executions in Serbia
or Italian shootings in Ethiopia, Italian commanders in Yugoslavia likewise responded to
guerrilla activity by targeting ordinary civilians to dissuade them from joining or
supporting the insurgency.
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From Restraint to Terror
Unlike in Ethiopia, Mussolini did not immediately impart instructions to his generals
regarding the treatment of insurgents. As in other areas of policy, Italian military
authorities in Yugoslavia enjoyed considerable autonomy over their handling of
repression, although the need to cooperate with civil authorities in Dalmatia, Slovenia,
and Croatia at times restricted their ability to dictate strategy. In 1941, Rome had good
reason to counsel restraint in its occupied territories. Experience in Ethiopia had
highlighted the counterproductive impact of excessive and arbitrary reprisals. Moreover,
in Europe, many neutral and defeated powers after 1939 looked to Mussolini as a
moderating influence within the Axis.56 The regime’s relatively “liberal” system of rule
established in Slovenia in May 1941 was intended partly to distinguish Fascist
administration as more enlightened than Nazi methods of domination, thereby presenting
Italy’s Imperial Community as a more palatable and inclusive alternative New Order.57
At the end of summer 1941 — with German brutality having reached new heights in
Poland, the Soviet Union, and Serbia — the Italian ambassador in Berlin, Dino Alfieri,
suggested that Italy could differentiate itself favourably from its German ally not only
politically and ideologically but militarily as well. Alfieri criticized the harsh methods of
repression and counterinsurgency adopted by German authorities, arguing that their
arbitrary “regime of terror” succeeded only in alienating the occupied populations and
fomenting resistance. Paraphrasing Machiavelli, Alfieri concluded that, while the
Germans preferred to be feared rather than loved, they risked becoming hated.58
In Yugoslavia it was not Mussolini but rather the commander of Second Army,
Vittorio Ambrosio, who issued a blanket statement during the first days of the occupation
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ordering all “francs-tireurs” [franchi tiratori] to be immediately shot by firing squad.59
This policy and language soon afterwards were enshrined in the armistice with
Yugoslavia, which stated that “participants in hostile actions against the Axis Powers will
be treated as francs-tireurs.”60 Suspects of other forms of resistance, communists, and
“anti-Italian propagandists” were to be arrested; in May, Dalmazzo’s VI Corps
established a concentration camp on the island of Ugljan [Ugliano] for these political
prisoners.61 With the launch of Operation Barbarossa and the “struggle against
Bolshevism,” Dalmazzo ordered even greater vigilance against communists, offering
rewards for soldiers that made arrests. Some of his subordinates responded with such zeal
that Dalmazzo later had to issue warnings against individual groups of soldiers
committing unauthorized reprisals.62 Still prior to the outbreak of major revolt,
Dalmazzo’s directives for the protection of communications lines in Dalmatia and Lika
ordered that anyone found in possession of firearms or caught committing sabotage “will
of course be shot.”63 Thus, even during the first relatively quiet months of the occupation,
Italian military authorities based their repression policy on the arrest of potential political
opponents and on the summary execution of combatants they deemed illegitimate. These
directives were not likely to be abused or extended to involve mass reprisals while active
resistance to Italian occupation remained limited. Nonetheless, they provided the legal
framework for the later escalation of violence as insurgency mounted.
This certainly was the case in German-occupied Serbia, where army-level
directives as early as May defined enemy combatants as “bandits” and stipulated that one

59

“Franchi tiratori,” 15 April 1941, appended to “Linea di vigilanza militare provvisoria,” 26 June 1941,
AUSSME, N1–11, b. 582, DS VI Corps, June 1941, allegati.
60

“Testo convenzione armistizio stipulato con la Jugoslavia,” 19 April 1941, DSCS, 3/II:369–70. The
terms of the armistice with France included a similar clause. John Horne and Alan Kramer, German
Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 406.
61

“Direttive,” 15 May 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 240, DS 151st Infantry Regiment (“Sassari”), April–
May 1941, allegati.
62

“Direttive,” 3 July 1941, and “Contegno delle truppe,” 6 July 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 523, DS 151st
Infantry Regiment (“Sassari”), June–July 1941, allegati.
63

“Vigilanza sulle linee ferroviarie e sulle zone a cavallo delle comunicazioni rotabili, telefoniche,
telegrafiche ecc.,” 20 July 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 582, DS VI Corps, July 1941, allegati.

446

hundred Serbs should be shot for every German casualty during the occupation. Ben
Shepherd notes that this radical order was not initially carried out, but that it provided an
“ominous straw in the wind.”64 By October, with German forces in Serbia now facing a
genuine uprising, these guidelines were reissued and this time followed or even surpassed
by German division commanders. Italian commentators viewed this reliance on “terror”
as somewhat excessive and disproportionate, but they also praised German measures as
“energetic.” By the end of the year, having executed nearly 22,000 reprisal victims,
German authorities themselves acknowledged that their approach was counterproductive;
they began to exercise greater restraint.65 The death and destruction meted out by Italian
forces in Yugoslavia never matched the ruthlessness displayed by the Wehrmacht in
Serbia during 1941. This was partly due to different military cultures and approaches to
counterinsurgency, but local conditions were equally important. As we have seen, the
Italians did not face the same sort of general uprising aimed against them in their
occupied territories, certainly not in 1941. As the directives of Ambrosio and Dalmazzo
indicate, Italian commanders generally agreed with the Germans on the need to respond
quickly and harshly to signs of resistance.
Italian military commands also found themselves in agreement on this point with
Fascist civil authorities in the Governorate of Dalmatia, whose measures in response to
increasing but limited episodes of sabotage progressively targeted the general population.
In July, provincial prefects subjected all civilians to a curfew. Populations resented such
measures because they imposed restrictions on daily life; at one point, the curfew in Split
began as early as 5pm. Curfews were also a source of fear and worry, because Italian
sentries could and did fire on civilians that circulated after hours.66 Second Army ordered
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its own curfew after reoccupying Croatian territory in September; initially set from 10pm
to 5am, the curfew hours later were adjusted to 8pm until 6am.67 In addition to imposing
a curfew, from early August the Prefect of Split held civilian populations accountable for
acts of sabotage committed in their communities, threatening them with expropriation
and deportation or confinement in severe cases where the culprits could not be found.68
Finally, in October, Mussolini declared Slovenia and Dalmatia to be territories “in state
of war.” A “special tribunal” was established in Dalmatia, under Bastianini’s supervision
but made up of senior military officers, with the power to impart death sentences for
crimes ranging from participation in armed insurrection and sabotage to the possession of
firearms. Participation in strikes or demonstrations and spreading propaganda were
punishable with prison terms.69
During the height of urban guerrilla activity in November, Dalmatian authorities
began arresting and interning civilians en masse. In the two weeks that followed the
attack on the 51st Regiment’s military band, Italian police arrested 920 people in Split.
They laid charges against 250, interned or deported 487, and held another 150 as
hostages. Locals complained that Italian officials abused their powers while making
arrests by mistreating the elderly and confiscating property.70 Generals Armellini and
Spigo in 1942, and Roatta after the war, criticized “Fascist authorities” for governing the
annexed territories in a harsh and arbitrary manner.71 But, in 1941, these measures largely
met with praise and cooperation from the military authorities on the spot. While the
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command of the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division regretted “disorderly and unjustified”
episodes of hot violence in the wake of terrorist attacks, it too recommended the
internment of suspicious groups and authorized mass arrests and house-to-house
searches. The division forwarded suspected resisters to the special tribunal where they
faced execution, often on the same day as their trial.72 The division’s intelligence staff
believed that the executions convinced most Dalmatians to collaborate with Italian
authorities — the “cold hostility” of the local populations could only be held in check by
“a strong and totalitarian regime” based on “demonstrations of force and fear of
punishment.”73 Likewise, Dalmazzo credited the “rigorous measures” [provvedimenti di
rigore] taken by Bastianini and his prefects for improving the situation in Dalmatia by
December.74 Second Army’s commander, Ambrosio, praised Bastianini’s regime for its
resolute handling of resistance — including its speedy application of the death penalty —
and he called for similar harshness from High Commissioner Grazioli in Slovenia. In
fact, Grazioli had issued a series of repressive decrees in September, extending the death
penalty to cover various acts of subversion and establishing confino for “dangerous”
individuals.75 Thus, despite the personal and jurisdictional conflicts that mired their
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relationship in other affairs, Italian military and civil authorities shared a fundamentally
similar approach to repression in the annexed provinces.76
In occupied Croatia, where Fascist civil authorities exerted very limited influence,
Second Army’s use of threat and violence likewise escalated during the first year of
occupation. The army’s restraint and inaction in the first months of the occupation
reflected the confusing political situation posed by the newly formed Independent State
of Croatia. Italian commanders lacked the legal authority or political will to clamp down
on anti-Ustaša revolt in July and August 1941. While he ordered the Sassari Division to
protect the communications hub of Knin and its environs, Dalmazzo instructed Italian
garrisons not to sally forth without authorization from the command of the VI Corps.77
The Sassari Division was particularly sympathetic towards anti-Ustaša Serb fighters, but
by the middle of August its units had collaborated with armed Croat peasants and
gendarmes to hunt down and execute “communists” in Zones I and II.78 This began a
gradual, if inconsistent, process of escalating repression as Italian commanders
increasingly defined revolt in ideological terms.
Initially, Italian generals thought that they would be able to distinguish between
non-communist and Communist insurgents, isolating the latter. Upon reoccupying Zone
II in September, Dalmazzo’s instructions were largely defensive but he expected his
division commanders to be more aggressive in stifling “communist revolt.”79 On 7
September, Ambrosio issued a decree that authorized Italian military courts to issue death
sentences or heavy prison terms for subversive acts that threatened public order. It was
hoped that this threat of force would suffice to frighten the Communist Partisans into
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submission and dissuade nationalist Serb bands or local civilians from joining them.80
Second Army’s first large-scale offensive operations in September seemed to vindicate
this approach. As the Sassari Division approached Drvar — the short-lived capital of the
so-called “Drvar Republic” — most of the Serb rebel forces abandoned their Communist
allies and leaders. Monticelli was content to occupy his objectives without bloodshed,
allowing the opposing forces to melt away. Given his hatred of the Croats, he was not
very concerned that most of the disbanded Serbs had failed to turn in their firearms, or
that many fled into Croatian territory to continue the fight against the Ustaše.81 Italian
troops encountered some resistance by a Communist rearguard in Drvar itself, but
Dalmazzo concluded that the majority of the town’s population had not participated in
the fight. He ordered the execution of two men caught bearing, but hoped to win over the
rest of the population with leniency.82
That Italian leniency in summer and autumn 1941 stemmed largely from political
calculations is made apparent by Second Army’s half-hearted efforts to disarm the
occupied populations, something that had been a cornerstone of Italian pacification policy
in Ethiopia. Ambrosio’s 7 September decree defined the possession of firearms,
ammunition, or explosives as grounds for execution by firing squad. However, Italian
commands complained that Ustaša interference rendered total disarmament impossible.
They claimed that Croatian authorities had distributed firearms among local Croats prior
to transferring civil powers to Italian military authorities. Combined with a fear that the
Ustaše ultimately would return — exploited by Partisan propaganda and nourished by
Ambrosio’s decree, which left Croatian civil officials at their posts — Serbs were

80

“Proclama e bando,” 2 September 1941, and “Notiziario n. 133,” 14 September 1941, AUSSME, N1–11,
b. 583, DS VI Corps, September 1941, allegati. For a copy of the original decree in Italian and Croatian,
see AUSSME, N1–11, b. 381, DS 22nd “Cacciatori delle Alpi” Division, September 1941, allegati.
81

“Relazione sulle operazioni contro i ribelli comunisti dal 7 al 25 settembre 1941,” 31 December 1941,
AUSSME, N1–11, b. 568, DS 12th “Sassari” Division, August–September 1941, allegati. On the Drvar
Republic, see Hoare, Genocide and Resistance, 126–39.
82

“Situazione di Drvar,” 29 September 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 583, DS VI Corps, September 1941,
allegati.

451

reluctant to turn in their weapons.83 The command of the VI Corps was convinced that,
“if the tricolour flag forever waves over these lands, the arms would be turned in.”84 Until
then, the policy of disarmament jeopardized Second Army’s political and military
strategy of attracting Serbs. The Sassari Division reported that Serb public opinion turned
against the Italians after its troops executed a number of Serbs for possession of
firearms.85 Perhaps as compensation, some Italian units made a point of shooting
prominent Croats caught with weapons.86 Others avoided the full application of
Ambrosio’s decree, permitting lesser sentences for firearms infractions. Since these
punishments were not codified, Ambrosio insisted that officers either apply the death
penalty or exonerate and release detainees. His simultaneous instructions to act “without
weakness, but also without useless excesses,” carrying out executions only when
ownership and intent could be proven, suggests that at this point Ambrosio still favoured
leniency.87 Italian commanders took a complacent approach towards disarmament, wary
of alienating the Serb population. Having postponed the deadline for civilians in Zone II
to turn in their firearms, the Italians did not even attempt to extend the policy of
disarmament to Zone III.88
Following the occupation of Zone III in October 1941, Italian commands voiced
growing concerns that their relatively soft approach to counterinsurgency was not
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working. The Partisans that fled Drvar — estimated to number around 1,000 men with
two howitzers — remained active in the surrounding countryside.89 Monticelli admitted
that the Sassari Division’s practice of sending small daily patrols to rural villages in order
to maintain an Italian presence in the countryside did little to undermine the Communist
Partisan movement. Partisans merely disguised themselves as peasants and the terrorized
populace did not denounce them to the Italian patrols.90 A Christmas amnesty issued
jointly by Second Army and the Croatian government met a lackluster response.
Dalmazzo concluded that “the practical effects of the act of clemency […] were almost
null.”91
The Italian army’s attitudes towards repression in Croatia began to harden around
the same time as they did in Slovenia and Dalmatia: autumn 1941. This was primarily the
result of the Italian command’s growing equation of resistance and guerrilla warfare with
communism. The continued activity of Communist groups around Drvar prompted
Monticelli — so compassionate towards Serb rebels that fought the Ustaše — to issue a
directive for the conduct of his troops in the “anti-communist struggle” [lotta
anticomunista]. Given the “communist” penchant for surprise hit-and-run attacks,
Monticelli ordered his units to improve security and surveillance along communications
lines and to
act without scruples in communist repression; prompt and radical response. Give
no respite to the communist party and its members. And since the communist
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bands are commanded by able and resolute leaders, we need equal ability and
decisiveness.92
The growing strictness of Monticelli’s attitude towards security in general was prompted
not by the continued existence of large nationalist Serb bands, but by the activity of
smaller Communist formations.
These attitudes were reflected higher up the chain of command as well. While
Ambrosio’s 7 September decree did not legally sanction summary executions — even if
military courts were expected to act swiftly — further directives in October permitted the
summary execution of anyone caught in the act of armed resistance.93 By the end of
October, Ambrosio’s growing concern for the increased boldness of “communist groups”
prompted him to issue a detailed set of instructions for “actions against rebels.” Adopting
language from the Brigands’ War, Ambrosio emphasized the need to capture and kill
rebels when “brigand hunting” [caccia ai briganti]. Capturing territorial objectives
without a corresponding body count was no longer sufficient. Thus, he reiterated that
“captured rebels are immediately to be shot,” ideally at the same time as the troops
burned down the homes of Partisans and their supporters. Ambrosio added that “if rebels
have a base in a certain town it must be eliminated; evacuate the population and burn the
town.”94
Ambrosio thereby inaugurated a system of collective reprisals that peaked in size
and intensity in 1942 and did not cease until Italy’s exit from the war in 1943. Often
neglected in contrast to Roatta’s later “3C” circular, Ambrosio’s orders provided the legal
basis for the harshest measures employed by Italian troops in the Balkans: the execution
of insurgents and their presumed supporters and the destruction of property, including the
burning of entire villages. Issued before Italian units came under serious pressure from
Partisans in Croatia, this was a crucial step in the escalation of violence committed by the
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Second Army. That it was aimed primarily against “communist groups” — despite the
much larger presence of non-communist Serb formations in occupied Croatia — reveals
how this escalation in part stemmed from, and was coupled with, the growing ideological
character of the war in the Balkans.
Tales of Communist brutality helped justify the harsh approach desired by high
command. The capture and presumed killing of a carabiniere in November prompted
Colonel Francesco Delfino, head of Second Army’s CC.RR., to call for the more
systematic and severe treatment of “bandits” and their accomplices. Beyond tracking
down and arresting the true culprits of guerrilla activity, he suggested interning the
families of known insurgents as hostages and sequestering or burning their property.
Delfino insisted that his prescriptions be implemented promptly and without hesitation.95
The VI Corps had already taken civilians hostage earlier that month. When Italian units
near Sinj proved unable to locate Communist propagandists that had been reported in the
area, they took ten hostages instead.96 This added another form of reprisal action to the
measures outlined by Ambrosio, and demonstrated how frustration with the “struggle
against communism” [lotta contro il comunismo] prompted Italian repression
increasingly to target civilians. Indeed, during winter 1941–42, Italian commanders
began to equate the general population with guerrillas, particularly in areas where they
faced well-organized Partisan formations. They described entire towns and villages as
being “organized for rebellion,” where “the natives generally serve the rebels as service
components,” gathering intelligence and providing screens for Partisan units. Pivano
warned the officers of the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division to suspect anyone whose
movements did not have a clear motive.97
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Mussolini approved and encouraged Second Army’s escalating use of terror. In
November, he suggested shooting twenty “hostages” for every Italian soldier killed in
Dalmatia, although Ciano doubted that he would enforce this quota.98 At the end of the
year, he demanded that anyone suspected of Communist activity in Yugoslavia be “put to
the wall [and shot] even without trial.” Ambrosio informed Dalmazzo of the Duce’s
wishes and told him to launch a reconnaissance in force whenever he received “rumours
that something fishy is going on” [quando si ha sentore che in qualche zone vi è del
torbido], surrounding the areas in question and “arresting and shooting the suspects.”99
This demonstrates the convergence of views between Mussolini and military commands
at the division, corps, and army level. Military authorities adopted harsh measures firstly
in response to military, political, and ideological conditions posed by the Communist
Partisan movement; Mussolini’s directives prompted or legitimized further radicalization.
The opinions, statements, and policies of Mussolini and his generals in Yugoslavia were
mutually reinforcing.
In practice, Italian behaviour during winter 1941–42 varied between region and
unit. Whereas in Zone II Italian commands exercised sole authority over the legal
treatment of “communists,” Italian military authorities in Zone III lacked civil powers
and were supposed to forward suspected Partisans or partisan-helpers to Croatian courts.
Thus, Italian garrisons near the demarcation line were less directly involved in the
application of justice than their counterparts closer to the Adriatic. Nonetheless,
Dalmazzo reminded the commanders of these garrisons that “naturally [...] anyone caught
in the act of hostilities or sabotage against us must immediately be shot.”100 Monticelli’s
Sassari Division initially remained relatively lenient, due to the lack of casualties it
sustained through December and to its continued pro-Serb policy. Croatian officials
complained that, while German and Croatian security forces torched entire villages and
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killed thousands of Serbs in reprisals, the troops of the Sassari Division on the other side
of the demarcation line instead hindered the repression of Serbs.101 When saboteurs
derailed a train north of Knin, Monticelli opted to take no immediate action, but he
warned the local population that if such an incident repeated itself he would hold the
community responsible and “take severe reprisal measures.”102 While the Sassari
Division remained reluctant to carry out reprisals and continued to rely on the threat of
force, the neighbouring Bergamo Division — which had suffered heavier casualties at the
hands of Partisans — regularly reported conducting “acts of reprisal,” including the
burning of villages.103 In the territory occupied by the V Corps, the Re Division’s
widespread practice of burning homes prompted previously friendly “Orthodox Četniks”
to take up arms against Italian forces.104
Roatta’s 3C Circular
Partly to establish greater consistency in Italian counterinsurgency against an increasingly
well-organized and aggressive opponent, Second Army’s new commander, Mario Roatta,
issued his 3C circular on 1 March 1942. In its content, the pamphlet and its appendices —
published in the following months — did little more than codify and add detail to the
precepts that Ambrosio had laid out in 1941.105 Roatta sanctioned summary executions of
suspected insurgents as well as collective punishment of civilians through hostage-taking,
mass internment, and the confiscation or destruction of property. As Burgwyn notes,
these measures contravened the articles of the Hague Conventions but were justified by
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Fascist legislation that deprived “illegitimate” combatants of legal protection.106 The
language of the 3C circular emphasized the illegitimate nature of Second Army’s
adversary by referring to “rebels” and “rebel formations” that adopted “guerrilla”
methods “comparable to colonial warfare.” Roatta further justified collective reprisals
and terror against civilian populations by claiming that the “natives” were “generally
hostile” and ought not to be trusted.107
The connection between colonial rhetoric and legitimacy was significant. Colonial
opponents were not expected to fight according to the same rules of conduct and codes of
honour expected of Western armed forces.108 The language of Italian commands in
Yugoslavia was similar to that adopted in Ethiopia. Italian generals in 1941 and 1942
referred to insurgents most frequently as “rebels,” but also occasionally as “brigands” or
“raiders.” The Italians were less strict with their vocabulary than were the Germans, who
dehumanized their enemies in Yugoslavia by referring to them almost exclusively as
“bandits.”109 The very different policies taken towards Communist Partisans and Četniks
forced Italian commanders at times to be more specific. So, Italian intelligence reports
and maps on the location of “rebels” differentiated between hostile “Partisans,”
“Communists,” and “Četnik-Partisans” on one hand, and friendly “Četniks” or
“antipartisan” formations on the other.110 Perhaps for this reason, a new edition of the 3C
circular in December 1942 replaced most references to “rebels” with the word
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“partisans.”111 While defining the Communist Partisans in political-ideological terms was
not consistent with Italian colonial rhetoric, it did nothing to legitimize them in the eyes
of Italian generals. Indeed, the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division combined colonial and
ideological language by labelling insurgents in Slovenia “communist brigands” [briganti
comunisti, or b.c.].112 Other epithets that surfaced in the army’s internal correspondence
and operational orders emphasized the underhanded methods of the guerrilla enemy. In
Slovenia, both Robotti and his successor Gambara referred to the Partisans of the
Liberation Front as “scoundrels” [canaglie].113
In his 3C circular, Roatta avoided any direct mention of summary executions of
insurgents. However, his use of language to delegitimize the enemy and his calls to treat
the enemy according to the principle of a “head for a tooth” indicated his intention to
reinforce Second Army’s growing use of the firing squad. Roatta’s official silence on the
topic likely reflected his awareness that his policies contravened international law.114
Indeed, in April 1942, Roatta issued a specific directive on the treatment of insurgents,
which he instructed division commanders to impart “only verbally” to their subordinates
“for obvious reasons.” The directive was simple: “Rebels, caught bearing arms, will
immediately be shot on the spot.” Wounded Partisans, minors, and women would instead
be sent to military tribunals.115 Moreover, his accompanying instructions on the treatment
of civilian populations, published as the first appendix to 3C, stipulated that unarmed
men captured during anti-partisan operations in the “immediate vicinity” of armed
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insurgents or in areas where combat had taken place should be “treated as rebels” if it
seemed “evident” that they had participated in armed struggle. In this case, Roatta left
much discretion to the immediate commanding officer on the spot, empowered to carry
out a death sentence based on an assumption of guilt.116 Although Roatta specified that
civilian accomplices or supporters of the Partisans should be arrested for further
investigation, by permitting the summary execution of presumed rebels deemed to have
abandoned or hidden their weapons he provided column commanders in the midst of
operations with a justification not to take prisoners. Such loopholes were particularly
important given high command’s growing obsession with body counts as the key
indication of “success.”117
Executions were supposed to take place according to a solemn prescribed ritual
based on the speedy application of justice and respect for the condemned. Only a priest, a
doctor, and a firing squad of twelve to sixteen men with a commanding officer were
permitted on the site of execution. After receiving last rites, the condemned would be led
to a chair or wall, blindfolded, shot, confirmed dead, and buried without delay in a spot
chosen by family members.118 As in Ethiopia, postwar testimony reveals that this formula
was not always followed — especially in the case of summary executions without court
martial — and that mishaps sometimes occurred. In the case of the executions at Zapotok,
Mario Casanuova recalled that the “reluctant soldiers” assigned to the firing squad missed
many of their targets. It took three rounds of fire to drop all of the prisoners, lined up on
their knees with their backs toward the firing squad, and Casanuova was still left with the
grim task of administering the coup de grâce with his pistol.119
Due to their prominent role in the ritual of the execution, army chaplains
witnessed more executions than other military personnel. In September 1942, the
archbishop in charge of the Military Ordinariate of Italy [Ordinariato Militare d’Italia]
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asked Roatta not to task Italian chaplains with comforting condemned Slovenes, but
instead to provide priests versed in the local tongue who could properly hear confession.
However, this appeal fell on deaf ears; military authorities did not trust Slavic clerics and
often conducted executions even before an Italian chaplain could arrive on the scene.120
Pietro Brignoli, a chaplain serving with the Granatieri di Sardegna Division in Slovenia
and Croatia between May 1941 and November 1942, kept notes of the most troubling
episodes he witnessed during his service. These too include examples of summary
executions being carried out without the presence of a priest, of the army’s reluctance to
provide local priests for confession, of the mutilation of bodies through repeated and
excessive rifle volleys or pistol shots, of the failure to provide the condemned with
blindfolds, of the regular presence of “curious” onlookers, and of the burial, exhumation,
and reburial of bodies by Italian soldiers and the family members of their victims.121 The
frequent messiness of firing squad duty served to brutalize Italian officers and soldiers.
Even when the process functioned according to ritual, the solemn and calm appearance of
the victims reinforced racial stereotypes of the Balkan populations as an “apathetic
people, to whom, maybe, we did a favour by killing them.”122
To summary executions and executions by courts martial, Roatta’s 3C circular
added more specific provisions on the shooting of hostages in acts of reprisal. The Hague
Convention of 1907 was silent on hostage-taking and, although the International
Committee of the Red Cross sought to prohibit the practice in the interwar years, the
postwar “Hostages Trial” — which indicted twelve German generals for their actions in
the Balkans — justified hostage-taking under certain conditions.123 Roatta instructed
commanders to take and hold hostages from “the suspicious part of the population.” In
response to “treacherous attacks,” hostages from the area would “answer with their lives”
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if the actual culprits could not be apprehended within forty-eight hours.124 Since this
provided little time for a complete investigation, Tone Ferenc has argued that Roatta’s
policy “had both revenge and terror purposes.”125 These guidelines built upon the practice
of hostage-taking initiated by Second Army the previous autumn.
The shooting of hostages took place in all zones occupied by Second Army. The
war diaries of the Sassari Division, in occupied Croatian territory, reveal that the informal
execution of hostages during operations took place by April 1942. The division
established a more systematic policy of hostage-taking in November, when it compiled a
“list of hostages for reprisals in consequence of atrocities that take place.”126 In July
1942, General Dalmazzo ordered the execution of eighty-eight hostages held in camps
and prisons throughout the VI Corps’s zone after discovering Partisan correspondence
dating from April that authorized the execution of eighty-seven Italian prisoners.127
However, the execution of hostages was carried out most rigorously in the annexed
provinces. During winter 1941–42, Bastianini had already ordered imprisoned
“communists” shot as hostages.128 In June 1942, following the assassination of the prefect
of Zara by Partisans, he declared that all family members of suspected Partisans would be
considered “hostages.”129 That same month, Prefect Temistocle Testa ordered the first
shooting of hostages in the Carnaro.130
In Slovenia, where Robotti had enjoyed a relatively free hand over repression
since January, his XI Corps most enthusiastically adopted and applied Roatta’s guidelines
on the shooting of hostages. On 24 April, Robotti and Grazioli publicly announced a
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policy consistent with the provisions in the 3C circular.131 By 17 June, the XI Corps had
shot 77 hostages in reprisal for Partisan activity that had claimed the lives of two Italian
soldiers and 22 Slovenes and had wounded another 11 Italians. This figure likely far
exceeded the number of death sentences passed by military tribunals against individuals
actually deemed responsible for insurrection — five were shot between 21 May and 7
June.132 Robotti always claimed that hostages selected for execution were known
Communists or Partisans, “certainly guilty of terrorist activity.” However, it is evident
that many of the victims were simply drawn from army prisons with little regard to
whether or not they hailed from the locale where the act that prompted the reprisal took
place. Italian authorities also targeted prominent intellectuals. The number of hostages
shot depended on the seriousness of the offence in the eyes of Italian authorities. This
allowed for greater leeway than the German practice of rigidly prescribed quotas, but it
could also appear arbitrary. In one case, the Italians shot six hostages in reprisal for the
murder of six Slovenes that had refused to join the Partisan movement; in another, they
executed eight hostages in retaliation for the murder of a German couple.133
When acts of “terrorism” once again began to rise in September 1942, Robotti
announced that ten hostages would be shot for every victim of the Partisans.134 He
surpassed this ratio the following month when he ordered twenty-four hostages executed
on the same day that Communist agents assassinated Marko Natlačen, a former member
of Grazioli’s Consulta, in Ljubljana. Carried out in public on the same site as the
assassination, this was the single largest execution of hostages recorded in the Province
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of Ljubljana.135 Robotti admitted that the executions of hostages prompted fear and
concern among many Slovenes for family members in Italian custody. Nonetheless, he
felt that “to protect the principle of our authority, we must not deviate from the line of
progressive severity […] that has been forced upon us by the violent activities of a few
and by the supine acquiescence of the many.” Robotti was confident that his policy of
terror would best guarantee “peace in this new Italian land.”136
Another more widely adopted form of hostage-taking sanctioned by the 3C
circular involved the internment of family members of suspected Partisans as a
“precautionary measure.” During operations, Italian troops would conduct headcounts
and check documents in villages and towns. Able-bodied men found to be absent without
reason would, according to 3C, be considered “brigands” and their family members
arrested and interned.137 Although Roatta did not refer to these internees as hostages to be
shot in reprisals, they effectively functioned as hostages and were treated less-favourably
than other internees.138 General Balocco of the V Corps had advocated the expansion of
such a policy prior to the publication of 3C, suggesting the construction of “concentration
camps for hostages,” including women and children, on islands in the Adriatic or in Italy
itself.139 Roatta recognized the impracticability of physically interning “all the families in
question,” so he opted to send the most threatening family members to Italy while
punishing the rest with reduced rations.140 By April, units of the VI Corps were interning
hundreds of family members of presumed rebels at a time.141
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Roatta also authorized the internment of other groups through 3C and its
appendices. These included the inhabitants of dwellings near places where sabotage took
place: if Italian security forces could not bring the actual saboteurs to justice within two
days, they would hold local populations responsible, confiscating their livestock and
burning their homes before interning them. During operations, Italian troops also could
intern any non-local civilians they came across as well as locals they suspected of
supporting insurgency. Individuals, families, or — in the course of major operations
involving multiple battalions — the populations of entire villages could be evacuated and
interned “when contingent circumstances or measures demand it.”142 Finally, there was
also a category of “protective” internee that voluntarily sought internment out of fear of
reprisals by Partisans or Ustaše. Protective internees included collaborators, some Jews,
and civilians that had refused to join the Partisans. Their numbers were dwarfed by those
held under repressive “precautionary” internment.143
After the war, the Yugoslavian government estimated that between 110,000 and
150,000 of its citizens were interned by Italian authorities during the war.144 Internment
became a cornerstone of Robotti’s policy in Slovenia, where as much as one-fifth of the
local population was interned.145 As we have seen, mass internment in Slovenia
dovetailed with the regime’s policies of denationalization and Italianization. Rodogno
thus argues that 3C’s provisions for internment “served specific political purposes” by
making way for colonization in the annexed territories. Certainly, Italian generals voiced
no objections in principle to policies of “de-Balkanization” and “ethnic clearance.”146
But, it is difficult to determine the extent to which Robotti and other generals were
motivated by political rather than military factors.
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Although completely disproportionate to the level of insurgency encountered in
Slovenia, the policy was consistent with a military mentality that sought total solutions.
In February 1942, the XI Corps had constructed a “belt” of barbed wire and machinegun
nests around the city of Ljubljana in hopes of cutting off the resistance movement in the
countryside from its leadership and recruiting pool in the capital.147 In May, Ambrosio
proposed constructing a barbed-wire barrier along the province’s eastern border,
consciously drawing parallels with the wall that Graziani had built between Cyrenaica
and Egypt in 1931. Further discussions between Roatta and Mussolini connected the
closing of the border with the internment of 20,000 to 30,000 Slovenes.148 Cavallero and
Ambrosio even toyed with the idea of conscripting all able-bodied men in Slovenia and
Dalmatia and deploying them to Southern Italy to prevent them from joining the
Partisans, a measure that would have amounted to confino in uniform had it been
feasible.149 Mass internment fit within a variety of radical means that Italian commands
were considering as ways to separate guerrillas from occupied populations, usually by
targeting the latter. These approaches and rationales had parallels not only in the Italian
“reconquest” of Libya, but in Spanish and British practices of internment in Cuba and
South Africa earlier in the century.150
Italian military authorities, who exercised full control over public order in
Slovenia after January 1942, played the key role in escalating and implementing
internment policy in the province.151 After interning several hundred civilians during a
sweep through Ljubljana in February, Robotti informed Grazioli that his troops would
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begin interning families of students absent from the city. Between 24 June and 5 July, the
XI Corps checked the documents of 20,000 Slovenes, detained 3,516 students, teachers,
vagrants, and other “suspects” [indiziati], and interned 2,788 of them at Gonars and
Treviso.152 The policy continued to escalate through the summer, despite protests from
local clergy that the arrest and deportation of entire families invariably victimized the
innocent, while actual resisters roamed free.153 On one hand, the prevalence of this
practice meant that untrustworthy groups that often would have been shot in Ethiopia
were instead interned in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the large numbers of internees
made this form of repression more total; arguably, the army’s repressive policies directly
affected a larger proportion of the population in Yugoslavia than in Ethiopia. It has been
suggested that the total deportation of the Slovene population was only prevented because
Italy lacked the means — including housing and an available pool of Italian colonists
ready to replace the internees — to carry it out.154
Conditions in army-run camps, both within Supersloda’s jurisdiction and in Italy,
reflected the fact that Italian logistical capacity at this point in the war was stretched to its
limit. Most notorious were conditions on the island of Rab [Arbe], situated off the coast
between Fiume and Zara, but all camps generally suffered from insufficient food, shelter,
and sanitation, and the inconsistent delivery of correspondence or care packages.155 But,
poor conditions were only partly attributable to unavoidable supply shortages; they were
also an intended result of the army’s repressive policy. In his 3C circular, Roatta ordered
that the rations of interned family members of suspected Partisans be “reduced to the
absolute minimum.”156 Subsequent guidelines on the organization of internment camps in
Second Army’s zone dictated that “the internees will be treated as prisoners.” Security
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measures were meant to ensure that “no suspects can deceive themselves of leaving the
enclosure of the camp alive.” Men and women were to be kept separate, effectively
splitting up families. Conforming to these guidelines, the VI Corps established two
concentration camps in fortresses at the mouth of the Bay of Kotor, with its infantry
divisions providing the officers and guards. The most dangerous internees, including all
those designated as “hostages,” were held on the islet of Mamula. Elderly or infirm
internees as well as women and children were kept in a better-equipped camp across the
bay on the Prevlaka peninsula. The internees were put to work in nearby fields.157
Perhaps the most frequently applied means of repression directed against civilians
following the publication of the 3C circular was the destruction of their property, which
usually accompanied internment.158 Roatta held local civilian populations co-responsible
for Partisan activity. He authorized the destruction of dwellings and the confiscation of
livestock where the perpetrators of sabotage or other acts of insurrection could not be
apprehended within forty-eight hours.159 Such measures had already been sanctioned by
Ambrosio; now, Italian field commanders quickly exceeded Roatta’s guidelines. In the
month following 3C’s publication, various units reported matter-of-factly the destruction
of homes and entire villages as means of reprisal.160 By early April, Roatta lamented that
the burning of villages had become a “double-edged sword” that played into the hands of
Partisan propaganda.
After simple skirmishes, or during rastrellamenti conducted without injury, entire
villages have been destroyed.
The same thing has happened, during actual operations, in regards to villages
found abandoned, in areas where there has not been serious fighting, in the
assumption that the desertion of the homes constitutes clear and irrefutable proof
of the connivance of the populations with the rebels.
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Roatta reminded his officers that most of the civilian population was unarmed and lacked
the direct protection of Italian garrisons, which left them vulnerable to Partisans that
demanded lodging or supplies and often forced villagers to abandon their homes. Roatta
insisted that dwellings were only to be burned where the situation could be considered
“abnormal,” where sabotage had been conducted nearby, and only after forty-eight hours
had elapsed without apprehending the true culprits of said sabotage. Yet, he was not
willing to absolutely prohibit the destruction of civilian property. Decision-making
ultimately remained in the hands of the commander on the spot.161
Roatta’s warnings against the counterproductive destruction of property were
echoed by subordinates like Robotti and Armellini. The latter cooperated with
Bastianini’s Carabinieri in Dalmatia to determine “places and villages that should be
considered better or worse” in order to “proportion [graduare] the severity” of reprisal
measures, but this still amounted to collective rather than individual objective
punishment.162 It is clear that the burning of homes remained common practice,
especially during anti-partisan operations in which the situation always was deemed
“abnormal.” For the memoirists Casanuova and Brignoli, such forms of reprisal became a
natural part of war in the Balkans. Casanuova recalled that Croat “houses all had straw
roofs and, after a little artillery and mortar fire, they caught fire like shocks of wheat.”163
Brignoli noted how rural populations fled the approach of his column during operations
in northwest Croatia in September 1942. The only village that was not immediately put to
the flame was the one selected to house the regimental command. It too was burned when
the Italians departed.164 Even outside major operations, patrols from Italian garrisons
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continued to burn buildings — sometimes shacks constructed by Partisans in the forests
or mountains, but also civilian dwellings — on a daily basis.165
In some respects, the 3C circular was a highly detailed and prescriptive document
that reflected the Italian senior officer corps’s tendency towards “oversupervision.”166 In
other respects, 3C took the form of an open-ended guideline for conduct. In important
areas, its wording was vague and it left much to the initiative of field commanders.167 As
Ben Shepherd has noted in his studies of German field commands in Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union, such dispositions were open to interpretations ranging from restrained to
ruthless depending on circumstances and the mindset of individual commanders.168 In the
case of Circular 3C, the room it left for middle- and lower-level initiative was less
obviously a reflection of the Fascist “leadership principle” and more directly a response
to the unpredictable and fluid nature of anti-partisan warfare. Despite Roatta’s awareness
of the double-edged potential of summary executions, hostage-taking, internment, and the
destruction or confiscation of property, his directives on these measures functioned as
“invitations to abuse.”169
Following the publication of 3C, previously restrained divisions like the Sassari
grew demonstrably more violent in their behaviour. Encouraged by Roatta’s circular and
responding to the difficult combat conditions that his division found itself in since
January, Monticelli now authorized harsh measures in the midst of operations conducted
to relieve garrisons that had come under siege during the winter. He tolerated and
legitimized behaviour that might otherwise have been considered hazardous to discipline.
On 6 March 1942, a group of alpini attached to the Sassari Division burned the entire
village of Velika Popina because they deemed it a “breeding-ground for rebels.” In what
can only be described as officially sanctioned looting, the confiscated livestock and
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foodstuffs were given to the troops, many of whom had recently been released from
military prisons. On 26 March, after liberating the garrison of Srb, the relief column
executed their Communist prisoners along with a number of local sympathizers, and
evacuated the sixty inhabitants that had remained loyal to the occupiers. Then, in
unusually frank language for a unit war log, “free rein was given to the troops to plunder
and so the entire town was burned and with it the adjacent Kunovac and Kupirovački.
The whole Srb valley was in flames.”170 Such scenes became routine during the Sassari
Division’s operations in the following months. The division’s war diary now recorded
such measures more drily: “between Bos[ansko] Grahovo and Drvar everything was
burned; in particular the Kamenica plateau where not a single dwelling still exists. [...]
Some prisoners were shot; others were interned.”171 As a rule, “all the villages that have
supported the rebels are razed to the ground or burned and the inhabitants guilty of aiding
and abetting [favoreggiamento] them interned or shot according to conditions and
circumstances.”172 Outside of operations, Monticelli ordered garrison commanders to
hold family members of absent able-bodied males as hostages and to confiscate their
livestock.173 During the spring of 1942, his division employed all the repressive measures
authorized by 3C. His successor, Paolo Berardi, encouraged his subordinates to reread
and memorize the entire circular.174
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That the command of the Sassari Division fell into line with the precepts of
Roatta’s circular so quickly and willingly was due to its evolving interpretation of the
insurgency that it faced in Lika. By this point, officers and men of the division saw
themselves as operating in hostile territory. While it resurfaced from time to time, the
sympathy previously held for the local populations had dissipated.175 Italian patrol
commanders grew frustrated with the tendency of civilians to flee their approach or,
when they were captured, to respond to interrogations only “with the usual phrase:
neznam” [I don’t know].176 Gazzini concluded that “the [communist] criminals find
hospitality and support everywhere.”177 But, he also concluded that the harsh methods
employed by the division since March produced positive results.
A trend against the communists begins to show itself among the populations
connected to the reprisals executed by us on towns that went over to the Reds;
having seen our strong-arm methods [maniera forte], the naturally cowardly
[vigliacca] populations are leaning towards the stronger and are noticing that
communist propaganda brings them nothing but bad; there are in fact many bands
that are organizing themselves against the Reds and that will fight by our side.178
Thus, Gazzini and Monticelli did not consider brutal repression measures inimical to the
Sassari Division’s earlier policies based on co-opting the Serb populations. The language
was reminiscent of that used in Ethiopia; reprisals were merely another form of
persuasion to be employed among inferior colonial peoples.
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Grand Operations and the Perversion of Discipline
While Italian infantry divisions made considerable use of 3C’s provisions in their own
small- and medium-scale anti-partisan operations, major operations involving multiple
divisions saw the fullest application of the circular. Vast swathes of territory could be
deemed zones of operations, and therefore “in situazione anormale.”179 The publication
of 3C is often portrayed as a turning point precisely because it was followed by a year of
large-scale anti-partisan operations; it opened a new phase in Italian counterinsurgency in
Yugoslavia.180 In the first of these grand operations, Trio, Italian policy and behaviour
was mitigated to an extent by Roatta’s political objective of winning over the Serbs and
Četniks in Bosnia. Although initially agreeing that all captured insurgents and their
helpers must be shot, Roatta later prevailed upon the Germans to treat those who
surrendered as prisoners of war. This was not the result of a more compassionate Italian
attitude; Roatta’s aim was to avoid driving Četnik formations into resistance.181
Arguably, the Italian reliance on terror against insurgents and civilian populations
reached its apex in the summer and autumn of 1942 when all four Italian army corps were
employed in a series of grand operations intended to secure the annexed territories in the
Adriatic once and for all.182 In July, the V and XI Corps simultaneously launched major
operations in Slovenia and Carnaro, while the XVIII Corps cleared out part of the Velebit
mountain range along the border between Dalmatia and Croatia. These were followed in
October and November with joint operations involving the VI and XVIII Corps in
Herzegovina. In their operational orders, corps commanders referred directly to the 3C
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circular and its appendices, particularly in relation to the treatment of insurgents and
populations.183
Mario Robotti’s operations in Slovenia demonstrated the most zealous application
of 3C’s measures. Running through the summer of 1942, the operations took place
directly on annexed territory, where Italian concern for prestige was magnified. In
Slovenia, Italian policies were not mitigated by the political dynamics of coalition
relations with Germany and Croatia, or by Second Army’s desire to win over Serbs and
Četniks. Moreover, Italian manpower and resources in the region were at their height;
but, with reinforcements drying up, Italian generals knew that they had a limited window
to exploit these circumstances. Given these factors, Roatta made it clear at the outset of
operations that he expected the harshest measures of his 3C circular to be observed and,
indeed, exceeded.
Roatta’s preliminary instructions to Robotti demanded that “those who make any
act of hostility, or of abetting the rebels, will immediately be shot.” He continued to
consider the “destruction of homes and villages” as legitimate reprisals, albeit ones that
needed to be administered cautiously.184 Meeting in the field with generals Robotti and
Ruggero on the second day of operations, Roatta defined “combat zones” — in which all
forms of reprisal were justified — as including not only spots where Italian troops
encountered armed resistance, but any area subject to a rastrellamento. In addition,
Roatta gave individual soldiers the authority to check the documentation of civilians
found outdoors during the operations, including those tending their fields, and to
“immediately shoot any civilian found at fault.” Finally, he reminded Ruggero to
confiscate anything useful before burning homes.185 Robotti went even further,
authorizing significant repressive measures throughout the entire Province of Ljubljana.
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He ordered Italian units conducting operations to arrest all able-bodied men found in their
homes or villages and to shoot all those found in the countryside.186 These meetings and
directives, coming before or during the first three days of the operation, demonstrated the
extent to which Italian commands tolerated and anticipated a higher level of violence
against civilians during major anti-partisan operations. The generals also anticipated their
meeting with Mussolini on 31 July in Gorizia, where the Duce imparted instructions for
the harsh repression of Slovenes. Declaring that “this population will never love us,”
Mussolini called for his generals to respond with “fire and iron” and authorized “the
transfer of the mass of the population.”187 His encouragement was not necessary.
As envisioned by Roatta and Robotti, the main targets and victims of Italian
repression during the course of operations were civilians. This made a mockery of the
amnesty that Robotti had offered to villagers who, having been forced to join the
Partisans, returned to their homes prior to operations.188 In practice, the Italian
application of terror escalated over the course of operations. Partly, this was due to
bottom-up frustration with ineffective rastrellamenti, but as Osti Guerrazzi argues, the
majority of reprisals were episodes of “cold” violence ordered from above. In particular,
General Robotti’s language — which presented the entire civilian population as complicit
in the insurgency — grew increasingly rigorous as the operation continued.189
These dynamics were illustrated in the rastrellamento conducted by the Cacciatori
delle Alpi Division south of Grosuplje in the first week of operations. On 16 and 17 July,
units of the division encircled an area where some four-hundred Partisans were estimated
to be at large. The Italians uncovered various weapons stashes and hideouts but only
managed to kill three Partisans in combat. The mopping-up portion of the operation
commenced on the 18th, during which two Partisans were killed in combat, one partisan
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helper was executed, and the homes of people held responsible for sabotage were burned.
The 19th was a rest day, but on the 20th the Italians executed four “communist brigands,”
whose interrogation revealed that a much larger group of Partisans had slipped through
the division’s fingers.190 Robotti chastised the division’s commander, Vittorio Ruggero,
for his excessive and premature optimism regarding the loyalty of the local populations.
He exhorted Ruggero and his other subordinates to conduct their “purge” according to
“strict and restrictive criteria.”191 Perhaps in response to this pressure, or merely
frustrated by its inability to locate and engage larger masses of rebels, the Cacciatori
escalated their executions of civilians in the following days. On the 21st nine rebels and
“suspect persons” were executed. During the next two days, the 51st Regiment executed
the nineteen villagers at Zapotok. Finally, the operation concluded on the 24th when
Ruggero claimed to have encountered strong Partisan resistance, although he reported
suffering no casualties himself. According to the division’s war log, the Cacciatori killed
ten Partisans in combat, executed another 35, interned 38 people, and burned the property
of “communist brigands,” but only uncovered one light machinegun and six rifles.192
Italian units conducted executions on a daily basis during the operations in
Slovenia. More often than not, the victims were not armed Partisans but “suspect
persons,” individuals listed as “communists,” or partisan “helpers” found in villages.
Often, these executions were accompanied by the burning of property. For statistical
purposes, the XI Corps recorded all of its victims as “rebels captured and shot.” As of 23
July, they numbered 84, to go alongside the 32 “enemies killed in combat.” Even with
these creative accounting practices, the numbers were not high enough for Robotti, who
admitted that the difficult terrain and the shrewdness of the adversary might force him to
reduce his expectations. He reiterated his orders to “suppress without mercy not only the
guilty, but also the suspect, and intern the able-bodied men that seem to have returned to
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towns formerly occupied by rebels. [...] Remember that behind every civilian might hide
a partisan who, burying his rifle and seizing the spade, is ready to take it up again to
shoot our soldiers in the back.”193 By the end of the month, Robotti claimed that 150
“rebels” had been killed in combat, 239 had been executed, and 250 had turned
themselves in. In addition, his divisions captured 90 small arms, burned 134 dwellings,
and confiscated 138 head of livestock, at a cost of 35 dead — half of which came in a
single encounter at the beginning of the operation — and 92 wounded.194
This pattern repeated itself in August, now accompanied by orders from Robotti
to intern all able-bodied males encountered in operational zones. The policy of
internment, which had previously targeted the urban population of Ljubljana, thus was
extended to the countryside, marking its high point.195 The timing of the order, coming on
the heels of Mussolini’s speech at Gorizia, was significant. But, in his meeting with
Roatta and Robotti the previous month, Ruggero already had proposed “confiscating the
property belonging to men absent from villages and interning their families.”196 His
division adhered to the new directives with zeal, interning at least 420 civilians over the
course of August, most of them in roundups that detained between 50 and 100 villagers at
a time. Thus, Italian repression targeted civilians to an even greater extent than before.
On the other hand, the policy of internment may have provided officers in the field with
an alternative to executions. There is some evidence that Ruggero filtered the contents of
Robotti’s directives in order to tolerate more moderate, if inconsistent, behaviour from
his troops. While still reporting the execution of “brigands,” the Cacciatori Division’s
war diary entries now referred to partisan helpers and other suspicious individuals as
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being “captured” or “arrested” rather than shot.197 However, this was not Robotti’s
intention. He lamented that his division commanders showed “misplaced pity” by not
shooting unarmed “brigands.” Robotti reminded them that “many of today’s peaceful
workers are yesterday’s brigands that should be shot.”198
Ultimately, the Cacciatori Division applied internment as a repressive measure in
addition to summary executions, which it continued to commit. During rastrellamenti,
Ruggero authorized his troops to execute “whoever” they found. On more than one
occasion, this included women, even though Roatta’s first appendix to the 3C circular
called for them to be spared.199 Throughout the grand operations in Slovenia, the
Cacciatori delle Alpi Division recorded 342 executions. This was the highest number
among the participating units and is best explained by the division’s constant
employment in mobile operations. As a whole, between 16 July and 15 September, the XI
Corps claimed to have killed 965 “rebels” in combat, executed another 791, and took
1,135 prisoners at a cost of 47 dead and 143 wounded. In the process, the corps recovered
695 rifles, 60 pistols, 41 automatic weapons, and 9 mortars, not enough to equal the
number of Partisans killed in action.200 The ratio of 37 Slovenes killed for every Italian
soldier lost was remarkably disproportionate. It exceeded the ratio obtained by German
and Croatian forces that participated in Operation Weiss the following winter.201 Such a
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high ratio, combined with the qualitative evidence from unit war diaries and the language
of Robotti’s orders, suggests that a large number of the XI Corps’s victims were wounded
and captured Partisans or unarmed civilians.
The vast majority of those shot or rendered homeless and interned by the Italians
were victims of “atrocity by policy.” The military leadership had developed increasingly
harsh repressive measures in 1941 that were codified and incorporated into operational
directives in 1942. The operations themselves witnessed top-down pressure to conform to
the spirit of these directives. Bottom-up frustration, not from high casualty rates but with
the difficult environmental and logistical conditions and the style of guerrilla warfare
encountered in the Balkans, helped ensure that the lower ranks adhered to policy. As we
have seen, the army’s propaganda consciously exploited this frustration to develop hatred
for the enemy and, in turn, bolster unit cohesion and obedience. In addition, the army
leadership’s reluctance to prosecute subordinates for excesses served intentionally to
condone and encourage the application of harsh measures. Even when he warned against
counterproductive reprisals, Roatta informed his officers that he had no intention to
“question the past” [‘fare il processo’ al passato] or to examine alleged excesses on a
“case by case” basis.202
Although less radical in its form and results, the Italian army in the Balkans
underwent a “perversion of discipline” similar to that which, according to Omer Bartov,
contributed to the brutalization of German troops in the east.203 In his examination of
Italian military tribunals in Slovenia, Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi found that sentences against
Italian troops for theft or violence against local civilians were relatively rare; they were
non-existent for officers. More commonly prosecuted were crimes of insubordination or
dereliction of duty.204 This trend holds true for other army corps as well. After a year of
occupation, the number of cases forwarded to army tribunals each month by the VI Corps
had more than doubled, indicating a growing concern over discipline. However, while
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theft of private property or unauthorized requisition was punished occasionally, most
charges — and the most exemplary punishments — involved crimes committed against
the military establishment: theft from military stores, violence between soldiers,
disobedience, desertion, or self-mutilation.205 There was no significant change after the
command of the XVIII Corps took over the northern half of the VI Corps’s sector, despite
Armellini’s calls to crack down on the theft of agricultural produce.206 With the exception
of May 1942, where five soldiers were charged for rape and another four for theft of
private property, crimes against civilians usually accounted for only one or two
denunciations out of a monthly total ranging from twelve to forty-two.207
Looting was far more widespread than tribunal records indicate. Croatian officials
and clergy repeatedly harried Supersloda with complaints of pillaging by Italian troops,
usually during operations.208 Pietro Brignoli portrayed Italian soldiers as terrible looters,
blaming junior officers for failing to rein in their men.209 By the end of his operations in
Slovenia, Robotti admitted that looting by his troops was out of control.210 Italian
commanders repeatedly condemned the appropriation of foodstuffs and property by
individual military personnel and warned of potentially “draconian” punishments,
including execution.211 However, officers in the field appear to have been reluctant to
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prosecute men whose behaviour could be justified as conforming to directives from
above. At the end of 1941, Mussolini and Cavallero had called on Italian forces in
Croatia to requisition supplies aggressively. During 1942, Italian commands authorized
the confiscation of property belonging to presumed “rebels.” Unable to provide sufficient
boots for his men, Roatta permitted the confiscation [sequestro] of footwear from
Slovene civilians.212 As elsewhere, expectations to “live off the land” and to confiscate or
destroy property as a reprisal measure made excesses difficult to avoid.213 Thus, during
Operation Trio, Mario Casanuova’s men plundered what remained of a village that had
been burned in reprisal. Admitting to taking an elderly woman’s quilt and jacket at
gunpoint, Casanuova claimed that “the thought never even crossed my mind of having
committed armed robbery.”214 If the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division gained a reputation
among the occupied populations as a formation that “looted, burned, killed” — as
General Ruggero was forced to admit in autumn 1942 — this was as much the result of
higher-level policy as it was of low morale and lack of discipline among exhausted, illequipped, and poorly led troops.215
Despite their appeals against looting, when it came to discipline Italian generals
showed greater concern for the lazy behaviour and slovenly appearance that reflected a
lack of enthusiasm or combat spirit among their troops. Dalmazzo complained of soldiers
with unpolished boots, long hair, beards, deformed caps, raised collars, and socks or
“scarves of every shape and colour,” idling about with their hands in their pockets
making poorly executed salutes to equally shabby-looking junior officers. Robotti made
similar complaints in Slovenia.216 The most draconian punishments were reserved for
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officers and soldiers guilty of cowardice that threatened Italian prestige. Less than a
month before the armistice and two weeks after Mussolini’s fall from power, Second
Army’s military tribunal sentenced two officers and twenty-six soldiers to death for
allowing themselves to be disarmed by Partisans without a fight. In a circular to all four
corps, Robotti announced that “the sentence was carried out immediately.”217 This was an
exceptional case that came at the very end of the occupation — the Regio Esercito
executed far more of its own men in the First World War than in the Second — but it
highlights the greater emphasis that the Italian military leadership and justice system
placed on combat discipline compared to other breaches of discipline regarding the
treatment of civilians.218
The perversion of discipline during grand operations is illustrated in a report by
General Umberto Fabbri, whose formation of Guardia alla Frontiera troops conducted a
series of rastrellamenti south of Slovenia in support of Robotti’s operations. Between 12
July and 21 August, Fabbri’s men shot 245 people and interned 4,300, while burning
1,854 houses and confiscating 1,950 head of livestock. However, Fabbri concluded that
I did not have to resort to any serious disciplinary measures during the entire
operation; on the contrary I noted the desire of all the soldiers to participate
willingly in the task of destroying the enemy nests.
They gave respect and assistance to the elderly, women, and children, always
animated by that spirit of steady humanity and civilization that distinguishes the
Italian soldier, but not separated from the desire to eliminate able-bodied men to
avenge their fallen comrades, a few of whom were found cowardly stripped,
tortured, and mutilated.219
Fabbri’s language reflects the message of Italian propaganda, which expected soldiers
simultaneously to exalt in violent destruction and espouse humanitarian values that
marked them as bearers of a superior civilization. It also reflects the complacent view that
such behaviour was possible. But, in the midst of what amounted to officially sanctioned
pillaging justified by the barbarity of the guerrilla enemy and the presumed complicity of
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the local populations, field commanders were more concerned about the willingness of
their troops to follow orders than with the abuse of those orders.

Intelligence
The escalation of and variation within Second Army’s conduct of reprisals during 1941
and 1942 resulted in large part from the way that army, corps, and division commands
interpreted resistance in their territorial jurisdictions. These interpretations were fed by
assumptions that emanated from past experience facing insurgency, from racial
stereotypes of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and from an ideological aversion to
communism, which according to Roatta “exerted great fascination among the Slavic
populations of the Balkans.”220 The Italian approach to repression grew more severe
through 1941 as Italian commands equated revolt with Slavic communism. The
widespread targeting of civilians in 1942 reflected judgments that the occupied
populations, especially in the annexed territories, were uniformly hostile to Italy and that
terror was the most effective means of persuasion for “Balkan peoples,” endemic
brigands who refused “to suffer any government.”221 Citing a “very good expert on the
subject,” Robotti argued that the “dissatisfaction, restlessness, hypocrisy and perfidy” of
Slovenes was the result of a “servile mentality” formed after years of Austrian and
Yugoslavian domination. He concluded that Slovenes lacked the political maturity to
handle the autonomy granted them in 1941, which they viewed merely as a sign of
weakness, and that only military force could resolve the crisis in the Province of
Ljubljana. Robotti predicted that the rural masses, unimpressed by their “sad experience
of the communist paradise,” would submit to Italian authority once victory had been
achieved.222 When the Muslim populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina began to turn
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against the Italians in 1943, Second Army’s commander accused them of “lacking firm
will,” which he believed stemmed from their history of domination by other races.223
Italian generals placed great emphasis on the collection of intelligence and news
to inform their civil policies and to avoid or achieve surprise in counterinsurgency
operations. Units submitted daily reports on activity and rumours in their sectors, which
were filtered up the chain of command.224 Intelligence officers possibly were the busiest
staff officers in Second Army. Their reports, usually several pages long, make up the
bulk of material in division- and corps-level war diaries. Oddone Talpo has argued that
the reports included too much information for Italian commands to interpret, and he
criticizes commanders for neglecting to provide their subordinates with useful summaries
or context to inform lower-level initiatives.225 This might explain the intelligence failure
in February 1943, when the Murge Division responded too late to warning signs of a
Partisan build-up in the Neretva river valley and was badly mauled as a result.226 But
overall, despite complaints from corps commanders of insufficient, flawed, or
exaggerated reports, Italian intelligence services functioned competently and information
was shared up, down, and across chains of command.227 Intelligence staffs included
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officers fluent in Slavic languages, although some smaller units and garrisons lacked
translators capable of deciphering the Cyrillic characters used by Serbs.228
Corps and division commands employed substantial networks of informants, and
they instructed garrison commanders to do the same.229 In annexed territories, their
effectiveness was limited by lack of communication with civil authorities, who had their
own informants. In the Independent State of Croatia, Italian commands complained that
their informants were being intentionally targeted by Croatian police.230 Italian
authorities acted upon informants’ denunciations of “communists,” partisan helpers, or
individuals hiding weapons. However, Italian officers later commented that many people
who lost their homes and were interned as a result of a denunciation showed little
evidence of subversive activity. Evidently, personal motivations and, in Croatia, the
desire for revenge between Serbs and Croats fuelled many denunciations.231 This
contributed to the arbitrary appearance of Italian repression.
Despite their prodigious accumulation of informants and information, Italian
intelligence officers and commanding generals struggled to explain why resistance
continued to spread and why the Communist Partisan movement continued to gain
adherents among ostensibly anti-communist populations of Orthodox Serbs and Catholic
Slovenes. This was particularly vexing and embarrassing to the military leadership,
which had predicted in 1941 that the mere presence of Italian troops would restore calm
to Croatia, and in 1942 that large-scale operations would definitively end revolt in the
228
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annexed provinces. Neither prediction was borne out by events. Alongside assumptions
on the racial character of the rebellious population, Italian generals explained their failure
by citing foreign influences and interference, namely from the Croatian Ustaše and from
the Allied powers. While these actors did play important parts fuelling resistance, Italian
intelligence services tended to exaggerate or overemphasize their roles, thereby clouding
Italian understanding of revolt and guerrilla movements in Yugoslavia.
Indiscriminate Ustaša violence undoubtedly was a central factor instigating and
perpetuating revolt in the Independent State of Croatia and neighbouring regions.
However, Italian generals — like their German allies — used the Ustaše as scapegoats
for revolt, masking their own contributions and failures.232 As we have seen, Italian
commands in Croatia held Ante Pavelić’s regime primarily responsible for the outbreak
of revolt. Combined with pre-existing anti-Croatian sentiment and martial race theory,
these views prompted Italian generals to favour Serbs over Croats in the region. They
were unconcerned by Serb nationalism because they considered it essentially anticommunist and anti-Croatian in nature.233 When the Italian reoccupation of Croatian
territory failed to stifle the Serb revolt, generals blamed Zagreb’s continued meddling and
illegal Ustaša activity for undermining Italian occupation policy.234
Commanders in the annexed provinces also blamed the Ustaše directly or
indirectly for continued resistance in their jurisdictions. In 1941, Italian commands in
Dalmatia placed far too much emphasis on Ustaša intrigue and irredentist agitation when
local resistance was in fact Communist-led.235 They viewed Zagreb’s inability to keep its
own house in order as the main cause of instability in Dalmatia. After a series of
operations and reprisals at the end of 1941, Dalmazzo attributed continued guerrilla raids
in Dalmatia to “endemic brigandage, poverty, and the arrival of rebels from across the
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border.”236 Given his spat with Bastianini, General Armellini was more willing to place
blame upon the unpopular imposition of Italian civil government in the region, but even
he saw the Ustaša regime as the most significant obstacle to security in Dalmatia.237
Although Italian commanders in Slovenia could not accuse the Ustaše of meddling
directly in their affairs, they blamed the situation in neighbouring Croatia for the
resurgence of Partisan activity following Robotti’s grand operations of summer 1942.
Having declared victory over the Slovene Liberation Front in September, Roatta and
Robotti explained to Mussolini that renewed sabotage and ambushes in October were the
work of “Serbo-Croat rebels” that had crossed the border.238
Another common explanation for resistance in Yugoslavia was Allied influence
via propaganda and special operations. This too was a fixation that Italian generals shared
with their German counterparts, partly because they both viewed the conflict in occupied
Yugoslavia as part of the broader Mediterranean theatre of war.239 Military authorities in
Dalmatia reported the spread of “English propaganda” by British spies and “Russian
propaganda” by Communist agents during the first months of the occupation.240
Reflecting messages within Fascist propaganda after the Soviet Union’s entry into the
war, Italian intelligence officers assumed close collaboration between “Radio London
and Moscow.” Italian commands did not believe that home-grown resistance movements
had the organizational capacity or resources to operate as effectively as they did without
foreign assistance. They concluded that the Communists were able to play the lead role in
the spontaneous anti-Ustaša revolt in Croatia only with “the indirect or direct guidance of

236

“Notiziario n. 244,” 3 January 1942, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 585, DS VI Corps, January 1942, allegati.

237

“Sistemazione futura del C. d’A.,” 29 May 1942, NARA T-821/51/0685–91.

238

Roatta to Magli, 5 October 1942, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 1222, DS Second Army, October–November
1942, allegati. “Combattimento di Tanca Gora del 22 settembre c.a.,” 17 October 1942, AUSSME, N1–11,
b. 1059, DS XI Corps, October 1942, allegati.
239
240

Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement, 155.

“Notiziario n. 69,” 11 July 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 582, DS VI Corps, July 1941, allegati.
“Situazione in Dalmazia,” 29 July 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 583, DS VI Corps, September 1941, allegati.
“Relazione informativa,” 10 October 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 381, DS 22nd “Cacciatori delle Alpi”
Division, October 1941, allegati.

487

London and Moscow.”241 By 1942, Italian generals were convinced that they faced a vast
underground Communist network “under the direction of Russian and British agents,
wielding large financial means.” Robotti claimed that Slovene Partisan leaders were
“paid with Russian and English money,” while Italian naval intelligence reported that
British submarines were landing agents, funds, and supplies along the Adriatic coast.242
Assuming that Communist propaganda must have been financed and produced by Soviet
agents, a lower-level intelligence report in 1943 argued that this rendered “the Balkan
front […] a continuation of the Russian one.”243
The actual level of contact and support between Yugoslavian resistance
movements and the Allied powers was very limited through mid-1943. Tito’s command
maintained a radio link with the Comintern throughout the occupation, but the Soviet
Union was involved in its own struggle for survival and could offer no significant
material aid until the latter half of 1944.244 The British were more deeply involved in
Yugoslavia. Especially after the fall of France, British strategy placed great emphasis on
economic, psychological, and subversive warfare. However, in 1941 the Special
Operations Executive [SOE] was still in its infancy and the outbreak of revolt in
Yugoslavia took the British leadership by surprise. The SOE’s strategy involved the
development of “secret armies” that would rise up in occupied territories only in
conjunction with an Allied landing; the British did not favour the constant open guerrilla
warfare adopted by the Communist Partisan movement. These strategic considerations,
combined with a fear of communism and the Foreign Office’s support for the
Yugoslavian government-in-exile, prompted the British to back Mihailović rather than
Tito. Even then, contacts with the Četnik leadership were irregular and confusing; the
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British flew only twenty-five sorties over Yugoslavia in 1942. Only in 1943, when the
Allies shifted their focus to the Mediterranean with a view to knocking Italy out of the
war, did Yugoslavia become anything other than a sideshow in their eyes. In this context,
active guerrilla resistance became desirable; the SOE finally established contact with Tito
on 29 May, and long-range aircraft began dropping supplies to the Partisans in July. By
then, the Italian presence in the Balkans was nearing its end. Allied interest in and
support of Balkan resistance movements peaked well after Italy’s surrender.245
During the period of Italian occupation, the most significant Allied contributions
to the development of resistance in Yugoslavia came from their victories on other fronts.
Italian commands credited the state of war with the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union, and especially news of Allied victories in Russia and North Africa at the end of
1942, for fuelling resistance among populations that could now envision an Axis
defeat.246 But the Italian claims that London and Moscow directed and supplied the main
resistance movements in the Balkans were overblown. This misinterpretation reflected
the poor level of Italian intelligence on the organization of the Communist Partisan
movement in particular. Despite their growing equation of resistance with communism, it
was not until later in 1942 that Italian commands began to understand how the Partisan
movement was structured. They did not seem to appreciate Tito’s central role in
organizing and leading resistance. Although Tito had made the town of Foča — inside
the Italian VI Corps’s zone of occupation — his base in January 1942, Italian intelligence
reports in April believed that the 2,400 rebels signalled in the area were “not yet
organized.”247 Later reports referred to “the well-known leader Tito,” but only in the
same breath as the “well-known Partisan General Novaković,” and primarily in the
context of Tito’s alleged negotiations with British agents.248 By holding to their view that
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resistance in Yugoslavia was the result of endemic brigandage and anti-Ustaša reaction
co-opted by Communist leaders directed and funded by London and Moscow, Italian
commanders tended to underestimate the organization, resiliency, and flexibility of their
enemies while undervaluing the extent to which the insurgency represented a broad-based
liberation movement directed against foreign occupation.

Counterpropaganda
Fuelled by a set of racist and political assumptions about the populations of the Balkans,
and by an institutionalized contempt for irregular warfare, Italian commands responded to
guerrilla resistance with forms of military repression based on terrorizing the civilian
masses. However, the army’s approach to counterinsurgency was not completely onedimensional. In one of few studies to examine Italian propaganda efforts, Sanela Schmid
demonstrates that authorities in occupied Croatia made genuine efforts to win over the
local populations through persuasive propaganda backed by social welfare policies. This
approach contrasted sharply with German policy in Croatia but, she argues, it conformed
to the more inclusive form of empire-building touted by the Fascist regime.249 A similar
contrast existed between Italian generals in Yugoslavia and their colleagues in Ethiopia
who, especially before 1939, had largely rejected a population-centric approach to
counterinsurgency. This difference certainly reflected Italian concepts of a racial
hierarchy that placed South Slavs, and particularly Slovenes, on a higher intellectual
plane than East Africans. Moreover, the need to combat the spread of a modern ideology
like communism and the political opportunity presented by the Ustaša-Četnik conflict in
Croatia prompted Italian commands to adopt multiple avenues in their appeals for
obedience and loyalty. Still, the level of sophistication of Italian counterpropaganda was
limited by the same racial hierarchy, which did not credit Balkan peoples with fully
developed faculties of reason, by the structural deficiencies of the propaganda apparatus
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in Yugoslavia, and by an inferiority complex stemming from Italy’s deteriorating
situation on other fronts.
The impetus for a more population-centric approach in the region came not from
the army but from Fascist civil authorities. At the beginning of the occupation, the Fascist
regime hoped to win over Slavic populations as willing subjects within Italy’s Imperial
Community. Under the guidance of Minculpop, Italian newspapers presented Fascist
policy in Slovenia in liberal terms, emphasizing the political and cultural autonomy
granted to the new Province of Ljubljana.250 Similarly, Minculpop officials hoped that
they could make headway among Dalmatian Croats, by contrasting Italian policies to
those of the “brutal Germans” and “bloodthirsty Ustaše.” However, they admitted that the
annexation of Dalmatian territory alongside the formation of an independent Croatian
state rendered this work difficult. They also concluded that the Slavic “mentality” was
not susceptible to sophisticated propaganda based on oratory, but placed greater
“significance on order and the propriety of deeds and actions.”251 As Schmid argues,
Italian authorities deliberately employed “propaganda of the deed” to illustrate the
benefits of belonging to Fascism’s new Adriatic empire, governed according to Roman
principles of “justice” and “civilization.”252
The army largely shared this approach in 1941. At the beginning of its occupation
of Lika, the Sassari Division employed locals that had attended Italian universities to
spread propaganda about the great public works of the “Fascist Government” in Italy.
This raised hopes that Italian authorities would drain the malarial marshes and regulate
the flow of rivers near Knin.253 Officers also believed that the “pride, correctness and
discipline” of their troops would convince the population that Italians came “as defenders
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of justice and of a new social order that will be established in Europe.”254 Intelligence
officers attached to Ambrosio’s command reported that
the serious, correct, balanced behaviour of our troops in the annexed territories
and in those of occupation have been and remain the most effective propagandist
of italianità.
The contrast with the Serbian, German, and Croatian military occupations goes to
our clear advantage.255
These early appeals to a Fascist new order and Italian civilizing mission were not empty
rhetoric. Italian commands at various levels believed that moderate behaviour and
progressive policies would enable them to maintain security on the cheap and pave the
way for a permanent Italian presence in the region.
During the reoccupation of Croatian territory in September and October 1941,
Italian propaganda officers again emphasized “the correctness of our units and material
aid to populations” that suffered from “distressing poverty” as “the best
counterpropaganda action” available.256 Alongside this, Italian propaganda sections
distributed leaflets and showed documentary films that demonstrated “the wonderful
achievements of Fascist Italy” and “the progress made by our civilization.”257 By early
1942, Italian intelligence officers were convinced that they had benefited from Italy’s
reputation of relative “civility and liberality;” they hoped to exploit this perception
further.258 The “pacification of minds” comprised an important component in the army’s
schemes to expand Italian influence into Bosnia. In a region with such a diverse
population, Roatta advocated a policy of religious freedom that would distinguish the
254

“Relazione sulla situazione di Drvar,” 12 May 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 240, DS 12th “Sassari”
Division, May 1941, allegati. This rhetoric is repeated in the division’s war diary entry for 12 May.
255

“Slovenia, Dalmazia e Croazia. Sintesi della situazione,” 8 June 1941, DSCS, 4/II:80–81.

256

“Relazione mensile sul servizio ‘P’ per il periodo dal 15 agosto al 15 settembre 1941,” 24 September
1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 583, DS VI Corps, September 1941, allegati.
257

“Relazione sull’attività svolta in Croazia della 2^ Divisione Celere ‘E.F.T.F.’ nel ciclo operativo 4
ottobre–14 novembre 1941,” 24 January 1942, NARA T-821/60/0824. “Relazione mensile sul servizio ‘P’
per il periodo dal 15 agosto al 15 settembre 1941,” 24 September 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 583, DS VI
Corps, September 1941, allegati. “Relazione mensile sul servizio ‘P’ per il period dal 15 settembre al 15
ottobre 1941,” 31 October 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 584, DS VI Corps, October 1941, allegati.
“Relazione mensile sul servizio ‘P’ per il periodo dal 15 novembre al 15 dicembre 1941,” 5 January 1942,
AUSSME, N1–11, b. 585, DS VI Corps, January 1942, allegati.
258

“Notiziario n. 354,” 25 April 1942, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 1265, DS VI Corps, April 1942, allegati.

492

Italian regime from the anti-Jewish and anti-Orthodox attitudes of their German and
Croatian counterparts, even — and perhaps especially — if it undermined the sovereignty
of Pavelić’s administration.259
The most important social welfare programme developed by Italian authorities in
Yugoslavia involved the distribution of food to the occupied populations. Here, they
responded to a food crisis that broke out almost immediately in the annexed territories
and Independent State of Croatia. Most of the territory occupied by Second Army
comprised food-deficit areas cut off from their traditional sources of agricultural produce
when Yugoslavia was partitioned. In Croatia especially, circumstances were exacerbated
by the loss of persecuted rural Serbs as agricultural labour, peasant hoarding in response
to Zagreb’s food price policies, meagre and irregular official rations, and the inability to
gather harvests in areas held by Partisans or Četniks.260 Already in mid-May 1941, the
Sassari Division reported serious food shortages in Drvar. The division’s entire zone of
occupation required “steps to confront the economic situation, which becomes worse
every day.”261
Even before the annexation of Dalmatia, Fascist Party officials stressed the
necessity of establishing party-run welfare services in the new provinces and of supplying
food by sea to the hungry population.262 Bastianini’s government quickly reduced taxes
and duties on foodstuffs and began distributing food to Dalmatians, although he later
transformed food supply into a weapon by restricting access to rations in specific regions
as punishment for Partisan activity.263 Military authorities praised both sides of
Bastianini’s policy. The Sassari Division credited civil commissioners for improving
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relations with the local populations by distributing pasta and rice.264 By 1942, its units
were providing escorts for the transport and distribution of food by Fascist authorities.
Army officers took advantage of such occasions to arrest family members of presumed
communists who showed up to collect their rations.265 Ultimately, Dalmatia’s economic
woes were too deep for Bastianini’s policy to meet with total success. The food crisis
continued to provide ammunition for anti-Italian sentiment. While the VI Corps reported
public criticism of Fascist authorities for being more interested in parades than feeding
the population, its intelligence staff typically blamed the high price and scarcity of food
on Pavelić’s trade policies.266
When Italian troops reoccupied Zones II and III in Croatia, they distributed grain
to villagers and the army established commissions to oversee the steady supply of
food.267 Dalmazzo believed that the policy ingratiated his troops to the population by
highlighting the “generosity of the Italian soldier, who shares his rations with the poor
and with children and who demonstrates on every occasion the age-old civilization of our
people.”268 However, here too, food shortages remained a problem and the Italian army
was partly responsible. Second Army’s presence added further strain on Croatia’s already
fragile supply system. Agreements with Zagreb in late 1941 held the Croatian
government responsible for feeding not only the civilian population but the occupying
forces as well.269 Despite their awareness that mass hunger in the occupied zones could
transform itself into rebellion, Italian officers continued to requisition local resources for
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their own needs. At the beginning of the occupation, units of the Sassari Division had
ferreted out livestock that had formerly belonged to the Yugoslavian armed forces and
were therefore considered war booty.270 Some Croats — already convinced that Italy was
a second-rate military power that had done nothing to deserve its expanded role in the
Balkans — accused the Italians of having “taken away everything.”271 Cut off from
regular supply in the winter of 1941–42, the garrison at Drvar covered its own needs
through local requisitioning while reporting that civilians were dying of hunger. This
behaviour, although considered an unavoidable necessity, undermined the message that
Dalmazzo hoped to send. The return of good weather in April permitted Italian aircraft to
drop supplies that were doled out both to troops and civilians in the town, but the damage
had already been done. Much of the population had deserted to the Partisans in search of
food.272
The army lacked the means and sometimes the willpower to provide a solution to
the food problem in Croatia. By the end of September 1941, the city of Knin suffered
serious grain shortages and a barter economy had taken over.273 Although Italian military
authorities held civil powers in Zone II, they were not interested in micromanaging
economic affairs. In Knin, Monticelli left price controls and other measures up to
Croatian civil authorities while complaining of their incompetence and lack of concern
for economic questions. Prices never did normalize and by December Knin was
completely devoid of bread and basic foodstuffs.274 Similarly, Italian authorities in
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Dubrovnik allowed local Croatian officials to shoulder the burden of food supply, despite
allegations of corruption. Only when requested by provincial officials did Pivano agree to
help with “facilitating and securing the transport of foodstuffs for the population,” to little
effect.275 Following public demonstrations against municipal Croatian authorities in
March 1942, intelligence officers of the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division reported that the
local population was now amenable to the idea of Italian rule and possibly even
annexation. In early April, the Italian government announced its decision to send 400
tonnes of flour to Dubrovnik. The division’s propaganda section made much of the
“Duce’s gift” of flour to the population.276 As well as demonstrating the tardiness of
some lower-level commands to address the food crisis in their zones of control, this case
suggests a correlation between the humanitarian food policy of the Italian army and the
Fascist regime’s politics of imperial expansion. As late as April 1943, the XVIII Corps —
noting that “poor people driven by hunger align themselves politically with the powers
that give the best guarantee of giving them something to eat” — claimed that their
dependence on Italian military authorities for food had strengthened “annexationist”
sentiment among the Croat island populations in the Adriatic.277
The food crisis never dissipated and Second Army’s response remained
inconsistent. Indeed, like Dalmatian authorities, Italian military commanders weaponized
food in 1942. Already by February, the V Corps had implemented a policy of
withholding food from populations considered partisan helpers due to the absence of
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able-bodied men from their villages.278 During the grand operations later that year, Roatta
reasoned that, since Partisans gained their provisions from the local populations,
if the resources of the latter are restricted to the bare necessities of those
populations, or even withdrawn (through the evacuation of inhabitants, livestock
and foodstuffs) there is no doubt that the rebels will sooner or later find
themselves short of supplies. And if they take the resources that we left for the
populations, and just enough for their own needs, the sympathy and connivance of
the populace towards rebellion will diminish considerably.279
These measures contradicted Second Army’s welfare policies and propaganda. Italian
officers in Slovenia admitted that the policy mainly impacted civilian populations.280
While there are examples of the free distribution of army rations to loyal civilians,
in other cases the army proved reluctant to give away its resources without prospect for
tangible returns.281 Military authorities in Slovenia agreed that welfare was the most
effective counterpropaganda tool available to the occupying powers. To contribute to the
normalization of daily life in the province, Robotti ordered his units to facilitate the
supply of food by Fascist civil authorities. However, he insisted that any food delivered
from army stores be paid for by the civilian population.282 In September 1942, Robotti
asked for government funds in order to subsidize the poorest families and households in
Slovenia, but the requested sum of 100,000 Lire was relatively insignificant. According
to Second Army’s pay scales, the corresponding value would have been enough to
maintain no more than 370 irregular militiamen for thirty days. At the time, Robotti was
employing nearly 3,000 irregular troops.283 While the maintenance of auxiliaries and their
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families contributed to the welfare of select portions of the population, these figures
suggest that the army’s generosity was not open-handed. Generals expected to see
immediate and tangible political or military results from their policies.
Robotti maintained his niggardly attitude as commander of Supersloda in 1943. In
the weeks before Mussolini’s arrest, Robotti rejected Croatian requests for foodstuffs on
credit, citing Zagreb’s inability or unwillingness to pay for Italian supplies in the past. He
preferred to offer smaller donations of food in Croatian towns where Italian troops were
present and able to exploit the propaganda value of their generosity.284 By this point in
the war, Italian food policy had long since failed to achieve its desired results. Already at
the beginning of 1942, Dalmazzo had concluded that the inability to solve Croatia’s
economic problems had driven Croats and Serbs into the arms of the Partisans, whose
propaganda ably exploited the food crisis.285 The major problem facing Second Army’s
policy of engagement through food and welfare programmes during 1942 and 1943 was
the lack of a consistent Italian presence in the towns and countryside. The only way to
counter Communist propaganda among all social strata was to firmly occupy areas on a
permanent basis.286 The withdrawal and consolidation of Italian garrisons through 1942
hampered the effectiveness of Italian social policies on a broad scale. The provision of
food reflected a genuine commitment by Italian civil and military authorities to counter
the economic causes of insurgency and back up their claims that Fascism’s Imperial
Community promised an equitable and well-organized new order. However, political and
military calculations imposed limitations on the policy, which never received the
resources or conditions to ensure its success.
By 1942, Italian generals recognized that they were losing the propaganda war
against the Communist Partisans, who employed social incentives of their own alongside
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emotional appeals to the population.287 In areas where Partisan occupation was secure,
Communist authorities relied on orderly requisitioning rather than plunder. Tito’s policy
of redistributing land confiscated from collaborators also met with local support. After
1941, Partisan propaganda emphasized national liberation and regional patriotism over
class struggle, thereby broadening its appeal.288 Italian intelligence officers noted that
Communist propaganda sections were well-organized, issuing pamphlets and newspapers
in areas under their control.289 The success of the Partisans in this field suggested that,
despite the dismissive attitude of the Italian leadership, words did in fact have some
importance for populations in the Balkans. Through 1941, Italian authorities had
complacently relied on legal, economic, and security measures to gain loyalty from the
public, eschewing more sophisticated appeals for mass support and participation. Most of
the army’s propaganda activity had been conducted at the local level on the initiative of
corps and division commands with small propaganda sections commanded by junior
officers primarily concerned with troop morale. After spring 1942, Second Army sought
to develop a more systematic and intensive approach to propaganda for civilian
populations, now centralized and coordinated under the Counterpropaganda Section of its
own Propaganda Office.290
The Counterpropaganda Section reports are replete with accounts of problems,
obstacles, and delays, revealing that the army’s propaganda activity remained limited and
ineffectual for the remainder of the occupation. One of the greatest challenges facing
propaganda sections at every level was a lack of officers fluent in South Slavic
languages.291 Although the Venezia-Giulia region — governed by Italy since 1919 —
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included significant numbers of Slovenian and Serbo-Croatian speakers, the Italian army
remained suspicious of their loyalties through the Second World War, especially after
guerrilla activity spread from Slovenia to Venezia-Giulia in 1942.292 The imperfect use of
local languages could undermine the credibility of the army’s message, thereby posing
significant problems for Italian counterpropaganda in Yugoslavia.
Second Army’s propaganda officers were aware that poorly conceived
propaganda could be counterproductive. However, their concerns in this regard
sometimes led to inertia. The Propaganda Office commissioned several studies on areas it
deemed too complex for immediate action — such as propaganda in schools or material
aimed at Muslim populations — that do not appear to have resulted in any tangible
action. Other ambitious and expensive projects, like the development of an anti-partisan
version of the “Game of the Goose” board game, were delayed indefinitely awaiting
approval from central authorities in Rome.293 Conflict and competition with civil
authorities further hindered the work of army propagandists. In Croatia, the Propaganda
Office struggled to gain permission from Pavelić’s government to distribute its posters
outside Italian-occupied towns. In Slovenia and Dalmatia, it quibbled with Fascist
officials over the use of languages other than Italian in its propaganda.294
A lack of resources prevented Second Army from making much use of film or
radio in its propaganda for local populations. In 1942, military authorities began
providing film screenings in Croatian urban centres, but these suffered from a shortage of
suitable content. The VI Corps showed mostly comedies interspersed with LUCE
documentaries. Propaganda officers claimed that the comedies were popular, even though
they were not dubbed in Serbo-Croatian. On the other hand, documentaries with
“irredentist or immoral” themes proved counterproductive. The Cacciatori delle Alpi
Division’s “P” Section hoped that the local populations would be more impressed by
292
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straightforward war newsreels emphasizing Italian military strength.295 These concerns
paralleled those of colonial officials in East Africa, where assumptions that Africans were
unable “to distinguish illusion from reality” led Fascist authorities to avoid showing films
with morally ambiguous Italian characters.296 Most of the films available to Italian
authorities were originally intended for Italian audiences and therefore were not suitable
for the occupied populations. In Slovenia, the XI Corps complained that the LUCE
documentaries shown by civil authorities did more harm than good. Most offered a
“forced lesson in Italian patriotism” that repelled Slovene theatregoers.297 Army garrisons
in Slovenia preferred to show films that lacked political content and were for
entertainment value only.298
Italian radio propaganda was even less successful. Civilian populations in the
annexed territories were suspicious of broadcasts set up by Fascist civil authorities.299
The army issued its own broadcasts in Slovenian and Serbo-Croatian, but Supersloda’s
most powerful radio transmitter operated at a frequency that most radios in Yugoslavia
could not receive, and Italian garrisons lacked loudspeakers to facilitate community
listening.300 Unable to compete with Partisan and Allied radio propaganda, Second
Army’s Counterpropaganda Section studied the issue and developed plans to expand its
activity in that field after spring 1942. However, these plans were based on the
acquisition of new technology, including a high-powered receiver to intercept enemy
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propaganda and a new transmitter to broadcast satirical commentary on the same
frequency that the Allies used. At the end of the year, the army’s radio propaganda
remained at a “standstill” as the new equipment had not materialized.301
As a result of these obstacles, Second Army’s propaganda apparatus was limited
largely to print. But, even here, its propaganda officers could claim few outright
successes. According to their reports, the army’s most creative and popular publication
was a children’s colour magazine, which included crude moral tales extolling the values
and benefits of collaboration, especially as informants. From an administrative point of
view, the children’s magazine was successful because it enjoyed the enthusiastic support
of local Fascist authorities in Split and Fiume.302 In the annexed provinces, censorship
and control of the newspaper press largely was in the hands of the civil authorities, which
limited the army’s involvement in the production of print media before 1942. However,
the civil authorities faced problems of their own in this field. Bastianini suffered public
criticism for the delay in establishing a separate newspaper in Split.303 His attempt to
found a magazine in Dalmatia to counter Croatian irredentism was a dismal failure; its
launch date repeatedly was pushed back due to lack of material.304 The shortage of
locally produced propaganda could be alleviated in part by the distribution of the major
daily newspapers from metropolitan Italy. But, aside from the language constraints, these
papers often confused readers in the annexed provinces because they did not address the
actual situation in the Balkans.305 With a rich newspaper tradition and Rome’s initially
lenient attitude towards the Slovenian language, Ljubljana maintained an active but
301
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problematically autonomous local press. While Catholic papers in the province reacted
against the “sovietisation” of territories occupied by the Liberation Front, they
nonetheless obstinately refused to collaborate with Italian authorities.306 When the XI
Corps began publishing its own articles in local papers in summer 1942, some Slovene
journalists responded with a boycott.307
Print media in the Independent State of Croatia posed a different set of challenges.
Here, Minculpop and the Italian Foreign Ministry sought to spread Italian language,
culture, and socio-political ideals by sponsoring language classes and publishing a
weekly newspaper, but it was unable to compete with Croatian and German dailies.308 In
mid-1942, an Italo-Croatian press agency was established to spread propaganda on the
greatness of “Imperial Italy” and on Croatia’s role in the “new order,” emphasizing
episodes of friendship and solidarity between the two countries.309 Second Army
supported these initiatives, collaborating with the press agency and eventually publishing
its own magazine, Moć [Power], specifically to counter German influence in the country.
However, these efforts all came very late — in the latter part of 1942 or 1943 — by
which point any chance of cultural penetration in Croatia was lost.310
Taking pride of place in the reports of the Counterpropaganda Section was
Second Army’s counterpropaganda “bulletin.” Subsidized by the Ministry of Popular
Culture, the bulletin — first printed in broadsheet format in April 1942 — reflected
Supersloda’s pursuit of a more systematic and controlled distribution of written
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propaganda to the occupied populations.311 The newspaper illustrates the army’s overall
approach to counterpropaganda — as well as the challenges and shortcomings it faced —
after spring 1942. Initially, it was published as a weekly, with an ambitious print run of
100,000 copies. However, difficulties with logistics and transport meant that many of
these were never delivered and had to be pulped. This compelled the Propaganda Office
in July to reduce the paper to a semi-monthly bulletin and to cut its print run in half.
Throughout its run, which continued for over a year, the bulletin was published in three
editions intended for Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. The Slovenian edition was titled Work
for Slovenes [Delo za Slovence]. The Croatian edition was initially called Sincere
Croatian Man [Ispravan Hrvatski Čovjek], but after just over a month it was changed
simply to Sincere Man because the army deemed the original title too polarizing in
ethnically mixed regions. After spring 1943, it was simply referred to as The Newspaper
[Novine]. Similarly, the army changed the title of its Serbian edition from the provocative
Free Serbia to Paper of Truth, and eventually to News. The original title reflected Second
Army’s objective in spring 1942 of winning over Serb populations in Bosnia. So too did
the Propaganda Office’s decision to print the title — and, once suitable typographic
material had been acquired, the entire Serb edition — in Cyrillic characters. This
predictably raised the ire of the Croatian government, which had prohibited the use of
Cyrillic within its borders. The army went ahead with the project anyway, concluding
that the majority of Serbs preferred reading Cyrillic text and that its use served as a
means of demonstrating the Italian army’s independence from Zagreb.312
Italian propaganda officers also admitted that the use of Cyrillic in the Serb
edition was necessary to mask the fact that its content was no different from that of the
Croatian edition.313 Indeed, in terms of content, Second Army’s bulletin was not
particularly inspired or sophisticated. The first editions were made up entirely of news on
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international affairs and on the war in general, attempting to portray Axis victory as
inevitable. For example, the 9 April issue highlighted the submarine blockade against
Allied nations, Japanese victories on land and sea, American unpreparedness for war,
anti-British feeling in Egypt and India, costly and futile mass attacks by the Red Army,
ineffective and desperate British commando raids in France, the establishment of
diplomatic relations between Japan and the Holy See, German medical aid to Polish and
Soviet civilians, and a diplomatic rupture between Australia and Canada.314 Italian civil
authorities complained that Second Army’s bulletins were replete with translation errors
and worthless content. From Rome, the Ministry of Popular Culture suggested that the
army include more local material in the paper, highlighting Italian civil policies and
demonstrating the material advantages brought by Italian rule.315 Second Army defended
its emphasis on war news, arguing that it was a fundamental aspect of
counterpropaganda, but its Propaganda Office agreed to collaborate with civil authorities
to develop more targeted propaganda for Slovenes, who the Italians considered more
intellectually advanced than the Croats or Serbs.316 After mid-June, the Slovenian edition
of the bulletin included articles on the provision by Italian authorities of medical aid and
food to the poor, on the values of Roman-style Fascist justice, and on the godless
barbarism of the Partisans.317 However, collaboration with the overworked civil press
office in Ljubljana did not go smoothly and its contributions to the bulletin often were
limited. In October, the Propaganda Office decided to simplify the layout of all three
editions, once again limiting their content to very brief news bulletins and denunciations
of Partisan brutality. Thereafter, the main objective of the paper was to counter news of
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Axis defeats in North Africa and the Soviet Union with stories of Allied barbarity and
with claims that the Allies were overstretched and that the Axis therefore would soon
regain the initiative.318 More ideological themes always struggled against widespread
“antipathy to Fascism,” which propaganda officers concluded was due to “ignorance of
our doctrine.”319
The army’s reliance on war news in its bulletins is indicative of how military
authorities in Yugoslavia, like their predecessors in Ethiopia, based their efforts at
persuasion primarily on the use of intimidation and force. Once again, it was the Fascist
authorities in Rome that advocated for more sophisticated propaganda. Italian
intelligence reports reveal that news bulletins did not always achieve their desired effect.
The XI Corps noted that the Slovene population, “still loyal to the democratic myth and
its conviction, however stale, of the invincibility of England and therefore of all its
allies,” was not impressed by news of Axis victories in Russia and North Africa.320
Already by the end of summer 1942, Slovenes sensed that the war had shifted definitively
in favour of the Allies. Soviet resistance in Stalingrad meant that the war would continue
into 1943, by which time it was expected that American aid would reach Europe in full
force.321 Allied victories at Stalingrad and El Alamein further emboldened the Partisans
and prompted the spread of rumours among the civilian populations concerning an
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imminent Italian exit from the war. Military authorities had to focus their propaganda
efforts on countering this type of “sensational news.”322
Much of the army’s written propaganda came in the form of public decrees
[bandi] posted on walls and dropped by aircraft as leaflets. Their content further reflected
the army’s view that Balkan peoples responded better to facts and deeds than to
sophisticated arguments. Reassuring the public that Italian occupation brought justice and
security, these announcements outlined the regulations and policies of the occupying
authorities, which usually involved threats of punishment for acts of resistance.
Ambrosio’s 7 September 1941 decree, announcing the assumption of civil powers by the
Italian army in parts of Croatia, promised the populations that “the Italian armed forces
are guarantors of their safety, freedom and well-being” while also outlining offences that
would result in execution.323 During the siege of Drvar later that month, Italian aircraft
dropped pamphlets to the population that presented the Italian army as bringers of “peace
and order.” Italian authorities guaranteed safety of person and property to those who
returned to their homes but warned of strict measures against those foolish enough to
impede the work of Italian authorities.324 Likewise, Ambrosio’s Christmas amnesty was
accompanied by anti-communist themes and warnings that those who did not return to
their homes would be “pursued relentlessly.”325 The language of these decrees,
emphasizing the futility of resistance, the opportunity for normal economic life under
Italian rule, and rewards for collaboration — Roatta offered money for the capture of
enemy agents or Partisan leaders — differed little from that employed in Ethiopia.326
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As insurgency mounted in 1942, the balance of carrot and stick in Italian decrees
tilted towards the latter. Robotti announced his grand operations in Slovenia with a
decree printed on 22,000 posters and 120,000 aerial leaflets. Co-signed by High
Commissioner Grazioli, the decree lamented that “many Slovenes” had responded to
Italy’s “extremely humane and favourable” treatment by “raising the communist banner
and trampling upon the principles of religion and civilization” upheld by Italian
authorities and troops. Warning that all Slovenes would now pay for the crimes of a few,
Robotti and Grazioli announced prohibitions on travel and communications in the entire
province, the summary execution of those who “in any way support the rebels,” and the
destruction of dwellings of those who aided the Partisans. The decree concluded with a
promise of clemency for Partisans who surrendered before combat, and assured the
public that “the populations that remain calm […] will have nothing to fear, neither for
their persons nor their property.”327 The offer of amnesty in the midst of major operations
was a standard tactic that was hoped at the very least to spread distrust within Partisan
formations, compelling Partisan commanders to keep a closer eye on their men.328
Ultimately, such guarantees and amnesties were undermined by the actual conduct of
Italian operations and the lack of discipline displayed by some Italian units. Partisan
propaganda took advantage of this. At precisely the same time that Italian repressive
policies in Slovenia reached their most indiscriminate levels, the Partisan leadership
ordered fairer treatment of collaborators and neutrals and greater respect for private
property.329
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Second Army’s emphasis on demonstrating its strength and its power over life
and death in its appeals to the occupied populations was not just phenomenologically
similar to colonial practices. Army propagandists bolstered these themes with explicitly
colonial rhetoric, employed alongside themes of anti-communism and nationalism. At the
close of his operations in autumn 1942, Robotti addressed Slovenes through a large
bilingual poster. After claiming to have killed, captured, or wounded upwards of 5,000
“bandits,” Robotti offered clemency to those who remained at large while promising that
his garrisons would continue to hunt down “outlaws” in order to free Slovenes from
terror, bringing peace and order.330 This appeal was accompanied by a short article
drafted by the XI Corps’s intelligence staff — not the more Fascistized propaganda
section — for publication in Slovene newspapers. Entitled “A Devout Wish” [Un pio
desiderio], the article combined Catholic and anti-communist themes with classic
romanità. Like their ancient forebears, Italian soldiers now fought “Red barbarism” in
defence of “Catholic Slovene civilization.” To counter rumours of an imminent Italian
withdrawal from Slovenia, the article also likened Italian soldiers to those of the ancient
Roman legions, who permanently settled in conquered lands as “warrior-colonists,”
bringing peace and civilization. While “the already very civilized populations of
Slovenia” did not require further civilization, the article justified the Italian army’s
presence there by its desire “to harmonize the civilization of the two neighbouring
countries within the framework of [nel quadro di] the larger Italian community.” By
“conquering Slovenia,” the Italian army assumed this “right” as the “victor.”331 Despite
granting the Slovenes preferential status within its racial or cultural hierarchy, the army’s
use of romanità was intended primarily to remind locals of their subordinate status within
the Imperial Community and to bolster the flagging prestige of Italian arms.
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Similar themes are evident in propaganda leaflets distributed in late summer 1942
by the Sassari Division in western Bosnia, Lika, and Dalmatia.332 The longest leaflet
comprised over six-hundred words of text and assumed a relatively high level of literacy
among its audience, but its arguments would not have been out of place in Graziani’s
Ethiopia. It highlighted the destructive power of the Italian army, drawing attention to
recently concluded operations against Partisans in the Velebit Mountains. The leaflet
castigated the insurgents who had demonstrated their “habitual cowardice” and fled the
Italian advance, but not before “more than two hundred of these people’s traitors were
caught by Italian lead.” It then emphasized the terrible punishment inflicted by Italian
troops upon the general civilian population of the region as a threat and warning to
others.
The populations that had placed their trust in these enemies of humanity saw their
property destroyed and for the most part were transferred to another part of Lika.
The villages of the Velebit – Glogovo – Dabašnica – Bruvno and many other
places battered by our cannons, our flamethrowers, our airplanes, were put to the
flame or razed to the ground.
This is the fate that awaits he who gives refuge to communists.
At the same time, the leaflet promised its readers the enlightenment of “Roman
civilization.” It reminded Serbs of the humane protection they received from Italian
troops in 1941 and concluded that “only Italy, guardian of all healthy [sani] nationalisms,
is able to ensure your peace and make your country rise again.”333 This conformed to
Fascist concepts of an Imperial Community that included not only annexed Dalmatia and
Slovenia but Croatia and Bosnia as well.
A second leaflet was primarily anti-Communist and went beyond colonial themes.
It adhered to the general line in Fascist propaganda that Italy was fighting a just war as a
proletarian nation against materialistic Allied powers united by international Jewry.
Aware that some Serbs shared a pan-Slavic sympathy for the Soviet Union, the Italians
vilified the capitalist British and Americans for using communism to enrich themselves.
The leaflet further alleged that Jews made up the leadership of the Partisan movement in
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Yugoslavia, which aimed “to tyrannize the poor and especially the peasants.” Italian
soldiers, on the other hand, defended the poor: “they have protected you, they have given
you food, they have died to defend your lives, your peace, your homes. […] They are not
occupiers, they are defenders.”334 This example demonstrates how food policy and the
army’s written propaganda were intertwined. It also reveals the complexity and
inconsistency of the Italian army’s message in occupied Yugoslavia. The presence of a
Communist-led insurgency and the context of a broader European war meant that
colonial propaganda alone would not suffice to persuade civilian populations to submit to
Italian rule. The Italian army employed a wider array of propaganda techniques in
Yugoslavia, but this led to contradictions in the message itself and with the army’s
consistently brutal approach to repression in military operations.
Schmid argues that the army’s “Janus-faced” contradictions in Croatia — also
evident in Slovenia — are best explained by Fascist concepts of empire based on Roman
values of justice, civilization, and strength that sought voluntary incorporation within the
“new order.”335 Clearly, the policies and themes implemented both by Italian civil and
military authorities in occupied Yugoslavia were consistent with these vaguely defined
notions. However, it is more difficult to determine the extent to which the army’s efforts
at positive persuasion were motivated directly by Fascist concepts of a civilizing mission.
Military commands explained their approach by adopting Rome’s rhetoric of spreading
“civilization.” But, Italian policies also were informed by opportunism and responded to
immediate circumstances. Italian authorities publicized their limited political and
religious concessions to exploit rumours of harsher rule in German- and Croatianoccupied zones. Food policy was certainly intended to portray Italian superiority and
humanity, but Italian leaders also saw it as a means of justifying their territorial claims,
discrediting their Croatian counterparts, punishing suspected partisan helpers, and
preventing neutral civilians from joining the Partisan movement out of desperation. The
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army only developed systematic written propaganda at a late date in reaction to Partisan
successes in that field. Furthermore, a chronic shortage of resources and willpower
relegated propaganda and persuasion to a secondary role in Second Army’s approach to
pacification. Efforts to win the hearts and minds of the local populations through positive
measures and messages were genuine, but they often came with strings attached and were
backed explicitly or implicitly by threats of overwhelming force.

Deployment and Tactics
Second Army’s emphasis on persuasion through propaganda and social measures in
occupied Yugoslavia was not accompanied by any limitations on the use of military
force. Especially after the army’s shift to grand operations in 1942, Italian generals
considered “operational activity” to be the most effective means of “political action”
available to them.336 While its political, economic, and social measures were received
“passively” and sometimes “favourably” by locals, the XVIII Corps concluded that a
“strong and military approach [maniera forte e militare] is the most understandable for
these populations, for centuries habituated to such treatment by various rulers. The
humanitarian and compassionate approach is considered a sign of weakness and inability
to govern.”337 For Italian generals, crushing resistance militarily was the surest way to
gain the acceptance and loyalty of the occupied populations. Compared to the
inconsistency of its propaganda, the army’s operational methods and repressive
techniques were remarkably consistent, their intensity magnifying over time in response
to guerrilla activity. Arguably, the greatest similarities between the army’s behaviour in
colonial Ethiopia and occupied Yugoslavia were in the military strategies and tactics
adopted against insurgents. Italian commanders in the Balkans displayed the same
preferences and proclivities that they had in East Africa, from their deployment of
manpower to their reliance on heavy weaponry and destructive rastrellamenti operations.
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The Italian army faced the same dilemma over the deployment of garrisons in
Yugoslavia that it had a few years earlier in Ethiopia. Following the capitulation of
Yugoslavia, Cavallero and Ambrosio agreed to avoid “excessive dispersal of force” by
occupying only the most important communications centres with garrisons preferably of
regiment-sized units and certainly no smaller than battalion strength.338 However,
military precepts on the concentration of force soon gave way to political interests of
expanding Italy’s presence in the region. The army’s redeployment to Croatia in autumn
1941 resulted in very large zones of occupation that left Italian forces spread thin. The
area under the jurisdiction of Renzo Dalmazzo’s VI Corps amounted to 32,670 square
kilometres. As General Dalmazzo pointed out, this was roughly equivalent to the Italian
regions of Lazio, Umbria, and Marche put together, and twice as large as the zone
occupied by the XIV Corps in neighbouring Montenegro. The Cacciatori delle Alpi
Division joined Dalmazzo’s corps in September and, along with the enlarged garrison of
Zara, it took over the occupation of the Dalmatian provinces and much of the Croatian
coastline. This still left the Sassari, Bergamo, and Marche Divisions with 27,490 square
kilometres of Croatian territory between them.339
The divisions deployed to Croatia each were expected to garrison between six and
eight towns. Each division consisted of six infantry battalions and two CC.NN. battalions,
meaning that much of their strength was required for garrison duty.340 By the end of the
year, the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division — short one battalion that was detached to
another division’s sector — had been transferred to Herzegovina, where its forces were
spread out between ten garrisons, three of which were manned by lone infantry
companies.341 Ambrosio admitted that his units were “anchored to the ground by many
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garrisons.” To address the problem, he assigned independent carabinieri [CC.RR.],
camicie nere [CC.NN.], bersaglieri, alpini, and territoriali mobili [T.M.] units to each
sector in varying quantities.342 Many of these formations were made up of poorly
equipped older reservists and had to be assigned secondary tasks — guard duty, coastal
defence, or patrolling communications lines — that were meant to free up infantry
battalions for mobile operations. In some cases, they provided garrisons on their own.343
During the winter of 1941–42, small, isolated, and vulnerable Italian units
increasingly came under attack by Partisans. Following an incident suffered by an
infantry regiment in Croatia, Cavallero ordered Second Army to conduct its movements
with strong columns and to implement a “more economical” deployment of its forces,
limited to the occupation of the most important centres and defence of essential
communication lines. Cavallero’s orders reflected his experience and tendencies as
military commander in Ethiopia. He wanted Second Army to concentrate its strength in
order to conduct the “police operations in grand style” that he had a penchant for.344
When Mario Roatta took over as commander of Second Army at the beginning of 1942,
he ordered the abolition of smaller garrisons in order to concentrate the army’s mobile
forces for operations intended to deal a swift death blow to the surging Partisan
movement. Roatta drew explicitly from the teachings of colonial warfare. His 3C circular
called for mobile columns to operate “as in Africa,” laagering on high ground or in
villages at night.345 In preparation for major operations in Slovenia that summer, Roatta
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advised Robotti to employ his forces “as in the colonial wars,” coupling a system of static
garrisons with mobile columns.346
Subordinate commanders did not need to be convinced by Cavallero or Roatta.
Dalmazzo already had admitted that the “passivity” forced upon his corps by lack of
manpower had damaged Italian morale and emboldened the enemy. He ordered his
divisions to form sizeable mobile groups led by “resolute and energetic leaders [...] on the
‘arditi’ model.”347 After a difficult winter, the Sassari Division — previously an advocate
of territorial expansion at Croatia’s expense and of engagement with Serb populations —
was now content “to abandon the third zone to its fate, leaving behind garrisons of
Croatian troops.” The growth of the Partisan movement through the winter convinced
Monticelli and Gazzini that a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency in the
Balkans was futile. They praised Roatta’s measures as “very wise and in accordance with
the principles of economy of force and mass.”348
The army’s switch towards heavy operations in early 1942 was intended to defeat
the Partisans in battle, boost troop morale, and demonstrate Italian strength and resolve.
However, it came with a political cost. Despite some reinforcement from Rome,
concentration in one area required withdrawals from other sectors. Thus, while the new
policy was supposed to make the Italian army appear less passive, it effectively
eliminated the army’s presence throughout much of the countryside outside the course of
operations. This was the same paradox that Frusci had confronted in Amhara in 1939. As
we have seen, civil authorities in Dalmatia and Slovenia lobbied with some success for
the maintenance of garrisons in the annexed provinces. Roatta agreed that these territories
could not be treated “solely according to military concepts of ordinary war,” and that
smaller garrisons were necessary there for reasons of prestige.349 Nonetheless, he ordered
the consolidation of garrisons in the provinces while abandoning large swathes of the
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Croatian hinterland. Grazioli complained in June 1942 that, thanks to the army’s “lack of
drive,” Italy controlled only 39 of 95 administrative centres in the Province of Ljubljana
while 1,900 of 1,936 hamlets were in Partisan hands.350 In his memoirs, Mario
Casanuova considered this one of the “most serious errors” committed by the army in
Yugoslavia: “We occupied a town, we reorganized everything, the population became
our friends, and just when things got better we abandoned them to the revenge and
pillaging of the [Partisan, Četnik, and Ustaša] adversaries.”351 The reduction of Italian
garrisons, which began in the first winter of the occupation, severely crippled the army’s
ability to win over the hearts and minds of the local populations. At least some Italian
generals were aware of this, and they hoped to return to a system of more numerous
smaller garrisons after successful operations against the Partisans.352
The problem was that the Italians lacked the strength to effectively employ their
new policy. Even with the reduction of garrisons, division commanders complained that
they needed several more battalions to establish mobile reserves adequate to control their
sectors.353 However, it soon became clear that they could expect no further reinforcement
from Italy. In May 1942, while reiterating his directives for Second Army to concentrate
its forces for greater “dynamism,” Cavallero informed Roatta that he would have to cede
two divisions after summer. Roatta made plans to evacuate Zone III entirely and focus on
the defence of the annexed provinces, although this would still leave his army with a
deficit of ten battalions and was likely to be construed by the public as an Italian
retreat.354 On 19 June, Roatta and Pavelić signed an accord in Zagreb that would see
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Croatian forces replace Italian garrisons in Zone III and parts of Zone II. 355 In theory, the
accord would have resulted in a network of Croatian garrisons between which Italian
forces operated as an offensive mass of manoeuvre. However, the Croats proved unable
— or, Roatta thought, unwilling — to replace all the Italian garrisons. Additionally, the
withdrawals coincided with Tito’s “long march” from eastern to western Bosnia, which
placed Axis forces in both zones under great pressure. By August, it was clear to Roatta
that his offensive-minded concept of deployment could not be instituted fully until spring
1943, if at all.356
Nonetheless, informed by Cavallero and Mussolini that Second Army would have
to give up more divisions than initially indicated, Roatta continued to withdraw garrisons
from the Croatian interior.357 According to Klaus Schmider, the Italian withdrawals were
a “godsend” for the Partisans, who gained a safe base to regroup and consolidate.358
Roatta understood that the Partisans likely would fill the void left by his forces but,
forced to prioritize, he deemed the maintenance of public order in the Independent State
of Croatia to be of lesser import to Italian prestige than it was in the annexed
territories.359 Likewise, he wanted to avoid a repeat of events from the previous winter,
where isolated garrisons had been cut off and besieged by Partisan forces, damaging
Italian prestige.360
From the point of view of Italian commanders in 1942, prestige relied on military
successes and body counts. However, the forces available to them were ill-equipped to
obtain these results. The Italian Second Army was a poor military formation, in which the
shortcomings of the Regio Esercito as a whole — characterized by obsolete equipment,
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inadequate training, and unprepared officers — were exacerbated by the logistical
difficulties and low priority of asymmetrical warfare in the Balkans.361 Second Army was
made up mostly of frontline infantry divisions that had been denuded of much of their
supporting equipment. For example, the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division retained its
organic artillery but lost much of its motor transport, mules, and ammunition, especially
for its machineguns, mortars, and artillery.362 Manpower and material shortages within
the Italian divisions worsened as the war dragged on. These problems were not unique to
the Italians. The bulk of German forces sent to Yugoslavia in 1941 and 1942 comprised
substandard and under-armed infantry divisions raised from older recruits intended only
for occupation duty.363
Mobilization for total war ensured that, as in Ethiopia, the vast majority of
officers in Second Army were reservists whose level of competence varied greatly. After
the war, Armellini claimed that only twenty of the five hundred officers in his XVIII
Corps were professionals.364 By necessity, reserve officers often wound up in charge of
platoons and companies, units critical to low-level counterinsurgency operations.365
General Pivano lamented that the junior officers of his Cacciatori delle Alpi Division,
while enthusiastic, lacked professionalism. He considered few of his company
commanders up to their tasks and feared that there were not enough career non-
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commissioned officers to assist them.366 Indeed, following the loss of fifty-four men by
his garrison at Zavala in December 1941, Pivano lambasted his officers for their tactical
ineptitude. Defensively, they placed their machineguns in seemingly random positions
and were slow to react to enemy attacks. Offensively, they tended to launch operations
with vague objectives, relying on inadequate forces that became so widely scattered that
guerrilla forces were able to attack and capture isolated groups.367 Italian commands tried
to prepare junior officers for greater responsibility and initiative by leaving them
“complete freedom in execution” of basic tasks, such as patrols and guard duty.368 This
was hardly a suitable substitute for proper tactical instruction. The Italian high command
would blame the embarrassingly rapid collapse of the battalion-strength garrison at
Prozor — well-fortified and reinforced with tanks and artillery — in February 1943
primarily on the incompetence of its commander, a reserve captain that lacked the trust of
his subordinates and did not know how to coordinate such a large mixed force in
combat.369
In 1941, Italian soldiers and officers arrived in the theatre without any specialized
training for guerrilla warfare. Like the rest of the Regio Esercito, Second Army units
received the SMRE’s new guidelines for training in June 1941. Developed by Roatta,
they were intended first and foremost for frontline operations, with particular emphasis
on anti-tank exercises. But the new regulations also focused on squad- and platoon-level
tactics and sought to inculcate energy and initiative in squad leaders, characteristics that
were applicable to counterinsurgency.370 With the outbreak of revolt and Second Army’s
reoccupation of Croatian territory in September, Ambrosio urged commanders to provide
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additional small-unit training to their troops. Envisioning small-scale warfare conducted
by patrols against weak guerrilla bands, Ambrosio wanted his troops to function as lightly
armed, well-trained squads capable of operating alone under the command of noncommissioned officers, ready to “oppose slyness with slyness.” On the other hand,
Ambrosio precluded any notion of hunting down rebels in unfavourable terrain: “in such
cases there is nothing else to do other than cut their lines of supply and wait until hunger
and hardship make them come out.”371 Dalmazzo rephrased and relayed Ambrosio’s
instructions to his own men. However, he complained that many of his officers had failed
to assimilate the army leadership’s new emphasis on manoeuvre over frontal attacks.372
In October, Ambrosio issued more aggressive instructions. He now encouraged
his men to “take the reins, acting offensively, leaving the road,” regardless of who
initiated combat. He instructed squad leaders not to close up and form a base of fire when
encountering the enemy, but rather to spread out and try to encircle their opponents.
Although Ambrosio referred explicitly to the need to adopt “hunter tactics” [tattica del
cacciatore], this should not be confused with “hunter group tactics” that eschewed
encirclement as a panacea and favoured swift and direct attacks by fast-moving
combined-arms formations. Despite his heightened emphasis on small-unit tactics,
Ambrosio’s ideal operation was the large-scale rastrellamento aimed at encircling and
destroying entire enemy formations. Ambrosio instructed corps and division commanders
to plan operations carefully and with the greatest possible concentration of forces,
preferring that they amass their units for single operations rather than disperse them for
actions in multiple sectors simultaneously.373 Ambrosio thus envisioned something
similar to what characterized combat in Amhara during 1937–39: a constant cycle of
operations, one after another, focusing on individual regions one at a time.
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In practice, most Italian rastrellamenti in 1941 were relatively small affairs
authorized by division or garrison commanders in response to the activity of “rebel
raiders” or intelligence on their whereabouts. By November, Italian commands were
conducting these operations on a daily basis.374 Operations undertaken by the Sassari
Division in November and December 1941 involved reinforced battalions operating in
company-sized columns converging over tens of kilometres upon a shared objective in a
timeframe of four or five days. The troops were lightly armed — with rifles, light
machineguns, hand grenades, and sometimes with mortars — but they carried extra
ammunition, rations, and rain gear that slowed them down in the mountainous terrain.
These operations rarely resulted in sustained combat. More often, they concluded
anticlimactically with the detainment and interrogation of suspect civilians, arms
searches, anti-communist lectures, and warnings to the local populations that they would
be held responsible for further hostile acts.375 A lack of speed and mobility hampered
Italian infantry in these early operations. Monticelli had his units train for mountain
movement and warfare by combing the hills around Knin every day.376 Based on the
experience of the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division — which, despite its name, was not
equipped with mountain gear — Pivano encouraged his commanders to travel lightly and
allocate realistic objectives to be pursued ruthlessly, if necessary using local civilians to
carry supplies, “whether they like it or not.”377
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Commanding officers never were fully satisfied with the level of efficiency of
their troops. They repeatedly emphasised the need to improve the preparation of
companies, platoons, squads, and individuals, and bemoaned “numerous incidents” of
friendly fire that stemmed from lack of training.378 Fire discipline was a major concern.
Units tended to overreact to Partisan harassment, firing profusely at unseen targets,
giving away their position and strength, and sometimes leaving themselves dangerously
low on ammunition.379 Partisan successes emphasized the need for additional training for
truck-borne defence and combat.380 Dalmazzo was concerned that his units did not
institute effective security measures on the march. In one egregious example, an Italian
column lost ninety-two men in an ambush because it failed to deploy flankers or
sufficient scouts.381 Other incidents prompted orders from Ambrosio and Dalmazzo at the
end of 1941 to reduce operational activity in order to avoid costly ambushes, giving some
truth to German criticism of “the passiveness of the Italians.”382 While Roatta’s 3C
circular is best known for the repressive measures it sanctioned, the majority of the
document in fact was made up of technical details meant to address these tactical
shortcomings. It included sections on garrison defence, march security, traffic control,
guard duty, and convoy escort.383 Burgwyn has argued that Roatta’s circular was in part a
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response to German critique.384 Like most formations of the Regio Esercito, Second
Army relied upon “on-the-job training.”385 The difficulty was that many units, fully
employed in garrison and escort duty as well as construction and roadwork, had only
limited time even for this.386
Partisan successes in the winter of 1941–42 brought the army’s methods and
tactics under greater scrutiny from civilian authorities and observers. In Slovenia,
Grazioli and Italian business leaders criticized the army’s “garrison mentality” and
“passive attitude,” arguing that the XI Corps should adopt guerrilla-style techniques of its
own, leaving the roads to hunt down insurgents in the woods. Robotti brusquely rejected
these suggestions as dilettantish, which indeed they were in their details. Nonetheless, the
proposal to adopt something other than rastrellamento tactics based on the encirclement
and total destruction of Partisan formations had merit. In a meeting with civil authorities
from Slovenia and Dalmatia, Ugo Cavallero explained more clearly the rationale behind
the army’s aversion to adopting hunter group tactics. It was impossible to fight guerrillas
with their own techniques, he contended, because “one will never manage to eliminate
the difference between soldier and rebel” — soldiers sought combat, whereas guerrillas
chose to avoid it. Cavallero assured Grazioli that the problem was not Second Army’s
tactics but its lack of armoured vehicles.387
With plenty of encouragement from the Comando Supremo in Rome, Italian army
and corps commanders in Yugoslavia reinforced their faith in conventional means to
combat insurgency in 1942. The problem with rastrellamenti operations in the autumn
and winter of 1941, they concluded, was that they were not large enough and they were
not properly coordinated. Operations to relieve stranded Italian and Croatian garrisons in
the first months of 1942 provided a model for what was to come: multiple columns of

384

Burgwyn, “General Roatta’s War,” 317.

385

Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 145.

386

“Rapporto situazione,” 28 December 1941, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 514, DS 22nd “Cacciatori delle Alpi”
Division, November–December 1941, allegati.
387

Eugenio Gualdi to Amedeo Giannini, 12 May 1942, NARA T-821/402/0021–26. “Esposto dell’ing.
Gualdi all’Eccellenza Giannini,” 9 June 1942, NARA T-821/402/0018. “Sintesi della riunione tenuta
dall’Eccellenza il capo di Stato Maggiore Generale il 14 maggio 1942,” VCSMG, 3:471–72.

523

infantry, supported by all the artillery and aircraft available in an area, converged on one
spot in an effort to prevent Partisan forces from escaping.388 Roatta’s 3C circular of
March 1942 effectively launched the cycle of grand operations that Ambrosio had
recommended the previous fall. These began in April with Operation Trio and continued
into November, employing multiple infantry divisions at a time. Divisions not involved in
major operations still devoted much of their activity to medium-scale rastrellamenti. All
these operations displayed similar features: futile efforts to encircle and destroy enemy
formations; a reliance on heavy weaponry to demonstrate Italian strength and avoid
Italian casualties; and, the targeted destruction of civilian property and resources.
Anti-partisan operations of 1942 demonstrated the army’s intensified obsession
with encirclement in order to achieve a Cannae-like victory of annihilation over the
Communist Partisans. Despite the political motivations and intrigue behind Operation
Trio in April and May 1942, it is clear that Roatta desperately wanted to destroy the
Partisan formations that made up the Foča Republic. The tone of Roatta’s telegrams to
his commanders reveals his urgency to “immediately close the bag” on the Partisans.389
However, the objectives given to individual formations often proved unrealistic. The
progress of the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division was slowed by difficult terrain and weather
conditions, as well as by road blocks and effective rear-guard actions by the Partisans.
Pivano’s main column comprised seven battalions with supporting artillery and
engineers, but he still lacked enough men to scour the areas envisioned in his operational
plans. Heavy resistance compelled him to leave three battalions to guard communications
lines and advance on a narrower front, eliminating any possibility of trapping large
numbers of Partisans. The column lost 20 dead, 43 wounded, and 48 missing, most of
them in a single ambush. His men only captured fifteen insurgents, of which ten were
immediately shot; but Pivano claimed that the Partisans left “quite a few dead on the
ground.”390
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A second column of four under-strength infantry battalions suffered far fewer
casualties but proved a logistical embarrassment for the Italians. Lacking enough troops
to secure its own supply line, the column was laden with extra materiel, including fifteen
days rations, 20,000 litres of water, bridge-building equipment, and a field hospital.391
Because the zone of operations lacked natural sources of water, the column left behind
most of its pack animals in favour of motor transport. However, there were not enough
vehicles to move all the supplies at once; trucks made double-trips that slowed the
column down even further. The advance proceeded along the road, with Italian infantry
fanning out along a 1.5 km front to avoid an ambush. The partisans vacated the zone two
days ahead of the column. High command then ordered Pivano to redirect his forces to a
new objective, which could be reached only by mule paths. This prompted yet another
delay of several days as Pivano’s units switched back to animal transport. By the time
this was completed, the operation had been cancelled.392 The experience of the Cacciatori
delle Alpi Division in Operation Trio demonstrates the difficulties inherent to large-scale
rastrellamenti conducted by conventional forces with artillery and baggage trains in
mountainous terrain.
From mid-July, the same division — now under the command of Vittorio
Ruggero — was employed in the XI Corps’s grand operations in Slovenia. Since the
Partisans here operated in small dispersed units, Ruggero advocated innovative tactics
very different from those employed in Operation Trio. In contrast to Cavallero’s early
statements on the matter, Ruggero argued that to defeat these guerrillas “it is necessary
that we fight their type of war with their methods.” He agreed that the chief objective of
anti-partisan operations must be the capture and destruction of insurgents, which had so
often eluded Italian forces in the past: “I do not want to receive messages of the sort, ‘our
immediate response put the enemy to flight. Losses not ascertained’ which is the same as
saying: ‘the enemy suffered no losses’.” However, he suggested that the best way to
engage and destroy enemy forces was through ambush and surprise. He told column
391
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commanders to change direction frequently on the march and to lay ambushes for
Partisans who tried to return to an area following a rastrellamento.393 According to
Casanuova, Ruggero’s change in approach made his officers feel “a bit like Sherlock
Holmes in uniform, [...] we had to use more intelligence than force.”394 Nonetheless,
Ruggero’s operational orders for rastrellamenti conducted by his division still were based
on the dubious objective of encircling an area and preventing Partisans from escaping.395
Ultimately, Ruggero had little opportunity to employ his new tactics because
army and corps commands envisioned operations in Slovenia to take place along lines
similar to those in Croatia. Although the Slovene Liberation Front generally had not
organized into large combat units, Roatta’s instructions for the operations emphasized the
destruction of large Partisan formations as their principal objective. He reasoned that this
was the surest way to demoralize smaller bands and discredit the Liberation Front in the
eyes of the population.396 Conduct of the operations was entrusted to the commander of
the XI Corps, Mario Robotti, who provided his divisions with meticulously planned
itineraries and instructed them to avoid smaller improvised operations.397
It was clear from the outset that the Italians lacked the element of surprise. The
Partisans had been forewarned by the influx of Italian forces into Slovenia and they had
plans in place to disperse and evade capture when the Italian offensive began.398 The
difficulties encountered by the Cacciatori in eastern Bosnia resurfaced immediately in the
mountainous and heavily forested Slovenian countryside. Ruggero estimated that to
properly cover an area of 4 to 5 km, Italian troops needed to traverse 15 to 20 km. He
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asked Robotti for more time to complete his objectives.399 Operations in July failed to
trap the bulk of Partisan forces, which fled to the Kočevski Rog forest. Again, Robotti
hoped to encircle the area with the Cacciatori and Granatieri divisions and comb it with
converging troop movements which he carefully plotted out in advance in order to
capture “all, I say all, the rebel forces.”400 Again, most of the Partisans managed to melt
away, only to return to the area after Italian forces had left. Robotti ordered the Cacciatori
Division back to the forest in September with orders to “FIND THEM, FLUSH THEM
OUT ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE AND HIT THEM, HIT THEM OFTEN.”401
Despite his obvious frustration, Robotti did not choose to alter his tactics. His directives
for the last major operations in October and November echoed those from July: “Pursue,
engage, and destroy rebel formations [...] with the rapid action of several concurrent and
converging columns.”402 The task remained to “exterminate them all.”403 As Amedeo
Osti Guerrazzi has noted, Robotti’s increasing frustration during the operations —
magnified by pressure for results from Roatta, Ambrosio, Cavallero, and Mussolini —
was paralleled by the increasingly harsh “tone” of his orders on the treatment of local
populations.404 The Italian obsession with body counts and the chimera of total victory
created an atmosphere that favoured violence over restraint. As we have seen, within this
context repressive measures against the general civilian population became radicalized.
Large-scale anti-partisan operations certainly were the most total in their
application of force. However, the same basic criteria and techniques also applied to
399
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more localized or improvised rastrellamenti in 1942. In October, the Sassari Division
employed much of its forces in a combing operation southeast of Knin. As in the larger
operations organized by corps commanders, the division aimed to “destroy the partisans
and clear up the political situation of the villages” in the area. Multiple columns
conducted a “concentric march combing the zone” assigned to them “without finding a
trace of the enemy.”405
Italian operations of 1942, big and small, made use of conventional heavy
weaponry to the greatest extent possible. Experience demonstrated that Italian columns
burdened with artillery lost much of the mobility they needed to successfully carry out
their enveloping manoeuvres. Even mule-borne pack artillery proved too slow in mobile
operations.406 Often, heavy weapons were “only of moral effect.”407 However, their moral
value was precisely why Italian commanders relied upon them to such an extent. Already
in 1941, Dalmazzo had told his division commanders to employ a preponderance of force
in every occupation. Even if seemingly “excessive,” he felt that the demonstration of
Italian “decisiveness and strength” and of the army’s “abilities in the exploitation of our
means” had an important moral effect on insurgents and civilian populations.408 Roatta’s
3C circular advocated the “massive” use of artillery and aerial bombardment, “even
against normally disproportionate objectives,” in order to exploit the enemy’s supposed
“moral vulnerability.” Roatta based his assumptions upon precepts from “colonial
warfare, in which it is advisable to give the enemy the clear and immediate feeling of our
overwhelming superiority, and of the relentlessness of our reaction.”409 The Italian
405
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army’s use of heavy weaponry in Yugoslavia largely paralleled its methods from
Ethiopia. Roatta even considered the use of aggressive chemicals justified against an
illegitimate guerrilla enemy, but he was unwilling to set a precedent by employing lethal
gas in a broader war involving great powers that also had large stocks of chemical
weapons. Unlike in Ethiopia, Roatta also voiced humanitarian concern for the civilian
populations that could be exposed to gas.410
The Italian army deployed a limited number of armoured vehicles to Yugoslavia.
These included the same three-tonne tankettes that had served in East Africa and which
Casanuova described as “broken down field kitchens.”411 Second Army also deployed
the newer six-tonne model L6/40 light tank and Fiat armoured cars. Their main role was
to patrol communications lines and provide escort for supply convoys. During an
ambush, light tanks would move up and down the column to prevent insurgents from
approaching disabled vehicles and seizing weapons.412 Second Army also modified light
trucks with the addition of armoured plate, machineguns, and flamethrowers to bolster
the defensive capability of its convoys.413 The grand operations of 1942 saw greater
emphasis on the use of armour offensively. During Operation Trio, the Cacciatori delle
Alpi and Taurinense Divisions both were assigned companies of light tanks.414 For his
operations in Slovenia, Robotti had an independent tank company, a section of selfpropelled guns, three armoured car platoons, and a company of light tanks equipped with
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flamethrowers that could be parceled out accordingly.415 The usefulness of the
flamethrower tankettes available to Second Army was limited by the two-wheeled fuel
trailer that some models had to tow behind them. In its own operations, the VI Corps
found these vehicles too slow and unwieldy for use in rugged terrain.416 Rather than
accompanying Italian columns into the mountains, armour often remained in the valleys
to bolster blocking forces in rastrellamenti.417
Italian aviation suffered its own limitations in Yugoslavia, but remained a
significant component of the army’s counterinsurgency strategy primarily for its moral
effect. The aircraft available to Supersloda suffered from “precarious conditions of
personnel and materiel.”418 The Italians had only a handful of obsolete reconnaissance
planes and Br.20 bombers in the theatre, and it has been argued that aviation played less
of a role in the Balkans than it did in Ethiopia. The number of sorties flown was relatively
low and the pilots lacked training for the geographic conditions of the region.419
Nonetheless, commanders like Furio Monticelli considered air power one of Italy’s
greatest assets in counterinsurgency because of its terror value: “Aviation is a nightmare
for the populations [...] in fact, if on a day of good weather a couple of aircraft could
bomb and machinegun a few areas designated by this command, the moral results would
be enormous.”420 Italian commanders favoured air power as a means to carry out reprisals
against otherwise inaccessible locales.421 During operations, aircraft bombed villages and
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dropped propaganda.422 After operations, with Italian manpower reduced in number and
exhausted, commanders used aviation as an unsatisfactory replacement for mobile forces.
They hoped that the bombing and strafing of “the most dangerous localities” would
prevent the “reconstruction” of Partisan organization and force populations to “return
under our protection,” recognizing that “future life” depended upon Italian protection.423
To ensure the safety of Italian pilots, bombing typically was conducted from high
altitude; however, this was not very accurate and gave any Partisans in the area time to
flee.424 The most likely result of a bombing run was the destruction of civilian property
and infrastructure.
The weapon that Italian commanders relied on most heavily for its moral and
practical effect was artillery. Although Rome could not meet all of Second Army’s
requests for additional mortars — whose relative mobility and high angle of fire was
particularly useful in mountain warfare — Italian garrisons, mobile columns, and
armoured trains generally were well-endowed with mortars, howitzers, and guns of
various calibre.425 In preparation for operations in Slovenia, Roatta and Robotti advised
the use of artillery en masse to boost Italian morale and to “terrorize both the partisan
formations and the elements more or less conniving with them.”426 The operations
commenced with hour-long bombardments using heavy 149 mm and 152 mm guns.
Italian intelligence did not know the precise positions of the Partisans or their
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headquarters, so the artillery targeted villages that were considered “totally supporting or
strongly favourable” towards the insurgents.427 Army chaplain Pietro Brignoli confirmed
that civilian women and children were killed in these barrages.428
As in Ethiopia, Italian commanders displayed scant regard for collateral damage
caused by artillery fire. They did not hesitate to fire on inhabited villages, especially in
the course of anti-partisan operations. During a rastrellamento conducted by battalions of
the Sassari Division north of Bosansko Grahovo in April 1942, the accompanying
batteries hammered any villages they approached with artillery fire before the infantry
arrived: “in this way the operations are conducted without any loss on our part.” On one
occasion, while a battery of 100/17 howitzers laid fire on a village where “communists”
had been spotted, “a delegation from the town rushed up to the command of one of our
nearby battalions with a white flag asking that we stop firing” since the Partisans had
fled. Alongside the desire to limit their own casualties, Italian commanders in this case
considered collateral damage acceptable because it took place in territory they considered
hostile and whose populations therefore were subject to all the repressive measures laid
out in the 3C circular. During the operation, villages that were not destroyed by artillery
were burned to the ground since “they had gone over to the enemy.”429 Using the same
rationale, officers of the XVIII Corps shrugged off Croatian protests over civilian deaths.
While admitting that Italian artillery fire “produced many victims,” Italian officers argued
that the presence of Partisans in an area justified these casualties.430 Conversely,
Casanuova recalled that the commander of his regiment’s mortar company preferred to
direct a few shots around the outskirts of a village “in order to gently announce our
arrival without harming the remaining population.”431
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Artillery was seen as a way to make up for Italian weaknesses and demonstrate
that Second Army still had destructive power. By 1942, the Partisans often enjoyed parity
with Italian formations in terms of small arms and machineguns. Because garrison
defence relied heavily on machineguns, Second Army lacked sufficient automatic
weapons to support its mobile formations in offensive operations. Many of the army’s
machineguns were obsolete and unreliable models from the Great War.432 Like aviation,
artillery offered Italian commanders a way to project power without risking their own
troops. During the winters of 1942 and 1943, garrisons disrupted Partisan movements and
conducted “reprisals” against nearby villages and dwellings with artillery salvoes fired
from the safety of their own fortifications.433 These practices displayed none of the
concern for counterproductive excesses that Italian commanders sometimes voiced in
their directives.
As in Ethiopia, the use of heavy weapons with significant destructive power and
limited accuracy made collateral damage inevitable, especially when combined with an
attitude that civilian populations and infrastructure in hostile territory were legitimate
targets. Robotti’s orders for the eleventh set of operations in Slovenia aimed at “not only
the encapsulation and annihilation of the rebels, still hidden in the area, but, especially,
the destruction of their supporters and reserves so as to render life impossible to
formations that would later try to return to the region to reorganize.”434 During the
withdrawal of garrisons from Zone III, Armellini adopted a scorched-earth policy on
allied Croatian soil. He ordered his men to remove or destroy everything of value, leaving
only a “void” to the Partisans. Factories in Drvar were systematically dismantled and
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several dozen tonnes of scrap metal sent back to Italy as war booty.435 Later operations in
the Velebit Mountains intended to reduce the Croatian hinterland north of the Dalmatian
border to a wasteland where nothing could survive. As part of this strategy, Italian
aircraft machine-gunned livestock in the hills.436 Armellini proudly announced that if
“rebel losses were serious, even more serious was the destruction carried out [by the
troops]: villages, resources, wells, etc.”437
While capable of tremendous destruction, the Italian Second Army never was a
particularly effective fighting machine. It suffered from subpar armament and leadership.
Its officers and men received little specialized training in guerrilla warfare. Even when
Robotti instituted a series of lectures for officers and non-commissioned officers of his
XI Corps towards the end of 1942, the topics covered were very basic — repeating many
of the precepts from the 3C circular — and the reading materials to accompany the
lectures largely were irrelevant to counterinsurgency.438 Circumstances prevented the
commanders of Second Army from implementing fully their vision for deployment and
operations. Nonetheless, 1942 marked the apogee of the Italian army’s strength in
Yugoslavia, with relatively fresh manpower and under the fewest political and military
constraints. The grand operations of 1942 demonstrate how Italian commanders preferred
to conduct counterinsurgency given relative freedom to do so. These operations closely
paralleled the colonial “police operations” that had characterized the middle phase of
counterinsurgency in Ethiopia, especially in their reliance on heavy weapons and
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rastrellamenti that, combined with harsh reprisal policies, targeted civilian populations
and property as much as the insurgents themselves.

Irregular Forces
The Italian army’s use of locally recruited auxiliary forces in Yugoslavia also
demonstrated strong parallels with colonial practice in Ethiopia. It has been argued that
generals with colonial experience especially leaned towards a pro-Četnik policy.439 This
certainly was the case with Pirzio Biroli in Montenegro. However, it is worth bearing in
mind that Italian generals in Ethiopia had mixed feelings about irregular soldiers, which
they often deemed militarily ineffective and politically unreliable. Armellini advocated
disbanding irregular units in Amhara in 1939, but in 1942 he defended Second Army’s
alliances with “Četnik organizations” as “extremely useful in the struggle against
communism.”440 The army’s eventual reliance on irregular bands in Yugoslavia primarily
came as a response to local circumstances, which in many respects did parallel those
encountered in East Africa.
We have already seen that the development of irregular forces within Second
Army originated in occupied Croatia, primarily for political motives of expansion. By the
middle of 1942, these motives had been trumped by military necessity. Italian forces in
Yugoslavia were short on manpower and they lacked any equivalents to the colonial
askari troops that could function as specialized counterguerrilla units. Given the army’s
reluctance or inability to train its regular divisions for unconventional warfare, and its
poor relationship with the Croatian armed forces and Ustaša militia, Italian commanders
turned to local Serb auxiliaries as a less-than-satisfactory substitute.441 During the first
half of 1942, low-level negotiations and arrangements with individual Četnik bands
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transformed itself into policy.442 By June, the VI and XVIII Corps were subsidizing,
training, and arming irregular bands to help garrison territory that was to be abandoned as
part of the army’s efforts to consolidate its manpower for mobile operations. Italian
commands employed auxiliary forces offensively as well, launching rastrellamento
operations “conducted only by Četniks” with Italian artillery support.443
Over the summer, irregular territorial battalions and mobile formations gained
official sanction under the auspices of Supersloda’s Milizia Volontaria Anticomunista
[MVAC], which became integral to the army’s strategy in Croatia.444 Armellini
envisioned filling the “void” left by his Velebit operations with the deployment of
“Četnik” bands.445 As the XVIII Corps sought to conserve its manpower for additional
grand operations, Armellini’s successor ordered division and garrison commanders to
avoid autonomous operations. At the same time, Spigo placed no restrictions on the use
of MVAC forces, instead urging commanders to lean on them as much as possible.446
Thus, irregular bands took over much of the work previously conducted in small-scale
patrols and rastrellamenti at the lower level. While Italian infantry remained on alert in
their garrisons, MVAC columns — reinforced with Italian artillery, mortars, and
machinegun platoons — combed the surrounding countryside.447 By autumn, the XVIII
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Corps employed 5,100 Orthodox Serbs in its MVAC formations. The VI Corps
incorporated another 6,000 or 7,000 “Četniks” as anti-Communist militia.448
By that point, MVAC organizations had extended to the annexed territories as
well. In Dalmatia, “anti-communist bands” were recruited by the Governorate but
controlled, equipped, and supplied by army divisions.449 In Slovenia, where there was not
a large pool of Serb recruits to draw from, the XI Corps proceeded cautiously with its use
of irregular forces. In April, Slovene Catholic political leaders had approached Italian
authorities with an offer for military collaboration in return for greater administrative
autonomy in Slovenia. The Italians rejected any political concessions, so clericalist forces
clandestinely established their own bands that cooperated on an ad hoc basis with Italian
units during operations in the summer. Roatta sought to take advantage of this situation
by meeting with the Bishop of Ljubljana, Gregorij Rožman. The bishop’s “very
favorable” reaction has been described as a decisive turning point for Slovene
collaborationism.450
Even so, Robotti remained wary. Collaborationist Catholic groups still desired
greater political autonomy or independence, as well as an end to mass operations,
Fascistization, and Italianization. Robotti continued to reject concessions as harmful to
Italian sovereignty and prestige. Instead, he demanded collaboration on his own terms,
more consistent with the relationship between a “beaten people” and a “victorious”
one.451 Robotti warned Rožman to stop “fiddling around with political conditions”
[premesse programmatiche] and accept military collaboration solely on the basis of anticommunism. His written appeals to the bishop and the Slovene population emphasized
the horrors of the Communist programme and the violent atrocities committed by the
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Liberation Front.452 This propaganda and, more likely, economic factors helped the XI
Corps recruit 4,500 members for its MVAC by the end of the year.453 The subsequent
“Slovenization” of the army’s repression policy — which unleashed a chaotic year of
sectarian violence between Partisans and anti-Communists in the province — was a
response to the exhaustion, demoralization, and reduced manpower within Italian
formations.454 As in Croatia, it was hoped that Slovene MVAC bands would police areas
lightly garrisoned by Italian troops and act as vanguards or flankers in Italian operations,
constituting “the elite in the struggle against the partisan.” Italian commands still did not
trust these formations to operate en masse, preferring to keep them in company-sized
units more than a day’s march from each other.455
Lingering doubts over the loyalty of MVAC bands led Robotti intentionally to
restrict the military effectiveness of his militia units. He favoured heterogeneous units —
made up of multiple political and ethnic groups — to avoid “excessive harmony”
[affiatamento] within auxiliary formations. He armed his militia primarily with captured
French rifles and machineguns, for which parts and ammunition — limited to thirty
rounds per man — were difficult to come by. As well as ensuring that any weapons that
fell into enemy hands were of limited use, this practice was intended to keep MVAC
formations reliant upon Italian commands.456 The XVIII Corps adopted similar measures
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in occupied Croatia.457 Given that Italian commands expected MVAC forces to perform a
wide variety of tasks and to operate independently, the level of armament for these
formations was inadequate. The Partisans quickly learned to target MVAC formations,
inflicting heavy losses. A series of defeats in November led to “dejection” among
Slovene auxiliaries, precisely because they found themselves outgunned. This forced
Robotti and his successor, Gambara, to revise earlier limitations on the armament of
MVAC units.458 The Sassari Division’s MVAC office in Croatia echoed these sentiments,
arguing that the poor armament granted to auxiliaries reflected negatively on the prestige
of “a great army like ours.” Noting that its MVAC formations often had to abandon their
positions due to lack of ammunition, the office asked to establish magazines for MVAC
forces and to dole out more automatic weapons.459 The lack of armaments and the
growing, largely accurate, conviction that Italian commands assigned the most difficult
assignments to the militia contributed to poor morale within MVAC formations in
Croatia and Slovenia.460
Poor discipline made the bands prone to committing excesses. In Slovenia,
Gambara noted the tendency of MVAC personnel to operate “pro domo sua” as the
province descended into civil war.461 In January 1943 he disbanded a unit of auxiliary
“secret police” that had gained a reputation for harsh behaviour and had provoked public
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protests in Ljubljana.462 Greater excesses were committed by MVAC formations and
allied Serb bands in Croatia, where indiscipline was combined with ethnic conflict and a
desire to avenge Ustaša massacres. Many Četnik leaders shared what has been described
as a genocidal ideology. Marko Attila Hoare has argued that Bosnian Četniks consciously
took advantage of Italian protection to cleanse territories of Catholics and Muslims — by
extermination, expulsion, or assimilation — in the name of Great Serb imperialism. The
Italian army, he contends, effectively “aided and abetted” Četnik mass violence, further
alienating non-Serbs from the Italian administration.463
The Great Serb nationalism espoused by their Četnik allies was no secret to
Italian generals. Less clear is the extent to which Italian officers appreciated the
ideological roots of Četnik violence. Long before the establishment of the MVAC, they
were well aware of the tendency of Četnik bands to commit excesses against Croats and
Muslims.464 After the withdrawal of his troops from Foča at the end of 1941, Pivano
learned that Četniks had occupied the town and murdered hundreds of Muslims. These
events repeated themselves the following summer.465 By spring 1942, the Sassari
Division had established a close working relationship with Momčilo Đujić, one of the
principle Četnik leaders in western Bosnia. Monticelli knew that Đujić’s men issued
threats and conducted reprisals of their own against civilian populations but, in the midst
of anti-partisan operations, he was not overly concerned about it. The band left a swathe
of destruction in its wake during a series of operations in April.466 Even after Đujić’s
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band was formally incorporated into the MVAC, the Sassari Division reported that
individual members tended to “wander about plundering,” but this was dismissed as
reflecting their bandit-like “nature,” made evident by the tendency of rival bands to raid
each other’s territory.467 More revealing were statements by Serb leaders voicing their
intentions to “raze Croatian towns to the ground.”468
There is little evidence that Italian commands actively encouraged internecine
ethnic violence between Serbs and Croats.469 However, Italian propaganda geared
towards Serb populations came close to doing so, at least indirectly. Leaflets distributed
by the Sassari Division in August 1942 reminded Serbs of “what happened in this land in
the not distant summer of 1941” and criticized the Communists for seeking “the brotherly
union of Serbs and Croats.”470 The Italians appealed for collaboration in forming local
anti-Communist militias, since “only the Italians with the help of the Četniks have
brought you peace, tranquility and work.”471 By directly praising the “Četniks,” the
Sassari Division effectively endorsed the Četnik movement and Serb nationalism.
Without making explicit promises, another leaflet spoke of national revival under Italian
tutelage.472 The objective of these leaflets was to promote collaboration and dissuade
civilians from supporting the Partisans, not to foment ethnic violence. However, by using
Serb nationalism and anti-Croat sentiment to counter Communist propaganda and keep
the population divided, Italian propagandists exploited ethnic conflict. The particular
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arguments employed here reflected the themes used in Četnik propaganda, which had
proved successful in eastern Bosnia earlier that year.473
Italian commands largely excused the excesses committed by their MVAC
detachments. Responding to protests from Croatian authorities, Berardi claimed that it
was absurd “to expect the rigid observance of legality in a country subject to so much
disorder and full guerrilla warfare.”474 He further justified Četnik behaviour on the basis
that Partisan agents intentionally provoked violence between Serbs and Croats.475 Facing
pressure from Zagreb, Roatta initially claimed to have little knowledge of Četnik
violence against Croat civilians. When he later admitted that excesses were a problem, he
promised to instruct Četnik leaders not to undertake “anti-Croatian actions” and to
implement tougher punishments for perpetrators.476 However, up to the end of the
occupation, Italian commanders continued to defend their MVAC forces against Croatian
charges, citing a lack of evidence or blaming Partisans for masquerading as Četniks.477
The army’s ability to rein in the behaviour of its irregular formations was limited
by the lack of control it exercised over them. The MVAC units remained under the
command of local leaders, who were far more successful at recruiting followers than the
Italians were.478 Recruits and leaders often served on their own terms. Even in the mobile
bands, few wanted to stray far from their communities, which they sought to protect.479
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Đujić continued to refer to his formation as the “Četnik Dinara Division” that had been
organized in January 1942. He conducted his own operations and sometimes refused to
follow Italian direction.480 The Italians provided the bands with former Yugoslavian army
officers and non-commissioned officers to improve their professionalism, but soon
complained that these men were prone to drinking or gambling and often proved
incompetent. Replacing them with Italian officers was deemed impracticable, given the
“insurmountable difficulties” posed by language and culture.” Each formation was
supposed to have two Italian liaison officers, but a lack of personnel ensured that some
bands were not directly supervised at all.481 The same problems manifested themselves in
Slovenia.482 Although Zanussi later claimed that the main task of Italian liaison officers
in MVAC units was to “guide them towards more humanitarian behaviour,” their main
role was not to enforce discipline but to assist the organization and training of bands for
improved tactical control during joint operations with Italian units.483 While Berardi
lamented looting and violence committed by his irregulars against Croats, generally he
was content to leave discipline in the hands of their Serb leaders.484
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In Croatia, both MVAC and independent Četnik bands operated with almost
complete autonomy.485 This was a tactical and strategic preference of Italian commands.
Early experience suggested that irregular bands were best employed on their own or in
peripheral roles, “because it is impossible to coordinate actions of certain importance
with them.”486 Army and corps commanders hoped that the MVAC formations would
solve their problems providing garrisons in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the end of 1942,
the VI Corps relied on a combination of MVAC formations and independent Četnik or
Montenegrin bands to control Herzegovina without Italian oversight. Meanwhile, the
XVIII Corps had abandoned Croatian territory in favour of “forming a defensive wall
around annexed Dalmatia: in front of it either friendly populations with respective units
loyal to us, but that fight alone, or the enemy.”487 In these circumstances, which placed
vast zones in the hands of Četnik bands, Second Army could not realistically expect to
exercise control over its irregular forces.
As we have seen, Italian reprisal policy begat excesses. By tasking their
unsupervised MVAC formations with carrying out reprisals, Italian commands
effectively encouraged excesses. Prior to the establishment of the MVAC, units of the
Sassari Division on more than one occasion turned over captured Partisans or suspect
civilians to the Četniks for execution.488 When possible, Italian commanders opted to
spare their own troops the grisly work of conducting reprisals by offloading the task to
irregular forces. Two weeks into the destructive Velebit operations, the Sassari Division
ordered its troops to “abstain from carrying out burnings and destruction, tasks that have
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been given exclusively to the M.V.A.P. [Milizia Volontaria Antipartigiana].”489 Roatta
assured Croatian officials that he could avoid Četnik excesses by keeping his bands busy
in operations.490 But, since Italian commands permitted harsh measures against
populations during operations, this hardly proved the case. During a major anti-partisan
operation in October 1942, the VI Corps reported that its MVAC forces committed “some
excesses.” They burned 30 homes and killed 18 people in one village, prompting 3,000
Catholics to flee the surrounding area. While General Santovito promised a court martial
for the leaders of these “raiders,” he excused the wholesale destruction of other villages
as justified because his MVAC formations had encountered armed resistance.
Presumably to prove the even-handedness of his auxiliaries, Santovito added that, of the
56 villagers killed in another village, 13 had been Orthodox.491
Despite directives that prohibited unjustified and disproportionate reprisals by
MVAC units, operations conducted by the VI and XVIII Corps the following month
similarly were plagued by excesses and a lack of Italian control.492 During the entire
series of operations, the VI Corps recorded 681 Partisans killed and 337 firearms
captured at a cost of 192 MVAC casualties. The participating Italian units recorded not a
single casualty. This reflects that the irregular troops bore the brunt of combat alone in
the mountains while the heavier Italian columns remained stationary in Prozor and
Mostar. Given that real combat against organized Partisan formations clearly had taken
place, and that the region was deemed “entirely Partisan — as demonstrated by the
writings and posters found in every house,” Santovito considered the reprisals conducted
by his MVAC forces justified. These included the executions of “inhabitants that showed
signs of connivance with the Partisans.” Santovito also condoned the murder of a
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Croatian soldier and two women as a “natural reaction” to having come under fire and as
the unavoidable result of the “primitive and emotional character of the troops.”493
Santovito suggested that future “mishaps” could be avoided by disciplinary
measures including reductions to rations, arrest, and physical beatings [bastonatura].494
While reliance upon irregular forces was not necessarily a trait of Italian colonial warfare
doctrine, Italian commanders certainly treated their local auxiliaries as racially inferior
colonial subjects. Zanussi attributed the ineffectiveness of his Četnik collaborators to a
“Balkan” tendency to deceive oneself as to one’s own abilities and importance.495
Combined with the desire to avoid Italian casualties, this racist mindset made the militia
expendable in the eyes of Italian generals. Warning his subordinates of the possibility of
Partisans masquerading as Četniks in order to approach and surprise Italian positions,
Berardi insisted that it was “better to kill a Četnik by accident than to lose an Italian
soldier.”496
There are obvious similarities between the Italian army’s reliance and use of
irregular forces in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia. In neither case did Italian commanders
initially envision employing auxiliary formations to such a large degree. Their
development was a response to successful insurgency and their main military purpose
was to bolster the army’s insufficient manpower while limiting Italian casualties. As a
result, Italian commands assigned irregular formations with operational tasks that their
own colonial doctrine and experience had warned against. Predictably, the bands proved
unreliable and ill-equipped for the objectives assigned to them. The army expected
irregular formations to operate independently, but was reluctant and probably unable to
provide its bands with the arms necessary to make them self-sufficient. The Italians also
lacked the means or desire to supervise directly all irregular formations. Italian generals
largely accepted the excessive looting and violence committed by these units as the cost
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for their support. From the Italian perspective, the violence of the bands was consistent
with the military and cultural characteristics of the occupied territories and with the
army’s terror-based approach to counterinsurgency.

De-escalation and Defeat
The evolution of Second Army’s counterinsurgency strategy culminated in its ambitious
cycle of grand operations in 1942. This was the year in which Italian commanders were
best able to act as they wished, under the fewest military and political constraints. For the
better part of the year, Italian commanders stubbornly clung to their approach, despite the
failure of terror and mobile forces to achieve their objectives neither against potent
Partisan formations in Croatia nor against agile guerrilla bands in Slovenia. By the end of
1942, the Italian army in Yugoslavia had shot its bolt. Reverses on other fronts forced
Supersloda to release some of its forces and effectively “wait for the end of the war.”497
As had occurred towards the end of the Italian occupation in Ethiopia, failed operations,
exhausted troops, and dwindling manpower reserves compelled Italian commands to deescalate their repression policy to a limited and inconsistent degree without
demonstrating a wholesale shift in mentality.
While destructive for the civilian populations and occasionally for the insurgents,
the grand operations of 1942 failed to achieve their main objectives of annihilating all
Partisan formations and decapitating their leadership. Recognition of this failure
prompted the military leadership to re-evaluate its tactics in counterinsurgency, but only
partially. At the end of October 1942, Army Chief of Staff Vittorio Ambrosio issued to
Italian commands in every theatre a sixty-four-page circular that amounted to a generic
manual on counterinsurgency.498
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On the whole, the manual was not particularly remarkable. It paid lip service to
the political aspect of counterinsurgency, but devoted only a single page to propaganda
and economic activity while confirming that displays of force through radical repressive
measures remained “fundamental” [basilare] to military occupations.499 It emphasized
the need for basic training in the same small-unit tactics that Italian commanders had
found wanting since 1941, although it now added that rifle squads should receive
additional training on how to burn buildings.500 A call for hunter group tactics was the
chief innovation of Ambrosio’s circular. The best “antidote” to small groups of guerrillas,
it prescribed, was the use of “special units” — formed on a temporary basis from welltrained regular troops or locally recruited militia — which themselves employed guerrilla
methods.501. However, the classic rastrellamento — aiming at the “annihilation” of
guerrilla formations through “double envelopment,” and involving hostage-taking and
reprisals as routine aspects of a mobile column’s itinerary — remained the centrepiece of
operations against more “numerous and sizeable bands.”502 The manual reflected the
equivocal and varied approach to counterinsurgency adopted by Italian commands in
Yugoslavia after 1942.
Overall, the Italian military leadership was less enthusiastic about grand
operations at the end of 1942 than it had been at the beginning of the year. Lack of results
in the first half of a joint operation between the VI and XVIII Corps in western Bosnia
and Herzegovina prompted field commanders, who doubted that their forces could hold
the reconquered territories through the winter, to suggest calling off the second phase.
Under German pressure to secure the bauxite mines around Mostar, the Comando
Supremo insisted that the operation proceed as planned.503 Like the Italians, the Germans

499
500
501
502
503

Combattimenti episodici ed azioni di guerriglia, 28.
Combattimenti episodici ed azioni di guerriglia, 62–64.
Combattimenti episodici ed azioni di guerriglia, 9–10, 27.
Combattimenti episodici ed azioni di guerriglia, 51–54.

“Sintesi degli argomenti trattati nella riunione del pomeriggio 12 ottobre a Spalato,” 14 October 1942;
Spigo to Roatta, 19 October 1942; and, “Rapporto tenuto nei giorni 27 e 28 ottobre 1942-XX in Sebenico ai
comandati il VI e XVIII Corpo d’Armata,” 28 October 1942, AUSSME, N1–11, b. 1222, DS Second
Army, October–November 1942, allegati.

548

had largely rejected the use of hunter groups themselves and relied on terror and largescale encirclement operations in 1942. In 1943, they sent reinforcements to Croatia and
planned another big push to defeat Tito before the Allies could land troops in
southeastern Europe.504 When the Germans suggested further joint operations in 1943,
Cavallero and Roatta provided a lukewarm response, agreeing that they likely would
prove fruitless. Part of this reluctance was due to Italian concerns over the extension of
German political influence in their sphere of interest, but it also demonstrated that Second
Army was at the end of its tether in terms of manpower and combat efficiency.505
Nonetheless, the Italian command contributed three divisions to Operation Weiss
between January and March 1943. Despite their flagging enthusiasm, Italian commanders
expected the operations to be conducted with “firm harshness,” conforming to German
guidelines on behaviour towards the local populations.506 Roatta ordered all adult males
found in operation zones shot “on the spot.” As Burgwyn notes, this in fact marked the
most radical point of Second Army’s language on repression. No longer pretending that
the victims of executions were genuine insurgents, Roatta had fully “embraced the notion
of collective guilt and random punishment that left individual responsibility totally out of
the equation of justice.”507 During the operation, the Italians accused their allies of not
being rigorous enough when sieving through civilians in “liberated” territory, leaving
many Partisans at large.508 Although the Germans claimed to have killed 12,000
Partisans, Operation Weiss was a failure from the Italian perspective. It succeeded only to
push Partisan forces deeper into Italian zones, placing Italian garrisons and auxiliary
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Četnik forces in difficulty, and upsetting Second Army’s plans for redeployment. 509 In
particular, the manpower and materiel lost when Tito’s forces overran Italian garrisons in
the Neretva river valley was a major blow to the army’s prestige and confidence.510
Unimpressed with Italian participation in Weiss, the Germans did not even bother to
inform their allies of plans to launch another major operation, Schwarz, in Herzegovina
and Montenegro later in May.511
Despite their worsening position, Italian commanders in Croatia and Dalmatia
tried to maintain their heavy-handed approach to combating local insurgents. While
Spigo admitted that “reprisals against the families and property of partisans always
provoke ill feeling,” he remained convinced that, “at the same time, they produce a
period of calm.”512 As late as March 1943, Spigo still envisioned counterinsurgency in
colonial terms. Quoting directly from the year-old 3C circular, he insisted that
the fight that we are conducting is not a duel in which we have to compare arms
with those of the enemy, nor is it an ordinary form of war in which the means
employed are — in the interests of economy — proportionate to the size of the
targets.
But it is instead comparable to colonial warfare, in which it is advisable to give
the opponent a clear and immediate sensation of our superiority, and of the
inexorability of our reaction.
Spigo continued to advocate “colonial style” movements by powerful mobile columns
that “strike fear into the enemy.”513 The problem was that his reduced divisions rarely
were able to form columns strong enough to guarantee their own security. The result was
inactivity at the lower level. In mid-April, Spigo conceded that the trend of the Partisans
to organize into “divisions” that conducted “true tactics of war” necessitated a more
passive approach. He no longer expected his garrisons “to conduct operations that, being
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made with too meagre forces either do not achieve any results or cause us painful
losses.”514 Doubting that his forces were strong enough to hold a defensive perimeter
around Dalmatia and aware that no reinforcements were forthcoming, Spigo proposed
reducing his zone of occupation to two fortified “beachheads” around the cities of Zara,
Split, and Šibenik.515
While reducing the activity of its garrisons, the XVIII Corps continued to
participate in large operations that shared the features of those from the previous year. In
July 1943, fifteen battalions of the VI and XVIII Corps, reinforced by two Croatian and
one German battalion, launched a series of operations against Partisans in the Biokovo
Mountains. In their first phase, Italian commands claimed to have killed 310 Partisans
and wounded another 111 in combat, while conducting 14 executions and interning 900
people, at the cost of 12 Italians killed and 6 wounded. During July and August, Second
Army’s body counts totalled 2,414 enemy dead, revealing that the army’s heightened
passivity towards the end of the occupation did not entail a total de-escalation of
repression.516 Croatian authorities continued to accuse Italian troops and MVAC
personnel of excessive burning and looting. Italian commands continued to justify the
destruction as the result of legitimate reprisals that conformed to the 3C circular.517
Italian activity in Dalmatia and Croatia in 1943 thus displayed significant continuity with
Second Army’s approach and behaviour from 1942.
Conversely, in Slovenia the XI Corps made more concerted efforts to shift
towards a population-centric approach, reverting to its old policy of covering the land
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with garrisons while avoiding large-scale operations.518 By the end of his grand
operations in 1942, even Robotti concluded that the enemy-centric approach was unlikely
to bear fruit against the small but efficient Slovene Partisan movement: “Converging
actions, pincer movements, rapid thrusts (the rebels are always quicker than us, on their
terrain), combing operations, have systematically rendered the same inadequate
results.”519 Robotti suggested a new focus on positive measures of attraction. These
involved expanding the MVAC and subsidizing loyal populations, initiating make-work
projects in garrison towns, gradually releasing internees, and intensifying anti-communist
propaganda.520 Robotti’s conversion had its limits. He voiced doubts that the vast
network of garrisons necessary to carry out these positive measures was practicable.
Moreover, he instructed division commanders not to hesitate “to burn towns where the
population expresses its solidarity morally and materially with the rebels.”521 Robotti
replaced Roatta at the head of Supersloda in January 1943; the implementation of a new
strategy in Slovenia was left to the XI Corps’s new commander, Gastone Gambara.522
Gambara enthusiastically supported the policy of expanding garrison activity in
Slovenia. By January, the XI Corps had 167 garrisons — some numbering no more than
60 men — dispersed throughout Slovenia. Gambara instructed garrisons to keep ninety
percent of their strength mobile to respond to Partisan threats, patrol the surrounding
countryside, and temporarily occupy smaller centres. In theory, this enabled Italian forces
to maintain a presence throughout the province while restricting the Partisans to the
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forests where, it was hoped, they would eventually run out of supplies and choose to
surrender.523 In fact, during the winter, small Italian garrisons again came under attack,
and in some cases were destroyed, by Partisan forces. Gambara blamed the defeats on the
timidity of his garrison commanders, who lacked initiative and failed to come to each
other’s aid. He claimed that he would rather see reckless actions that resulted in serious,
“but heroic,” consequences than excessive caution.524 Gambara’s determination to make
his system work was not shared by all his subordinates. Ruggero — who commanding
the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division had proposed several tactical innovations the previous
spring — warned Gambara against relying on very young junior officers left to fend for
themselves in isolated garrisons. The entire strength of his division, he complained,
effectively was confined to garrisons that lacked the strength to undertake forays into the
countryside or support neighbouring garrisons that came under attack. The situation grew
more difficult as the XI Corps surrendered additional forces for the defence of Italy,
thereby multiplying the responsibilities of its remaining units.525 By June, a frustrated XI
Corps once again was preparing for a major summer offensive that would see its
divisions abandon their garrisons to traverse the Slovenian countryside in search of
Partisans. Once again, the objective was “to not give any respite to the enemy and to try
to annihilate him definitively.”526
Alongside questions of tactics and deployment, the army’s treatment of insurgents
also fluctuated during this period. Whereas Italian commanders previously rejected “any
negotiations” with Partisan leaders that offered prisoner exchanges, Partisan successes
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forced them to reconsider this approach.527 The Sassari Division, which had previously
shot hostages to convince Partisans to release Italian captives, exchanged several
prisoners with enemy bands in December 1942.528 When Partisans overwhelmed a
battalion of the Murge Division on the Neretva River, capturing 286 Italian personnel, the
VI Corps agreed to provide three days rations for the prisoners and it forwarded Partisan
requests for prisoner exchanges to Supersloda.529 The Germans themselves had
exchanged prisoners with Partisans under similar circumstances. As Partisan strength
increased, a number of senior German officers advocated granting Partisans status as
combatants.530 Robotti finally reined in executions of “rebels that surrendered themselves
outside of combat.” He now permitted Partisan deserters to join the MVAC instead of
being interned.531 In March 1943, Robotti appeared to give negotiations official sanction,
ordering commands to stop shooting captured Partisans so that they could instead be
exchanged for Italian prisoners. However, these orders were rescinded in May.532 Robotti
and Gambara chastised the commander of the Lombardia Division for treating Slovene
Partisans with a “reciprocity that is completely in contrast with higher directives not to
grant partisan bands rights as combatants.” They ordered the division to end its
negotiations and reiterated that “all rebels captured in Slovenia must be shot.”533
The army’s policies in 1943 can best be described as oscillating and incoherent.
Italian commanders adopted different approaches month by month and region by region.
This resulted from a sense of desperation and futility combined with a stubborn
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attachment to the idea of empire. Despite the threat of an Allied landing in Italy and the
dwindling strength of Italian forces in the Balkans, Italian generals did not consider
abandoning the annexed provinces to Partisan, Nazi, or Ustaša control. Military
circumstances compelled Italian commanders to change their approach, but they proved
reluctant to renounce the methods they had gravitated towards in 1942. With their
inefficient forces now exhausted and depleted, Second Army’s leadership floundered
vainly in search of methods that could stanch the Partisan tide without risking their
remaining manpower.
Italian reports from the last months of the occupation indicate that nearly every
aspect of the army’s counterinsurgency policy had failed. Corps commands unanimously
agreed that the fall of Fascism at the end of July had negative repercussions in their
zones. In Dalmatia, the XVIII Corps reported that
After the fall of Fascism (that has brought particular joy to everyone, because they
see it as the collapse of Italy) and reprisal actions, which struck the masses and
not the individual, relations between the troops and the population have been
worsening day by day. In every Italian the population sees an occupier, an
oppressor and not a bearer of civilization [civiltà] and well-being. All these antiItalian sentiments are skillfully exploited by various parties, but, in particular by
the communists.534
In Slovenia, the XI Corps found that “the masses remain as restless as ever towards our
political dominion and eager to escape it by any means.”535 In Croatia, the V Corps
suffered the scorn of Ustaša authorities, who continued to accuse MVAC personnel of
committing excesses. Even the army’s Četnik allies appeared to favour the prospect of an
Allied victory and the reconstruction of Yugoslavia. The civilian populations appreciated
Italian assistance to refugees and destitute families, but the local economy was paralysed
and the supply of food was irregular and insufficient.536 Only the underlying fear that an
Italian withdrawal would be replaced with something worse helped to maintain the
semblance of order in the Italian zones. All commands reported a resurgence of Partisan

534

“Relazione di c. propaganda dal 25luglio al 25 agosto,” 27 August 1943, NARA T-821/289/0028–31.

535

“Situazione politico-militare (relazione),” 31 July 1943, NARA T-821/31/0249.

536

“Relazione mensile,” 28 August 1943, NARA T-821/287/0381–85.

555

activity and the exodus of local youth to join the insurgents. Partisans increasingly
targeted Italian garrisons with attacks and propaganda, aiming to seize Italian arms.537
To the end, Italian commands considered the Communist Partisans to be
illegitimate and detested enemies. Thus, following the armistice of 8 September, Italian
forces in the Balkans were caught “between two fires.” Second Army had been given no
forewarning from Rome; most of its units learned about the armistice on the radio. Italian
commanders received confusing orders to “react immediately and energetically against
any armed violence by the German army or by the population [...] but to give German
commands advance notice of intended operations.”538 Demonstrating a combination of
fanaticism and absurdity, Robotti was dismayed that his troops greeted so joyfully “an
armistice that frustrated all our hopes of victory.”539 German forces immediately entered
the Italian zones and proceeded to disarm the Italian army. The disoriented Italian
commands disintegrated in a matter of days. Despite individual efforts to resist and the
flight of many soldiers to the mountains, the majority of Italian personnel surrendered
themselves to the Germans and were sent to labour camps in the Third Reich. Only
further south in Montenegro, where the delayed arrival of German forces provided time
to make decisions, did Italian commands offer coordinated resistance. Even then, alliance
with the Partisans came as a last resort and was rejected by many officers. Those who
remained to fight the Germans as part of the “Garibaldi” Division did so in complete
subordination to Tito’s command.540 Italy’s occupation of Yugoslavia was over.

Second Army developed its counterinsurgency policies and practices during 1941–42
gradually, responding to political circumstances and the characteristics of resistance that
it faced. Given the lack of direct intervention from Rome, the contradictions in Italian
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policy, and the critical role of local conditions on the army’s behaviour, Italian decisionmaking in Yugoslavia can appear entirely passive, following a logic that was “more
defensive than offensive” and lacked any ideological component.541 However, much of
the nuance in Italian policy stemmed from or conformed to the Fascist regime’s imperial
objectives in the region. Elements of a hearts-and-minds approach — including the
recognition of an independent Croatia, political concessions in Slovenia, a neutral attitude
towards religion, and the provision of food and welfare to local populations — reflected
the regime’s desire to reduce the military cost of occupation while differentiating its
Imperial Community from the Nazi New Order. The army’s expectation that its
reoccupation of Croatian territory in 1941 would proceed bloodlessly thanks to the
goodwill of local Serb populations was consistent with these broader objectives.
In fact, the relatively benign attitude of the Italians in the early months of the
occupation was not so unique. In Serbia, the German army itself adopted an easy-going
stance through June 1941, dispersing its troops among small garrisons, developing
propaganda newspapers, limiting requisitioning, and importing food for the populations.
These policies were the result of the German army’s concern for troop discipline, Hitler’s
purely strategic interests in the region, a Nazi racial hierarchy that considered South Slavs
superior to those in the east, and the lack of active guerrilla resistance until July. German
violence and reprisal activity escalated after the outbreak of revolt, peaking with major
operations at the end of 1941.542 The timeline was different for the Italian Second Army.
Not until autumn did Italian generals perceive that they confronted a major uprising
directed against Italian occupation forces. By then, a swift and harsh response akin to that
employed by the Germans in Serbia was no longer possible because Italian troops were
immobilized by winter conditions in mountainous territory. Italian military violence did
not peak until spring and summer 1942, when climatic and logistical conditions permitted
Second Army to launch major anti-partisan operations.
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These operations targeted civilians as much as combatants. The Italian army was
less prescriptive than the Wehrmacht in its formulation and application of quotas for
reprisals, which in Serbia the Germans had only been able to meet by shooting Jews.
However, Italian generals displayed a similar institutional logic with a proclivity towards
the use of terror and disproportionate force, reflecting the methods of counterinsurgency
employed in Ethiopia. Their reprisal policies — based on the destruction of property,
summary executions, and mass internment — aimed to separate populations from
insurgents through terror. Statistics from Slovenia indicate the arbitrary character of the
army’s repressive activity. While Italian authorities carried out 51 executions as the result
of courts martial proceedings, another 146 Slovenes were shot as hostages and at least
1,569 were shot without formal judgment, not including those reportedly killed in
combat.543 Tens of thousands more were interned. This targeting of civilians was justified
and reinforced by racist assumptions about their Balkan mentality and affinity for
communism. The army’s propaganda sought to spread fear of Italian military might along
with reverence for Italy’s superior level of civilization. Military operations sought the
encirclement and annihilation of Partisan formations using a combination of conventional
means and light irregular forces, both of which multiplied the level of violence and
devastation in Italian rastrellamenti.
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Conclusion
During the last months of the Fascist empire, Italian generals struggled in vain against the
pressure of circumstances. Indeed, this pressure had always exerted itself to greater or
lesser extent on the Italian military occupations in East Africa and the Balkans. In both
case studies examined here, the influence of local conditions on Italian decision-making
was powerful, and often decisive. This is to be expected in any colonial or military
occupation of large diverse territories. The pressure of circumstances becomes even
greater when uncontrolled insurgency is added to political chaos. The anarchic
environment he encountered in Croatia and Slovenia in 1942 led Mario Casanuova to
liken the campaign in Yugoslavia to a film Western.1 Given the disorder, fratricidal
violence, racism, and reliance on firepower that characterized both occupations, the
analogy to the Wild West is appropriate. Chaotic circumstances resulted in nuanced and
varied responses from Italian military authorities in different geographic locations and at
different levels in the chain of command.
The relatively benign occupation of Harar stands out as an example where
individual personalities and unique political and topographic circumstances produced
behaviour that contrasted markedly with that of Italian authorities in other zones of
Ethiopia, especially war-torn Amhara. For three years, Guglielmo Nasi governed Harar
according to a well-formulated programme based on previous experience that recognized
the value of attracting locals through wide-ranging political means. Italian success in
Harar, permitting the appointment of a civilian as governor in 1939, has been credited to
Nasi’s benevolent approach.2 But, Nasi also benefitted from a number of fortuitous local
and political circumstances. The population largely comprised previously marginalized
ethnic and religious groups whose legal status did not worsen, and in some respects
improved, under Italian rule. Mussolini’s pro-Muslim and anti-Amhara declarations —
both of which primarily served purposes of international propaganda — enabled Nasi to
1
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take full advantage of these characteristics and adopt a tolerant attitude in Harar.
Militarily, Nasi was helped by terrain that was somewhat less hospitable for guerrillas
than in the Amhara region, and by good communications lines in the north along the
Djibouti–Addis Ababa railroad. Even in this case, the success of the Italian occupation
was limited by failures elsewhere and by the structural weaknesses of the Fascist regime.
Schemes for the economic exploitation and colonization of Harar fared little better than
elsewhere.
The Italian-occupied area of Yugoslavia was made up almost entirely of wooded
mountainous terrain that favoured guerrilla activity. Nonetheless, political circumstances
led to great variation in policy and behaviour across sectors and unit commands. The
direct annexation of Slovenia and Dalmatia by Italy and the creation of an Independent
State of Croatia under the unpopular and murderous Ustaša regime had profound
implications on the subsequent occupation and insurgency. The Italians encountered the
most consistently hostile public opinion in the annexed territories but faced the largest
insurgent formations in Croatia. Italian military authorities had different objectives,
responsibilities, and levels of autonomy depending upon which zone they operated in.
The Italian army arguably was most violent in Slovenia, annexed territory where Italian
prestige was at stake and where military authorities enjoyed a great deal of control over
the repression of a particularly frustrating guerrilla opponent.
In Croatia, the civil war between Ustaše, Četniks, and Partisans complicated
matters for Second Army politically and militarily. While Italian generals were
consistently anti-Partisan, the level of cooperation of division and corps commands with
Croatian authorities and Četnik leaders varied by region and changed over time. Whereas
the Sassari Division enthusiastically embraced a policy of attraction towards Serbs from
the beginning of the occupation, the Cacciatori delle Alpi Division’s initial experience
with hostile Četniks made its command more cautious in this regard. The Sassari
Division’s pro-Serb orientation resulted in relatively moderate behaviour towards the
largely Serb population of its sector through 1941, while neighbouring divisions grew
more violent. The division shifted towards a harsher approach to repression because of
orders from above but also as a response to increasing casualties suffered in Communist
Partisan attacks. After this shift, the Sassari Division terrorized some Serb villages while
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continuing to spearhead efforts to collaborate militarily with Serb bands from other areas.
This too reflected variations within the division’s sector of occupation, which included
hotbeds of Communist and Četnik activity that sometimes reflected pre-existing regional
rivalries — the examples of Partisan Drvar and pro-Četnik Bosansko Grahovo are cases
in point.3
Inconsistency and variation in behaviour was not unique to the Italian armed
forces. Studies of German conduct in occupied eastern and southeastern Europe have
emphasized the nuanced application of policy at the middle level. Individual units and
commanders interpreted and applied policy in different ways. While most German
commanders reflected the Nazi reliance on terror as a means to cow local populations,
others recognized the good sense of adopting a balanced approach to occupation policy.4
As in the German case, it is important to acknowledge and account for variation in order
to fully understand Italian behaviour. Personal proclivities undoubtedly had an impact on
policy — the replacement of Graziani, Cavallero, and Mezzetti with the likes of Amedeo
di Savoia, Nasi, and Frusci accompanied a real change in approach to repression in
Ethiopia; likewise, the character of occupation in Slovenia shifted after Robotti’s
replacement with Gambara. However, the present study has emphasized the considerable
degree of consistency and continuity in the Italian approach to occupation, especially at
the middle level. Nasi and the Duke of Aosta struggled to transform the attitudes of their
subordinates in Ethiopia. In Yugoslavia, the turning point in repression usually attributed
to Roatta in fact built upon precedent set by Ambrosio. The sacking of Armellini and his
replacement with Spigo brought virtually no change to civil-military relations or
counterinsurgency strategy in Dalmatia. At the helm of the Sassari and Cacciatori delle
Alpi divisions, Berardi and Ruggero inherited the command staffs of their predecessors,
Monticelli and Pivano, and generally built upon their policies. While the Sassari Division
behaved somewhat leniently through 1941, by the second year of the occupation its
policies had conformed to those of neighbouring divisions.
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The broad consistency among Italian commands in attitudes and approaches
towards occupation and counterinsurgency reflected institutionally conditioned responses
to similar sets of perceived circumstances. This study has explored the relationship
between the Regio Esercito and Fascist imperialism in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia through
three levels of analysis: political-legal; ideological-cultural; and, military-strategic. At
each level, the objective has been to distinguish between patterns of behaviour or
mentality on one hand and ad hoc responses to contingent circumstances on the other. It
is now possible to summarize the conditions confronted by Italian commands on
occupation duty in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, as well as the decisions, behaviour, and
preferences of Italian senior officers through each of these three lenses.

The Politics of the Italian Army
Political conditions imposed by Mussolini’s Fascist regime had a crucial impact on the
nature of occupation in both Ethiopia and Yugoslavia. Both occupations were the result
of imperial conquests driven by Fascism’s inclination towards open-ended expansionism,
its drive to obtain global leadership status by establishing a “third Rome,” and its
domestic pursuit of cultural revolution via war and dominion. However, the regime’s
vision of empire — the way it expected its colonial administration and Imperial
Community to function — was defined only in general terms, leaving many of the details
up to hasty improvisation. Moreover, this vision differed markedly as it pertained to
Africa and Europe. In Ethiopia, Mussolini immediately imposed irrational and selfconsciously “fascist” policies in Ethiopia based on violent terror, racial segregation, and
super direct rule that rejected co-opting existing political structures. But after 1938 he
repudiated part of this framework as a failure, permitting functionaries in the field to
operate with greater autonomy and to employ a broader range of political means. The
result was an equivocal policy that set an ambiguous precedent for future behaviour.
Italian rule in the Balkans was not intended to duplicate the failed systems imposed in
East Africa. The regime aimed to incorporate partitioned Yugoslavia into its imperial
sphere through a combination of direct annexations to the metropole and indirect rule by
means of protectorates.
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The political organization of the two theatres of occupation thus differed
considerably, with implications for the expected roles of the Italian army and the level of
autonomy granted to military authorities on the spot. In East Africa, officers of the Regio
Esercito were seconded to the Colonial Ministry or Ministry of Italian Africa and thus
subordinated to a political command structure headed by Mussolini and administered by
Fascist ideologues like Lessona and Teruzzi. In Yugoslavia, the annexed territories of
Dalmatia and Slovenia came under direct Fascist civil administration. Although the
Province of Ljubljana initially received special status in an effort to differentiate between
the Fascist and Nazi new orders — thereby demonstrating Mussolini’s tolerance for
significant tactical deviation and variation after 1938 — civil authorities subjected the
annexed zones to policies of Fascistization and Italianization. Meanwhile, a Croatian
puppet state was established at Mussolini’s behest under the quasi-fascist rule of the
Ustaše. Second Army’s role was intended to be strictly military; its traditional command
structure remained in effect.
Neither in Ethiopia nor in Yugoslavia was the Italian officer corps the regime’s
first choice to implement Fascist policy. However, Rome’s unpreparedness and the rise of
local resistance ensured that the military played a key, often pre-eminent, role in the
politics of occupation. In Ethiopia, the lack of trained colonial personnel left political and
administrative positions at various levels in the hands of army officers. In Yugoslavia, the
inability of the Italian and Croatian civil regimes to maintain public order ensured that
military and political matters overlapped. Given these circumstances, Italian military
authorities in both theatres sought to increase their freedom of action, necessarily at the
expense of Fascist ministries and local civilian functionaries. The conflicts that arose
between civil and military authorities must be understood primarily as manifestations of
the institutional and jurisdictional rivalries so typical of colonial administration and
occupation regimes. Anti-Fascism or incompatibility with fascist principles was not the
principle motivator of these disputes, which sometimes led to crippling dysfunction
thanks to the personality traits of the individuals involved. The conflict in Dalmatia
between the genuinely dissident Armellini and the Fascist hierarch Bastianini was
fundamentally similar to that in East Africa between Graziani and Lessona, two devoted
Fascists. Both disputes hinged on jurisdictional control over forces of repression —
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Graziani objected to the formation of an autonomous Fascist police force (the PAI);
Armellini countered Bastianini’s efforts to assemble a “gubernatorial army” and conduct
an independent counterinsurgency strategy.
Italian generals at times questioned Rome’s directives or policies, but not the
overall objectives of the regime, which often were defined only vaguely and thus were
open to a degree of interpretation. Criticism and debate focused on practical rather than
ideological matters. When central policies were clearly defined, as at the beginning of the
occupation in Ethiopia, Italian commands dutifully adhered to them. Graziani complained
that Mussolini’s blanket prohibition against collaboration with indigenous elites
needlessly tied his hands and rendered nearly impossible the pacification of Amhara and
Shewa. But, in practice, Graziani pursued the policy of exclusion rigorously and, once the
uprising he predicted became a reality, he did so enthusiastically. A lack of competent
organizations and the presence of revolt compelled military governors in Ethiopia to curb
Mussolini’s colonization schemes, yet they largely conformed to Fascist racial policies,
so critical to the regime’s palingenetic aim of creating racially conscious “new men.”
In Yugoslavia, Mussolini took a much more hands-off approach without ever
defining an official line to follow in the complex dealings of local and coalition politics.
The army’s repudiation of the alliance with the Ustaše, its controversial negotiations with
the Četniks, and its protection of Jews appeared at certain points to contrast with Rome’s
intentions. In fact, the army was but one group among several that proffered policy
alternatives aimed to achieve the regime’s broad objectives in the context of what was
from the beginning an improvised and fluid political situation. While they provoked the
ire of the Axis allies, rival institutions, and some influential Fascists, the army’s policies
found support among other groups connected to the regime. Armellini and Bastianini
hated each other but agreed on the pointlessness of the Ustaša alliance. Second Army
struggled with the Foreign Ministry over its approach towards Zagreb, but the two were
in agreement on the treatment of Jews. Mussolini was kept abreast of the army’s course
of action, which he generally approved either explicitly or implicitly until German
pressure became too great in 1943.
There is little evidence that the military leadership consciously conspired to
undermine Fascist policies or objectives. Rather, the army’s decision-making represented
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improvised responses to circumstances, conditioned by short-term strategic
considerations but also by interpretations of Rome’s long-term political goals. Thus,
Robotti’s mass internment of Slovenes coupled with the regime’s policy of Italianization.
Likewise, the army’s schemes to extend its presence in Bosnia and to defend Italy’s
spazio vitale against German and Croatian pressure by courting the Serb population were
fully compatible with the regime’s open-ended expansionism and its concept that the
entire Balkan region fell within the Italian sphere of interest. The politics of the Italian
army largely reflected and conformed to the regime’s broadly defined aims and values.

The Army’s Propaganda
Corresponding to variations in the political framework of occupation in Ethiopia and
Yugoslavia, the army’s involvement in the indoctrination of junior officers and troops
with ideological and morale-boosting material differed between the two case studies. The
regime exercised rigid control over propaganda during the invasion of Ethiopia and the
months immediately following its declaration of empire. Aside from speeches and
circulars, army officers in East Africa had little role in the production of propaganda.
Conversely, the army’s propaganda activity was greatly enhanced in Yugoslavia.
Mobilizing for total war on multiple fronts, Fascist leaders recognized the need to
delegate or offload the duties of military propaganda to the armed forces themselves.
Propaganda sections at the army, corps, and division level closely monitored the
distribution of print, radio, and film propaganda to the troops. Some commands
developed content for the field newspapers that saw a resurgence at this time.
In Ethiopia, Fascist control over propaganda ensured that the message that
reached Italian troops was the same as that promoted by the regime. In Yugoslavia, the
army’s greater level of autonomy in the field of propaganda complicated matters.
Elsewhere, it has been argued that army commanders tended to appeal more to traditional
military values of esprit du corps and comradeship than to Fascism and its goals of
conquest or “civilizing mission.”5 However, the military propaganda examined here was
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largely consistent with that of the regime. While it is true that Italian generals did not
typically employ overtly Fascist rhetoric in addressing their troops, their messages
broadly reflected Fascist motifs, especially romanità and anti-communism.
Expansionistic themes based either on irredentism or concepts of an Imperial Community
were not lacking in the army’s propaganda. This consistency reflects the relatively high
degree of Fascistization among the propaganda officers attached to Second Army, but
also the existence of shared values between senior officers and the regime.
In both Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, the regime and army employed ideologically
charged themes to indoctrinate and brutalize Italian troops. The regime’s long-term
programme to transform Italians into hardened “new men” coalesced with short-term
military imperatives of maintaining fighting spirit to produce propaganda that highlighted
the Italian soldier’s role as superior conqueror while demoting insurgents and occupied
civilian populations to an inferior status. Propagandists presented the soldier’s mission
and presence in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia in imperial terms, drawing especially on the
imagery of ancient Rome. Both conflicts promised Italians greater prosperity by raising
Italy to a position of equal status with other imperial powers. Aggressive expansionism
and occupation of foreign lands were further justified by attributing Italian combatants
with positive humanitarian characteristics. In both cases, Italian propaganda claimed to
liberate formerly oppressed populations who stood to benefit from the introduction of
Latin “civilization.” Like the Roman legionary, the Italian soldier was supposed to be
both the virtuous representative of Fascist discipline or order and the ruthless practitioner
of justice against the enemies of progress.
Italian propaganda thus encouraged an attitude of patronizing sympathy for
backwards Africans and Slavs who suffered under cruel socioeconomic conditions. But,
simultaneously, the army and regime actively sought to inculcate hatred for members of
the population that took up arms against the invading or occupying forces. In Yugoslavia,
the role of communism in the Partisan movement bequeathed an extra ideological
component to the army’s propaganda, which served to further delegitimize resistance
while transforming the Italian occupation into a defensive campaign to protect Europe
from the scourge of Bolshevism. In his study of the Spanish Army of Africa, Sebastian
Balfour has noted a similar tendency to create “simple dichotomies of identity” in
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military propaganda, both in the colonial setting of the Rif War and in the Spanish Civil
War, where the army labelled diverse groups uniformly as “Communists.”6
One of the most effective ways of spreading hatred of the enemy was through
atrocity propaganda. Whether based on myth or reality, propaganda on the brutality of an
opponent — and, in the case of guerrilla insurgency, of the population that supported it
— serves to transform an army’s victims into imagined enemies, thereby legitimizing
military violence against prisoners and non-combatants.7 Italian authorities presented
their opponents in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia as barbarians or savages accustomed to
irregular and illegitimate forms of warfare that could only be countered with similarly
brutal and immoral methods. Furthermore, by attributing guerrilla resistance to racial
characteristics, Italian propagandists blurred the boundaries between insurgents and the
general population. Although Italian propaganda always maintained some distinction
between enemy combatants and civilian non-combatants, the tendency to conflate the two
groups increased as resistance became more widespread. This potentially had serious
ramifications on the behaviour of Italian troops towards local civilians. The Italian army
intentionally fostered a mental environment in which victims of Italian repression could
be constructed as enemies.

Italian Counterinsurgency Strategies
In Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, Italian generals confronted genuine resistance movements
whose strength, organization, and characteristics developed gradually in response to
occupation policies, foreign aid or events, and favourable topography. Insurgency was
better-equipped in Yugoslavia, where the Partisans tended towards semi-conventional
tactics in times of success. In both cases, Italian generals credited resistance movements
for adopting effective guerrilla techniques. In neither case was total victory over the
insurgents likely. The damage and disruption caused by early policies — the exclusion of
the rases in Ethiopia; unpopular Italian annexations and Ustaša mass violence in
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Yugoslavia — was too great. The occupied territories were too large and the terrain too
rugged. Italian resources and capabilities were too meagre.8 These factors prevented a
swift and immediate Italian military victory in either theatre. Long-term failure was the
result of Italy’s defeat in the Second World War.
The effectiveness of Italian counterinsurgency strategies is of secondary
importance to this study, to the extent that success or failure contributed to decisionmaking processes. The more important objective here is charting trends in policy
decisions and analyzing the motivations behind them and their connection to fascist
violence. Like its propaganda, the Italian army’s methods in counterinsurgency idealized
violence and expected the absolute submission of the occupied populations. As a
practical phenomenon, Italian military violence in the cases of Ethiopia and Yugoslavia
developed in different ways and at different paces. In Ethiopia, Mussolini from the outset
gave repression a distinctly Fascist character by prohibiting negotiation or clemency and
instead issuing blanket statements that all “rebels” were to be shot. Because Italian forces
quickly encountered resistance from the remnants of Ethiopia’s standing army,
Mussolini’s directives found immediate purchase. In Yugoslavia, the application of
violent forms of repression developed more gradually and in closer but disproportionate
correlation to the growth of insurgency. Although Ambrosio’s earliest directives called
for the summary execution of “francs-tireurs,” Second Army’s initial behaviour was
restrained by the complex political situation in the Independent State of Croatia and the
lack of serious resistance faced by Italian forces. Mussolini did not intervene until his
“put to the wall” statement at the end of 1941, by which time the army’s approach had
already hardened in response to heightened guerrilla activity. But the escalation in the
army’s repressive activity anticipated and was disproportionate to the actual level of
resistance it faced. Nor was this escalation the result of purely military factors; the
equation of resistance with communism helped to loosen earlier restraints on violence.
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Military violence peaked in the middle phases of both occupations: 1937–39 in
Ethiopia and 1942 in Yugoslavia. These were the stages in which Italian commanders
were the least constrained by political factors or civilian oversight, but still had the
military capacity to take the initiative and adopt strategies of their choosing. Given this
freedom to follow institutional doctrine, Italian officers — with some exceptions —
gravitated towards policies based on terror. These included the widespread use of
summary executions of captured insurgents and their supposed accomplices, hostagetaking, internment, and the confiscation or destruction of property. The army’s
uncompromising treatment of “rebels” was behind most of its excesses, because it was
difficult to differentiate between genuine insurgents, partisan helpers, and innocent
bystanders. Although justified by the Roman model of severe but fair justice, Italian
punishment did not always appear fair. Instead, violence often was collective, arbitrary,
and undignified. The majority of victims labelled “rebels” or “communists” almost
certainly were non-combatants, targeted because they belonged to social groups whose
political loyalties were suspect or held accountable for the alleged actions, or unexplained
absence, of family members and neighbours. Although Italian generals paid lip service to
the danger of counterproductive excesses, their directives provided loopholes to justify
most lower-level activity, they rarely punished subordinates for criminal behaviour
against prisoners or local civilians, and the tone of their orders favoured harshness over
mildness. There is little indication that Italian commanders were greatly concerned about
establishing proof of individual guilt. Collective reprisals were meant primarily to
terrorize populations into submission. Terror became the principal element of Italian
counterinsurgency strategy.
Terror not only guided Italian policies of repression, it fuelled the army’s tactical
use of force as well as the propaganda that it directed towards the occupied populations.
Italian operational plans typically relied on unrealistic encircling movements by large
powerful formations. These rastrellamenti frequently involved frustrated officers and
troops sifting through unarmed inhabitants in operational areas, subject to the full rigour
of martial law. Italian generals sought to exploit the technological advantage they
enjoyed over their enemies not only to crush the opponent in battle but to impress civilian
populations of the army’s destructive power. Commanders made liberal use of artillery,
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air power, and — well into the occupation of Ethiopia — chemical weapons, displaying
scant regard for their inaccuracy and tendency to inflict collateral damage. Indeed, they
targeted villages and civilian infrastructure with the expressed purpose of spreading fear.
The use of heavy weapons was meant to convince the occupied populations of the futility
of resistance against a great power like Fascist Italy. This also was the primary aim of
Italian propaganda, based on countering rumours of Italian weakness and threatening the
further application of force. In both Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, the centrality of terror to
the army’s strategy was justified by the intelligence gathered and interpreted by Italian
commands. While intelligence staff appreciated the complex nature of local affairs, their
overall interpretation of resistance reflected the same racial characterizations that
suffused Italian propaganda. Initially anticipating that the populations would welcome
Italian troops as liberators and civilizers, commands interpreted resistance as a sign of
racial or cultural backwardness and concluded that supposedly primitive African and
Balkan populations — increasingly considered uniformly hostile and in league with the
insurgents — only appreciated force.
Although they lacked the same level of “ideological blinkers” that often prevented
their German allies from recognizing the importance of securing hearts and minds, Italian
generals did not display a strong inclination towards a population-centric approach to
counterinsurgency.9 The limited political means employed by Italian occupying
authorities conformed to the basic framework provided by Mussolini and Fascist
ideology. The regime’s desire to present the new Rome as an ably governed secular and
inclusive empire fostered an emphasis on religious freedom and the provision of welfare.
Here, Italian military commands followed the lead of civil authorities. However, the
army’s own strategy of deployment undermined the depth and success of these policies.
The army could not guarantee protection or distribute welfare to populations that it had
no contact with. While in both occupations military commanders initially dispersed their
forces throughout numerous garrisons in the interest of political penetration, they quickly
responded to resistance by withdrawing troops from small or isolated locales and
consolidating their forces for mobile operations in which terror predominated. Military
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principles of concentration and the desire to avoid casualties trumped the political
benefits of maintaining boots on the ground.
Italian officers generally were willing to negotiate with local leaders to obtain
cooperation and ease the burden of occupation, so long as that cooperation came on
Italian terms. In Ethiopia, this option was for some time rejected by Mussolini. In
Yugoslavia, where the regime’s concept of a European Imperial Community permitted
greater elasticity, negotiations with armed Serb bands transformed into an Italo-Četnik
alliance. If misguided, Second Army’s dealings with the Četniks represented a
willingness to adopt constructive engagement that its German allies generally lacked. 10
Neither in Ethiopia nor in Yugoslavia did Italian military authorities initially intend to
rely on irregular forces in garrisons or counterinsurgency operations. The increased use
of indigenous personnel came in response to Italian manpower shortages. Italian generals
were aware that their auxiliary personnel sometimes were driven by ethnic or tribal
rivalries, or even by ideological hatred. However, while Italian commanders complained
that their irregular forces were ineffective and undisciplined, they nonetheless permitted
them to operate without sufficient oversight in defensive and offensive roles where
uncontrolled excesses virtually were guaranteed. Irregular units became integral parts of
the Italian army’s apparatus of terror.

A Fascist Mentality?
The thesis that Italian functionaries in occupied Europe “worked towards the Duce” —
proposed by Davide Rodogno more than a decade ago — has come under criticism in two
major respects. Bosworth has countered that Italian Fascism lacked the consistency or
clarity for Kershaw’s model of “working towards the Führer” to be applicable in the
Italian context.11 Burgwyn has argued that Italian generals too frequently developed
policies that directly countered Fascist principles and were governed by pragmatic
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rationale.12 Yet, allowing for the lack of clear direction, coherent political objectives, or
ideological motivation, a strong argument can be made that the Italian case fits with
Kershaw’s concept. For Kershaw, the Third Reich was characterized by “governmental
disorder.” Policies developed haphazardly in relation to “Hitler’s known broad aims.”
Kershaw allowed for an “indirect” interpretation of “working towards the Führer,”
applicable to conservative groups like the army who functioned in pursuit of Hitler’s
goals despite the absence or secondary importance of ideological motives.13
Nor was Nazi ideology without contradictions, especially when applied in
occupied territory. As David Furber and Wendy Lower have shown, “working towards
the Führer” did not always and irrevocably result in a linear radicalization of policy. In
occupied Poland (the General Government), Nazi authorities found common ground on
the annihilation of Jews, but the civil administration and SS bickered over the treatment
of Poles. Whereas Himmler’s SS pursued a policy of Germanization that entailed ethnic
cleansing, Hans Frank’s civil administration sought to transform the General Government
into a “labor reserve” for the Reich. Although Frank’s vision contrasted with Hitler’s
demographic concept of Lebensraum, it conformed to the “colonial character” of Nazi
objectives in the east. His more pragmatic view prevailed through much of the war.14
Tactical variation, institutional squabbling, and competing ideological visions were not
unique to the Fascist system of rule in Italy and its occupied territories.
Despite the differing goals and end results of Fascist and Nazi imperialism, they
operated according to similar bureaucratic phenomena. Chaos and improvisation were the
order of the day in the occupied territories. Although the party played a less decisive or
influential role in the Italian case, the lack of clear jurisdictional boundaries between the
army, state ministries, governors, and lower-level administrators — all representing
various stages of Fascistization after more than a decade of dictatorship — created a
similar atmosphere of infighting for personal and institutional aggrandizement. None of
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these groups, including the army, consciously adopted anti-Fascist goals or policies.
Italian generals certainly did not work against the Duce.
Comparing the Italian occupations of Ethiopia and Yugoslavia through the three
lenses employed here, we can conclude that Italian senior officers largely conformed to
what effectively were Fascist objectives. Politically, they were a key part of establishing
a unique form of super direct rule and apartheid in Ethiopia, even if their participation
initially came with reservations. In Yugoslavia, where the Fascist regime could not claim
total conquest or annexation, the generals actively worked on their own initiative towards
objectives of imperial consolidation and expansion. Ideologically, they publicly portrayed
their mission in terms that echoed the key themes of Fascist propaganda, attempting to
motivate their soldiers by comparing them to the legionaries of ancient Rome. Militarily,
Italian commanders either conformed to or anticipated central directives that advocated
harshness and terror. In Yugoslavia, they adopted the greatest severity in the annexed
territories where the stakes for the regime and the Italian state were the highest.
More generically, the Italian occupations conformed in style to what Alan Kramer
has defined as “fascist warfare.” Kramer argues that fascist warfare — ushered in by
Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and taken to its extreme by Hitler’s attack on
the Soviet Union in 1941 — was truly total because it combined the technology of mass
slaughter with a racial and ideological drive towards genocide, thereby completely
eliminating the distinction between combatant and non-combatant.15 Although Fascist
Italian policies did not intentionally aim to eradicate targeted groups, they did aim to
establish a new order defined by racial hierarchies. The combination of technologically
and racially or ideologically driven mass violence can be found in both cases examined
here. This dynamic was most evident in Ethiopia, where the Fascist racial hierarchy and
Italy’s complete technological superiority — without any risk of retaliation by enemy
powers equipped with long-range bomber aircraft or large stockpiles of chemical
weapons — permitted unrestricted warfare. In Yugoslavia, too, the army worked within
an essentially racist political framework that ultimately contributed to mass violence
between Serbs and Croats, it used anti-communism to interpret and justify its mission,
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and it employed heavy weaponry against soft targets. In both cases, military policies
ultimately treated civilians as enemies, culminating in Slovenia with the mass internment
of much of the population.
There was no significant or measurable difference between Fascist and military
violence in Italian-occupied territories. In Ethiopia, where Fascist leaders advocated
radicalism, the military readily obliged. Despite episodes of uncontrolled squadrist
violence in Addis Ababa, military policies were responsible for the majority of victims in
the country. In Yugoslavia, civil and military authorities at times competed to prove their
harshness; typically, the army proved more extreme. Complaints of undisciplined
Blackshirt units — lodged, for example, by Armellini against the “Toscano” Battalion
and by Robotti against the “Nizza” — were always connected to power conflicts.16 If, as
Giacomo Scotti has argued, Fascist militia carried out atrocities more enthusiastically
than did army conscripts, this contrast did not extend to the level of commands.17 The
Italian occupations provided nothing akin to the resignation of the German Military
Commander in France, Otto von Stülpnagel, in pragmatic and principled protest of Nazi
security policy in 1942.18
Was the army’s conformity to Fascist objectives and fascist methods the result of
a consciously “fascist” mentality among Italian military authorities? To what extent did
Italian generals actively work towards the Duce out of ideological conviction? Mussolini
does not appear to have played a significant role in motivating or inspiring the army’s
decision-making. This is where the concept of “working towards the Duce” seems least
convincing, at least insofar as the Italian army is concerned. In the Nazi case, Kershaw
emphasizes Hitler’s “charismatic” role “of unifier, of activator, and of enabler.” Hitler’s
direct intervention in policy decisions rarely was necessary, but the “Hitler myth” played
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a vital symbolic purpose as motivator.19 Conservative generals like Edmund Glaise von
Horstenau were personally drawn towards Hitler in ways that are not evident in the
relationship between Italian senior officers and Mussolini.20
Whereas Hitler was central to the Wehrmacht’s propaganda, which “made a
concerted effort to associate Hitler with God,” Italian military propagandists relied less
frequently on the symbolism of the Duce to inspire their men.21 After the early defeats of
the Second World War, the regime reduced the centrality of Mussolini in its own
propaganda, which increasingly preferred to emphasize the masses and common man.22
Although the Wehrmacht’s counterinsurgency directives in southeastern Europe referred
to the need to perform “the task entrusted to us by the Führer,” Italian generals rarely
justified their actions by appealing to the will of the Duce.23 Only Robotti seems to have
had a penchant for quoting Mussolini. On more than one occasion, he repeated
Mussolini’s description of Slovene Partisans as a “communist ‘bubo’” that needed to be
eradicated.24
The findings of this study tend to reinforce the emerging historiographic
consensus that career officers of the Italian army shared much with Fascist ideology and
values, and that they willingly adopted many of the external trappings of Fascism without
necessarily identifying themselves or their institution with Fascism or Mussolini’s
regime. In mundane and symbolic ways, Italian military authorities in the occupied
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territories assimilated the customs and rituals of the Fascist Party. This included the
adoption of the appello fascista in funeral ceremonies for fallen Italian soldiers. The use
of the Fascist calendar year in roman numerals alongside Gregorian dates was standard in
internal correspondence through both campaigns. Occasionally, staff officers forgot to
change the date following the Fascist new year in October, but this was no more frequent
than the typos that followed 1 January. At least one staff typist in Second Army’s Civil
Affairs Office continued to include the Fascist date after Mussolini’s fall on 25 July
1943; this was apparently out of habit, since the typist corrected his mistake by crossing
out the roman numerals.25 Unlike in ordinary Italian society, in military staff writing the
convention of adding the Fascist date became second nature.26
There is some evidence that Italian generals considered 28 October, the date of
the Fascist March on Rome, significant. In 1942, Berardi hosted Croatian civil and
military authorities in Knin at a dinner celebrating the ventennale, the regime’s twentieth
anniversary.27 More intriguing is the ideological tone of an after-action report signed by
General Spigo, who boasted that “five-hundred dead enemies testify to the valour of the
garrison of Bos[ansko] Grahovo that — on 28 October — worthily celebrated in the field
the Ventennale of the Revolution, against blind communist rage.”28 Spigo’s report was
addressed only to Roatta’s command and it had no propagandistic motive. It suggests that
the army’s anti-communism could be connected to pride in the Fascist revolution.
The personalities examined here run the gamut from enthusiastic self-proclaimed
Fascists like Graziani to skeptical dissidents like Armellini. But the impact of political
identity on their policies or their attitudes towards higher-level directives was negligible
or complicated by the existence of other motivating factors. In their jurisdictional
disputes with Fascist authorities, both generals adopted Fascist rhetoric to bolster their
cases. Private sentiments towards Fascism did not necessarily alter an officer’s conduct
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as administrator or military commander. Although Ettore Formento — who reached the
rank of lieutenant general in the postwar army — was a subaltern of a younger generation
in occupied Ethiopia, his remarkably frank memoirs illustrate how “patriotism,
nationalism and enthusiasm” could override scorn for the “clownish and empty rhetoric”
of Mussolini, Starace, and Teruzzi: “We did not question Fascism; we were Fascists. [...]
We still believed that ‘Fascism had made Italy great’.”29 The equation of Fascism with
the Italian state and great power status proved a powerful source of allegiance. Italian
generals were perfectly amenable to concepts of racial prestige, romanità, national
rebirth, and spazio vitale; all of these terms found their way into military propaganda and
internal reports. Traditional nationalist values ensured the continued adhesion of the
officer corps to the Fascist imperial programme well into 1943. Even when facing
inevitable defeat, Italian commands unrealistically spoke of maintaining Italy’s dominant
status in its imperial territories.
Ultimately, Italian staff officers and field commanders in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia
were functionally complicit perpetrators of Fascist policy and of Mussolini’s imperial
agenda. If they often were unimpressed by the Duce’s demagogic rhetoric and resentful
of the influence of bombastic party elites, the generals nonetheless worked towards what
they interpreted to be the objectives of the Fascist regime. Their response to their mission
was less reluctant, more enthusiastic, and more active than some historians have allowed
for. They agreed with the vague but well-known long-term Fascist objectives of national
rebirth and imperial expansion. For the most part, they agreed with Fascist methods too,
especially relating to the application of violent repressive measures.

A Colonial Mentality?
To what extent did the army’s functional participation in Fascist policies and violence
stem from a distinctly “colonial” mindset? Did knowledge, experience, and attitudes
learned in Africa contribute to Italian military decision-making in Yugoslavia? Exporting
a colonial mentality from Africa to Europe was a key component of Fascism’s
revolutionary project of remaking Italians. In its imperial phase, Fascism aimed to
29
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accelerate its revolutionary process of cultural transformation and national rebirth by
inculcating Italians with a colonial consciousness. Ethiopia provided a unique “world
without moral limits” where Fascism could “impose its core beliefs of hierarchy and
absolute obedience.”30 The colonies were treated as “testing grounds” for strategies,
policies, and behaviour that could later be adopted in metropolitan Italy.31
At the same time, it must again be stressed that Mussolini did not necessarily
envision imposing colonial systems of political organization on the European territories
that made up the Roman Imperial Community. Referring to his initially liberal treatment
of the Province of Ljubljana, Mussolini told Alberto Pirelli that “it is not possible to treat
European countries like colonies.” As Mazower notes, this statement reflects the
differences between Fascist and Nazi concepts of empire and racial hierarchy. 32 It also
suggests that, although Fascist literature typically used the two terms interchangeably,
Mussolini perceived a difference between imperialism and colonialism.
Whereas imperialism can be defined broadly as the process by which one society
acquires domination over another, colonialism refers to a specific form of rule in which
the occupier transforms indigenous structures and societies according to its own needs
and interests. Some scholars argue that colonialism must involve colonization by
settlers.33 Adopting these definitions, Fascist rule in Ethiopia represented a genuine
colonial project — East Africa was intended to become a settler-colony with very limited
capacity for indigenous self-administration. However, the Fascist vision for the Balkans
was largely restricted to the exercise of political and economic hegemony over foreign
societies. Although Fascist policy assumed colonial characteristics in the annexed
territories — where the distinct citizenship status of non-Italians somewhat resembled
that of colonial subjects and where the regime envisioned “internal colonization” of what
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technically became a new metropolitan periphery — the regime’s plans in Yugoslavia
may better be defined as imperial rather than colonial.34
If the Italian army in Yugoslavia did not necessarily operate within a colonial
political or legal framework, strictly speaking, its commanders nevertheless approached
their mission with a colonial-imperial psychology that they shared with Mussolini and
Fascism. In the German case, it has been argued that “Nazi ideology transferred the
principles of social Darwinism to a European setting.”35 The Wehrmacht willingly
adopted these principles in eastern Europe thanks in part to the traditional “faith in the
sword” [Schwertglauben] of Prussian-German militarism.36 A similar, if not absolutely
equivalent, phenomenon is evident in the Italian example. To be sure, Fascist ideologues
and Italian generals maintained aspects of a Christian worldview. Monticelli’s sympathy
for persecuted Serbs — and his calls for their chivalrous protection — in 1941 were at
least partially inspired by humanitarian sentiments. Italy’s image as a protector of the
weak and source of charity became an important aspect of Fascist imperial ideology and
propaganda in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia.
Nonetheless, the language of the military reports and correspondence examined in
this study suggests that the senior officer corps of the Regio Esercito shared a social
Darwinian mentality with Mussolini. As Bruce Strang has argued, social Darwinism was
the most important element of Mussolini’s ultranationalist “mentalité.” Like Hitler,
Mussolini believed that strong nations had the natural right to conquer others. He was
obsessed with demographics and considered territorial expansion necessary to
accommodate the population growth that would ensure the nation’s long-term survival.37
Through their own efforts to expand the territory under their occupation in 1941 and 1942
— and through their reluctance to admit defeat and abandon the annexed provinces in
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1943 — Italian generals demonstrated that they too measured national strength, health,
and prestige in terms of territorial control and expansion. Their preferred means of
enforcing Italian hegemony were based on the impression of might and displays of force.
Closely connected to its Darwinism, the army’s deeply rooted racism also gave its
behaviour in Yugoslavia a colonial character. Arguments on the weakness of radical
racism in modern Italy, usually attributed to the country’s ethnic and religious
homogeneity, do not seem applicable to the Italian military leadership.38 The army’s
propaganda included examples of the various forms of racism espoused by Fascist
ideologues, from biological and mystical to national. Like Mussolini, the Italian officer
corps most commonly expressed the latter type, equating race with nation, ideally defined
by core social values such as hierarchy and discipline.39 But there is little evidence that
the army’s racism was guided directly by Fascist ideology. The language and policies of
Italian generals are replete with racist assumptions and sentiments that reflected views of
Western superiority broadly held by Italian elites as well as several decades of
institutional experience governing and combating revolt against African and Slavic
populations. As Laura Ricci has demonstrated, Fascism’s “language of empire” largely
built upon the motifs and stereotypes of nineteenth-century Italian and European
imperialism.40 Typical of imperial dynamics, imperialist practices rather than ideologies
were most decisive in transforming “vague, insubstantial race thinking” into more
malignant forms of racism that justified “limitless violence.”41
Like security forces in other Western empires, the Italian army in Ethiopia and
Yugoslavia undertook the role of establishing and preserving a new racial hierarchy. This
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was a defining characteristic of colonial violence.42 The invention and application of
martial race theories by the officer corps — evident in the army’s preference for Amhara
and Serb auxiliary bands — was typical of Western, especially British, imperialism.43
The legitimizing role of the Italian army’s “civilizing mission” also functioned in
essentially the same way as it had at the height of Western imperialism in Africa and
Asia. This included a tendency, shared by all colonial powers of the late nineteenth
century, to respond in a massively disproportionate way to resistance from supposedly
inferior natives that were expected to be grateful and obedient.44 This way of thinking
epitomizes the Italian response to the assassination attempt on Graziani in 1937 as well as
Second Army’s escalation of repression in 1942. When it became clear that Slovenes had
rejected Italian rule, Fascist Party secretary Aldo Vidussoni advocated the “need to act
like the askari and exterminate them all.”45 The XI Corps’s response fell short of that, but
the grand operations, mass round ups, and reprisals that followed resembled a similarly
disproportionate and irrational reaction to a perceived slight against the new regime.
The most direct evidence of a colonial mentality linking the Ethiopian and
Yugoslavian campaigns can be found in the Italian army’s response to resistance and the
methods of repression it employed. There were, of course, important military differences
between the conduct of each campaign. As Rochat points out, the Partisans in Yugoslavia
treated their struggle as a modern national or class war and were better organized and
equipped than their Ethiopian counterparts. Secondly, whereas in Ethiopia the askari took
the main role in combat and repression, in Yugoslavia this was left to poorly trained and
immobile Italian conscripts; the undisciplined collaborationist bands proved no substitute
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for the askari.46 As a result, Angelo Del Boca has argued that the crimes committed
directly by Italian personnel in the Balkans “certainly were greater, in number and
ferocity, than those in Libya and Ethiopia.”47 Regardless of whether mass killing was
carried out by Italian conscripts, Blackshirt volunteers, colonial troops, or local
auxiliaries, Italian commands and senior officers were responsible for the orders and
directives that guided military violence in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia.
An accurate calculation and comparison of the human cost of Italian repression in
the two theatres likely is impossible. Estimates of war-related deaths in both cases are
unreliable and vary widely. In six years of war and occupation, anywhere between
350,000 and 760,000 Ethiopians lost their lives.48 The Yugoslavian government’s initial
claim of 1.7 million total war dead has since been revised to 1 million.49 Of these, as
many as 400,000 perished in territories annexed to Italy or occupied by Italian forces. 50
However, it is not clear how many of these deaths occurred during the two and a half
years of Italian occupation, or how many were the result of violence committed
independently by Ustaša, Četnik, or Partisan forces. One study holds Italian troops
directly responsible for the deaths of 15,000 Serb civilians in the Independent State of
Croatia.51 A Slovenian inquest calculated a total of 12,807 dead in the Province of
Ljubljana.52 Quantitatively, Italian commands likely were responsible for more deaths in
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Ethiopia than in Yugoslavia. Qualitatively, military violence in Ethiopia appears to have
been more lethal, unlimited, and frenzied than in Yugoslavia, where internment was more
likely than summary execution. These differences stemmed from the more isolated
position of Ethiopia, the technical superiority enjoyed by Italian commands in that
theatre, and the assumption of Italian officers that South Slavs were racially superior and
somewhat more civilized than Ethiopian populations.
This would have been of little comfort to the European victims of Italian firing
squads in villages like Zapotok. The contrasting levels of violence in Ethiopia and
Yugoslavia reflected differences of degree rather than kind. The Italian army employed
the same tactics and modes of repression in both theatres for the same rationale.
Sometimes — but perhaps less frequently than might be expected, given the importance
and currency of the Ethiopian venture — Italian generals defined their rationale in
explicitly colonial terms, using personal or institutional experience in Africa as a point of
reference. Armellini found the political-military “environment” in Dalmatia and Croatia
“strangely similar” to that encountered in his “long colonial life.”53 In his 3C circular,
Roatta advised column commanders to adopt security measures “as in Africa” and to
employ disproportionate levels of force “comparable to colonial warfare.”54 Despite the
enhanced strength of the Yugoslavian Partisans towards the end of the Italian occupation,
Spigo reiterated Roatta’s advice well into 1943.55 As Sala has noted, these direct
references to colonial experience were reinforced with a shared vocabulary.56 Italian
propaganda and internal correspondence in Yugoslavia adopted language similar to that
used in Ethiopia. The Balkan peoples were considered “primitives” and “savages.” Those
who rejected Italian offers of “protection” in return for “submission” were labelled
“rebels,” “brigands,” or “raiders.”
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The shared language and patterns of behaviour between the two campaigns
indicates that the Italian military leadership in Yugoslavia, including officers with little or
no personal experience in Africa, assimilated colonial doctrine and adapted it to conduct
counterinsurgency in the Balkans. Ambrosio prefaced his October 1942 guidelines for
combating “guerrilla actions” by pointing out that the task “does not represent anything
new for armies that have been engaged in colonial campaigns and even less for our own,
that gained ample experience in Libya and East Africa.”57 This direct connection between
colonial and guerrilla warfare reflected Ambrosio’s conclusion that an institutional
counterinsurgency doctrine existed within the Italian army, and that techniques from the
African colonies could successfully be imported to Europe. But these techniques, like
most of the references to Africa summarized above, provided vague guidelines rather
than prescribing specific actions. The parallels in military behaviour between Ethiopia
and Yugoslavia did not reflect the conscious direct application of policies from one
context to another as much as the existence of a set of basic assumptions shared within
Italian military culture. Italian generals espoused broad concepts based partly on their
worldview and partly on learned experiences, but these doctrines took effect only “in
combination with structural factors on the spot.” The Italian case thus provides further
confirmation that the process of knowledge transfer among imperial or military elites,
whether considered across or within borders and timeframes, is “creative” and “hardly
linear.”58
This raises a chicken-and-egg question: were the links between the army’s
approach to warfare in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia the result of a distinctly colonial
mentality; or, were they more indicative of a common approach to counterinsurgency as a
technical phenomenon? Did Italian officers draw upon what Gerwath and Malinowski
have termed a “colonial archive” — a bank of common knowledge shared by Western
colonial powers on the treatment, exploitation, and extermination of subject peoples,
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applicable to different geographic areas — to inform their methods in the Balkans, or
were the similarities between Ethiopia and Yugoslavia more indicative of a strictly
military counterinsurgency archive?59
Italian generals of the interwar period discerned little difference between
counterguerrilla warfare and colonial operations. This overlap was typical of high
imperialist thinking, which assessed the level of civilization of extra-European peoples
through their ability to adopt Western political systems and military doctrine.60 The
“colonial worldview” blurred distinctions between combatants and non-combatants. As
Douglas Porch explains, “‘civilized’ standards of warfare [...] were considered
superfluous by Europeans in non-Western settings against an enemy viewed as culturally,
racially, and morally inferior.”61 Discussion of low intensity warfare among Italian
military theorists of the Fascist era solely involved the extra-European colonial context.
But even outside of that context, Italian officers deemed combatants that adopted
guerrilla tactics to be uncivilized, akin to colonial enemies. This is evident in Yugoslavia
in 1941–43, where the army’s propaganda and directives sought to undermine the
legitimacy of its opponents. But the equation of guerrilla warfare with barbarism and of
counterinsurgency with state-building and civilizing missions was deeply embedded in
the Italian military psyche, extending back to the Brigands’ War of the 1860s. As Aliza
Wong has demonstrated, perceptions of savage brigandage prompted post-Unification
political and military elites to view southern Italy “as a colony” inhabited by barbaric and
inferior peoples or races.62 As scholars of colonial genocides have found, it can be
difficult to distinguish between colonial violence inspired by politics or racism and
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military violence fuelled by the “security syndrome” that afflicts many
counterinsurgents.63
In Yugoslavia, where Second Army’s repression policies developed gradually,
Italian violence was guided by a “strategic logic,” a calculated response to guerrilla
warfare.64 The army’s military policies and decisions — and therefore, the large part of
its violence — stemmed first and foremost from its doctrine and military culture. Like
that of the German army, Italian military culture evinced a radical contempt for irregular
or popular warfare that had nineteenth-century European roots in the establishment of a
professionally officered conscript army as “school of the nation” and in the bitter
experience of the Brigands’ War, which paralleled the German experience against francstireurs in 1870–71.65 Italian military culture by no means was equivalent in every respect
to the Prussian-German model described by Isabel Hull. The Italian officer corps was far
more pessimistic and risk averse, far less reliant on lower-level initiative, and less blinded
to its own defeat or self-destruction than the German.66 But, the Italian army’s hatred of
guerrilla warfare prompted it to lash out against real or perceived resistance by targeting
civilians and giving no quarter to suspected insurgents. At the height of both
counterinsurgency campaigns in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, the Italian army sought final or
total solutions to the problem of resistance in the form of large-scale offensive military
operations and collective reprisal measures.
The singularity of the German trend towards “absolute destruction” has been
questioned elsewhere.67 Hull agrees that the Imperial German army’s “institutional
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extremism” was typical of other Western armies of the late nineteenth century, but she
argues that civilian governments and public opinion in those countries more consistently
exercised a moderating influence over military leaders.68 During the interwar period,
these moderating forces became stronger in the European empires, which struggled
against economic depression, increasingly sophisticated resistance movements, and
growing colonial weariness or anti-colonial protest among their metropolitan
populations.69 Italian Fascism was somewhat unique among interwar colonial powers in
continuing to project classic nineteenth-century notions of expansionist imperialism.70
However, these political differences did not reflect radically different military approaches
in responding to colonial resistance or insurgency. While mass killing was “mercifully
rare” in the established imperial territories of most Western colonial powers during the
interwar years, there were nonetheless episodes of military intervention accompanied by
disproportionately high death tolls.71
Elements of what would later become known as a hearts-and-minds approach to
counterinsurgency — emphasizing negotiation, compromise, political and social
concessions, and the limited or proportionate use of violence — had been widely
accepted within most Western armed forces prior to the Second World War.72 However,
during the 1920s and 1930s, all militaries displayed a propensity for extreme violence
when confronted by large-scale insurrection in border regions or recently acquired
mandates. Operations conducted by the British along India’s North-West Frontier relied
on increasingly heavy columns and frequently involved reprisals, the destruction of
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villages, and the execution of prisoners.73 British political and military leaders justified
the heavy use of aerial bombing in Iraq, Aden, and Somaliland on the basis of its
relatively low cost compared to ground warfare and its supposed humanitarian benefits,
since villagers could be warned of punitive raids beforehand by the dropping of leaflets.74
The French in Morocco and Syria and the British in Palestine crushed major insurrections
be resorting to offensive strategies conducted by sizable conventional forces. These
operations involved village destruction, summary executions, exemplary hangings,
hostage taking, population transfers, indiscriminate artillery and aerial bombardments,
and the co-option of politicized auxiliary forces to divide, isolate, and terrorize the local
populations.75 In a campaign whose brutality may well have carried over to the Spanish
Civil War, the Spanish Army of Africa used chemical weapons “in vast quantities”
against the Rif tribes of northern Morocco between 1921 and 1927.76
Whether understood as colonial warfare or as counterinsurgency doctrine, the
Italian army’s approach to asymmetrical conflict was not unique. Although its aversion to
irregular warfare may well have come close to German levels, the Regio Esercito was
hardly an exceptional institution. Its methods were not particularly innovative. Nor did
they differ greatly from those of other Western colonial powers. Italian commanders
easily overcame any taboo against applying broadly equivalent “colonial” methods to
their repression policies in Europe because they perceived similar patterns of resistance
that, according to their doctrine and military culture, permitted and necessitated harsh
responses. Racist views of the savage Balkan “other,” reinforced by their equation with
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communism, further legitimized Italian policy in Yugoslavia and bequeathed to it a
colonial character.

Italian military culture did not need special or unique characteristics in order to conform
to Fascist objectives. Nor did Italian generals, as traditional imperial elites, need to be
Fascistized to participate enthusiastically in Fascist wars of conquest characterized by
“fascist” violence. In the context of Mussolini’s pursuit of empire, the Royal Army’s
conventional approach to counterinsurgency merged quite naturally with the aims and
style of the Fascist regime. Italian generals accepted Fascism’s political and ideological
goals of aggressive expansionism and a racially constructed new order as legitimate and,
when unimpeded by legal restraints or circumstances, they actively pursued them. Their
military measures reflected Fascism’s exaltation of violence, brutality, and terror, and its
equation of national prestige with armed force. Given its development out of the First
World War and its objective of militarizing society, Fascism did not represent a
completely foreign moral universe to career army officers. Their ethos and way of
thinking coalesced with the modes of behaviour desired by the regime in conquered
territories. When Armellini, a general of unquestionable devotion to his institution,
claimed to “have served [...] as the perfect Fascist even before Fascism existed,” he was
not far off the mark.77
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Appendices
Appendix A: The Torre d'Italia
Source: ACS, FG, b. 45, fasc. 40, sf. 3.
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Appendix B: Urban planning: Gondar
Source: ACS, FG, b. 45, fasc. 41, sf. 6.
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Appendix C: La Tribuna Illustrata, 7 February 1937
Caption: “Colonel Lodolo (among the first Italians to reach the capital of Galla Sidamo)
descended upon Jimma by parachute, to prepare a landing strip. While he dropped from
the sky he saw a large mob of spear-wielding blacks running to meet him, but he had not
even touched down when the same rabble prostrated themselves to pay him homage. The
colonel quickly put the blacks to work so that after just a few days the runway was ready
and the first Italian aircraft could land there.”
Source: http://www.collezione-online.it/tribuna%20illustrata%2020%20retro.jpg
(accessed 26 August 2016)
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Appendix D: La Tradotta del Fronte Giulio, 1 November 1942, 4.
Translation: Typists. “The typist wrote by mistake: ‘Every driver must inspect the skirts
[goNNe; whereas the Italian word for tires is goMMe] and repair any tears.”
Source: Fondazione Museo storico del Trentino, Emeroteca, Trento.

618

Appendix E: La Tradotta del Fronte Giulio, 25 October 1942, 1.
Source: Fondazione Museo storico del Trentino, Emeroteca, Trento.
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Appendix F: La Tradotta del Fronte Giulio, 29 November 1942, 1.
Source: Fondazione Museo storico del Trentino, Emeroteca, Trento.
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Appendix G: La Tradotta del Fronte Giulio, 10 January 1943, 1.
Source: Biblioteca delle civiche raccolte storiche, Milan.

621

Appendix H: La Tradotta del Fronte Giulio, 29 November 1942, 4.
Translation: When the ‘colonel’ is ‘good’. “Crucca recruit: ‘Comrade colonel, I would
like to enter your corps...” The Colonel: No can do, kid; you’re not big enough…”
Source: Fondazione Museo storico del Trentino, Emeroteca, Trento.
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